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Abstract 
 
What are the ideas, institutions and actors involved in the development of competition law 
regimes in Latin America, and how do the interactions between them shape these regimes? In 
this dissertation we offer a new way of understanding the trajectories of this area of law in Latin 
America, and especially in Chile, Colombia and Chile. We argue that the competition law regimes 
of these countries are shaped by a tension between two “projects”, that is, networks of 
individuals and institutions organized towards the promotion of certain ideas about what 
competition law is about. These are the State-centered competition law project and its 
counterpart, the neoliberal competition law project. The first views the State as a tool for 
collective transformation, and hence responsible for how markets work, while the latter is about 
protecting individual freedom and enabling economic efficiency by shaping the State around 
such goals. The first Latin American regimes were similar in their State-centered outlook and 
resulted from similar field dynamics. The advance of the neoliberal competition law project in 
the 1990s (in Chile since the 1970s) placed each regime on its own path. In Chile, the 
transformation of competition law institutions exemplifies the indeterminacy within the 
neoliberal project. In Colombia, field dynamics prevented the development of neoliberal 
institutions, but enforcers have developed a de facto neoliberal practice. In Mexico competition 
law became a tool for challenging abuses of sheer economic power. More recently, international 
organizations are driving the global outreach of these regimes by promoting their convergence, 
with limited success. Overall, the argument we advance in this dissertation overcomes particular 
limitations found in the literature about this topic and offers a more nuanced understanding 
about the origins and trajectories of competition law in this region. 
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1. The Original Puzzles 
 
I. Introduction 
 
For the last three decades Latin American States have incurred considerable efforts to 
develop new competition law regimes (hereinafter CLRs) and amend previously existing ones.1 
The history of competition law in this region is very rich, although a good part of it is often 
overlooked in the relevant literature.2 The first regimes appeared as early as the 1910s, and by the 
late 1950s they were part of the policies considered necessary for preventing abuses of economic 
power, a goal consistent with economic thinking prevailing at the time. In the 1990s, however, a 
different way of understanding what competition law was about arrived to Latin America. This 
way focused more on economic efficiency and curbing the role of the State in markets and their 
functioning. Since then, these regimes have become a contested field between these differing 
views about what competition law stands for - and the actors that promote them. This 
dissertation looks at the development of the CLRs in Chile, Colombia and Mexico in order to 
show how this rivalry has shaped these regimes.  
 
 In this introductory chapter we describe what this dissertation is about and why it is 
relevant. In section II we present briefly the questions that guided our research, describe the 
main arguments that we advance, and how it unfolds in the chapters of this dissertation. Then, in 
section III we describe the data collected and how it relates to the arguments we advance and the 
theoretical framework. Finally, in section IV we conclude by discussing the contributions that 
this dissertation makes and its overall relevance for the study of competition law in Latin 
America. 
 
II. The Making of Competition Law: How the Argument Unfolds 
 
II.A. Research Questions 
 
Since their origins, CLRs in Latin America have been the result of complex processes 
involving the transplantation of foreign legal rules and theories unto Latin American contexts. 
                                                            
1 By “Latin America” we refer to all the States in Central and South America, including Mexico and Brazil, but 
not the States in the Caribbean. 
2 We discuss this issue later on in chapter 3. 
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These processes are often posed as just being about “tailoring” foreign competition law rules to 
local circumstances, but in reality they address a wide variety of issues, some of which are 
politically sensitive. Among these are the delimitation of industries and sectors exempted from 
the application of these regimes, the conformation and independence of the enforcement bodies, 
their relation to other State institutions such as courts, and their investigative and punitive 
powers. Besides these issues, the adaptation of foreign legal rules also involves drawing on 
theories about the interpretation of the rules themselves, which are often referred to by actors in 
these new contexts in order to guide their application. Hence, the histories of CLRs in Latin 
America can be framed through the lenses of contemporary discussions about legal transplants. 
 
A particularly salient topic in comparative law theory throughout the second half of the 20th 
century focused on the feasibility of transplanting legal rules to different contexts and yet 
preserving their meaning and effectiveness.3 This is a highly relevant issue for the transplantation 
of competition law rules. The question of whether legal rules could be transplanted and yet 
maintain their original meanings and effectiveness generated two different trends in the academic 
literature. A first trend gathers views that consider that legal transplants are possible and 
ubiquitous, while a second, and reactive trend, gathers views that are more skeptical. Below we 
briefly summarize these trends and the later developments that have taken place based on their 
insights.  
 
The most well known author within the optimist trend is Alan Watson, who argues that legal 
rules can be transplanted between jurisdictions in spite of the differences of context between 
them. The relative autonomy of legal rules with regard to their context does not mean that the 
latter is irrelevant; rather, that legal rules can be transplanted between contexts while maintaining 
their meaning.4 For Watson, legal transplants are not just possible; they are the most common 
form of legal change.5 For example, he points to the reception across medieval and modern 
Europe of Roman law doctrines and institutions as examples not only of legal transplants 
themselves, but also of their importance in the development of the Western legal tradition.6 The 
                                                            
3 Graziadei, Michele. "Comparative Law As the Study of Transplants and Receptions." The Oxford Handbook of 
Comparative Law. Edited by Mathias Reimann and Reinhard Zimmermann. 2006. 
4 Watson, Alan. Legal Transplants: An Approach to Comparative Law. 2nd ed. University of Georgia Press, 
1993. Pg. 96 (Herinafter Legal Transplants) 
5 Watson, Alan. "Comparative Law and Legal Change." Cambridge Law Journal (1978): 313, 318 - 321 (1978). 
6 Watson, Op.cit. Legal Transplants. Pgs. 22 – 26. 
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adoption and endurance of the French Code Civil in varied set of contexts provides some support 
to Watson’s arguments.7 
 
More recent approaches based on law and economics insights focus on the relative efficiency 
of comparable legal regimes that originate in different legal traditions. These approaches tend to 
focus on the conditions that make the transplanted rules effective across different contexts.8 An 
example of this can be found in a well-known article co-authored by Rafael La Porta about 
different types or “families” of corporate law regimes. Their argument is that such regimes 
originating in the common law tradition offer more protection to investors than regimes from 
other traditions, thus increasing the incentives for investments and the development of 
entrepreneurial activity.9 This is so because these regimes protect investors more than others, 
which in turn increases their confidence in the governance of corporations that are governed by 
these legal regimes.10 Similar arguments have been made regarding CLRs; for example, Armando 
E. Rodriguez suggests that common law CLRs fare much better than those that have been 
developed within the civil law tradition.11  
 
The second trend views with skepticism that legal rules can be relatively autonomous from 
the contexts they originate in, and so challenges the ideas that legal transplants can take place 
without substantial transformations. This skepticism dates back to Montesquieu, who asserted 
that legal rules are extremely dependent on the uniqueness of their contexts.12 Contemporary 
positions suggest that the “transferability” of legal rules depends on the degree of embeddedness 
they have with regard to their contexts. Otto Kahn-Freund, for example, argued that particular 
legal regimes are better suited for transplantation than others depending on the extent to which 
they drew from deeply embedded social structures that reflect power relationships.13 Therefore, 
according to this author, rules regarding divorce and marriage have proven to be much more 
                                                            
7 Graziadei, Op.cit. Regarding the diffusion of the Code and European private law, see See, in general, 
Merryman, John Henry, and Rogelio Pérez-Perdomo. The Civil Law Tradition: An Introduction to the Legal 
Systems of Europe and Latin America. Stanford University Press, 2007. 
8 Mattei, Ugo. "Efficiency in Legal Transplants: An Essay in Comparative Law and Economics." International 
Review of Law and Economics 14, no. 1 (1994): 3-19. 
9 La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W Vishny. "Law and Finance." The 
Journal of Political Economy 106, no. 6 (1998): 1113-1155. 
10 Ibid. Pgs. 1151 & 1152. 
11 See for example Rodríguez, A E. "Does Legal Tradition Affect Competition Policy Performance?" The 
International Trade Journal 21, no. 4 (2007): 417-454. 
12 Montesquieu, Charles. The Spirit of Laws. Translated by Thomas Nugent. Batoche Books, (1748) 2001. Pgs. 
22 - 23. 
13 Kahn-Freund, Otto. "On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law." The Modern Law Review 37, no. 1 (1974): 
1-27. Pg. 13. 
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easy to transfer across jurisdictions than rules that allocate political power and policy-making 
prerogatives along society.14  
 
More skeptic positions suggest that the pervasiveness of legal transplantation do not 
necessarily improve legal regimes, and result from distinctively political efforts to accommodate 
legal rules to particularly influential interests. For example, Pierre Legrand criticizes Watson by 
arguing that legal rules are so context-dependent that the concept of legal transplants is 
particularly misguided.15 “At best, what can be displaced (…) is, literally, a meaningless form of 
words. To claim more is to claim too much. In any meaning-ful sense of the term, 'legal 
transplants', therefore, cannot happen.”16 Rather, what is at stake with legal transplants is the 
displacement of the values embedded in legal rules, not simply the adoption of new formal 
commands.17 The literature based on law and economics arguments has also produces skeptic 
accounts of the feasibility of legal transplants. For example, Daniel Berkowitz and his co-authors 
argue that contexts - and the social dynamics that are part of them - play a highly determinant 
role in the success of the transplanted rules than their origins.18 That is, independently of 
whether a set of rules comes from a common law or civil law tradition, what determines their 
effectiveness is their compatibility with the “borrowing” jurisdiction.19   
 
The body of literature addressing the transplantation of CLRs echoes to a large extent the 
two trends mentioned above.20 It is important to note that this particular body of literature is 
closely related with “law and development” projects undertaken by both national governments 
and international institutions. A first strand argues that developing countries should transplant 
CLRs identified as efficient. In doing so, this particular strand relies considerably on law and 
economics insights and on doctrines developed mostly in the United States (hereinafter US). It is 
                                                            
14 Ibid. Pgs. 13 – 19. 
15 Legrand, Pierre. “The Impossibility of Legal Transplants" Maastricht J. Eur. & Comp. L. 4 (1997): 111 - 127. 
16 Ibid Pg. 120. (emphasis in the original text) 
17 Ibid. Pgs. 121 – 123. 
18 Berkowitz, Daniel, Katharina Pistor, and Jean-Francois Richard. "The Transplant Effect." The American 
Journal of Comparative Law (2003): 163-203. (Hereinafter Transplant Effect.) Also Berkowitz, Daniel, 
Katharina Pistor, and Jean-Francois Richard. "Economic Development, Legality, and the Transplant Effect." 
European Economic Review 47, no. 1 (2003): 165-195. (Hereinafter Economic Development.) 
19 Berkowits, Transplant Effect Ibid. Pg. 189 
20 Gerber, David J. "Comparative Antitrust Law." In The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law. Edited by 
Mathias Reinmann and Reinhard Zimmerman. Oxford University Press, 2006. 
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not uncommon to find casual comparisons between the CLRs of developing States and their US 
counterparts to see how well they measure up.21  
 
In turn, the second trend of this body literature is skeptic of the possibility of transplanting 
CLRs across jurisdictions as a strategy for contributing to development. In this sense, it is 
reactive to the body of literature mentioned just before. Drawing in part from the preceding 
discussion in comparative law theory, it is composed of a diverse literature that suggest that 
regimes like US competition law are so embedded in their contexts that it is virtually impossible 
to transplant them.22 Also, it includes arguments that show that US competition law is not the 
only competition law regime that is efficient, for EU competition law has efficient (but different) 
rules as well.23 This body of literature also includes works that focus on the development of 
competition law regimes in the EU and in Asian countries by showing how competition law 
regimes resulted from reformist agendas and political struggles between social groups in 
particular contexts.24  
 
Since the early 2000s there has been a partial consensus in the making regarding the 
feasibility of legal transplants in general and of transplanting CLRs in particular. This consensus 
acknowledges that legal transplants are widespread and can be successful, and that contextual 
dynamics are key in their success or failure independently of their origins or prestige. Thus, legal 
transplants should be about more than simply redrafting rules as they appear in the books; they 
should also involve different actions to assure their effective enforcement through time.25 
Regarding CLRs, the new consensus continues to adhere to its law and economics origins while 
conceding the importance of “tailoring” foreign rules and doctrines to particular contexts. In 
particular, this more recent trend argues that there are no “one-size fits all” approaches to the 
design of CLRs, and that core law and economics insights can be translated unto different 
                                                            
21 See for example Coate, Malcolm B, Rene Bustamante, and A E Rodriguez. "Antitrust in Latin America: 
Regulating Government and Business." The University of Miami Inter-American Law Review (1992): 37-85. 
Also Rodriguez, Op.cit. 
22 Waller, Spencer Weber. "Neo-Realism and the International Harmonization of Law: Lessons From Antitrust." 
U. Kan. L. Rev. 42 (1993): 557 - 604. 
23 See, for example, Fox, Eleanor M. "We Protect Competition, You Protect Competitors." World Competition 
26, no. 2 (2003): 149-165. Also Fox, Eleanor M. "Monopolization, Abuse of Dominance, and the Indeterminacy 
of Economics: The US/EU Divide." Utah L. Rev. 3 (2006): 725-913. 
24 In particular, Gerber, David J. Law and Competition in Twentieth Century Europe: Protecting Prometheus. 
Oxford University Press, 1998. See also Freyer, Tony A. Antitrust and Global Capitalism, 1930--2004. 
Cambridge University Press, 2006. 
25 Perhaps the best statement of this new, albeit hesitant consensus, is Davis, Kevin E, and Michael J Trebilcock. 
"The Relationship Between Law and Development: Optimists Versus Skeptics." Am. J. Comp. L. 56 (2008): 
895-1095. Also Twining, William. "Diffusion of Law: A Global Perspective." The Journal of Legal Pluralism 
and Unofficial Law 36, no. 49 (2004): 1-45. 
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institutional forms26 However, that is as far as these consensus go. The focus on implementation 
has rekindled interest in the political nature of legal transplants undergone by States, as they 
displace local political dynamics and values, usually under the guise of technical assistance.27 
Regarding CLRs in particular, this new trend says preciously little about how to  “navigate” 
through the different social dynamics that characterize each context in which new rules are being 
transplanted in order to ensure their effectiveness.  
 
The focus on the local conditions that determine the eventual success of a legal transplant 
tends to highlight the social relations between actors involved in the craft and application of legal 
rules. In the case of CLRs, this focus leads to analyzing the role that different actors play in the 
development of such regimes within and across jurisdictions. The literature that addresses these 
issues is not particularly broad,28 and either it focuses on the CLRs of other jurisdictions,29 or 
focuses on Latin America but does not address competition law directly.30 Hence, we identify a 
gap in the literature regarding the particular ways in which legal transplants involving 
competition law have been shaped by the different actors involved in the making and application 
of CLRs in Latin America.  
 
Against this background, the general enquiry that guided our research is about the 
interactions between contextual dynamics and the transplantation of foreign rules and theories 
about competition law in Latin America. In particular, what are the ideas, institutions and actors 
involved in the development of CLRs in Latin America, and how do the interactions between 
them shape their trajectories? This general question can be broken down into more concrete 
questions, like the following: Who are the individuals and the organizations involved in the 
adoption and the transformation of these regimes? What are their agendas, and how were they 
connected to broad changes in law and economic policy? How are these agendas, and the ideas 
                                                            
26 See for example Kovacic, William E. "Institutional Foundations for Economic Legal Reform Transition 
Economies: The Case of Competition Policy and Antitrust Enforcement." Chicago-Kent Law Review 77, no. 
265 (2001): 265-315. Also Gal, Michal. "Antitrust in a Globalized Economy: The Unique Challenges of Small 
and of Developed Economies." Fordham International Law Journal 33 (2009): 1-56. 
27 Kennedy, Duncan. "Three Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought: 1850 - 2000." In The New Law and 
Economic Development: A Critical Appraisal. Edited by David M Trubek and Alvaro Santos. Cambridge 
University Press, 2006. 
28 See for example Gal, Michal. "Reality Bites (or Bits): The Political Economy of Antitrust Enforcement." New 
York University Law and Economics Working Papers No. 57 (2006). 
29 See Dezalay, Yves. "Technological Warfare: The Battle to Control the Mergers and Acquisitions Market in 
Europe." In Professional Competition and Professional Power: Lawyers, Accountants and the Social 
Construction of Markets. Edited by Yves Dezalay and David Sugarman. Routledge, 1995.  
30 Dezalay, Yves, and Bryant G Garth. The Internationalization of Palace Wars: Lawyers, Economists, and the 
Contest to Transform Latin American States. University of Chicago Press, 2002. 
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and institutions they support, related to the substantive content of these CLRs and their 
interpretation?  
 
II.B. What this Dissertation is About: The Main Arguments 
 
 In this dissertation we argue that the development of CLRs in Latin America, and especially 
in Chile, Colombia and Mexico, has been shaped by the tension between two different 
“projects”, that is, sets of ideas, theories and beliefs that make the understandings of the actors 
populating a particular field regarding what competition law is about and how it should be 
practiced.31 These are the State-centered competition law project and its counterpart, the 
neoliberal competition law project.  
 
 The main difference between these two projects resides in their approaches to markets as 
institutional arrangements for organizing social life. In a nutshell, the State-centered competition 
law project views markets as institutional arrangements that result from and should be subject to 
the regular functioning of democratic politics. This view not only holds that markets are 
constructed (as opposed to considering them a form of natural ordering), but also that the State, 
viewed as the institutional embodiment of the mechanisms for collective governance, is 
responsible for the outcomes resulting from the operation of markets. The intellectual origins of 
this project are varied, and they range from Rousseau’s “Discourse on the Origins of 
Inequality”32 to John M. Keynes’ “The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money”33 
and Raul Prebisch’s “The Economic Development of Latin America and Its Principal 
Problems.”34 The different ideas that make up this project informed the first CLRs adopted in 
Latin America, which were viewed as legal mechanisms for controlling the economic power of 
big businesses and as part of the policies established to bring about economic development. This 
project was dominant for most part of the second half of the 20th century, and especially between 
the 1950s and the 1980s; moreover, some of its institutional forms and rationales continue to be 
highly important in the present.  
 
                                                            
31 We further describe this term and the concept of field in chapter 2. 
32 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. Discourse on the Origin of Inequality. Edited by Franklin Philip and Patrick 
Coleman. Oxford University Press, 1999. 
33 Keynes, John Maynard. The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money. Atlantic Publishers & Dist, 
2006. (Reprint) 
34 Prebisch, Raúl. "The Economic Development of Latin America and Its Principal Problems." CEPAL 1950. 
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In turn, the neoliberal competition law project originated from a profound skepticism 
towards the State as an embodiment of collective governance and its capacity to direct economic 
processes effectively. This skepticism is partly based on the idea that the economic rationale that 
characterizes markets is the best parameter for assessing the adequacy of the State. In doing so, 
this project views the State as a visible, supporting hand whose functions are conceived upon 
and assessed from the viewpoint of economic rationales. In this sense, democratic political 
processes have a limit as to their capacity to address markets and their outcomes. The intellectual 
roots of this project date back to the middle of the 20th century, and include texts such as 
Friedrich von Hayek’s “The Road to Serfdom”,35 Milton Friedman’s “The Role of Monetary 
Policy”36 and George Stigler’s “The Theory of Economic Regulation”.37 The ideas that make up 
this project have been used in Latin America mostly in a reactive manner to the State-centered 
project since the 1980s and were expressed in policy prescriptions like the so-called “Washington 
Consensus”38 and the wave of reforms that followed. These considerations, which we refer to as 
neoliberal, influenced in important ways the development of CLRs in this region. They provided 
the intellectual grounds to criticize the existing regimes, characterizing them as ineffective and 
inefficient, and for building new ones based on a new economic rationale. The new regimes were 
also considered part of the policies that were necessary to bring about economic development, 
albeit under the new guise of increasing efficiency and growth. This project has become 
dominant since the 1990s, although it too has undergone transformations of its own: in 
particular,  we will refer to the growing importance of neoinstitutional insights about the role 
that institutions have in the success or failure of enforcement of the CLRs.  
 
We also argue that the development of the tensions between these two projects unfolds 
historically against the local political dynamics taking place in each of the countries we study - 
Chile, Colombia and Mexico - mostly during the second half of the 20th century and the first 
decade and a half of the 21st. The first CLRs in these countries appeared after the constitutional 
protection extended to property rights had been softened and the bureaucratic apparatus of the 
State had extended and consolidated politically. It is not surprising that these regimes were 
administrative in nature and bound to the executive branch of the State. The advance of the 
                                                            
35 Von Hayek, Friedrich. The Road to Serfdom. University of Chicago Press, 1944. 
36 Friedman, Milton. "The Role of Monetary Policy." 58 The American Economic Review , no. 1 (1968): 1- 17. 
37 Stigler, George J. "The Theory of Economic Regulation." The Bell journal of economics and management 
science (1971): 3-21 
38 The Washington Consensus is the name given to the policies that were advised by international financial 
institutions, often under conditional terms, to developing countries in order to improve their economies. See 
Williamson, John. "What Washington Means by Policy Reform." Latin American Adjustment: How Much Has 
Happened? Edited by John Williamson. Institute for International Economics, 1990. 
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neoliberal competition law project began, at least intellectually, with a challenge to the 
established regimes, and then took on to establish new CLRs based on the ideas that nurture it. 
Since then, its advance has been steady but not without problems. In some instances like Chile 
during the early 2000s, the adoption of institutions inspired in neoliberal ideas created severe 
malfunctions that diminished drastically the effectiveness of the regimes for almost a decade.39 
More recent efforts geared towards achieving convergence between CLRs have not been entirely 
successful, as evidenced by the development of Colombia’s leniency regime.40 Overall, as the 
tensions between these projects unfold, we evidence the pre-eminence of the neoliberal project 
in these three countries, although the project has been resilient in some circumstances.41 
 
II.C. How the Argument Unfolds - Chapter Plan. 
 
In this sub-section we unfold the main argument advanced above by providing a brief 
summary of the different chapters that are part of this dissertation. The narrative arch that binds 
all the chapters together is precisely the argument advanced above, according to which the 
tensions between (and sometimes within) the State-centered competition law project and its 
neoliberal counterpart unfolds historically in the development of the CLRs in each of the 
countries that we study. This binding takes place in different ways. Chapters 4, 8 and 9 address a 
few common features of the CLRs of the different countries we study, while chapters 5, 6 and 7 
focus individually on particular manifestations of how these tensions unfold in each of these 
countries. In doing so, we aim to provide a view that is both general and particular in order to 
develop more clearly the arguments as presented above.  
 
Our analysis begins with chapter 2, in which we present the theoretical framework we use for 
analyzing and presenting the data we gathered during our research. (In the following subsection 
we describe the data in detail.) This framework combines two different strands of enquiry. On 
one hand, it draws from the history of political and economic ideas in order to frame the 
substantive content of the CLRs. This first strand is about the origins and evolution of the core 
ideas inspiring each of the projects we identify - the State-centered competition law project and 
its neoliberal counterpart. On the other, it draws from “field theory”, a particular theoretical 
frame of analysis common to several disciplines in the social sciences including sociology, 
political economy, and institutionalism. We also describe the concept of “project”, and use it as a 
                                                            
39 See chapter 5. 
40 See chapter 8. 
41 See chapter 5. 
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hinge that connects both strands; building upon the concepts developed by Pierre Bourdieu,42 we 
argue that a project can be understood as “doxa in the making”, and fill the two projects with the 
ideas that we have found to inform the craft and application of CLRs in Latin America. Overall, 
this chapter provides the main ideas and considerations that inform the following chapters of 
this dissertation.  
 
Chapter 3 presents a literature review of the different texts concerning the development of 
competition law in Latin America as a region as well as a local phenomenon in Chile, Colombia 
and Mexico. This chapter is premised on the idea that these bodies of literature are part of the 
fields of our enquiries just as the legal provisions or administrative decisions issued by 
enforcement bodies. We begin by locating this body of literature as part of other, more general 
bodies of literature with which it has close ties, and then we address different texts on 
competition law in Latin America. We do this at two levels; we first address the texts addressing 
the trajectory of CLRs regionally, and then we focus on the texts addressing the trajectory of the 
CLRs of each of the countries we study. Our main finding is that the advance of the neoliberal 
competition law project in the 1990s led to a re-characterization of the CLRs that were in place 
at that time by disregarding both their functioning as well as the literature that describes it. In 
doing so, the literature that is part of the neoliberal project began to develop the myth that the 
CLRs in place at the time were misguided and had hardly been enforced. At the local level, we 
trace how local authors used neoliberal ideas to defend the legal reforms of the 1990s (and with 
which they had varying degrees of involvement). Overall, this chapter challenges the neoliberal 
views that have become prevalent about the trajectories of CLRs in this region and sets the stage 
for the arguments presented in the following chapters.  
 
Chapter 4 addresses the adoption and enforcement of the first CLRs regimes in Chile, 
Colombia and Mexico. In this chapter we argue that the adoption of the original regimes 
followed from ideas related with granting the State more tools to address economic issues. 
Underlying this process were changes in constitutional politics resulting from the pressures 
exerted by new radical ideas, industrialization and the consolidation of urban labor in this region. 
Mexico was the first of the three countries here studied in which these changes took place, as 
evidenced with the promulgation of the 1917 Constitution, the first of its kind establishing a 
developmental approach to competition law. In Chile and Colombia the changes involving 
                                                            
42 In particular, Wacquant, Loic J.D. "Towards a Reflexive Sociology: A Workshop with Pierre Bourdieu." 
Sociological Theory 7, no. 1 (1989): 26-63. (Hereinafter Reflexive Sociology). Other texts in which Bourdieu 
develops these concepts are The Logic of Practice. Stanford University Press, 1990. 
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constitutional politics took a different path; after amendments to the constitutional protection 
afforded to private property, the States expanded their regulatory capacity. The first CLRs 
followed from these changes, as they complemented price-control regulations and other 
economic policies that granted to the State a considerable control over the economy. Overall, the 
analyses presented in this chapter present a new way of understanding the evolution of these 
regimes and invite discussing critically the shortcomings noted before in the relevant literature.  
 
In chapters 5, 6 and 7 we focus on the development of the CLRs of Chile, Colombia and 
Mexico since the 1990s until mid 2015. Rather than addressing the different areas of law and 
focusing solely on all their content, we focus on particular developments of the regimes that 
highlight the conflicts between and within the two projects mentioned before. While focusing on 
these aspects implied not focusing on others, we stand by our choices because we believe they 
are the most significant given the data available and the history of the regimes themselves. (We 
discuss below our criteria for these choices). 
 
In chapter 5 we argue that the development of Chile’s CLR since the 1990s can be 
characterized as being about the development and transformation of the tensions resulting from 
rival versions of the neoliberal competition law project. Contrary to Colombia and Mexico, by 
the 1990s neoliberalism was well entrenched in the Chilean legal and political context. However, 
the ideas that were entrenched were part of an older neoliberal project that emphasized 
individual autonomy more than economic efficiency. As a consequence of the increasing 
importance of economic rationales in neoliberal discourse that took place during the 1990s, this 
older project was challenged and became subdued by a more recent neoliberal project. The 
grounds in which this contest between rival neoliberal projects took place were firstly the design 
of the enforcement bodies, and later on, the enforcement of the provisions concerning collusion 
and the amendments to the regime conceived to make it more effective. Even though the latter 
neoliberal project prevailed, in the process of doing so it faced considerable challenges and the 
actors supporting it met with unforeseen circumstances that threatened the achievement of their 
goals. Overall, the changes taking place in Chile’s CLR evidences the internal tensions that can 
take place within a project.   
 
In chapter 6 we address the tension between the two rival projects mentioned before as it 
unravels in the transformation of Colombia’s CLR since 1990. The story of this regime can be 
characterized as the institutional unraveling of a tension between State-centered institutions and 
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their neoliberal enforcement practice. The origins of the tension dates back to the 1991 
Constitution, which established an explicit mandate for protecting competition that was not 
developed significantly by the government of Cesar Gaviria (1990 - 1994) because of the political 
consequences that might follow. As result, Colombia’s CLR continued well into the 1990s with 
an institutional setup clearly fashioned after the State-centered project that inspired the 
appearance of this regime in the 1950s. However, within this institutional setting, several 
directors of the enforcement body, the Superintendencia de Industria y Comercio (hereinafter SIC), 
developed an increasingly activist agenda during the 2000s that targeted business associations. 
This agenda paid off, for in 2009 a new statute made SIC the sole enforcer of the different 
competition law provisions that were dispersed throughout Colombia’s legal system and granted 
it more powers via new enforcement tools and higher sanctions. However, once SIC decided to 
use its new powers, it faced a backlash from a new government and the business sector - the 
main supporters of SIC’s State-centered nature. Also SIC’s reliability as an unbiased enforcer has 
been questioned by its mismanagement of sensitive information obtained during leniency 
applications. Although a new competition law is in the making, it is unclear whether it will bring 
about a drastic change to the institutional setup of SIC that brings it closer to its neoliberal 
practice. 
 
In a similar vein to the previous two chapters, Chapter 7 looks at the development of 
Mexico’s CLR since the 1990s. We show how two neoliberal policies - the privatization of a 
State-owned enterprise and the modernization of this country’s CLR - led to conflicting 
outcomes. This chapter not only highlights a tension within neoliberal law reform projects in 
general, it also shows how a neoliberal initiative can turn into State-centered development 
precisely because of how this tension unfolds in a given context. It does so by focusing on the 
complex interactions between Telmex, a former State-owned telecoms company, and the 
competition law enforcement agency, the Comisión Federal de Competencia (hereinafter CFC). The 
privatization of Telmex was one of the most commented issues of the administration of Carlos 
Salinas de Gortari (1988 - 1994), and a new competition law statute, the Ley Federal de 
Competencia Económica, enacted in 1992, followed it. The sequence of these events and the 
content of the new statute prevented the CFC from addressing the behaviors undergone by this 
company; however, such involvement began to take place since the late 1990s. As Telmex used its 
resources to delay the actual application of the sanctions imposed against it, affected parties 
sought protection under the international trade regulations, and the CFC sought more 
enforcement tools from the legislative. Even though each of these parties was successful 
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internationally and locally, the struggle to reign over Telmex ’s dominance has continued, to the 
extent that it became one of the leading issues in the 2012 elections and in the constitutional and 
statutory amendments promoted by the current government of Enrique Peña Nieto (2012 - 
2018). Overall, this aspect of the history of Mexico’s CLR shows that a regime clearly inspired by 
neoliberal insights could be turned around and converted into a contemporary example of State-
centered competition law enforcement. 
 
In chapter 8 we address the roles that international organizations, such as the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (hereinafter OECD), the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (hereinafter UNCTAD) and the International 
Competition Network (hereinafter ICN) have in the development of CLRs in Latin America. In 
the absence of a global CLR, these organizations have assumed the role of promoting the 
convergence of individual CLRs across the world. Their efforts revolve around combinations of 
ideas and institutional blueprints based on the CLRs of the United States and the European 
Union (hereinafter EU). In the particular case of Latin America, these organizations have been 
particularly active since the 2000s, carrying forth programs that have contributed to shape the 
CLRs of this region, and in particular those of Chile, Colombia and Mexico. In doing so, their 
efforts to shape these regimes have laid bare their strategies involving collaborations and 
rivalries. These strategies have been partially successful, as evidenced by the disparate outcomes 
produced by the transplantation of leniency regimes in Chile, Colombia and Mexico. Also, the 
activities of these organizations contributed to the consolidation of a field constructed around 
technical assistance programs for States.  
 
Finally, in chapter 9 we present the conclusions of this dissertation. Using the analyses of the 
previous chapters, it offers an alternative account of the trajectory of the CLRs in Latin America 
by resorting to the experiences in Chile, Colombia and Mexico. We do so as a conclusion 
precisely because it is an opportunity to offer a more general view of the argument we advance 
and to emphasize our claim that these regimes are not converging but are developing along 
particular trajectories of their own. If anything, there continues to be a considerable diversity 
among CLRs. We also address the relevance and contributions of this dissertation, the 
limitations of our research, and suggest further venues of enquiry. 
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III. Data Gathering and Analysis 
 
In this subsection we will address the data we have gathered and describe how our analysis 
fits with the arguments and the chapter plan presented above. We begin by discussing the time 
periods we focus on and the selection of Chile, Colombia and Mexico (and their CLRs) as 
subjects of our enquiries. Then we describe the data itself and how it relates to the arguments we 
advance.  
 
III.A. Periodization  
 
 Coming up with the particular contours of the different projects and how they develop in 
Latin America requires making choices about the scope of the research and the data collected. In 
order to simplify our analyses, we focus on two different periods of time - from the 1950s to the 
1990s and from the 1990s to 2015, and in three jurisdictions - Chile, Colombia and Mexico. The 
main reason for organizing our analyses in these two periods follows from the data itself. As we 
discuss in chapters 3 through 8, an important change associated with the advent of the neoliberal 
competition law project took place in the 1990s. The literature about CLRs in this region, as well 
as the political and legal changes that were taking place at the time, all provide support of the 
occurrence of this change. We believe this periodization focuses on the different field dynamics 
that led to the happening of this change and the consolidation of the different institutions and 
ideas associated with it. Moreover, we focus considerably more on the developments that have 
taken place since the 1990s precisely to account for the particular dynamics and developments 
that have shaped these regimes until their present form.  
 
III.B. Why Chile, Colombia and Mexico? 
 
Our decision to focus on Chile, Colombia and Mexico results from a variety of reasons. The 
first reason concerns the relative influence that certain aspects of the legal systems of these 
countries have along their Latin American peers. The second reason concerns the different paths 
that the CLRs in each of these countries have taken, and which show the diversity of CLRs in 
this region. Finally, the third reason has to do with the availability of data regarding the 
development of these regimes. 
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Firstly, these countries are considered to be quite influential among Latin American countries 
in terms of the production and circulation of law. The reasons for using “influence” to establish 
a sample of countries to research about are mostly historical. Chile acquired a reputation for the 
study of private law, and especially of the Code Civil, thanks to the diffusion across Latin America 
of the Chilean version of the Code drafted by Andrés Bello and enacted in 1855.43 Regarding 
competition law, the institutional blueprint of Chile’s enforcement system in place since 2003 has 
become a sort of a regional model around which regional convergence can be achieved. Mexico, 
in turn, is particularly well known in this region for its constitutional law. The 1917 Mexican 
constitution was the first to establish the “social function of property”, to establish social and 
economic rights along first-generation rights, and to establish a judicial mechanism for their 
protection - the acción de amparo. All of these aspects have been the subject of numerous legal 
transplants across Latin America.44 This constitution is also the first to establish an explicit 
prohibition against anticompetitive practices and to establish a mandate for the State to protect 
competition. Finally, Colombia is perhaps the least influential of these three countries, although 
in the past three decades the jurisprudence produced by the Constitutional Court regarding social 
and economic rights has become well known globally.45 While Colombia continues to be at the 
receiving end of the global networks involving the circulation of institutional blueprints and 
theories concerning competition, it is starting to become influential among its close neighbors. 
Evidence of this can be found in the technical assistance program that SIC developed with 
Ecuador.46 Finally, it is worth mentioning that Brazil is also considered a highly important 
country on both issues of constitutional law and competition law; however, because of language 
barriers it has not been as influential as Chile or Mexico have been, although this may change in 
the near future. 
 
A second reason behind our choice of these three countries has to do with their similarities 
and differences regarding their legal systems. This reason complements the previous one, for it 
highlights the diversity of our sample. To begin with, these three countries share colonial 
traditions resulting from their common institutional and cultural heritage as former Spanish 
colonies. Even after their independence, these three countries adopted civil law institutions 
                                                            
43 García Villegas, Mauricio. "Apuntes Sobre Codificación Y Costumbre En La Historia Del Derecho 
Colombiano." Precedente - Anuario Jurídico (2003): 97 - 124. Pgs. 113 - 114. 
44 See for example Mac Gregor, Eduardo Ferrer. "El Amparo Iberoamericano." Estudios constitucionales: 
Revista del Centro de Estudios Constitucionales 4, no. 2 (2006): 39-65. 
45 Rodríguez-Garavito, Cesar. "Latin American Constitutionalism: Social and Economic Rights: Beyond the 
Courtroom: The Impact of Judicial Activism on Socioeconomic Rights in Latin America." Tex. L. Rev. 89 
(2011): 1669-1977. 
46 "Superindustria Asesora a Ecuatorianos En Protección Al Consumidor." Elespectador.com, 1 February 2010. 
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fashioned after European private law like the Code Civil, mentioned before. This influence 
extended well unto the reception of anti-formalist legal writers like Leon Duguit and continues 
to be felt today.47 However, during the 20th century the local political dynamics taking place in 
each of these countries led to different constitutional law regimes that, albeit their similarities, 
established unique institutional trajectories. Hence, the intellectual roots of the Chilean 
Constitution of 1980 are quite different from those of the Mexican 1917 Constitution or those 
of the Colombian 1991 Constitution. Even aspects that could be considered similar - for 
example the constitutional mandate to protect competition established in article 28 of the 
Mexican Constitution and in article 333 of the 1991 Colombian Constitution - have played very 
different roles in the development of the CLRs of these two countries. Just as well, the absence 
of such constitutional mandate has not prevented the development of an effective CLR in Chile. 
Overall, the fact that the tension between the State-centered competition law project and its 
neoliberal counterpart unfolded differently in each of these countries suggests that focusing on 
each one of them could be particularly revealing. 
 
Finally, our third reason has to do with the availability of data that could be useful for 
answering our research questions. This reason also proved to be very important for justifying our 
sample. The delimitation of the different fields related to competition law requires amassing and 
analyzing a considerable amount of data. It requires having access to the decisions issued by 
enforcement bodies and courts, academic texts, and newspaper articles or other sources of 
information that reveal the impact of decisions, changes in the applicable provisions, and 
investigations. We focused on three countries where all these materials were relatively abundant. 
There are a few Latin American States that have created online databases with the decisions 
issued by their competition law enforcers. The databases developed in Brazil, Chile and Mexico 
are among the most complete, but because of language barriers we dropped Brazil from our 
analysis. The database developed by Colombia’s competition law enforcer, SIC, lacks many 
important decisions issued during the 1990s but has most of the decisions issued since the year 
2000. Other countries that could have been of interest, like Venezuela, do not have databases as 
reliable as the ones from these other countries. Just as well, competition law issues have reached 
the national media on several occasions in each of the countries we selected, which hinted that 
the enforcement of these regimes was a politically contested subject that merited further 
attention. This, unfortunately, has not been the case of other countries we considered initially. 
                                                            
47 García Villegas, Op.cit. 
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While this in itself is an interesting aspect of the CLRs in those countries, we decided instead to 
focus on those countries where the availability of data enabled us to ground better our analyses. 
 
As we analyzed the data we also started to notice that there were some field dynamics that 
were more interesting than others. For example, when considering the dynamics shaping 
Colombia’s CLR, it became evident that to focus on the trajectory of abuse of dominance law 
would have been considerably less interesting than focusing on the area of cartels or mergers. 
One of the reasons for this is that there are considerably few decisions regarding abuse of 
dominance with regard to the number of decisions issued on other areas. Moreover, such 
decisions had less coverage in the national media and there are very few academic articles written 
about them. Also, issues of abuse of dominance did not figurate prominently in the 
congressional record of the amendments to Colombia’s CLR. Business associations, moreover, 
have not complained about the enforcement of these provisions as they have regarding 
provisions from the other areas jut mentioned. While these reasons suggest a state of affairs that 
deserves analysis on its own, we decided instead to focus on areas where the interactions 
between different actors are well documented and available for third parties interested in this 
research. This is why we focus on the development of enforcement bodies and their activities 
regarding horizontal agreements (Chile and Colombia) and abuse of dominance in the telecoms 
sector (Mexico). 
 
III.C. Type of Data 
 
In order to support our arguments, we have gathered different types of data. A first type of 
data is what we can consider “strictly” legal, and is made up of official decisions issued by the 
competition law enforcement bodies, judicial decisions issued by courts, statutes issued by 
legislative bodies, decrees issued by ministers or presidents, and constitutions issued by the 
respective assemblies. When we relied on databases provided by the enforcement authorities, our 
searches were guided either by the type of conduct (for example “acuerdos colusorios”) or by the 
parties involved (for example “Telmex”.) We also rely on congressional records especially for the 
debates surrounding the amendments to the CLRs in each of these countries. In some cases, 
gathering different bits of this type of data has required archival research. For example, some of 
the decisions issued before the 1990s in Colombia were not readily available online or in the 
libraries of Colombian universities but were available in print in the national archives. 
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A second type of data is made of the academic literature on CLRs in Latin America and 
written by local and foreign authors. This literature includes for the most part articles and book 
chapters, although a few key texts are books, such as Ignacio de León’s seminal books on these 
issues. We have gathered literature addressing the development of CLRs at regional and national 
levels, and in particular we have gathered the most relevant texts addressing the dynamics we 
discuss in chapters 5 through 7. We have also focused on texts authored by individuals that 
belong to enforcement bodies, international organizations or that are specialized litigants in these 
regimes, because we consider that their particular roles provide them with useful insights related 
with the different projects in question. 
 
Finally, a third type of data is made of media reports and articles taken from newspapers, 
magazines and online news portals from each of the countries we study. For example, we rely on 
newspaper clips from El Mercurio and La Tercera regarding Chile and from El Tiempo and Revista 
Semana regarding Colombia. We sought articles online that addressed three particular topics: i) 
political discussions surrounding the enactment of or the amendments to established CLRs, ii) 
final decisions issued by the enforcement bodies punishing or absolving parties for their 
engagement in anticompetitive practices, and iii) interviews (in print or in video) or journalistic 
profiles that provide background information about the perspectives of the leading officials 
directing these bodies.  
 
III.D. Data Analyses 
 
Our analysis of the different data involved a gradual process of developing a sense of the 
particular developments in the CLRs of Chile, Colombia and Mexico from the perspective of the 
framework and the arguments we advance. We focused especially on analyzing all the data in a 
way that i) made sense as a whole - from the ideas that make up the projects to the particular 
newspaper articles commenting the reaction to a particular decision - and that ii) left as few 
issues unanswered as possible. The process was reiterative, as it involved looking at the data 
several times, and usually after taking steps to narrow our focus of enquiry. 
 
We began by reading academic texts about the political history of Chile, Colombia and 
Mexico since. Particular texts, like Edwin Williamson’s “The Penguin History of Latin 
America”,48 were particularly useful for relating political dynamics with changes at the level of 
                                                            
48 Williamson, Edwin. The Penguin History of Latin America. Penguin UK, 2003. 
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constitutions and the general regulatory apparatus of the State. Other academic texts, especially 
those mentioned in the literature review, were highly useful to locate the debates about 
competition law against the general landscape of the mayor changes that had taken place in this 
region.  
 
Against the background provided by these texts, we searched for the legal materials, 
especially those related with the decisions issued by the different competition law enforcement 
authorities we engage with in chapters 5, 6 and 7. We focused on the statutes and the changes 
that particular issues had received over time - for example, the conformation of the enforcement 
bodies, the goals of the CLRs, among others. Once we gathered all the relevant legal materials 
for the three countries, we compared and contrasted the content of these materials with the 
academic texts regarding competition law as well as the more general texts about political 
changes in Latin America. In doing so, we wanted to evidence how the authors of these texts 
acknowledge and characterize the legal development of these regimes. 
 
Once we had a general sense of the CLRs and their trajectories, we made choices as to which 
developments were of particular interest for our purposes. In some cases, for example Mexico, 
this decision was rather easy because of all the attention that Telmex and the CFC have received 
in the last two decades. In other cases, the choice was more difficult because there were several 
developments that could be used to develop our arguments. Regarding Chile, we considered it 
would be interesting to focus on collusion decisions because it would highlight the institutional 
mismatch resulting from the creation of the Tribunal de Defensa de la Libre Competencia in 2003 and 
its aftermath. As for Colombia, we focused on collusion decisions as well because they 
highlighted the tension between SIC and business associations. By then we already had a sense of 
how the different CLRs were fields in which the tension between the different projects unfolded, 
but we still had to collect data that showed the social relevance of the political discussions 
surrounding the enactment or amendment of the regimes and the decisions issued. In order to 
so, we resort to media articles and interviews that confirmed or rejected our reading of the 
events under analysis or that contributed to enrich it.  
 
The result of this is a text that draws on media reports and articles of different sorts to 
illustrate the dynamics taking place within the establishment of CLRs as fields characterized by 
the tension between the State-centered competition law project and its neoliberal counterpart. 
While our focus is on legal materials - to the extent that we use them to challenge unfounded 
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empiric assumptions present in the relevant literature - we aim to highlight their social 
importance as much as possible, and to ground our claims in different data that we believe 
provides them with support. The outcome is a dissertation that highlights the social relevance of 
the tension between different projects and that grounds legal and theoretical issues on concrete 
and particular manifestations of social activity. 
 
IV. Contributions and Relevance 
 
In the previous sections we presented the main argument that we advance in this 
dissertation, the research questions that led to it and how it unfolds in the different chapters that 
follow. We also described briefly the data collected and analyzed. In this final section we would 
like to address the contributions of this dissertation and its relevance. 
 
The most important contribution we make in this dissertation is to offer a different way of 
understanding the origins and trajectories of CLRs, as illustrated with our analyses of the 
Chilean, Colombian and Mexican regimes. We challenge the prevailing view of competition law 
in Latin America as presented by local and foreign commentators, by showing that it lacks the 
empirical support required to properly ground its assertions and by introducing new data that 
contradicts their allegations. Using our framework, we show that a more nuanced and careful 
appreciation of the history of these regimes is possible. We welcome the debates that our 
analysis may generate.  
 
It may be argued that our analyses are too focused on particular fields to be able to 
generalize about the development of CLRs in Latin America. This argument aims to undermine 
the regional dimension of this dissertation, and it is successful to the extent that we hold that 
different field dynamics shape these respective CLRs differently. However, our purpose is not to 
create a generalized knowledge or to present perspectives that would follow from such 
knowledge for the reform (or not) of the different CLRs. We are particularly skeptic about such 
efforts precisely because we emphasize the uniqueness of the dynamics that characterize the 
different regimes as fields. Instead, we contribute to the current state of reflections and 
discussions about competition law in Latin America by aspiring to provoke two different 
outcomes. On one hand, we welcome more discussions about the issues addressed, and in 
particular about the role of power and ideas in the shaping of CLRs in this region, and invite 
other voices to join the discussion. On the other, we hope to contribute by generating critical 
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reflections about how we write and talk about competition law. It would be to the benefit of the 
Latin American competition law community at large to have more discussions about the 
unstated premises we have when discussing about competition law. Readers from jurisdictions 
different from Chile, Colombia or Mexico may find that the theoretical framework developed in 
chapter 2 can be useful for enquiring about the origins and trajectories of their own CLRs and to 
analyze their future developments.  
 
Besides these, we also offer other contributions that also support the relevance of this 
dissertation. One of the most important aspects of this dissertation is that it relies on actual 
decisions and judicial rulings issued by the enforcement bodies and by courts involved in 
competition law enforcement activities. Readers familiar with the literature on competition law in 
Latin America know that this is uncommon, for most of the analyses done with a regional scope 
does not address particular decisions.49 The analysis of first-hand data thus distinguishes this 
contribution from most of the literature commented above. Besides this, we also introduce new 
data that has not been analyzed at the level of the countries involved. In particular, we found 94 
decisions issued by the Mexican Supreme Court between 1917 and 1990 regarding the 
constitutionality of different bylaws according to the mandate to protect competition established 
in article 28 of the 1917 Constitution. We also found 23 decisions issued by the Colombian 
competition law enforcement body between 1962 and 1968 addressing mergers, abuse of 
dominance cases, and a few horizontal agreements (see annex 1). Moreover, we found the first 
modern competition law statute in this country, dating from 1955. This is significant because it 
shows that the efforts to control economic power did not originate in the reformist government 
that followed the military regime of Gustavo Rojas Pinilla, but in the military regime itself. (See 
chapter 4)  
 
These contributions highlight the relevance of this dissertation from two separate 
perspectives. First, this dissertation is highly relevant for the study of competition law in Latin 
America for the reasons mentioned above, and in particular because it contrasts importantly with 
the literature on this topic. Second, it is also highly relevant for the study of how ideas and power 
                                                            
49 See for example Peña, Julián. "Limits of Competition Law in Latin America." In The Global Limits of 
Competition Law. Edited by Ioannis Lianos and Daniel D. Sokol. 2012.  Alvarez, Ana Maria, and Pierre Horna. 
"Implementing Competition Law and Policy in Latin America: The Role of Technical Assistance." Chi.-Kent L. 
Rev. 83 (2008): 91 - 128. Naím, Moisés. "Does Latin America Need Competition Policy to Compete?" In 
Competition Policy, Deregulation, and Modernization in Latin America. Edited by Moisés Naím and Joseph 
Tulchin. Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999. Coate, Malcolm B, Rene Bustamante, and A E Rodriguez. "Antitrust 
in Latin America: Regulating Government and Business." The University of Miami Inter-American Law Review 
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shape legal rules. In particular, we believe that by relying on field theory, this dissertation 
becomes highly relevant for lawyers and social scientists that want to approach Latin American 
economic regulation and competition law. In doing so, it bridges different theories and 
approaches that show the importance of studying law as a social fact. Overall, the relevance of 
this dissertation is related with its approach to the development of the different CLRs studied, 
and with the wealth of the legal data collected and analyzed. 
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2. Theoretical Framework 
I. Introduction 
 
In chapter 1 we stated that this dissertation is about how competition law regimes 
(hereinafter CLRs) in Latin America appeared and developed because of the interactions 
between different actors - lawyers, politicians, public officials among others - taking place within 
the State’s dynamics. We also mentioned that to show this we would focus on the development 
of CLRs in Chile, Colombia and México. By focusing on these interactions, and in the ideas that 
shape them, we account for the most salient traits of these challenges and explore the established 
ways in which the development of these regimes has been understood.  
 
This chapter is about the framework we rely upon in order to develop these analyses. This 
framework combines two different strands of enquiry. The first strand is about the history of 
legal and economic ideas, and in particular, about the intellectual history of neoliberalism and its 
rival tradition State-centered developmentalism. We address this first strand in section II of this 
chapter. The second strand is “field theory”, a strand of social sciences theory and methodology 
developed by authors like Pierre Bourdieu. We address this second strand in section III of this 
chapter. The combination of these two strands is particularly important for our purposes 
because it highlights our emphasis on the role that conflicting ideas play in the history of CLRs 
in Latin America. In chapter IV we conclude by showing how both parts are complementary and 
comment briefly on examples in other areas of legal research in which this combination has 
taken place successfully.  
 
II.  Ideas That Shape Competition Law in Latin America: An Overview.  
 
This section presents the first part of our framework, which consists of an overview of the 
main economic ideas that shaped Latin American regulation during the second half of the 20th 
century. We proceed from the more general to the more precise. We begin by identifying the 
main strands to which neoliberalism and State-centered developmentalism belong in the tradition 
of liberal political philosophy, and then we narrow our perspective towards more precise and 
contextually dependent ideas.  
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II.A. The Imperatives of Capitalism and the Demands of Democracy 
 
We begin our characterization of these two strands is by locating them within the tradition of 
liberal political philosophy and the different divisions it presents. Since its origins, this tradition 
has harbored different ideas that often come across as opposed to each other. We can evidence 
this by referring briefly to how two central authors to the liberal political philosophy, John Locke 
and J.J. Rousseau, address the issues of freedom and inequality. In his Second Treatise, Locke 
offers a characterization of society in which individuals have rights because of their nature as 
rationale beings (and created by God) and roughly the same capabilities. Inequality results from 
the success that a few individuals have by combining their skills with hard work. The institution 
of government is devised in order to protect the rights of individuals, and this protection is 
extended to the inequalities that result from their skills and work.50 Rousseau viewed issues quite 
differently. In his Discourse on the Origins of Inequality this particular trait is a pervasive characteristic 
of human nature, and it results from both skills as well as violence. However, the institutions of 
private property contribute to legitimize the unequal relations between individuals by providing a 
facade to the power property-owners have to determine how other individuals access the 
resources they control.51 The social compact that Rousseau advances is a collectivist endeavor in 
which individuals can decide the relations that are part of their society, including those that stem 
from private law. In doing so, Rousseau’s arguments are about using the State as a mechanism 
for social transformation.52 The tension between Locke’s concerns for the protection of 
individual rights and freedoms and Rousseau’s call for a social contract that transforms social 
relations provides an ample ground for considering how neoliberalism and State-centered 
developmentalism are related. 
 
The brief introduction and the examples presented above enable us to provide a more 
precise characterization of these two terms. A recent reinterpretation by Grewal and Purdy of 
the division within the tradition of liberal political philosophy views the contention as being 
about a contest between the imperatives of capitalism vs. the demands of democracy.53 The 
imperatives of capitalism are related with facilitating how it works and the relations it produces. 
                                                            
50 Locke, John. Second Treatise of Government: An Essay Concerning the True Original, Extent and End of 
Civil Government. John Wiley & Sons, (1689) 2014. 
51 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. Discourse on the Origin of Inequality. Edited by Franklin Philip and Patrick 
Coleman. Oxford University Press, (1755) 1999. 
52 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. The Social Contract and Other Later Political Writings. Edited by Victor 
Gourevitch. Cambridge University Press, 1997. 
53 For reference to this body of literature, see Grewal, David Singh, and Jedediah Purdy. "Introduction: Law and 
Neoliberalism." Law & Contemp. Probs. 77 (2014):  Pgs. 1 - 3. 
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These include the protection of private property and contract, as well as more elaborated 
concepts including the expectations of return on investments and corporate managerial 
autonomy.54 The demands of democracy, in turn, are about achieving a series of conditions that 
run counter to the former, including equality of opportunity, fairness, solidarity and other 
conditions associated with the legitimacy of the social ordering of a community.55 While the 
contest or confrontation between these ideas is largely abstract, it becomes concrete as it unfolds 
in particular social contexts.56 
 
For Grewal and Purdy, it is this contest that allows for a characterization of neoliberalism; 
we add that it also adds for a characterization of State-centered developmentalism. For these 
authors neoliberalism “(…) names a suite of arguments, dispositions, presuppositions, ways of 
framing questions and even visions of social order that get called on to press against democratic 
claims in the service of market imperatives.”57 In this sense, neoliberalism is a strand of theory 
that encompasses particular ideas and arguments about promoting markets (and their 
rationalities) as the best mechanisms for collective ordering and public governance. Neoliberals 
often (but not always) describe markets as spaces in which individuals exercise their autonomy 
and freedom by making choices with the information at hand without being coerced to do so. 
Different ideas contribute to this particular understanding, but we will just mention two. Firstly, 
this characterization of markets views them as aggregate of single transactions carried forth by 
individuals acting by their own accord and in the absence of coercion. Second, what makes 
markets work so well as mechanisms for allocating social resources is the price system. Prices 
coordinate almost effortlessly the activities of different individuals, for their movement transmits 
useful information about the relative abundance or scarcity of goods and services exchanged 
between individuals in the absence of a central, like governmental agencies.58 Hence, the 
promotion of markets is often defended on various grounds that combine both arguments about 
individual freedom and dignity as well as an efficient allocation of resources.59 
 
What, then, is new about neoliberalism? We contend that the differences between this strand 
and classical liberalism involve a certain perspective related with the events taking place during 
                                                            
54 Ibid. Pg. 3 
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56 Ibid. Pg. 4 
57 Ibid. Pg. 4. 
58 Hayek, Friedrich. The Use of Knowledge in Society. In: Individualism and Economic Order. U. of Chicago 
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the second half of the 20th century. Firstly, neoliberal ideas do not involve a separation of 
spheres of social activity as the classic liberal motto laissez faire, laisser passer suggests. In this 
sense, neoliberals view markets as social constructs purposefully built by legal rules, not as a pre-
existing form of social ordering.60 A particularity of this shift is that while classic liberal authors 
like John Locke conceived the State as a shield against third parties as well as a possible danger 
(via tyranny),61 neoliberals focus their fears on the State and its potential as a vehicle for 
totalitarian ideas and the suppression of individual freedom. This particular issue can be 
appreciated in the work of early neoliberal authors such as noted Austrian lawyer and economist 
Friedrich Hayek. In his book The Road to Serfdom he addresses the dangers of “collectivist” 
regimes that curtailed economic freedom through heavy-handed regulation in the name of 
national ideals.62 In his later works Hayek advanced a theory about the complementarity between 
the State and markets. In a nutshell, markets are particularly apt institutions for coordinating 
economic activity for the reasons mentioned in the preceding paragraph. However, for 
successful coordination to take place, markets require a facilitating structure, which he identified 
with the generality, universality and certainty that should characterize “the Rule of Law”.63 
Underlying such a legal order is a constitutional choice involving the protection of freedom, not 
just a passive attitude.  
 
Second, more recent neoliberal authors rely on economic theory to reimagine how the State 
should work and the adequacy of its endeavors. In doing so, they use economic theory as a 
template for different aspects of public governance, ranging from the design and implementation 
of public policies to enforcement of the law.64 We offer two examples of this neoliberal “move” 
from the works of Gary Becker and George Stigler. The work of Becker, in particular, expanded 
the logic of economic analysis into social spheres that were until then considered non-economic, 
like family law and law enforcement. For example, in Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach 
Becker argues that optimal deterrence resulting from law enforcement should be based on the 
trade-off between the costs and benefits of crime, including aspects like the cost of enforcement 
and the nature of punishment. Under-deterrence occurs when criminal benefits outweigh the 
social costs of crime prevention, and as such is wasteful because ineffective; over-deterrence, on 
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the other hand, is also wasteful because the social costs of preventing crime exceeds its benefits. 
George Stigler, in turn, extended economic analysis into the development of regulation itself. In 
The Theory of Economic Regulation he makes the case for a theory of regulation based on the supply 
offered by government officials and politicians and demand by different economic actors bent 
on furthering their interests. Such a theory, he claims, is better than the alternatives based on 
public interest or the irrationality of politics for explaining issues like regulatory barriers to entry 
or qualification requirements for certain professions.65 In doing so, both authors use economic 
analysis as a template for how the State works and to assess the adequacy of its functions. 
 
State-centered developmentalism can also be defined by relating it to the contest between the 
imperatives of capitalism and the demands of democracy. It can be defined as “(…) a suite of 
arguments, dispositions, presuppositions, ways of framing questions and even visions of social 
order”66 used to oppose to the imperatives of capitalism in the service of the demands of 
democracy. It is, in other words, a strand of theory that encompasses different ideas and 
arguments about the primacy of democracy over markets, or other alternatives, for organizing 
different aspects of social life. In this sense, democracy is often viewed as both a process and an 
end-result. Democracy as a process is about how participating in democratic practices is 
beneficial for the individual and the community she belongs to. In turn, democracy as an end-
result is about the legitimacy of the decisions reached, and which resides not in their accuracy 
but precisely on the substantive value resulting from following the democratic process in the first 
place.67 The State, then, can be seen as a highly complex mechanism established to harbor 
democratic institutions, but also to enforce the decisions they produce; through its prerogatives 
the State is in charge of making democratic ideals a reality. 
 
Just as we enquired about what does neoliberalism contribute to liberalism, we can enquire 
about what the “developmentalism” in State-centered developmentalism is about. We contend 
that it stands for the desire to use the political process and in particular the State as an agent of 
social change empowered to pursue the demands of democracy over the imperatives of 
capitalism. In this sense, it is a State that contrasts with the classical liberal State, which is 
considered passive on such issues, and with the neoliberal State, which is also active bur for the 
opposite reasons. Furthermore, we argue that the roots of State-centered developmentalism are 
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both political and theoretical, and they are intertwined in the developments that took place 
locally and globally during the second half of the 20th century.  
 
We begin with the political events and their theoretical backgrounds that contributed to 
shape the broad contours of economic policies in western States, both developed and 
developing, during the second half of the 20th century. At the international level, among the most 
significant of these events was the crafting of an international economic regime. Shortly after the 
end of WW II several States gathered in the Bretton Woods conference of 1944 in order to 
conceive an international monetary system that ameliorated the issues posed by currency 
instability and to bring about peaceful commercial relations between States that would facilitate 
the conditions of social welfare. In doing so, the drafters of these institutions aimed to prevent 
the economic issues that led to WW II.68 This materialized in a global monetary system in which 
each State fixed their currency exchange rates to a gold standard, and new institutions like the 
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank to cover for their fiscal imbalances and 
contribute to the financing of their development projects.69 At the local level, economic policy 
developments followed two broad guidelines. Firstly, there was an understanding that there was 
ample room for the State to intervene and direct if necessary certain economic processes in 
order to attain full employment, economic growth and social welfare. In doing so, the State 
could complement, or even supersede, markets through different policies, including industrial 
policies. Along this idea, fiscal and monetary policies played an important role in maintaining 
high employment levels and to counteract business cycles. Second, States developed social 
welfare systems through which they provided directly particular services (for example health 
services) financed through the fiscal system.70 These welfare systems aimed to ameliorate the 
social consequences resulting from the advances of industrialization in the different countries.71 
The expression “embedded liberalism” refers to this combination of entrepreneurial and 
corporate processes that were embedded in a web of social welfare policies, and which resulted 
from both international and national efforts to bring about economic stability after WW II.72  
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The policies that made up the “embedded liberalism” reflect the influence of John Maynard 
Keynes in economic policy-making and theory. Keynes himself was part of the drafting team of 
the Bretton Woods agreements.73 He is well known for arguing in favor of using monetary policy 
to counteract business cycles and to keep unemployment low in times of limited industrial 
activity. This idea was based on the insight that, contrary to what classical economists argued, 
labor wages did not follow smoothly the supply and demand in the markets of goods and 
services. The cases in which this happened were exceptional, and the absence of such 
phenomenon justified the use of monetary policy to prevent and counter high levels of 
unemployment and its social consequences.74 According to Albert Hirschman, this particular 
insight was particularly important for the emergence of development economics as a field of 
enquiry.75 In turn, “expansive” monetary policies became one of the targets of neoliberals policy 
makers and authors like Milton Friedman.76 
 
Developing States took stock of the organizations and institutions that were part of 
“embedded liberalism”, although they did so in their own accord. A particularly important 
consideration in Latin America was that the terms of trade between developed and developing 
States had been deteriorating since the end of the 19th century. Raul Prebisch argued in his 1950 
report The Economic Development of Latin America and Its Principal Problems that developed nations 
benefit twofold from international trade with their developing counterparts; first by importing 
raw materials at increasingly lower prices, and twice by exporting manufactured goods to these 
States at prices that did not reflect their technological advances.77 Prebisch’s ideas contributed to 
reassessing the protectionist policies that were already in place, for they could then be 
understood as part of a larger design aimed to achieve development. While the policies 
themselves varied importantly across States, the broad contours of the policies adopted in this 
region consisted in combining import substitution with the promotion of particular exports. 
That is, on the one hand governments established different restrictions to certain imports in 
order to shift the demand to locally produced substitutes. On the other it promoted the 
strengthening of certain exports that were highly important because they were sources of foreign 
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currency and contributed to the maintaining the balance of payments.78 The overall effect is a 
reallocation of social resources towards more productive uses, boosting local industries and 
bringing about benefits for the economy at large. Other complementary policies included 
establishing different fixed exchange rates, providing local industries with privileged lines of 
credit, subsidies, and others.79 The prominent role of these policies also emphasizes the role of 
the State in the State-centered developmentalism strand. 
 
Prebisch’s report is an example of a policy analysis that also provides theoretical insights. In 
the particular case of The Economic Development of Latin America and Its Principal Problems it revealed 
a challenge against the classic theory of comparative advantage developed originally by David 
Ricardo. According to this theory, trade between countries could be beneficial to all the parties 
involved if each one of them specializes in the goods demanded by other countries and which it 
can produce at the lowest cost.80 According to Joseph Love, this theory was congenial to the 
governmental support that the producers of traditional exports received by the end of the 19th 
century and during the first decades of the 20th.81 Prebisch’s argument, however, showed that 
developing States were not benefiting from international trade as they were supposed under the 
theory of comparative advantage. Instead, the idea that came across was that of dependancia; 
developing States were bound to follow the fate that their developed counterparts fixed for them 
through their commercial agreements. The call for industrialization in developing States, and 
especially in Latin America, challenged the theory of comparative advantage because it required 
support for developing industries in new contexts rather than contributing to previously 
established ones.82 Besides this particular theoretical contribution, the notion of dependencia was 
further on developed by Latin American economists like Fernando Henrique Cardoso.83 
 
II.B. Central Ideas to the Development of Competition law in Latin America  
 
In the preceding subsection we offered a general characterization of neoliberalism and State-
centered developmentalism and how they relate to the tradition of liberal political philosophy. In 
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this subsection, we focus more on the relation of these two strands with the origins and 
trajectories of CLRs in Latin America.  
 
We begin with theories and policies about State-centered developmentalism. As mentioned 
above, one of the particularities of the theories and policies that are characteristic of “embedded 
liberalism” and the developmental institutions adopted in developing States is the prominence of 
the State itself. This evidences a break with the postulates of classic economics, as well as certain 
confidence on what the State can actually achieve. In particular, these theories and policies place 
in the State the ultimate role of controlling economic processes and their outcomes. This implies 
that the State has the means and the capacity to shape economic processes in ways that are 
congenial to its goals. It also implies that the State is responsible of procuring a series of results 
or desirable states of affairs. In doing so, it is a premise that relies considerably on the State’s 
bureaucratic capacity to achieve social change. The works of classic development authors like 
Paul Rosenstein-Rodan,84 Arthur Lewis85 and Albert Hirschman86 evidence this belief in the 
instrumental capacity of the State to take certain inputs and produce the desired economic and 
social outputs.  
 
Contemporary authors working within State-centered developmentalism also rely on markets 
and make arguments for their adoption.87 In doing so, however, they do not envision markets as 
ends in themselves, but as social mechanisms that further other non-economic goals (like the 
dispersion of economic power). Their contention, in many cases, is that in particular situations 
and contexts the imposition of market discipline seems unjustifiably skewed in favor of a few 
individuals or organizations and to the detriment of others. In doing so, it is important to note 
that the justifications they discuss are not framed from an economic rationale, but rather from a 
broader perspective based on democracy. Consider the following statement by Roberto 
Mangabeira Unger and Carlos Salinas de Gortari:  
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The focus of conflict and debate in the world is changing. The old opposition between 
state and market is dead or dying. (…) Reforms undertaken in the name of the market 
economy can start us down more than one road of reinvigorating political, economic, and 
social freedom. One of these roads turns people into enemies of markets because it turns 
markets into enemies of people. Another road leads to a society reconciling more 
decentralized and diversified economies with more intense democracies, and productive 
innovation.88 
 
The instrumental view of the State in development theory has a “mirror image” in the 
development of law and legal theory in Latin America during the 20th century. Since the first 
decades of this century, anti-formalist legal thinking took a stronghold over this region, leading 
to the idea that law can be molded to achieve the ends its society considers worth aspiring to.89 
Since then, law is seen as a tool for social change (as opposed to, for example, a repository of 
traditional values), reflecting the circumstances that are unique to the Latin American contexts.90 
This instrumental view of law can be appreciated in several aspects of the legal regimes resulting 
from the political events taking place in the region. One of these aspects is the considerable 
discretion that the executive power had by constitutional fiat or legislative mandate to design and 
implement regulation. The officials subject to the executive power are considered his delegates, 
and their lack of autonomy compensates for the capacity of the President, or of his cabinet, to 
coordinate the different policies in place. Overall, the flexibility embedded in administrative law 
is translated into the discretion that legal rules provide to the different bodies and officials in 
charge of policy enforcement. (See also chapter 4.) 
 
This emphasis on the State had a profound impact in the development of CLRs in Latin 
America, although it is often argued that State-centered ideas and policies are at odds with the 
protection of competition.91 Certainly import-substitution policies suggest that much, but only 
partially, for they do not address the competition exerted by rival goods and services produced 
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locally. Our research suggests that State-centered ideas and policies include different views about 
the importance of protecting competition. On one hand, as we show in chapter 4, the first CLRs 
were adopted during the heyday of these policies and by governments – first in Mexico, and then 
in Colombia and in Chile - that adhered to these ideas. This is an aspect that we consider of 
critical importance, and that casts a doubt over how the development of competition law in 
Latin America has been understood by local and foreign commentators. On the other, we find 
among the individuals that endorsed these policies and ideas a support for competition, although 
the intensity of this support varied considerably.  
 
Let us consider first the lukewarm ambivalence of Raul Prebisch on this issue. In his 1962 
article “Reflexiones sobre la integración económica latinoamericana”, he argued that excessive reliance on 
custom tariffs and other protectionist instruments have led to monopolist practices that affect 
negatively economic productivity - a consequence he condemns.92 However, in later articles he 
focuses on issues he considered structural. In his 1979 article about neoclassic economic theories 
and development he states that he is a defender of competition, but that the structural issues of 
peripheral capitalism cannot be addressed through competition protection.93 The following year, 
he argued that the neoclassical idea that competition leads to diminishing producer surplus 
contradicts the experience of capitalism in the periphery.94 In contrast, let us consider briefly the 
position of Jorge Ahumada, also a foreign-trained economist who worked at the United Nations 
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean. In the second edition of his 1958 
book “En vez de la miseria”, Ahumada openly criticized monopolies and the increasing 
monopolization of the Chilean economy and made a call for fostering competition.95 The record 
of State-centered policies and ideas does not support the argument that these were flatly against 
the protection of competition. 
 
The advance of neoliberal ideas and policies in Latin America was particularly traumatic. In 
part, this was so because many policies inspired in neoliberal ideas were advanced as 
prescriptions to address the problems that Latin American countries were facing by the late 
1970s and early 1980s, including its level of debt. Arguably, the crises themselves were triggered 
by neoliberal changes in monetary policy, which in turn led to the advance of the above-
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mentioned neoliberal policies in this region.96 The first region-wide package of neoliberal 
reforms is often referred to as “the Washington Consensus” because of a paper by John 
Williamson in which he describes the main structural reforms that Washington-based institutions 
had prepared for developing countries during decade of the 1980s.97 Since then, experimentation 
with economic policies of different sorts (including CLRs) departed from its State-centered roots 
to embrace different forms of neoliberalism.98 
 
One of the reasons we refer to neoliberalism and State-centered developmentalism as strands 
of theories is because they group different positions that while share important elements differ in 
others. This is particularly the case of neoliberalism, both abroad and in Latin America. Before 
we described briefly two variants of these versions when we addressed the works of Friedrich 
Hayek, Gary Becker and George Stigler. Below we will address these two variants and a third 
one, and comment briefly on their impact in Latin American competition law. 
 
The first variant we wish to address emphasizes the importance of individual freedom as the 
cornerstone of the legal and economic orderings of society. We previously identified it with the 
ideas of Friedrich Hayek, and this is also one of the first variants of neoliberalism to emerge. As 
other forms of neoliberalism, it is not about laissez faire because it conceives an active role for the 
State and the legal system. This role, in particular, is constitutive; the legal system should be 
construed around individual freedom and should create spaces where individuals are able to 
exercise this freedom without coercion, very much like their view of markets. As we will argue in 
chapters 3 and 4, this particular form of neoliberalism developed in Chile during the late 1970s 
and 1980s and can still be appreciated in the works of a few competition law authors. Hayek 
himself visited Chile in two occasions and met briefly with Pinochet once.99 
 
The second variant of neoliberalism influential in Latin America is related with the “Chicago 
School” of economics. We already hinted as much when we mentioned before the works of 
Gary Becker and George Stigler and what made their academic stances as distinctively neoliberal. 
How neoliberal ideas developed within the “Chicago School” is a fascinating subject that is also 
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closely related with the development of neoliberalism in Chile. However, we will only address 
some elements of this topic here. To begin with, Hayek became a professor in the humanities in 
1950, and from there he continued with his plans for furthering the political influence of his 
ideas and developing networks of like-minded individuals, like the Mount Pelerin Society.100 The 
faculty of economics harbored intellectuals that, like Hayek, viewed a positive role for the State 
in promoting individual freedom and competition. One of these was Henry Simons, who would 
eventually become a mentor of Milton Friedman. Simons, like Friedman after him, was a critic of 
the New Deal and argued for a State that would dedicate itself to a limited set of activities; one 
of them was the active promotion of competition.101 Friedman came eventually to propose this 
idea in a 1951 essay entitled Neo-liberalism And Its Prospects. In this essay, he argued that the State 
should promote competition by protecting the freedom to establish an enterprise, enter any 
profession, and provide for monetary stability.102 However, Friedman dropped the promotion of 
competition as a policy proposal in his later works,103 while remaining consistent in his critical 
views of the New Deal and an expansive monetary policy.104 As to his influence in Latin 
America, Friedman became the advisor of many of the so-called “Chicago Boys”, the Chilean 
economists that participated in the economic direction of this country during the military 
regime.105 Later on, Friedman would write a letter to Pinochet in support of the economic plan 
adopted by the regime.106 
 
Within the Chicago School, the perspective on competition law changed rather drastically 
(when compared from the perspective of the views of Simons and the early Friedman) with the 
work of George Stigler. We mentioned that one of Stigler’s contributions was to develop a 
critique of the existing theories of regulation at the time by relying on a market-based approach 
to the demand and supply of regulation by different interest groups.107 Regarding competition 
law, Stigler proposed a view of cartels that changed in important ways both the academic and 
policy approaches towards this practice. We refer, in particular, to his argument about the 
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inherent instability of cartels resulting from the incentives their members have to cheat each 
other.108 As we argue in chapter 8, this argument contributed to the craft of leniency policies in 
the United States (hereinafter US) and abroad, including Latin America.  
 
However, perhaps the most widespread source of influence of the “Chicago School” comes 
from individuals broadly identified as being part of this “school” such as Richard Posner and 
Robert Bork. Posner, who is worldly known for his writings on law and economics, 
acknowledges the influence of both Stigler and Bork in defining the position of this School 
towards the established doctrines at the time.109 Bork, in particular, argued that competition law 
in the US (known as antitrust law) was divided between two variants, one of which promoted 
economic efficiency and the other that thwarted it by protecting competitors instead. In order to 
reform antitrust law and make it coherent, Bork proposes a theory based on microeconomics 
that he complements with a particular historical interpretation of the goals of antitrust law in the 
US.110 As it turns out, Latin American authors commonly cite Bork during the 1990s in texts 
discussing the goals of their own CLRs (as we will show in later chapters). 
 
The third and final variant of neoliberalism involves a combination of neoliberal elements 
like the ones described until know and neoinstitutional arguments. In the US, the combination of 
these two strands has led to a variant of antitrust law theory that combines law and economics 
insights with transaction costs analyses. An example of this can be appreciated in the work of 
Oliver Williamson, who in "Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications" shows the 
extent to which market interactions can break down easily and thus meriting governmental 
intervention (but only in some particular instances).111 The combination of neoliberalism and 
neoinstitutionalism in Latin America has drifted more towards issues related with the functioning 
and the possible reform of CLRs in order to improve their performance. The most common 
example is the argument (that we address in later chapters) that the adoption of a CLR 
contributes to the advances achieved in other areas of law regarding the liberalization of the 
economy. In this sense, neoinstitutionalism has become a lens for addressing the foundations of 
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these regimes, their functions and limitations, and a source of inspiration for particular reforms 
in Latin America.112  
 
Table 2.1 The Neoliberal and State-Centered Competition Law Projects Compared 
 
 Neoliberal competition law project State-centered competition law project 
Core ideas 
General Idea 
- The State should actively promote and 
protect markets and competition. Deep 
skepticism regarding other goals. 
 
- The State is a tool for collective social 
transformation and improvement. 
- The State should promote markets and 
competition only to the extent that it 
contributes to furthering other goals. 
- CLRs complement State-led policies aiming 
at economic development.  
- Democratic rationales are an adequate 
baseline for devising and evaluating legal 
regimes. 
Variant 1 
- Markets are the best forms of social ordering 
because they are based on individual freedom. 
Variant 2 
- Markets are the best forms of social ordering 
because they bring about efficient allocation of 
resources. 
- Economic rationales are an adequate baseline 
for devising and evaluating legal regimes. 
 
Overall, both State-centered ideas and their neoliberal counterpart exercised considerable 
influence in the policy landscape of Latin America. In this subsection, we have situated both 
strands of theory in a larger historical context and identified their differences, especially as to 
how they play out in competition law and their relevance in Latin America. In the next section 
we will present a framework that will be useful for identifying more precisely how they 
contributed to shape CLRs in this region.  
 
III. Field Theory and Law  
 
In this section, we use field theory to complement the previous analyses by focusing, through 
the lens of field theory, on the interactions between social actors that promote or reject these 
strands of theory. We will describe the concept of fields, the interactions that take place within 
them and how they emerge and transform. In doing so, we will rely on the explanations provided 
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by different authors that are part of this theory, including Pierre Bourdieu.113 Finally we will 
provide an overview of his text The Force of Law in which he applied some of the concepts 
referred to above to the study of law.  
 
III.A. Field Theory: Basic Concepts  
 
The concept of field refers to a semi autonomous social space in which interactions of 
different nature take place between the actors that are part of them.  Fields vary importantly in 
their structures and memberships, and are related among themselves in different ways. As 
Fligstein and McAdam point out, they can incorporate different degrees of social activity, from 
the narrowest of social interactions to those incorporating highly aggregated, complex actors.114 
Pierre Bourdieu defines fields and their operation in the following way:  
 
To think in terms of field is to think relationally. (…) I define a field as a network, or a 
configuration, of objective relations between positions objectively defined, in their 
existence and in the determinations they impose upon their occupants, agents or 
institutions, by their present and potential situation (situs) in the structure of the 
distribution of species of power (or capital) whose possession commands access to the 
specific profits that are at stake in the field, as well as by their objective relation to other 
positions (domination, subordination, homology, etc.) Each field presupposes and 
generates by its very functioning, the belief in the value of the stakes it offers. (…) In 
highly differentiated societies, the social cosmos is made up of a number of such 
relatively autonomous social microcosms, i.e. spaces of objective relations, which are the 
site of a logic and of a necessity that is specific and irreducible to those that regulate 
other fields.115  
 
Just as fields are made of particular interactions, the positions or situation of the different 
actors in the field is very important. This relates to the structure of a field itself. The interactions 
between actors are what give fields their structure and their boundaries; hence they are defined 
internally by the different interactions that take place within them, and defined externally by the 
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interactions taking place in or across other fields. The resulting structures can be horizontal, thus 
suggesting that the actors populating the field have roughly the same power, or vertical, 
suggesting instead that the field is organized towards a hierarchy. It is common to find fields 
with structures that combine horizontal with vertical elements.116 The structure of fields is also 
determined by the particular roles that the different actors in them have. Broadly, there are two 
types of actors - incumbents and challengers - whose interactions make the field in the first place 
and shape its trajectory over time. Incumbents are “(…) actors who wield disproportionate 
influence within a field and whose interests and views tend to heavily reflected in the dominant 
organisation of the (…) field".117 Their advantageous position enables them to shape the 
interactions taking place in the field to their favor, and to shape the understandings that shape 
what the field is about and legitimize their role and their actions. Challengers, in turn, are actors 
that do not have privileged positions within the field and have a limited capacity to change its 
structure. Although they understand their role in the field just as they are aware of incumbents 
and their roles, they do not necessarily share the beliefs of incumbents nor consider their control 
over the field legitimate. Just as well, they may control particular resources that are important in 
the field, but not enough to alter a field’s structure. The oppositional situation or position of 
incumbents and challengers is not fixed, but is a result of how they emerge, consolidate and 
change over time - their trajectories. Both incumbents and challengers can compete for control 
of the resources produced in the field, but they can unite and work together towards a common 
goal given a contingent threat or opportunity.118  
 
As we just mentioned, the interactions between actors are related with the control of the 
resources available in the field. These resources can be of different kind and are generated by 
different activities. Bourdieu refers to these resources as different forms of capital. It is 
important to bear in mind that capital does not refer only to the ownership of assets of 
considerable economic worth. This term is also used to the exercise of, for example, political 
influence or an established reputation to control or shape the interactions taking place in the 
field. In his own words,  
 
The forces that are active in the field (…) are those that define the specific capital. A 
capital does not exist and function but in relation to a field: it confers a power over the 
field, over the materialised or embodied instruments of production or reproduction 
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whose distribution constitutes the very structure of the field, and over the regularities and 
the rules which define the ordinary functioning of the field, and thereby over the profits 
engendered in this field.119  
 
Bourdieu also relates the use of capital with the potentially contentious nature of the field as 
well as with the particular positions that the actors in them occupy. He continues: 
 
As a space of potential and active forces, the field is also a field of struggles aimed at 
preserving or transforming the configuration of these forces. Concretely, the field as a 
structure of objective relations of force between positions undergirds and guides the 
strategies whereby the occupants of these positions seek, individually or collectively to 
safeguard or improve their position, and to impose the principles of hierarchisation most 
favourable to their own products. The strategies of agents depend on their position in 
the field, that is, in the distribution of specific capital.120 
 
Incumbents and challengers share a series of understandings about their roles, the stakes 
involved in their interactions and the nature of the field itself. As to their roles, both incumbents 
and challengers develop rationales that justify their trajectories within the field and legitimate 
their actions. Bourdieu refers to such rationales as habitus, which he defines in the following way:  
 
The habitus - embodied history, internalized as a second nature and so forgotten as 
history - is the active presence of the whole past of which it is the product. As such, it is 
what gives practices their relative autonomy with respect to the external determinations 
of the immediate present. This autonomy is that of the past, enacted and acting, which, 
functioning as a accumulated capital, produces history on the basis of history and so 
ensures the world. The habitus is a spontaneity without consciousness or will, opposed as 
much to the mechanical necessity of things without history in mechanistic theories as it is 
to the reflexive freedom of subjects ‘without inertia’ in rationalistic theories.121 
 
It is important to note that this concept aims to overcome the opposition between 
determinism and agency devoid of context in the analysis of individual or group behavior. Rather 
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than characterizing the trajectories of the actors only as a result of the structures they inhabit, or 
as a result of their unfettered agency, this concept refers to the actor’s dispositions - engrained 
patterns of thought and action - resulting from both their backgrounds as well as from their own 
capacity to make trajectory-changing decisions within the field. In doing so, this notion provides 
room for experience-based learning and identity development.122  
 
Just as actors develop narratives of themselves, they also develop understandings about the 
field itself. These basic understandings entail awareness about the particular positions of other 
actors (and the capital they control) as well as the stakes resulting from their interactions and the 
overall trajectory of the field.123 Bourdieu posits the concept of “doxa” as the regularly exercised 
belief in the different dispositions that make up the habitus and which is necessary for the 
functioning of the field. “Doxa is the relationship of immediate adherence that is established in 
practice between a habitus and the field to which it is attuned, the pre-verbal taking-for-granted of 
the world that flows from practical sense.”124 In other words, doxa is what makes the dispositions 
that make the habitus to come across as natural and legitimate to the actors in the field.125 Even 
so, that these understandings or doxa are shared does not mean that the different actors 
necessarily adhere to them uncritically. While incumbents develop understandings about the field 
that become widely accepted, even if self-serving, challengers can develop alternative accounts 
through which they reinterpret their position in the field. These alternative accounts are based on 
the same elements and address the same field as the understandings developed by the 
incumbents; however they can be more oppositional, challenging their role in legitimating their 
place in the field.126  
 
Both concepts of habitus and doxa are particularly useful for explaining the concept of 
“project” as used throughout this dissertation. By “project” we mean the efforts to make the set 
of ideas, theories and beliefs that make the understandings of particular actors predominant in a 
particular field through their interactions with other actors.127 Borrowing from Bourdieu, a 
“project” is doxa in the making; neither particular enough to be ascribed to a single actor as 
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habitus nor broad enough to be doxa, projects emerge from the former and aspire to the latter. As 
such, this concept entails a sense of purposeful dynamism; the agendas, and the collective 
endeavors underlying them, have to continuously unravel in order to be fulfilled. However, their 
plasticity resulting from being unfinished and accommodating makes them (intellectually) 
indeterminate and porous. This particular issue is very important. As (successful) projects 
become more encompassing, they incorporate the potentially conflicting ideas and theories 
developed by both incumbents and challengers into understandings that aspire to be coherent. 
This can be achieved by allowing grey areas in the doxa, or by avoiding potential contradictions 
between salient ideas by formulating highly abstract premises that minimize challenges. By 
drawing on the concept of “project”, we wish to highlight the importance that ideas, theories 
and other elements that make the doxa have in the making of CLRs as fields. 
 
The plasticity of projects invites consideration about the origins and changes taking place in 
and across fields. According to Fligstein and McAdam, fields result from the interactions 
between different actors in a society.128 Not all social spaces are fields in themselves. New fields 
develop from previously established ones, especially as social activity becomes more specialized. 
What lies behind this process is the capacity of actors to mobilize their resources in order to take 
advantage of new opportunities or to feign off particular threats. The development of a field in 
of itself can therefore entail a promise of redefining already existing interactions in ways that are 
more productive to the future incumbents behind such initiative.129 In this sense, while new 
fields emerge from proximate fields, they themselves come across as an opportunity to re-assert 
new interactions, new forms of capital accumulation, and new narratives to make sense of them 
all. However, not all efforts in establishing a field are successful; “settlement” takes place when 
the interactions between actors lead to their reproduction (and that of their interactions), and 
this is not always the case.130  
 
The emergence of State-related fields is of particular interest to our purposes. The State itself 
is composed of various different fields organized in very particular ways and in which legal rules 
play a predominant role. Just as well, these fields are also often connected with other non-State 
fields, like markets or the academia.131 Moreover, in societies in which ideas about the law play an 
important role in the organization of different aspects of social life, as in Latin America, State-
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related fields become privileged spaces for the definition of power and the structure of social 
life.132 The emergence and transformation of these fields are often expressed through political 
process that bring about legal reforms, or are the result of other, related legal processes.  
 
The relevance of field theory for understanding how different ideas and the actors that 
promote them shape CLRs can be appreciated by recalling the notion that there is a contest 
between different and opposing ideas - neoliberalism and State-centered developmentalism - in 
how social life is ordered. Field theory suggests that this conflict takes place in different legal 
areas, including competition law, and that it is waged by different actors who compete and 
collaborate in order to make their projects the doxa of these different areas. In particular, control 
over the law, including the control of how the law allocates right and duties and how it is 
understood are part of the stakes involved in this contention. Hence, field theory enables us to 
relate the substantive content of legal doctrines and legal rules with the different stakes involved 
in the contest about how an area like competition law is understood. 
 
III.B. Local and Transnational “Juridical Fields”  
 
In “The Force of Law: Toward a Sociology of The Juridical Field” Bourdieu applied the concept of 
field to sketch some basic issues of what he considered a scientific approach to law using 
adjudication as an example.133 This author argues that the interactions between different the 
actors (litigants, judges, academics and others) that populate the “juridical field” shape the 
prevailing ideas about how the content and application of the law is understood. These 
interactions are antagonistic and result from the structural position that the different actors have 
with regards to each other.134 Different views about the law are possible because of the 
operations involved in legal reasoning itself; law takes words from lay language and transforms 
them into legal rules working under dynamics of their own. This prevents the development of a 
single way of understanding of how an area of law should be interpreted and applied. Mastery 
over legal language and other basic aspects of the “juridical field” are prerequisites for 
developing views about what the law is and should be about.135 This mastery enables actors 
(especially litigants) to come forward and advance different views about the interpretation of 
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legal rules and their relation with the area of law they are part of; Bourdieu, in particular 
distinguished between conceptualist and practice-oriented views.136 Judges play a fundamental 
role in the development of dominant views. Their position in the juridical field allows them to 
“speak” for the law, announcing which are the views and legal arguments they find compelling. 
Moreover, in doing so, they reinforce the symbolic effectiveness of the law.137 This is why, for 
Bourdieu, jurisprudential theories are part of the “juridical field”, and not useful for developing a 
scientific understanding how such field works.138  
 
This particular insight has two important implications for our work. First, it prevents us from 
transferring directly ideas developed in other jurisdictions like the US or the EU to study the 
development of CLRs in Latin America, even those that are congenial to our own efforts.139 This 
is so because while theories are often expressed in universal terms, they are the result of the 
interactions taking place in particular fields belonging to particular contexts. As Bourdieu points 
out, these ideas are as part of the “juridical field” as the interpretations of the legal rules they 
contribute to develop. Resorting to alien ideas instead of unearthing the ones that have been 
central in the field is not useful if the task at hand involves understanding how a particular field 
of law came to be. This is particularly relevant regarding discussions about the goals of the 
different CLRs, for such discussions often do not take into consideration the institutions 
involved in the attainment of such goals in the first place.140   
 
Second, it prevents the mechanical application of Bourdieu’s analysis to fields that are 
structured differently from the one he discussed in the article mentioned above. In this sense, it 
is important to note that this author’s analysis can be extended to other “juridicial fields” as 
CLRs, as long as the interactions, structures and meanings of the fields they are part of are 
accounted for. This is a consequence of considering that there are unavoidable ties between the 
interactions taking place in a field, its structure, and the meanings about what such field is about. 
In particular, certain issues become highly relevant for the field study of CLRs such as the 
conformation of the bodies that adjudicate cases, their relative political independence, and even 
                                                            
136 Ibid. Pgs. 821 - 823. 
137 Ibid. Pgs. 825 - 826. 
138 This is the thesis that Bourdieu sets at the beginning of this article. See Ibid. Pgs. 815 - 816. 
139 Among these are Amato, Giuliano. Antitrust and the Bounds of Power: The Dilemma of Liberal Democracy 
in the History of the Market. Hart Publishing, 1997. Also Page, William H. "Ideological Conflict and the 
Origins of Antitrust Policy." Tulane Law Review 66, no. 1 (1991). Finally, Peritz, Rudolph J.R. Competition 
Policy in America, 1888-1992: History, Rhetoric, Law Oxford University Press, 1996, 2001. 
140 See Lianos, Ioannis “Some Reflections on the Question of the Goals of EU Competition Law” CLES 
Working Paper Series 3/2013. 
  51 
the mastery over particular forms of knowledge that, like economics, play a very important role 
in how competition law is understood.  
 
IV. Bringing the Pieces Together: The Roles of Ideas in Legal Fields 
 
In this final section we show how the historical overview of the ideas and the basic tenets of 
“field theory” can fit together in making the theoretical framework from which we assess the 
development of CLRs in Latin America in the following chapters. We also offer an example of a 
related effort that, combining both history and field theory, provides an account of the 
transformation of Latin American law in general. 
 
In the introduction of this chapter we argued that the two parts presented in the previous 
two sections could complement each other and contribute to a framework useful for 
understanding the role those ideas play in the development of an area like competition law. This 
complementarity results from the contributions that each part makes. While the discussions 
about neoliberalism promote the ideas that become embedded in CLRs, field theory engages 
with the struggles and collaborations that led to the embedding process of such ideas in the first 
place. An analysis of CLRs based on “field theory” benefits importantly from an overview of 
ideas because they provide an initial framework for understanding the dynamics and structure of 
these regimes as fields. Moreover, it also provides necessary elements that allow the 
identification of both habitus and doxa. At the same time, an intellectual history of CLRs benefits 
from identifying the conditions that led to the prevalence or demise of certain ideas in these 
regimes. In particular, it benefits from being able to relate the ideas advanced by the different 
actors that participate in a given field with the interactions between these actors, such as 
competitive struggles or collaborations. Hence, by coming together we can use field theory to 
account for the roles of ideas in the development of CLRs, and contribute to identifying 
contextually the elements and boundaries of these regimes as fields. 
 
To sum up, our framework can be summarized as follows: CLRs are part of semi-structured 
and semi-autonomous fields populated by different actors that from their own habitus compete 
and collaborate for establishing their own understanding of what this field is about - their doxa. 
These fields are mostly national and local although the presence of State and non-State, national 
and international actors, along with the influence of neighboring fields, place them in areas that 
defy stark categorizations. We use the word “project” to refer to the particular understandings 
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that these actors aim to establish for the entire field, that is, doxa in the making. Furthermore, we 
identify two sets of ideas that inform the neoliberal competition law project and its counterpart, 
the State-centered competition law project. Both sets of ideas are in tension with each other, but 
when considered together they account for the views underlying competition law in Latin 
America. 
 
IV.B. An Example of The Framework in Practice 
 
An example of a work that has important commonalities with this dissertation is The 
Internationalization of Palace Wars: Lawyers, Economists, and the Contest to Transform Latin American 
States, a book written by Yves Dezalay and Bryant G. Garth and which relies considerably on the 
variant of “field theory” developed by Pierre Bourdieu.141 This book traces how ideas about law 
and economics produced in the United States became influential in Argentina, Brazil and Chile, 
during the second half of the 20th century. It is important to note that the scope of this book is 
considerably wider than this dissertation, addresses other fields different from CLRs, and does 
not focus on particular legal developments. However it is useful for our purposes because it is a 
preeminent example of the analysis that results from combining the history of ideas in Latin 
America and “field theory”. 
 
The account presented in Palace Wars begins with the increasing presence of the US in Latin 
America, resulting from its positioning as a global power after WW II, and especially from its 
concern for the increasing presence of communism in this region. During the Cold war, the US 
invested considerably in programs aiming to bring about what were understood as core elements 
for development - basic economics and human rights. However, the ideas underlying these 
programs developed in such a way that they ended confronting each other. In Chile, for 
example, Chicago School economists assumed an important role in the military dictatorship, 
which in turn placed them against the activists that denounced the military regime for its 
violation of human rights.142  
 
In Palace Wars Garth and Dezalay also show how changes in the US academic landscape 
regarding what was considered “correct” economic learning had a profound impact in this 
region. This is in part because economists replaced lawyers in key position within the State, a 
                                                            
141 Dezalay, Yves, and Bryant G Garth. The Internationalization of Palace Wars: Lawyers, Economists, and the 
Contest to Transform Latin American States. University of Chicago Press, 2002. 
142 Ibid. Chapter 9. 
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development that peaked during the 1980s, as they became the elite entrusted to steer their 
country’s economies during the debt crises taking place then. As a result, having a degree from a 
top economics school became a political requirement for addressing key issues of economic 
management in Latin America. Members of the elite with close ties to the legal profession, in 
turn, adapted to these circumstances. Following a trajectory similar to that of economists, their 
professional paths began to rely increasingly more on acquiring graduate degrees in US law 
schools. In doing so, the content of their education changed as well. The new generations of 
lawyers focus on fields related with the economic reforms taking place from the private side (like 
corporate law) and on new theories like law and economics. Overall, the analysis in this book 
shows how the interactions taking place within networks of actors and their beliefs shape how 
State governance is understood.143  
 
The ideas developed by Bourdieu and expanded by scholars like Dezalay and Garth are 
useful for understanding how the circulation of different legal and economic ideas shape the 
interactions between the actors that populate a field. Not only does the Palace Wars address 
common topics to this dissertation, like the circulation of ideas about law, economics and the 
State, but it also focuses on key interactions related with the development of particular areas of 
law involving human rights and commercial law. We believe the ideas developed by these 
authors complement the framework we propose in two particular ways. First, we consider very 
important to include a new series of actors and interactions that are not part of the framework 
set out by Bourdieu in The Force of Law. In particular, it requires being able to assess the roles of 
competition law enforcement bodies and international organizations, both of which defy easy 
categorization. Second, following Dezalay and Garth, we rely on the premise that Latin 
American views about what a field of law is or should be about are infused from ideas produced 
in other jurisdictions and fields. This is a consequence of the “peripheral” position that Latin 
American CLRs have with regard to “core” fields geographically situated in the US and Europe 
populated by actors that have been highly successful in colonizing many other fields with their 
own ideas and understandings.144 This awareness contributes to understanding the origins of the 
ideas posited by actors within the field as well as by how proximate fields affect the development 
of CLRs. 
 
                                                            
143 Ibid. 
144 See also López Medina, Diego Eduardo. Teoría Impura Del Derecho: La Transformación De La Cultura 
Jurídica Latinoamericana. Universidad De Los Andes, Legis y Universidad Nacional De Colombia, 2004. 
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In this chapter we presented the main elements that make up the framework from which we 
will analyze the emergence and trajectories of the CLRs of Chile, Colombia and Mexico. This 
framework consists of two parts that complement each other. The first part is an overview of the 
history of ideas and events that have shaped regulation in Latin America during the second half 
of the 20th century. We identified two prominent sets of ideas and compared them with regard to 
how they envision the role of the State vis a vis economic processes. The second part consists of 
“field theory”, a broad theoretical perspective that studies social change based on the concept of 
“field” as developed in social science. In doing so, we relied on the explanations and definitions 
provided by various authors including Pierre Bourdieu, and introduced the concept of “project”, 
which we defined as doxa in the making. We also provided two examples of how field theory can 
be highly useful for understanding legal issues, one of which is particularly relevant because it 
exemplifies the usefulness of a very similar framework. With this in mind, we can now turn to 
the relevant literature regarding the history of competition law in Latin America. 
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3. Writing about Competition Law in Latin America 
 
I. Introduction 
 
We begin our analysis of the development of competition law regimes (hereinafter CLRs) in 
Latin America by describing and analyzing the literature that has been produced about this field 
of law. In this chapter we describe the main ideas that make this rather heterogeneous body of 
literature and relate it with the field dynamics that shape the development of these regimes in 
this region. We will show how this literature relates to the more general body of literature about 
Latin American law, describe its most important variants and comment upon a few texts we 
consider important. Finally, we will also argue that the perspective established in the texts about 
competition law in this region during the 1990s and after is a by-product of the political changes 
taking place in the region, in particular the advance of neoliberalism.  
 
This chapter is organized as follows. In section II we address the place that the literature 
about competition law in Latin America has within the more general body of literature about law 
in this region. In section III we describe in more detail what this literature is about, and we 
describe two main strands in it. We focus here mostly on books and articles that address 
competition law issues from a regional perspective, while in section IV we focus on a few key 
articles and books in Chile, Colombia and México. Finally, in section V we conclude.  
 
II. Competition law and the Latin American Legal Tradition  
 
In general terms, the rather heterogeneous body of literature concerning Latin American law 
can be classified in two strands. The first strand emphasizes the European origins of core Latin 
American legal institutions and acknowledges the growing importance of certain institutions 
drawn from the United States (hereinafter US) and local developments. The second strand, in 
turn, has a more developmental approach to law, and focuses on how Latin American legal 
institutions contribute (or hinder) the development of the Rule of Law. This second strand, 
while arguably more recent, has become increasingly important and is prominent in both local 
and international policy circles. Notably, both strands have considerably different outlooks. 
While the first strand views Latin American law as a continuation, sometimes imperfect, of well-
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established legal traditions, the latter views it from a policy perspective, focusing more on how it 
works and the outcomes it produces.145  
 
Readers familiar with the comparative law literature on legal families should be quite aware 
with the first strand mentioned above. Its definitive trait is about highlighting how certain legal 
institutions have travelled across jurisdictions and over time, leading to particular new 
developments. In the case of Latin America, a central element is the reception and 
transformation of the French 1804 Code Civil in this region.146 The reception of the Code has been 
important for several lines of enquiry. Firstly, the Code - and the civil law tradition it is embedded 
in - is often considered a key element in Latin America’s legal history. Hence, studies about how 
the Code has been received, amended and transferred across Latin America are particularly 
important.147 Second, the Code also played an important role in shaping the core ideas underlying 
the development of a creole legal culture in this region. Its reception contributed to shape a local 
identity that mixed theoretical sophistication with a pragmatic approach to local politics.148 
Finally, the adoption of the Code also facilitated the on-going reception of theories and ideas 
about the law based on it, contributing to shape local legal cultures.149 This is a strand that 
continues to develop today, especially in universities within jurisdictions where Civil Law 
institutions have had a particularly important historical role.  
 
While emphasizing the heritage of European legal traditions continues to be very important 
in Latin American law, it is not the only important current that we find in it today within this 
strand of literature. During the last three decades or so the body of literature focusing on 
constitutional law and human rights has burgeoned. We contend that this is related to the 
changes taking place in these areas of law during this period of time; the “constitutionalisation” 
of entire legal systems, as it is often posed, results from the increasing importance that 
constitutional courts have acquired.150 Along with this change, there has been an increasing 
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reception of theories about rights and constitutional adjudication that are originally from the US 
and Germany. This can be appreciated, along other things, in the reception of authors like 
Ronald Dworkin and Robert Alexy by Latin American judges, practitioners and academics.151 
One of the consequences of the “constitutionalisation” of legal systems has been that these 
theories about rights have “trickled down” unto fields that until recently were dominated by 
traditional legal thought, like criminal law.152 Importantly, the authors that contribute to this 
tradition have developed their own, particular approaches and their texts are, overall, 
constructive, for they support the changes taking place. 
 
These two currents seem to describe entirely different legal cultures, and yet in Latin 
America they co-exist side by side and are integrating into one strand within the literature about 
law in this region. The integration process has been uneasy, for each of these currents stands for 
particular ideas and social structures that are not always congenial. Discussions about the 
“constitutionalisation” of various legal regimes tips-off these difficulties, for they are about the 
advance of constitutional analysis (and Courts) in areas where they had not been involved until 
recently. Therefore, they are interactions where incumbents engage with new participants that 
threaten to establish their own views of these regimes as the new “common sense”. In some 
instances, incumbents have denounced that the new “constitutionalisation” amounts to an 
abusive use of legal theory by courts to usurp the functions of Congress.153 Besides this 
dimension of the confrontation, this integration process also evidences a generational change 
that evidences the rise of the United States as a new epicenter of legal knowledge.154 We contend 
that the accommodation of these different elements or currents is leading to the view that Latin 
America is a “diverse” legal tradition where new theories and institutions drawn from the United 
States share the spotlight with their more traditional civil law counterparts.155 
 
We can use this description of the first strand of literature about Latin American law as a 
background for explaining the origins and developments of the second strand. Readers familiar 
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with the law and development literature will recognize most of the defining traits of this 
particular strand. Several traits characterize it. First, it views legal issues from a policy 
perspective, and thus its analyses and recommendations are policy-driven. In doing so, it 
contrasts sharply with the historical and analytical styles that permeate the strand described 
before. This is also related to the fact that most of this strand has been written under auspices of 
different international organizations that have programs in Latin America, whether in the form 
of aid or technical assistance.156 Second, although the different works that make it up address 
different legal regimes and practices, they share perspectives based on their potential to promote 
economic growth, development and the Rule of Law.157 Arguments about rights have a central 
role in this strand. While the protection of individual rights in general is considered a hallmark of 
democracy and the Rule of Law,158 the protection of property rights is considered essential for 
the development of efficient markets and attaining growth. Hence a topic like judicial reform 
became central to this particular strand, for the judiciary has a very important role in making 
these protections effective - and was a target of key programs of the organizations mentioned 
above.159 Thirdly, this particular strand appeared mostly during the late 1980s and the 1990s as 
neoliberal ideas became prevalent in policy analysis and discussions. This strand is, to some 
extent, a particular development of John Williamson’s Washington Consensus.160 As a result, they 
are considerably critical of the legal institutions and practices that predominated until then, often 
arguing that they were inefficient,161 produced poverty,162 facilitated corruption,163 and other 
negative consequences. Underlying these different views is the premise that Latin American law 
has failed to produce institutions conducive to democracy and economic development.  
 
Most of the literature about competition law in Latin America is part of this second strand of 
the more general body about law in this region. The bulk of this literature was written during the 
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1990s by local and foreign authors, and it is highly critical of the institutions then in place or 
ignores them altogether. It is also a literature that emphasizes the importance of protecting 
competition for having well-functioning markets oriented towards economic growth and 
development. Moreover, individuals that have stakes in the legal reform of these regimes 
participate as authors of this body of literature. Finally, we wish to highlight that it is a body of 
literature that does not engage with the other, more traditional strand about Latin American law. 
Because of this absence, it fails to discuss how the origins of CLRs in this region were related 
with the wider political, legal and economic issues taking place at the time.  
 
III. Writing about Competition Law in Latin America 
 
III.A. Before the 1990s: Competition Law, Development and Foreign Investment 
in Latin America 
 
We begin our analysis by commenting on the texts concerning competition law in Latin 
America before the 1990s. As we argued in the introduction to this dissertation, the advent of 
neoliberal reforms during that decade set the CLRs of this region - and the literature addressing 
them - in a distinctive trajectory of their own. Before the 1990s, texts about competition law in 
Latin America were rather rare. Except for the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (hereinafter UNCTAD), international organizations were focused on other issues. 
The interests of practicing lawyers were also focused on other aspects. The few texts written by 
practitioners address issues that, like technology licensing, seem to follow from the commercial 
activities of their clients. In any case, the literature is scarce but nonetheless quite interesting. 
 
The first text we comment upon is based on a study developed by UNCTAD regarding the 
development of CLRs in Latin America between 1974 and 1978.164 The text, prepared by 
Eduardo White, who also made the study for the above-mentioned organization, is a forerunner 
of the Peer Reviews and similar exercises of the late 1990s and 2000s. It provides valuable 
insights about the trajectories of the CLRs and their relationship with other policies in Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Venezuela, and describes recent developments in each of these 
States.  There are four ideas present in this text that are worth noting. First, these regimes were 
originally quite different, and that such differences result from the local political dynamics of the 
countries in which they appear. Second, that the approach to competition evidences in these 
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regimes is pragmatic, for they complement other policies considered just as important. Third, 
these policies were in the process of adapting to the changing conditions taking place at the time, 
including both the on-going crisis of the late 1970s as well as the development of local markets 
of manufactures goods. Finally, that the development of these regimes does not go along the 
lines of the development of the competition law in the United States or in other jurisdictions, 
exhibiting instead certain particularities of its own.165 Overall, besides being a particularly useful 
secondary source, this text is quite interesting because it evidences how competition law was 
conceived and developed in this region during this period. 
 
In turn, the literature produced by the private sector, and in particular by practitioners, seems 
to follow the interests of foreign firms investing in Latin America. An interesting article about 
this issue, comparing the potential for the development of competition law of licensing laws and 
regulations with regard to competition law enforcement was authored by Lawrence F. Ebb and 
published in 1974.166 This article is also a forerunner of a common element in this body of 
literature, and which consists of practitioners explaining particular elements of the CLRs for the 
benefit of their clients.  
 
Along this line, a 1982 article by Rafael Germán provides a more general commentary of the 
CLRs in Latin America at the time.167 It describes the general outlines of the regimes in Latin 
America, although it places considerable emphasis on Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia and 
Mexico, and how they relate to other economic policies in place. Like White, he argues that the 
CLRs in place evidence a pragmatic approach, balancing the promotion of competition and the 
prevention of anticompetitive abuses with the promotion of national industrialization.168 An 
example of this balancing is, according to this author, the special exceptions that the 
governments can issue, in the name of industrialization, to clear what would otherwise be an 
anticompetitive practice.169 Notably, Germán is rather critical of the CLRs he discusses about. He 
states that neither foreign competition law analyses nor the adoption of competition as an 
organizing principle have been thoroughly adopted in this region, and questions whether certain 
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social conditions - like the close ties between members of the industrial sector - may facilitate 
their flourishing.170  
 
The texts authored by White, Ebb and Germán are different in purpose and outlook. While 
the first address the evolution of CLRs from a policy perspective, the latter comment on 
particular issues of interest for the private sector. However, they have one aspect in common, 
and it is this idea that CLRs were part of a wider net of policies geared towards industrialization 
as a means for development. Both assert that while the regimes are different and their 
enforcement varies, they complement other economic policies and are congenial to the goals of 
the government. Their descriptions highlight the State-centered competition law project as 
described in the previous chapter. 
 
III.B. The Advent of Neoliberalism 
 
The crisis of the 1980s prompted several changes in Latin America concerning economic 
regulation and competition. The changes were about liberalizing the economies and relying 
considerably more on markets, and addressed important elements of the legal systems of these 
countries. In Mexico and Colombia the political inertia resulting from the crisis led to changes in 
the respective constitutions as well as to amendments to their respective CLRs during the early 
1990s. Chile, on the other hand, has already undergone this transformation during the mid 
1970s, and by the 1990s was taking its first steps towards democracy again. The literature about 
competition law taking a regional, Latin American view, has all these issues as part of its 
background.  
 
Malcolm Coate, René Bustamante and A.E. Rodriguez, all members of the Bureau of 
Economics of the US Federal Trade Commission during the 1990s, wrote an early article that 
practically set the tone of future discussions about competition law in this region.171 This article 
is quite interesting for several reasons. To begin with, it aims to explain the enforcement 
priorities that CLRs in this region should have. It notes that recent economic changes such as 
the privatization of State-owned enterprises can be complemented with adequate competition 
law enforcement, and then describes what they consider to be adequate on this regard. In doing 
so, the text suggests that Latin American States have only a limited experience with markets and 
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resources to devote to competition law enforcement.172 Second, the text describes various 
anticompetitive practices, ranging from price fixing to price discrimination, and then comments 
on how they are addressed by US courts and their counterparts in Europe. The description of 
the practices relies considerably on texts authored by “Chicago School” members, notably 
Robert Bork and George Stigler,173 and their advice for Latin American States hardly follows that 
of the EU and is more consistent (although not entirely) with that of the US.174 Moreover, the 
text explicitly argues that the dynamics of the civil law tradition that permeates this region can 
bring about difficulties in contributing to the development of particular regimes.175 Finally, the 
text inaugurates a rather grim view of past enforcement activities that have taken place in Latin 
America. Notably, the text refers to Eduardo White’s text mentioned above but in a jaundiced 
way; instead of highlighting the practical approach involved in combining competition law with 
other policies, they use it to assert that the different regimes have hardly been enforced.176 Also it 
provides a rather inaccurate summary of the CLRs in place at the time, and does so by using US 
categories and in disregard to the rules and doctrines that were already in place in States like 
Chile,177 Moreover, the text does not refer to a single decision issued by any of the enforcement 
authorities in place at the time. Overall, this text is important because it framed the analyses 
about Latin America that were to come, and in doing so it also contributed to a 
misrepresentation of the recent past of CLRs in Latin America.  
 
By the end of the 1990s important changes had already taken place in several Latin American 
jurisdictions. Chile, which had already switched to neoliberal policies in the early 1970s, was 
about to go a new “modernization” of its CLR. The experiences that were resulting then 
contribute to a flurry of books and articles evaluating the recent Latin American experience with 
competition law. Among these was a book published in 1999 containing a collection of essays 
about the development of competition law on both a regional and national perspective edited by 
Moises Naím and Joseph Tulchin. In his chapter, Naím, who is an economics PhD from the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology and was Venezuela’s trade minister between 1989 and 
1990, assesses the preconditions required for having competition in this region.178 He argues that 
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the further development of competition law policies should take into consideration local factors, 
including the residual turbulence resulting from the policy changes themselves. This is so 
because although the effort done until the moment were highly valuable and evidenced a turn for 
the better (that is, for more competition law enforcement), there were still important challenges 
that needed to be met. Some of these efforts include improving the State’s capacity to enforce 
complex policies, but also the capacity to resist protectionist measures, which continued to exist. 
One change he focuses on is the development of a stock market; unless small and medium 
enterprises can take full advantage of financial institutions, they will continue to be at 
disadvantage with regard to well-funded (and well connected) firms. Hence, rather then focusing 
on the enforcement of legal rules, Naím argues, competition would be better served by 
addressing certain economic issues that contribute to its actual development in the first place.179 
Overall, Naím’s text is particular interesting because, by considering the different policy and 
especially macroeconomic facts that affect competition, it adopts an institutionalist analysis of 
CLRs and their effectiveness. 
 
The turn towards institutionalism as part of the neoliberal analyses of Latin America’s CLRs 
would receive a considerable boost from Ignacio de León, arguably the most prolific and 
influential author on competition law in Latin America. His two books on the development of 
competition law in Latin America weave in a unique way the different ideas that we have 
highlighted so far.180 In the second of the two books, “An Institutional Assessment of Antitrust Policy: 
The Latin American Experience”,181 De León argues that competition law in Latin America is deeply 
flawed, and offers two mayor arguments in support of it. A summary of the first argument 
would be as follows: During colonial rule, the Spanish crown controlled economic activities 
according to its own interests and without regard for establishing well-functioning markets. The 
independence movements of the first decades of the 19th century did not affect the prevailing 
ideas regarding this issue in the recently independent Latin American States. Quite the contrary, 
the nascent Latin American States continued to use law to direct economic activities following 
their own political prerogatives. During the 20th century, price controls and import-substitution 
policies prevented the application of the CLRs that were in place at the time, thus continuing the 
suspicions against free markets. The changes to these regimes that followed the “Washington 
Consensus”, for all their emphasis on market liberalization, were unable to challenge this legacy 
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of interventionism. As a result, CLRs and their enforcement have become a new vessel for 
economic dirigisme.182  
 
The second argument is more theoretical and less grounded on the specifics of Latin 
America. De León argues that the economic foundations of competition law enforcement are 
based on a wrongful premise, mainly that market concentration and competitive performance are 
closely related. This premise, in turn, is based on the views about perfectly competitive markets 
and monopolies that emerged in the 1930s developed by notable economist Joan Robinson and 
as a counterpoint to Alfred Marshall’s views. According to De León, Alfred Marshall viewed that 
the increasing returns that monopolists earned contributed to competition dynamically by luring 
new entrants into markets, both of which learned in the process. In turn, Robinson used a static 
theory of competition to argue, on the contrary, that the increasing revenues would benefit 
monopolists by enabling them to strengthen their position in the market, given birth to the 
theory of imperfect competition. Moreover, De León argues, underlying such a view was a 
wrongful interpretation of Marshall’s theory, which apparently she herself acknowledged. 
Eventually, as Robinson’s theory of imperfect competition found its way along industrial 
organization theories, it contributed to the idea that competition law enforcement could bring 
about the “utopia” of competitive markets.183 Therefore, De Léon concludes, competition law in 
Latin American is deeply flawed because it combines a tradition that favors economic dirigisme 
with a legal apparatus based on the analytical tools that (wrongly) justify it. It has been recast and 
adapted to follow the same dirigist policies that prevailed before the 1990s by the political forces 
that drive the development of economic policies in this region.184  
 
The skeptic tone developed by Coate and his co-authors and taken to new heights by De 
León has become a staple of the writing about competition law in Latin America. This can be 
appreciated in other texts that rely on the combination of historical overview of policies and the 
institutional analysis to account for the current state of enforcement in this region or to explain 
particular developments in certain jurisdictions considered problematic.185 Some of these texts 
emphasize the role that legal formalism has in the development of this field of law. On one 
hand, competition law enforcement is distinctively rule-bound, leading to economically 
inaccurate decisions. This results partly from the resistance of judges trained in the civil law 
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tradition who lack the means to rely on economic theories in their reasoning like their common 
law peers. The roots of this lay in the adoption of a formalist legal culture that is suspicious of 
non-literalist interpretations of legal rules.186 On the other, competition authorities have not 
adapted economic tests to the particularities of their own contexts, characterized by highly 
concentrated markets and pervasive informality. As a result, they misinterpret the conditions in 
which competition takes place.187 Overall, these texts are based on a particular form of 
institutionalist analysis that is particularly critical of traditional Latin American institutions; at the 
same time, however, they often fall in generalizations that are hardly defensible. This includes, 
for example, attributing certain behaviors to Latin American judges, without distinctions, as a 
consequence of the civil law rather than to the local conditions they are part of.  
 
Not all the texts written after the 1990s have such a skeptic perspective. An exception to the 
rule, “The Consolidation of Competition Law in Latin America”, is a short piece by Julián Peña that 
describes the trajectory of the CLRs in this region in a single linear fashion for the better, even 
though there are setbacks and problems to be addressed.188 Peña summarizes the development of 
competition law in this region in three stages, ranging roughly from the 1930’s to the 2010’s.189 
In the first stage, which takes place between the 1950s and the 1990s, only a few countries like 
Chile or Mexico had CLRs, which were basic, vague and poorly enforced. These were adopted at 
a time in which there was little support for competition law enforcement, a situation that 
followed from the interventionist bent of the governments. In the second stage, which takes 
place during the 1990s, most countries updated their regimes or adopted new ones. These 
processes took place shortly after the Washington Consensus policies were being implemented. 
The adoption of CLRs and Washington Consensus policies supposedly evidences a break from 
the interventionist policies that predominated in the past. Also, this second stage is characterized 
by the involvement of international organizations like UNCTAD in providing assistance for the 
new regimes to take place. Finally, in the third stage (which begins in the 2000s) the 
consolidation of the different CLRs begins to take place. This stage is characterized by the 
support awarded by the highest levels of the government, and the increasing participation of 
other branches of the State, civil society and academia. Second, it is also characterized by relying 
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less on legal transplants and more on learning from enforcement experiences. Thirdly, it is also 
characterized by the increasing involvement of international organizations, like UNCTAD and 
the OECD.190 This text can be seen as going counter to the other texts mentioned above by 
providing a more positive assessment of the fate of competition law in this region.  
 
 Overall, the texts written about the development of CLRs in Latin America after the 
1990s are quite skeptic about the effectiveness of the reforms accomplished, as they focus on   
institutional factors that contribute to hamper their development. As mentioned above, these 
factors range from a history of undue State interventionism, a pervasive dirigist mentality, the 
limitations brought upon the civil law, and the relatively adverse contexts in which these regimes 
are supposed to take place. In sharp contrast with their predecessors, the literature about 
competition law considered here is highly critical of the experiences before the 1990s, and their 
criticisms are based on the prevailing views of the 1990s rather than on the views prevailing 
before then. What was perceived as a practical approach to competition law - the combination of 
competition law with other developmental policies - was an object of criticism. Moreover, none 
of these texts engages with the decisions issue by the enforcement authorities before the 1990s, 
limiting only to state that these regimes were seldom enforced. In this sense, these texts are not 
empirically grounded, in spite of the fact that they make empirical assessments. In spite of these 
issues, these views have become common when considering issues about the development of 
CLRs in this region.191 
 
IV. The Local Traditions 
 
In the previous section we commented upon a series of texts that discussed the development 
of CLRs in Latin America, before and after the 1990s. In this section, we turn to the literature 
about the CLRs in each of the countries we study - Chile, Colombia and México. Instead of 
commenting on all or some of the texts that address these regimes, we focus on a few texts 
related to field dynamics that contributed to shape each of these regimes. In doing so, we also 
focus our attention to particular periods of time and to particular topics.  
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At the outset we would like to point to some important differences between the literature we 
review here and the one commented in the previous section besides the rather obvious 
differences in scope. Firstly, the literature addressing individual CLRs evidences the political 
issues taking place at the national and international level. In this sense, most of the texts that 
compose it respond to changes in political perspectives, and imprint these new perspectives unto 
local competition law analysis. Moreover, most of the texts are written by individuals that are 
involved in the issues they describe, either as practitioners addressing an aspect of the law related 
with their own practices (and the situation of their clients), as public officials doing work related 
to the enforcement authorities, or as consultants addressing issue their clients consider merit 
attention.  Second, this literature is also more empirical than its regional counterpart, for it has 
considerably more references to actual decisions, laws and other legal materials. It is a highly 
valuable source of insights about how each of the CLRs we study throughout this dissertation is 
experienced by the actors that participate in it. Thirdly, while it is a literature that focuses on the 
institutions of a given State, it can often have an outward, international perspective. It is not 
uncommon to find texts that, in order to justify a series of policy choices or particular 
interpretations of legal provisions turn to legal materials from other jurisdictions. For example, 
references to authors like Robert Bork are common. We believe this is a consequence of the 
particular trajectories of the authors of these texts; after studying abroad, they rely on foreign 
sources to justify the institutions or interpretations they prefer. Overall, this body of literature is 
also less skeptic about the future of the different regimes, although is can be just as critical of the 
established institutions.  
 
IV.A. Chile: Between the Old and the New Neoliberal Traditions 
 
We begin our analysis with Chile, the only of the countries that we study here that embarked 
on a neoliberal path before the 1990s. The development of local approaches to this country’s 
regime has been deeply influenced by the political events taking place in it, and in particularly by 
the neoliberal program developed by the military regime and which led to the adoption of a new 
CLR in 1973 and a new constitution in 1980.  
 
From the perspective of the development of local approaches to competition law, the texts 
written between the 1973 coup and the mid 1990s bring forth two different strands of 
neoliberalism. The differences in approach have not been addressed by the different studies on 
this regime, for they assume that the original neoliberal outlook of this regime has endured over 
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time.192 We argue, instead, that the different pieces of literature issued during the period 
mentioned above evidence a transition that takes place within the neoliberal competition law 
project. 
 
The period we focus on ranges from the mid 1970s unto the mid 1990s, and during it several 
important political events took place, including the enactment of Decreto Ley 211 of 1973, the 
adoption of the 1980 constitution, and the return to democracy in 1990. The texts and related 
events we focus on evidence the consolidation of neoliberalism, but also its change from a 
concern for protecting markets via legal rules to the attainment of efficient regimes. In this 
sense, this texts evidence a series of intellectual changes that are taking place within the 
neoliberal camp as they are reflected upon the particular Chilean context. 
 
The first text we consider here was published two years before the 1973 military coup in the 
American Journal of Comparative Law and was authored by Dale Furnish, a US law professor.193 
There are several reasons why this text is of interest, including its wealth of details about the 
enforcement of law 13.305 of 1959 and its references to direct sources, very much in the vein of 
Eduardo White’s. Moreover, we find the text particularly interesting because Furnish noted in 
1971 that the enforcement activities were diminishing as a consequence of the mayor changes 
taking place at the level of economic policy. He concludes soberly that “[b]arring an unlikely turn 
of events under the present or some future administration, antitrust will never be an important 
law in Chile, as respects the domestic economy.”194  
 
Furnish’s comments were ominous. The socialist government of Salvador Allende brought 
competition law enforcement almost to a stand still, but then this field experienced a revival 
under the military regime. The military coup of 1973 adopted a plan to reverse the economic 
policies enacted by the previous governments, including the enactment of a new competition law 
statute, Decreto Legislativo 211 of 1973 (hereinafter DL 211). This decree became the cornerstone 
of Chile’s CLR, and its enforcement activities led to texts reflecting on its enforcement. 
Members of the enforcement authorities wrote most of the texts published in the years that 
followed the enactment of DL 211 and they are mostly about comments on the case law and the 
doctrines that were developing. One of these texts, written by Waldo Ortuzar, director of the 
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competition law enforcement body, the Fiscalía Nacional Económica, is of particular interest 
because it describes the changes introduced by the DL 211 of 1973 and the decisions resulting 
from it.195 This text relies on microeconomic theory to describe issues of competition, but 
decisively asserts that the goals of its enforcement are the ones defined by the law.196 In doing so, 
it does not grant to efficiency considerations the intellectual prowess they received in the 
competition law literature of other jurisdictions.   
 
Even so, a local neoliberal doctrine was in the making as fiscal Ortuzar published his analysis. 
We refer, in particular to the growing influence that the so-called “Chicago boys” and the 
gremialistas were having in the craft of new policies within the military regime and which led, 
among other things to the 1980 Constitution. The first group composed by economists from 
Universidad Católica that had participated in a foreign research program organized between this 
institution and the University of Chicago since in 1956. Among the most visible individuals of 
this group was Sergio de Castro, an economist who contributed to draft the neoliberal manifesto 
known as El Ladrillo (literally, “The Brick”).197 The second was a group that came to be known as 
the “gremialistas”. It was organized around a catholic-inspired conservative movement led by 
Jaime Guzmán, who was part of the drafting group of the 1980 Constitution. Although their 
ideas did not match in all aspects, both groups coincided in the most important agencies of the 
Chilean State during the military regime and worked together towards the consolidation of what 
came to be the first neoliberal State in Latin America.198  
  
“Think tanks” played a very important role in the making of this local neoliberal doctrine. 
An example of their activities to such purposes can be found in the record of the activities 
organized by the Centro de Estudios Públicos or CEP. This organisation was established by 
politicians and academics with ties to other national and international networks related with 
neoliberalism, including the Mount Pelerin Society. Thanks to their plans, they arranged two 
visits by Friedrich Hayek to Chile in 1977 and 1981.199 CEP also arranged the visit to Chile, in 
1982 of Ernst Joaquin Mestmäcker, a noted “Ordoliberal” and former director of Germany’s 
competition bureau. During this visit, Mestmäcker participated in a colloquia about competition 
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law attended among others by fiscal Waldo Ortuzar and Jorge Streeter (a well-known competition 
law professor at the Universidad de Chile). The text of Mestmäcker’s intervention was published 
by CEP and stands todays as an example of the influences on Chilean competition law and 
constitutional law.200 During the colloquia Mestmäcker expounded his views about individual 
freedom and competition law, stating that “[t]he purpose of antitrust laws is the protection of 
the possibility of free competition. It is impossible to define the content of freedom without 
destroying it. Freedom is indeterminate by definition. For this reason, it can only be protected 
through negative rules.”201  
 
 We contend that events taking place in the background, like the consolidation of a 
neoliberal constitutional regime, as well as special events organized for the benefit of the 
competition law community, like Mestmäcker’s visit, had a profound effect on the way this field 
of law was conceived by local actors. In particular, it led to an understanding of competition law 
that, along the lines of the 1980 Constitution, was viewed as a form of administrative punitive 
law (in Spanish derecho administrativo sancionatorio). The reasons for viewing competition law under 
this light become clearer when considering the disruptive nature of competition law enforcement 
by a State that is not to be trusted. Since competition law enforcement affects the exercise of 
property rights and freedom of contract of the parties directly involved, its proceedings should 
meet high standards, - perhaps analogous to those involved in depriving individuals of their 
freedom, as in criminal law. This particular view of competition law also found support in the 
fact that DL 211 had administrative as well as criminal punishments, thus enabling discussions 
about the adequate canons of interpretation and burdens of proof required for its lawful 
application. Contemporary discussions about the burden of proof required to ascertain the 
occurrence of certain practices and the use of criminal law to sanction forbidden anticompetitive 
practices have their roots in these discussions. A canonical example of the discussions resulting 
from the criminal law approach to competition law issues can be found in the work of Domingo 
Valdés, a long-standing professor of competition law at Universidad de Chile. In his book, he 
states the following:   
 
 It may, perhaps, draw certain attention the use of an expression like “legally 
protected good” for a body of law that, like Decree Law 211, has been subject to recent 
modifications leading to the elimination of the criminal provision for monopoly has been 
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withdrawn (…). However, as we will explain below, this is not enough to affirm that 
Decree Law 211 rejects the use of notions and fundamental guarantees designed 
originally for the criminal field and that today can be properly extended to the so-called 
illicit administrative acts. Additionally, we will develop our conception that the difference 
of degree, and not of nature, that differentiates the criminal from the administrative 
crime, which will be dealt with in the respective chapter.202  
 
If the interpretation of DL 211 through the lens of administrative punitive law is a result of 
the field dynamics involved in the making of the Chilean State during the last decades, so to are 
the more recent law and economics approach. The latter of the two is a development that results 
from the growing importance that economists acquired within the Latin American States, 
including the Chilean State, a trend that continued during the transition to democracy.203 In the 
case of competition law, it is also a consequence of granting access to economists to the public 
institutions involved in the application of the relevant provisions, as is the case in Chile. The first 
texts showing this trend date from the early 1990s. Examples of these are a series of texts by the 
former president of one of the enforcing bodies, Ricardo Paredes, which appeared during the 
early 1990s. In “Jurisprudencia De Las Comisiones Antimonopolio En Chile” Paredes argued that both 
the legal provisions that make up competition law and their enforcement should be grounded on 
economic theory. Moreover, the only practices that should be punished are those that diminish 
social welfare, as assessed from the perspective of economic efficiency. This should lead to 
cautious, case-by-case analyses of the different acts or agreements prohibited, since most of 
them can foster competition under some conditions.204 In doing so, this text marks an important 
difference with the views expressed by fiscal Ortuzar back in 1978; while the fiscal uses economic 
theory to describe issues of competition but frames the goals of law enforcement explicitly in the 
law, Paredes relies on economic theory as well for setting the goals that enforcement should 
pursue. This difference is highly significant because it evidences the increasing reliance on 
economic theory as a normative standard for policy, a development typical of the more recent 
versions of neoliberalism (see chapter 2).  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
201 Ibid. Pg. 12 
202 Valdés Prieto, Domingo. Libre Competencia Y Monopolio. Editorial jurídica de Chile, 2009. Pg. 78. Quotes 
in the original text. The change referred to is law 19.911 of 2003. (My translation) 
203 See in general Dezalay, Yves, and Bryant G Garth. The Internationalization of Palace Wars: Lawyers, 
Economists, and the Contest to Transform Latin American States. University of Chicago Press, 2002. 
204 Paredes, Ricardo. "Jurisprudencia De Las Comisiones Antimonopolio En Chile." Estudios Públicos, no. 58 
(1994). (Hereinafter Jurisprudencia) Pgs. 232 - 233. (Citing Robert Bork’s The Antitrust Paradox) 
  72 
Why is there an absence of texts addressing competition law from perspectives different 
from neoliberalism, as can be found in Mexico? Given the politics of the military regime, the 
development of State-centered projects would not have been viable given the alignment of 
academics and practitioners, lawyers and economists, with the political stakeholders during and 
after the regime.205 In particular, the effect on legal education and practices was considerable. It 
strengthened the tendency to continue with traditional ways of legal education and weakened 
other alternatives based on more sociolegal research.206 These conditions would explain why 
there is an almost complete absence of research, based on sociolegal or critical traditions, 
addressing the Chilean CLR.  
 
IV.B. Colombia: Professors, Litigants and Consultants 
 
 Like its Chilean and Mexican counterparts, the literature about Colombia’s CLR during 
the 1990s was a by-product of the changes taking place in this country at the time. It is made of 
two   different approaches or currents. A first current, which has been developed mostly by 
lawyers, aims to develop particular doctrines regarding how the provisions in the new articles 
ought to be interpreted. A second current, in turn, framed the adoption of a new statute as part 
of the government’s efforts to overhaul this country’s regulatory apparatus.  
 
 Against this background, the literature about Colombia’s CLR focused on the 
significance of the changes undergone, and especially on issues related to the application of law 
155 of 1959 and decreto ley 2153 of 1992.  The first of the strands we consider here is arguably the 
strongest and better established. It has been developed by a more recent generation of 
"gentleman lawyers" that has taken advantage of these changes to capitalize their knowledge 
about foreign law.207 This new generation of lawyers teaches and practices law, but in contrast 
with previous generations they have a neoliberal approach. Their positions within influential 
universities like Pontificia Universidad Javeriana (hereinafter PUJ), enabled these lawyers to 
shape how law students understand what competition law is about. As teachers they provide to 
their students a sense of the key issues that make this field of law. As practitioners, they litigate 
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before the competition law authority using their academic background to make arguments 
regarding the adequate interpretation of the law. In the latter scenario they relate with other 
professionals who were their students or read their texts, and that can typically be working as 
their counterparts, SIC employees, or counsel to common clients. Their double positioning 
makes them “brokers” of knowledge and gives them an inordinate capacity to shape how this 
field is understood.  
 
 Alfonso Miranda Londoño stands out as a predominant example. After doing his LL.M. 
in Cornell Law School, Miranda returned to Colombia and started the Centro de Estudios de Derecho 
de la Competencia (CEDEC), a center for the study of competition law at PUJ in 1995.208 By then 
Miranda had already published a few articles in Colombian journals, including an article on the 
general features of US antitrust law in Spanish.209 Since then Miranda has argued for the use of 
foreign doctrines for the understanding of Colombia’s CLR. For example, in various occasions 
he has argued in different articles that the “Rule of Reason” and the per se rule are applicable to 
the legal provisions that prohibit anticompetitive conducts in Colombia.210 His argument is that 
the open-ended prohibitions established in articles 1 of law 155 of 1959 and 46 of DL 2153 
should be interpreted according to the “Rule of Reason”, in order to accommodate for an 
effects-based approach that takes into consideration the market power of the investigated 
parties. In turn, the per se rule is applicable to all the other provisions that are not open ended 
because they establish with precision the reach of their prohibition.211 In another article, Miranda 
provides an overview of the basic economic issues involved in the protection of competition, 
linking explicitly economic ideas, legal provisions and institutional arrangements.212 While the 
articles authored by Miranda and by the other members of the PUJ “school” are perhaps the 
ones most interested in the history of competition law, they nonetheless lack evidence to support 
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their claims about this regime before the 1990s.213 In doing so, this strand has contributed to the 
myth that competition law enforcement began in the 1990s.  
 
 One of the particularities about the literature on competition law in Colombia is the 
relative high number of articles addressing the application of competition law rules to the 
agricultural sector. This is most likely a result of these lawyers reflecting upon their own legal 
practice and the cases they participate in. One of the more prominent authors from the PUJ, 
Juan David Gutierrez, has published several texts in which he addresses cartels and other 
restrictive practices with an eye on the agricultural sector.214 On the same issue, there is also a 
notable text by María Clara Lozano and Ricardo Arguello.215 While not theoretical in outlook, 
these texts are particularly interesting for appreciating how Colombian practitioners and 
academics understand these issues. 
 
 Until recently, competition law issues were almost exclusively a topic developed by 
lawyers. Economists have developed a second current, which has been historically less strong. It 
views the development of competition law as a product of the 1990s and is mostly about 
explaining the importance of having a CLR for a well-functioning economy. Very much like its 
international counterpart, this current characterizes the pre 1990s competition law practice as 
non-existent and the regulation of the time as highly cumbersome and problematic. The legal 
reforms of the 1990s, in turn, evidence an interest in competition and economic efficiency. An 
example of this strand is the article about competition and regulation written by the former 
Minister of Finance during the Gaviria Administration, Rudolph Hommes.216 This author argues 
that the absence of a strong CLR in Colombia can be explained by looking at the political 
economy underlying the development of regulation in this country. Firstly, the populist 
movements that would support competition law have not taken roots in Colombia, and the other 
political forces that could do so rely on business associations and conglomerates for their 
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electoral survival.217 Second, Hommes argues that an even more important reason has been the 
support of industrialization, which is supposed to be at odds with competition.218 Thirdly, and 
this is the reason he details more, the historical evolution of business in Colombia has not 
created a demand of this kind of regimes. The major Colombian enterprises developed as 
business conglomerates in order to cope with the governmental regulation as well as to take 
advantage of the opportunities it entailed. As a consequence, there has been historically little 
appeal for policies that aim to foster competition.219 However, he argues, the reforms of the 
Gaviria administration grant the State with the tools to address anticompetitive practices, if there 
is the political will for doing so.220  
 
 It is important to note that Hommes does not refer at all to the first CLR, established in 
decree 2061 of 1955, nor to the decisions issued by the competition law enforcers before the 
1990s. This view is not supported by any empirically based study of the decisions found in the 
national repositories. Instead of offering any support of this sort, he offers a series of reasons for 
considering that such enforcement was unlikely, and then proceeds to argue for the importance 
that granting political support to competition law enforcement. His position as a former cabinet 
member, directly involved in the changes of the 1990s, grants his views with considerable 
authority. Perhaps this explains why the idea that there has been little competition law 
enforcement in Colombia remains such a well-established myth. (In the following chapter we 
describe briefly a series of decisions issued between 1962 and 1968 that challenge this view.) 
Later analysis by lawyers and economists will continue this trend.221 It is only recently that 
economists have devoted to analyzing particular decisions issued by the enforcer.222 
 
IV.C. Mexico: Neoliberal Design, Illiberal Performance 
 
 The literature about the development of competition law in Mexico has important 
similarities with the literatures just discussed concerning Chile and Colombia. Firstly, it is a 
literature that reflects the regulatory changes that took place during the 1990s, including the 
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adoption of a new CLR. Second, it is also a body of literature that evidences a close proximity 
between practice and academia. However, there also are texts developed by academics and other 
individuals without direct ties to the events they describe, both local and foreign. Below we will 
focus on two particular currents of literature. The first is made of texts written by actors 
involved in the making of the CLR of the 1990s, and focus on both their use of foreign 
categories and sources to highlight their sophistication. The second, in turn, details how the CLR 
was incapable of dealing with sheer monopoly power. The contrast between these two currents - 
the first one is hopeful, while the other is critical and gives the impression of a “failed State” - 
evidences the parallel between the literature about competition law in this country and the body 
of literature about competition law in Latin America. 
  
 The first current we consider is composed mostly of texts written by lawyers and 
economists that participated in the drafting of Mexico’s competition law statute of 1992, the Ley 
Federal de Competencia Económica (hereinafter LFCE) or that have close professional ties with the 
enforcement agency. The drafters of this law were officials working for the Pedro Salinas de 
Gortari government, which negotiated the participation of Mexico in the North America Free 
Trade Agreement, liberalized regulation and privatized several state-owned enterprises, including 
Telmex. It is against this background that the new law was being crafted. A very interesting article 
describing the origins of this law, written by Gabriel Castañeda, reveals the interest of the 
drafting team in making a competition law bill that incorporated the analysis developed by other 
jurisdictions and international organizations. In particular, he notes, the intellectual thrust of the 
LFCE was based on Robert Bork’s The Antitrust Paradox, and the distinction it establishes 
between absolute monopolistic practices (including most horizontal agreements) and relative 
monopolistic practices (like vertical agreements and unilateral conducts) was based on texts by 
Thomas Sullivan and F.M. Scherer.223 These efforts to come up with what looked like a 
sophisticated competition law statute paid off, as they were considered as positive by 
international observers.224  
 
 However, it is important to note that not all the literature addressing the enactment of 
the new law present it in positive terms, for there are a few texts that cast a shadow over the 
politics involved in the adoption of the law in the first place. For example, in a 1997 article James 
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Crawford argues that the enactment of this law was a way of balancing a series of conflicting 
political interests that were resulting from Mexico’s accelerated liberalization process.225 On one 
hand, the Mexican economy needed foreign investment and the dynamism resulting from having 
free trade, but on the other it also needed to protect its national industry from the competition 
that their US counterparts could impose. The LFCE is part of such balancing process, Crawford 
argues, because by forbidding a series of practices considered anticompetitive it is providing a 
space for local industries to defend their grounds with regard to foreign firms, including those 
that could be important competitors.226 From a different perspective, Manuel Palma Rangel 
argued in a 2007 text that the adoption of the LFCE should be understood in terms of the local 
political dynamics. The enactment of this law took place in a deteriorated political context for 
the ruling party, the Partido Revolucionario Institucional; the reforms previous to the law favored 
local Mexican interests, and the LFCE’s own design prevented its application to the outcomes of 
these reforms. Hence, while the law is about protecting competition, its design precludes its 
application to sources of anticompetitive conduct resulting from close ties between politicians 
and industry members.227 
 
 The second current that we consider here addresses the consequences resulting from the 
capacity of the LFCE to address monopoly power in light of the proceedings conducted against 
Telmex. As we argue in Chapter 7, this strand develops the observations made by some of the 
authors mentioned before. It is made of texts that focus on the interaction between the CLR and 
the telecommunications regime, especially in the efforts of the former to tackle the behavior of 
this company. In particular, these texts comment upon the privatization of Telmex, its subsequent 
behavior as a monopolist, and the consequences this has produced for consumers, the market 
and the CLR. They reinforce the idea that crony practices dictate policy outcomes and that the 
fields of law that could address the latter, like competition law, are unable to do so.228 In doing 
so, this current reinforces the negative views about policy that are common to the literature on 
Latin American law in general. 
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 When considered together, the literature about competition law that results from Chile, 
Colombia and Mexico (especially during the 1990s) shows the extent to which it is understood as 
a local law regime that is shaped by local and international actors. We discuss particular aspects 
of the processes involved in the following chapters. As to what the literature shows, the 
adoption of CLRs entailed a promise of modernization that was only partially fulfilled in the best 
of cases. This promise, especially during the 1990s, came hand-in-hand with new forms of 
knowledge and discourse, while the factors that prevent its attainment are typically characterized 
as local - even indigenous - issues like the political system. In doing so, the literature about 
competition law in the different States here considered parallels the arguments and perspectives 
of the body of literature about the development of CLRs from a more regional perspective 
discussed in section III. 
 
V. Conclusions 
 
 Throughout this chapter we have commented upon different texts dealing with 
competition law in Latin America, both at a regional and local (State-based) level. We discussed a 
few texts addressing competition law before the 1990s, and then focused on those that were 
published after that.  We focused on texts that addressed key issues in each of the jurisdictions 
we are studying - Chile, Colombia and Mexico - in order to emphasize the connections between 
the literature and the changes taking place.  
 
A particular set of texts that we have not mentioned, but that are becoming increasingly 
more important, are the studies of the regimes produced by organizations like UNCTAD or the 
OECD. The history of these reviews dates to before the 1990s, as the text by Eduardo White for 
UNCTAD evidences. We will argue in chapter 8 that the more recent versions of these texts, 
and especially those of the OECD, are developed as part of the strategies that these 
organizations, and others, have to bring about the convergence of the different Latin American  
CLRs. We contend that these texts “bridge” local understandings about competition law and the 
more international views about what competition law should be about in this region. As they 
become references for both local and international actors, these reviews and reports play an 
important role in shaping future understandings about competition law in Latin America. We 
will comment upon these texts in chapter 8. 
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We wish to highlight that the assessments found in these texts provide considerable support 
for the reforms that have taken place since the 1990s, and they do so by characterizing 
competition law practices before then as a non-existent, sporadic or counterproductive. There 
are texts that, although second-hand sources, provide the elements to challenge such an 
interpretation of the past. There are also first-hand sources that do so directly (see chapter 4). 
But, even in the absence of both, it is remarkable that the literature on competition law in Latin 
America has devoted so little attention and efforts to study competition law enforcement before 
the 1990s. Except for the texts by White, Furnish and Ortuzar, there is no text based on rigorous 
archival research that provides any basis for making claims about the levels, adequacy or effects 
of enforcement in Latin America. Hence, all that we have left are stylized accounts of these 
CLRs that are of little help for understanding this field of law. Moreover, in doing so, this body 
of literature reinforces the more negative aspects that typically characterize the body of literature 
about Latin American law in general.229 
 
The shortcomings of the literature about competition law are so serious that it gives place to 
important examinations about the origins and developments of this field of law. If Latin 
American governments were against competition between the 1930s and the 1990s, why did they 
adopt the first competition law regimes during this period? Why did they enforce them? If a 
State like Mexico was so imbued in economic dirigisme since the early 20th century, how do we 
explain the adoption a constitutional provision ordering the protection of competition and 
banning monopolies in 1917? How do we reconcile the different neoliberal views about 
competition in Chile after the military coup of 1973? We will offer some tentative answers to 
these and other, related questions in the following chapters of this dissertation.   
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4. Competition Law in Latin America 1910s - 1980s 
 
I. Introduction 
 
An important question left unanswered left by the existing literature is why the examined 
jurisdictions adopted competition law regimes (hereinafter CLRs) in periods of time in which 
allegedly the promotion of competitive markets did not constitute a priority for their 
governments. In the previous chapter we argued that this body of literature is unclear as to how 
it grounds its claims regarding the lack of enforcement of such regimes. Not only the different 
texts reviewed fail to cite any source to sustain such claim, they also fail to specify what level of 
enforcement counts as adequate. Identifying these shortcomings opens the possibility of 
suggesting a different history of the origins and development of competition law in Latin 
America.  
 
The purpose of this chapter is to address these shortcomings by providing a new account of 
the first CLRs in Latin America. We argue that the adoption of the first CLRs followed from 
ideas related with granting the State more tools to address economic phenomenon. Underlying 
this process were changes in the constitutional politics of the countries just mentioned. The 
pressures exerted by new radical ideas, industrialization and the consolidation of urban labor, 
increasingly challenged 19th century constitutions. The result in Chile and Colombia were 
changes to the constitutional protection to property rights and an expansion of the State’s 
regulatory capacity. In turn, the first CLRs followed from these changes, as they complemented 
price-control regulations and other economic policies that granted to the State a considerable 
control over the economy. In the case of México, the result was the 1917 Constitution, the first 
of its kind establishing a social-oriented and developmental approach to competition law. Hence, 
the shortcomings noted before can be addressed by considering the enactment of the first CLRs 
in light of the constitutional changes taking place during the 20th century. 
 
This chapter is divided in the following sections: Section II explains the transformation of 
Latin American constitutions that enabled the adoption of CLRs. Although this process was 
different in Chile, Colombia and México, it led to similar outcomes, namely granting the State 
more powers to regulate economic issues. Section III describes the conditions that led to the 
enactment, the main features and changes over time of the first CLRs in Chile, Colombia and 
México. Finally, section IV presents our conclusions. 
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II. The Constitutional Foundations of Competition Law In Latin America 
 
 Our analysis begins with a brief overview of constitutional history and theory in Latin 
America. The independence movement that swept through Latin America during the first 
decades of the 19th century uprooted the traditional roots of colonial political power in the newly 
formed States. In the absence of a strong monarchy supported by the Catholic Church, local 
elites were confronted with the need to fill a legitimacy gap by building governmental institutions 
based on whatever sources of legitimacy they could muster. This proved to be extremely 
difficult. After all, the liberal ideas that fostered the independence movement in the first place – 
individual liberty, equality, and democracy – pushed against consolidated structures (political and 
economic) that were privilege-based and hierarchical.230  
 
 Given the pre-eminence of conservative and liberal forces during the 19th century, it 
should not be surprising that the above mentioned constitutions were, in general, conservative 
constitutions with liberal undertones. First, they include similar provisions protecting civil and 
especially property rights preventing their amendment by future laws, preventing their 
expropriation without compensation.231 They also privileged Catholicism over other religious 
beliefs, establish a strong executive branch among other branches of power, and condition the 
extension political rights to issues of education and wealth.232 This is particularly so for the 
Chilean constitution of 1833, which remained in place until 1925, and that embodied the 
conservative values of the dominant conservative factions but was amended by liberal 
governments between the 1860s and the 1880s.233 It is also the case of the 1886 Colombian 
constitution, which was adopted as a conservative solution to the political disarray prompted by 
the liberal and federalist constitution of 1863.234 Even so, it was a constitution that was also 
“liberalized” during the 20th century until it was replaced in 1991. However, it was not strictly the 
case of the 1857 Mexican constitution, which was originally a liberal compact inspired in the 
1854 Plan de Ayutla and the program of La Reforma, and which lasted until 1917. Even so, this 
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constitution shared with its Chilean and Colombian counterparts both the enshrinement of 
property rights and the establishment of a strong executive branch.235  
 
 The constitutionalism of the 19th century came under considerable pressure as different 
economic, social and political factors pushed for change at various levels of governance. As 
industrialization-related processes and immigration from Europe continued to take place during 
the early 20th century, the size of the urban population grew considerably. As a result, the political 
views and interests of this burgeoning population, including their demands for more rights and 
better working conditions, became politically more salient. The increasing political importance of 
this population and of its demands also contributed to ascendance of leftist political parties as 
well as to the inclination to the left of liberal parties. This change in the intellectual and political 
landscape brought the demise of the traditional conservative and liberal views that prevailed 
during the 19th century.236 As a result, these new ideas, as well as prevailing social conflicts, 
exerted a considerable pressure over the core tenets underlying the 19th century constitutions and 
the economic order they sustained.237  
 
 The result of this pressure was the adoption of new constitutional theories that had a 
more “social” component. This “social” component meant reconsidering the social and 
economic conditions that had to be assured in order to achieve the purposes established under 
the constitutional order.238 However, the demise of 19th century constitutionalism did not imply 
anything like a new constitutional beginning. The new constitutional “mix” extended some 
institutional arrangements already in place and altered others. Among the former is the 
establishment of a strong executive branch, characterized by having a strong president who 
could enact and enforce legal rules, sometimes by overriding the acts of legislative bodies. 
Among the latter is the redefinition of the constitutional protection extended to civil and 
especially property rights, and which enabled the State to intervene further more on economic 
processes. Although the relationship between presidentialism and the constitutional protection 
of private property is complex, we assert that the enlargement of the latter could not take place 
without the former. This is so because as long as property rights could not be amended, 
regulatory processes would be subject to burdensome processes relating to the compensation 
property owners expected to receive from their property. From this perspective, a staunch 
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protection of property rights would prevent the State from accomplishing its mandates and 
presidents from following through with their policies. Hence, only after it became politically 
acceptable to rearrange or restructure property rights could the State embark in a process of 
regulatory development that came across as constitutionally legitimate.  
 
 An important change in the theory of the constitutional protection of property rights 
came from European private law theory. The scholarship of authors like León Duguit became 
influential in Latin America during the first half of the 20th century. Duguit himself presented in 
Argentina his work General Transformations of Private Law Since the Code Napoléon in 1911. It was 
during the presentations of he famously stated that “property is not a right; it is a social 
function.”239 Duguit’s work was part of a wider current of anti-formalist and solidarity-oriented 
legal thought that revolted against 19th century legal projects, and especially, against the 
individualism embedded in the 1804 French Civil Code. This movement saw in law an 
instrument for social transformation and a manifestation of the culture in which it emerged, as 
opposed to Universalist or ahistorical theories of law.240 While this changes in legal thought 
originated in Europe (and in to similar extent in the US), they acquired a particular significance in 
Latin America that they didn’t have in their original context.241 Duguit carefully distinguished his 
work from socialist theories of law, for when he claimed that property rights were a “social 
function” he argued he was providing framework for understanding the social transformations 
he witnessed.242 However, his theory was used in Chile and in Colombia for tempering with the 
constitutional protection extended to civil rights and then became a justification for the 
implementation of large-scale reforms regarding the use of land and industrial development.243  
 
 A consequence of adhering to Duguit’s arguments is viewing private property rights as 
comprising a set of relations originating in social practices. Their “social function” could be 
modified in different ways and in accordance with the prevailing views and needs of the time. In 
turn, Duguit’s ideas became amalgamated with other strands of public law theory that became 
                                                            
239 Duguit, Léon. Les Transformations Générales Du Droit Privé Depuis Le Code Napoléon. (2d ed. 1920) Pg. 
21. Quoted in: Mirow, Matthew C. "Social-Obligation Norm of Property: Duguit, Hayem, and Others, the." Fla. 
J. Int'l L. 22 (2010): 191. (Hereinafter The Social-Obligation Norm of Property) 
240 See Kennedy, Duncan. "Three Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought: 1850 - 2000." In The New Law and 
Economic Development: A Critical Appraisal. Edited by David M Trubek and Alvaro Santos. Cambridge 
University Press, 2006. 
241 An excellent explanation of this phenomenon can be found in López Medina, Diego Eduardo. Teoría Impura 
Del Derecho. La Transformación De La Cultura Jurídica Latinoamericana. Universidad de los Andes, Legis & 
Universidad Nacional de Colombia (2004) 
242 Mirow, Origins, Op.cit. Pg. 1192. 
243 Regarding Chile, see Mirow, Ibid. Regarding Colombia, see Bonilla, Op.cit. 
  84 
prevalent at the time, like corporativism.244 During the late 1920s and after, corporativism 
became the dominant paradigm of State organization in Europe, and was briefly developed in 
the US.245 Under corporativism, the State should aspire to become the embodiment of national 
sentiment. To that extent, it should incorporate different social groups – the military, the 
Catholic Church, the industrial sector, and labor – into its structure with the purpose of 
conciliating the conflicts that took place between them. Moreover, the State could direct the 
different economic processes in ways that would contribute to the general welfare and conciliate 
the ensuing conflicts that such processes bring about.246 As Howard Wiarda points out, there is 
certain affinity between the “social function” theory of property rights and corporativism (as a 
theory of government).247 Because the State embodies the interest of the whole society, it can 
confiscate or limit severely the exercise of an individual’s property rights in order to tend the 
common good. In doing so, the State acts as an arbiter between competing claims to resources 
posited by actors with different interest, in order to accommodate and prevent conflicts.248  
 
 The combination of new property rights theories and corporativism was complemented 
with development economics, that is, economic theories and policies conceived to bring about 
economic development. As mentioned in chapter 2, in the 1930s Latin American States 
developed a regulatory apparatus with the purpose of protecting national industries, based on 
raising import tariffs and subsidies along corporativist lines. By the 1950s this trend was further 
accentuated by the different strands of development theories developed by authors like Walt W. 
Rostow, Albert Hirschman, Raul Prebisch or Fernando Henrique Cardoso. The adoption of 
policies combining the substitution of imports with local products, the fostering of exports, and 
the devaluation of local currencies became common strategies in the quest for development. The 
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Latin American State thus became a corporativist “developmental state”. The enactment of the 
first CLRs was a result of these ideas and developments. 
 
II.A. Chile 
 
 When compared to its 1833 predecessor, the 1925 Constitution brought important 
changes regarding the protection of civil and in particular property rights, but continued with the 
tradition of establishing a relatively strong executive branch. Regarding the first of these traits, 
section 10 of article 10 of the 1925 constitution began by stating that all forms of property rights 
were inviolable. Then, this provision established that no individual shall be deprived of their 
property rights without due process of law, or unless it is required for achieving a public purpose 
as defined by the law, case in which a the owner is entitled to compensation.249 Following this it, 
it states that the exercise of property rights are subject to “public utility” limitations required for 
maintaining and achieving social order, and therefore the law may impose restrictions “in favor 
of the interests of the State, the health of the citizens and the public well-being”.250  
 
 The notion of subduing private property to “public utility” resulted from the discussions 
that took place in the 1925 constitutional assembly, led by President Alessandri. Within the 
assembly, members of the Radical Party argued that property rights could not be absolute, and 
that they should fulfill a “social function”, while members of the liberal-moderate and 
conservative parties defended notions of property rights that were closer to the liberal tradition 
and of an individualist inclination.251 As the discussions ensued, President Alessandri proposed a 
draft of article 10 that appeased the contending parties. While the liberal formulation of property 
rights was maintained, the idea of limiting them in the name of “public utility” was also included 
because doing so was a way of reflecting how the Chilean constitutional regime was keeping up 
with the social changes that were taking place at the time. Underlying this change, moreover, was 
the intellectual influence of Leon Duguit, whom Alessandri quoted often while explaining the 
text he proposed.252  
 
 As mentioned before, this constitution maintained the figure of a strong executive 
branch led by a president. The function of the president was given wide discretion to issue the 
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decrees and ordinances necessaries for the enforcement of the laws enacted by Congress.253 The 
constitution also enabled the president to issue special decrees during episodes of internal 
commotion and the declaration of the state of siege.254 However, these functions were quite 
limited in the original context, and were amended later on. The elections for president were also 
direct and universal, and his term in office was established for six years without the possibility of 
immediate re-election.255 
 
 Several waves of constitutional amendments increased the prerogatives of the president 
and granted more powers to the State to regulate the economy. The first wave of amendments 
came with the Ley De Reforma Constitucional N° 7.727 in 1943. This amendment established that 
laws regarding the political and administrative organization of the State and the creation of new 
public utilities (among other topics) were all matters of presidential discretion.256 It is within this 
framework that Chile’s first competition law regime was adopted. Further waves of 
constitutional amendments continued in this direction. The second wave, taking place during the 
1960s, enabled the State’s control over assets used in the production of goods and services and 
to determine the conditions under which the expropriation of private property merited 
compensation.257 The third wave of amendments, which took place during the 1970s, addressed 
other provisions of the 1925 Constitution. The 1970 amendment enabled congress to delegate 
law-making powers to the president addressing various issues, extended the protection of some 
constitutional rights and nationalized important aspects of the mining industry.258 Overall, these 
reforms evidence the increasing role that the State played in the organization of economic life in 
Chile and are a particular example of the consolidation of the State-centered project. Even so, as 
we commented before, the 1973 military coup halted dramatically the consolidation of the State-
centered project, and sought to counter it with the adoption of neoliberal political and economic 
foundations. 
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II.B. Colombia 
 
 The 1886 Colombian Constitution said little about the intervention of the State in 
economic affairs, much less about regulation and competition. Like its Chilean counterpart, it 
entrusted the president with the capacity to issue decrees that enabled the enforcement of the 
laws passed by congress,259 and extended a special protection to civil and in particular property 
rights. Regarding the latter, article 31 states that civil rights could not be disregarded or amended 
by future laws. However, when a law enacted for the public benefit clashes with civil rights, 
private interest will be subdued to the public interest. Any expropriation resulting from the 
enforcement of a law enacted for the public interest entitles the affected parties to 
compensation. In turn, article 32 stated the conditions for the compensation had to fulfill the 
requirements established in the law.260  
 
 The trend to ascertain the “social function” of property rights and to entrust the 
government with wider powers to address economic issues began in 1936. After the liberal party 
returned to power in 1934, president Alfonso López hastened to amend the constitution in order 
to establish the foundations for future economic reforms. The core argument for this 
amendment was the idea that the constitutional protection awarded to property was too 
individualistic, and the limited nature of the State prevented the achievement of social reforms.261 
Three aspects of the 1936 amendment are quite noticeable. First, the new text of article 16 of the 
constitution stated that the Colombian State and its authorities are instituted for protecting the 
lives and property of the residents in the country, as well as for assuring the compliance of the 
social duties of both the State and the individuals. This article was meant to introduce both the 
concept of social solidarity – individuals have duties as well as rights with each other – and to 
explicitly state that the State has social duties towards the welfare of its citizens.262 Second, the 
new text of article 31 introduced the notion that private property has a “social function” that 
brings about duties, and that while full compensation for expropriation was the general rule, 
congress could decide in some particular cases not to award it. Notably, this article also contains 
the general protective clause of the 1886 constitution, according to which civil rights cannot be 
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modified by laws enacted after their constitution.263 Thirdly, the new text of article 32 established 
that the State may intervene through laws (“por medio de leyes”) in the activities undergone by 
public and private industries with the purpose of rationalize the production, distribution and 
consumption of riches, and extend to workers the fair protection that they are entitled to.264 The 
Colombian congress promulgated the proposed amendment in 1936, and it became the 
cornerstone of the reforms that President López began to implement.265 
 
 Later amendments to the Constitution continued to expand the government’s capacity to 
intervene in economic processes. Article 4 of the 1945 constitutional amendment expanded the 
content of article 32. The new text stated that economic intervention had to follow from a 
mandate established in the law, thus enabling both congress to enact general laws and 
administrative bodies to fill in the details.266 In turn, the new text of article 69 allowed the 
legislative branch to delegate its powers to the president when special circumstances arose or 
became convenient under certain conditions, thus leading to a Colombian version of the decretos 
con fuerza de ley.267 The increasing trend towards granting further powers to the government 
continued with the constitutional amendment of 1968.  
 
Two particular aspects of this 1945 amendment are noteworthy. First, it amended once more 
the content of article 32. Its new text stated that freedom of enterprise and economic activity 
were protected within the limits of the common good, and that the general direction of the 
economic activity was reserved for the State. It also stated that it could intervene according to 
the law in the production and distribution of goods and services (private and public) in order to 
rationalize the economy and achieve an integral development.268 Second, the amendment also 
relaxed the conditions in which the president could issue decretos con fuerza de ley to some extent by 
not mentioning that these decrees could not address particular issues or topics reserved only for 
the law.269 Overall, these reforms showed that the Colombian State had changed its 
constitutional profile and began to resemble “developmental state” increasingly more. 
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III.C. Mexico: The Public Nature of Private Property 
  
 Contrary to its counterparts in Chile and Colombia, Mexican constitutional tradition 
addressed competition law issues explicitly. However, this tradition would become infused by 
populist ideas during the process that led to the adoption of the 1917 Constitution. The result 
was a constitution that addressed competition law issues from a new perspective based upon 
claims of social justice and economic development. 
 
 The road to the 1917 Constitution was the result of a combination of armed struggles 
and political negotiations between different actors. The Constitution itself was the result of a 
revolt led mostly by unsatisfied regional elites, peasants and indigenous groups against the regime 
of caudillo Porfirio Díaz. However, what started as a revolt against Diaz became by 1914 a civil 
war between the central regions, including Mexico City, and the northern and southern regions. 
Victoriano Carranza emerged as the leader in 1916 and called that same year for a constitutional 
assembly in the city of Queretaro. This convention led to the drafting and later enactment of the 
1917 Constitution. However, this did not put an end to the struggle. Carranza was ousted as his 
plans to rig the 1920 elections were revealed. Alvaro Obregón was elected president in 1920 and 
chose to rule under the mandates of the 1917 Constitution.270 
 
 The process of drafting the constitutional text evidenced the tensions between the 
interests of the rivaling parties that had participated in the revolution. The proposals made by the 
different revolution leaders evidenced that they had quite different views about the new political 
organization of the Mexican State. Both the 1911 Plan de Ayala and the Convención de Aguascalientes 
of 1914 evidenced the strength of popular sentiments about political and economic power. They 
served as a background for the discussion that took place in the Queretaro constitutional 
assembly. The resulting text used the 1857 Constitution as a thematic template and combined, 
uneasily, the interests of the different actors, notably the interests of disposed peasants, 
indigenous groups, workers and the landed gentry.271  
 
 Even though the entire 1917 Constitution can be characterized as democratic and 
economically progressive, there are two articles that deserve special attention since they are 
about private property and competition law. They evidence how social issues permeated 
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constitutional thinking during this time period. The first is article 27, which establishes a very 
ambitious formula based on a view closely related with that of Duguit’s “social function” of 
private property opening the path for regulation.272 The second is article 28, which refers 
explicitly to competition law issues from a related perspective. The “social” element is evidenced 
not in the inclusion of a competition law provision in the first place - the 1857 Constitution 
forbade monopolies and estancos - but in how it places competition law at the service of social 
justice considerations. Its first paragraph states the following:  
 
In the United States of México there shall be no monopolies or estancos of any kind, 
nor tax exemptions nor prohibitions in the name of industrial protection (…) 
Consequently,  the law will severely punish and the authorities will effectively pursue any 
concentration or hoarding by one or a few hands of essential consumer goods with the 
purpose of raising prices; any act or procedure that prevents or tends to prevent free 
competition in the production, industry or commerce, or services to the public, any 
agreement or combination, of any form, between producers, manufacturers, traders and 
 businessmen of transport or any other service to avoid competition with each other and 
force consumers to pay inflated prices and, in general, everything that constitutes an 
undue exclusive advantage for one or more specific persons and at the expense of the 
general public or a particular social class. 
 
 The text of this article remained unchanged until 1982, when by the end of his term 
president José López Portillo presented to congress an amendment that nationalized the banking 
system. In that same year, elected president Miguel de la Madrid presented a new amendment, 
giving to this article a wording closer to the one currently in place, and which includes 
monopolistic practices along with the prohibition of monopolies. This proposition was enacted 
as a constitutional provision in 1983. The new wording of the article also established more 
clearly the conditions under which the State can intervene in the economy and allowed, although 
with conditions, the awarding of subsidies.273 However, this amendment did not change the 
prohibitions established at the beginning of the text nor changed its “social justice” overtones.   
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III. The First Competition Law Regimes 
 
III.A. Chile 
 
 The history of Chile’s first CLR dates back to the government of Carlos Ibañez (1952 - 
1958), who was an independent politician that developed a program characterized by its populist 
overtones. As inflation spiraled upwards during the mid 1950s, his government attempted several 
plans to curb it without success. In 1955 the government hired the services of a US consulting 
team, the misión Klein-Saks, which had helped Perú overcome similar problems in the late 1940s. 
Their plans were originally to propose a series of policies that would curb inflation. Their 
prescriptions, however, became much more extended. The misión considered that the root of 
Chile’s spiraling inflation were the government’s macroeconomic policies, and so their advices 
ranged from addressing labor wages to exchange rates, government spending and, notably, 
competition law.274  
 
 While some of the prescriptions of the mission found political support in a congress 
dominated by the opposition to the government, the political climate of the late 1950s prevented 
a more committed adoption the entire reform program. Several factors contributed to the 
demise of the misión before it achieved all its goals. On one hand, the revolts of 1957 and a new 
spike in inflation let the government to adopt measures in direct contravention to what the misión 
advocated. On the other, the government itself had problems with the congress, where 
conservative majorities opposed to Ibañez government made it increasingly harder to enact laws 
in line with the misión’s recommendations. The misión was quietly dismissed in 1958.275 
Addressing the daunting economic challenges became a highly important task for the 
government of moderate conservative Jorge Alessandri (Arturo Alessandri’s son). 
 
 Shortly after being elected, president Alessandri pushed through the Chilean congress a 
law that contained some of the recommendations issued by the misión Klein-Saks, including the 
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adoption of a CLR.276 In a 1956 letter addressed to the finance minister of the Ibañez 
government, the director of the misión presented several arguments in favor of the adoption of a 
CLR. Among these were that the anti-inflation policies would have little effect if monopolies 
could still determine prices, that free competition facilitated the development of new firms and 
that the rents received by monopolists were unjustifiable.277 The congressional record of the law 
echoed this view by asserting that price controls were ineffective because they allowed the less 
efficient firms to cover for their production prices, which affected negatively the interests of 
consumers, the “protected class” of these controls.278 Hence in title V of law 13.305 of 1959 the 
Alessandri government adopted the advice given by the misión on this topic. 
 
 Title V of law 13.305 of 1959 contains ten articles. Articles 172 through 174 contain the 
core substantive provisions, while article 175 establishes the competition law enforcer - the 
comisión antimonopolio - and the remaining articles address procedure issues. Article 172 forbids 
granting monopolies to private firms, and establishes that State institutions can only administer 
monopolies if there is a law that explicitly enables them to do so. Article 173 contains a general 
prohibition and the sanctions that can be imposed for transgressing it, which include fines, 
imprisonment and the cancellation of forced dissolution of legal entities. It is important to note 
that the article combines a broad prohibition and a non-taxative list of forbidden conducts.279 
 
  Article 174 contains a general exception clause to the prohibition just mentioned. It 
states that the President may allow forbidden acts or contracts to preserve the stability of 
national firms facing foreign competition, or if they take place between a third party and State-
controlled entity “as long as the national interest so requires it”. Similarly, article 181 states that 
the notwithstanding article 173, all regulations regarding mining, public utility corporations, 
banking, and insurance are legal, as are those granting the authorities the capacity to regulate 
economic activities, including the capacity to set prices. These articles thus created a strong link 
between the enforcement agency and the President, as well as between the former and other 
administrative bodies involved in regulatory affairs. 
 
 Article 175 of this law created an administrative agency in charge of enforcing the rules 
contained throughout this title. This agency, originally called a comisión or “Commission”, was 
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composed of a judge from the Supreme Court and two superintendencies belonging to the 
administrative branch. It had two main purposes; first, it should investigate and decide on alleged 
violations of the law denounced by individuals, corporations or other government bodies.280 In 
order to do so, article 180 of the law also empowered this Commission to ask for information 
from any administrative body. If the Commission decided against the investigated parties, it had 
to present its findings and conclusions before the courts, which in turn had decide on the 
sanctions applicable.281 Second, it was also to study and provide council to individuals, 
corporations and the government about the legality of particular acts and contracts. Besides this 
advisory function, the Commission could revise different acts and contracts in order to assess 
their legality during a three-month term. If the Commission found that these violated the 
aforementioned article, it could propose different measures that would render them legal, and 
the official decision of the commission could be challenged before the courts.282 Notably, the 
Commission was a legislative addition to the bill proposed by the government; it was thought 
that the Ministry of Finance was not impartial enough to provide accurate, impartial assessments 
of whether particular acts were anticompetitive or not.283 
 
 In 1963 the institution of Fiscal Económico was created. The fiscal was in charge of 
investigating the claims of anticompetitive behavior and presenting his findings before the 
commission.284 The Commissions most important assignment was to issue decisions based on 
the findings of the Fiscal. The Commissions role was left intact, mostly because it lacked the 
resources to do more; working in the Commission was a part-time assignment for its members, 
who continued to work for the Supreme Court and the superintendencies mentioned in law 
13.305 of 1959. Just as well, the Commission had no administrative staff besides the Fiscal and 
no budget of its own to conduct its affairs, for it depended on the Superintendence of Insurance 
Companies, to which it was formally ascribed. The first fiscal appointed, Waldo Ortuzar, 
remained in that post for the next three decades. 
 
 There is little information about the number of cases decided by the commission 
between 1959 and 1973, with estimates being around one hundred and twenty.285 In his classic 
text on Chile’s CLR, Dale Furnish argues that between 1959 and 1970 more than one hundred 
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twenty cases were decided. Fiscal Ortuzar offered a similar account.286 Most of these were 
decided during the three years that followed the adoption of law 13.305 of 1959, for the 
workload of the commission diminished considerably, deciding six or so cases per year during 
the government of Eduardo Frei (1964 – 1970). Moreover, the bulk of the commission’s 
decisions were about approvals of corporate bylaws submitted for review.287  
 
 The role of the Supreme Court in the development of competition law doctrine in Chile 
during this period was limited. The court reviewed the decisions of the commission in nine 
written opinions, of which only six involved controversies, and only one arose from facts that 
occurred after the enactment of the law.288 An important issue addressed by the Court in its 
decisions was the scope of the law with regard to other regulations. In some cases involving 
flour mills and bakers, the Court upheld the commission’s view that competition law trumps 
other forms of regulation, only to follow the commission once it ruled differently.289 In other 
cases involving gasoline providers and retail stations, the commission upheld a market-sharing 
agreement between three gasoline-distributing companies, one of which was national, but 
condemned a “tied-in” product promotion agreement between the companies and gasoline 
retailers.290  
 
 Competition law litigation became increasingly involved in the political strategies of the 
Allende government and its opposition. Fearful that the banking nationalization of 1971 would 
not find support in congress, the Allende government decided to buy directly the stock shares of 
the banks in the regular market through the State’s development bank. Members from the 
opposition challenged this strategy in congress. In a hearing convened for discussing this 
strategy, fiscal Ortuzar argued that the government’s proceeding was illegal because there was no 
law explicitly authorizing such proceedings. This gave the members of the opposition the legal 
foundation to file a complaint before the commission. The government, in turn, argued that the 
commission did not have the powers to decide on this issue, for law 13.305 established 
considerable exceptions and the law was targeted only towards private firms. Although the 
commission ruled after the government’s opinion, the Court overruled this decision and 
remanded the file so that the commission could issue a substantive decision. The 1973 military 
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coup took place as the commission was studying the case again, which was finally solved by the 
new competition law enforcer in 1975.291  
 
 The military coup of September 11, 1973 had a lasting and complex effect in the 
development of competition law in Chile. On one hand, this effect can arguably be appreciated 
in the enactment of a new CLR in December of that same year, Decreto Ley 211 of 1973 
(hereinafter DL 211). Notably, this decree has considerable similarities with its successor but 
changed in important ways the institutional arrangements related with competition law 
enforcement.  Among these similarities are an enforcement scheme organized around 
administrative agencies with little independence and the exemption of anticompetitive practices 
as a discretionary governmental policy. On the other, the shift towards neoliberalism that 
consolidated with the enactment of the 1980 Constitution led to the idea that this decree was an 
expression of economic freedom. Below we will describe the content of this decree and its 
enforcement, and suggest some elements that explain how it came to be seen as an expression of 
the 1980 Constitution. 
 
 Contrary to what has been commonly ascertained, it is hard to identify the distinctive 
neoliberal ethos DL 211.292 It is not radically different from that of its 1959 predecessor, and 
actually continues with some of the arrangements the former CLR had established. This 
continuity is most likely a consequence of having fiscal Waldo Ortuzar among the drafting team 
of this decree and as its main enforcer thereafter.293 Article 1 of this decree prohibits in general 
terms acts and agreements that restrain competition and establishes imprisonment as a 
punishment.294 Article 2 details conducts that are considered anticompetitive including 
agreements about prices, production quotas, distribution and market allocation, exclusive 
distribution, among others. Notably, this article also prohibits both labor and business unions 
that impeded collective negotiations and affected the possibility to take part in a labor position.295 
Article 3 establishes corporate dissolution as another sanction that can be applied to firms caught 
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in these agreements. In turn, article 4 prohibits granting individuals the concession of any 
monopoly by law, except for contracts that concern private investments recognized by other 
laws or in which state entities are involved. Moreover, State entities can administer monopolistic 
enterprises in the terms set by other legal laws.296 Article 5 states that the provisions that allowed 
the State to fix the prices of certain goods and services will continue to be valid, including those 
pertaining to the gas, oil and banking sectors.297 Also, it is important to note that there were no 
merger review provisions in this decree, so mergers were analyzed in terms of the prohibitions 
stated in its first article. 
 
 DL 211 changed the institutional setup of competition law enforcement. It upgraded the 
fiscal by establishing the Fiscalía Nacional Económica (hereinafter the FNE) and created new 
enforcement institutions - a comisión resolutiva (hereinafter CR), several comisiones regionales and a 
comisión central preventiva (hereinafter CP). The FNE is an administrative body that investigates 
anticompetitive conducts and submitted its findings to the CR, who also had the power to 
appoint the fiscal.298 Also, the FNE provided the CR and the CP with administrative support.299 
In turn, the CR was also an administrative body, but had a quasi-judicial function. Based on the 
evidence collected by the FNE, it ruled whether a conduct was anticompetitive or not, and could 
impose administrative and criminal sanctions.300 Also, it exercised competition advocacy 
functions regarding the competitive nature of governmental regulation. The CP was a 
consultative body and did not have faculties to change any legal arrangement. Its opinions were 
about the legality of particular arrangements, and it could ask the FNE to undergo investigations 
and submit cases to the CR for review. The comisiones regionales were also consultative bodies 
located in the different regions, and their decisions could be reviewed by the CP.301 Notably, 
several members of the CP, the CR and the fiscal were appointed by the executive power, and the 
FNE aided the CR with administrative tasks since it did not have any staff. This was because the 
CR and the CP were conceived as extra-curricular bodies; they only functioned occasionally, its 
members were drawn from (and paid by) other institutions, and had little expertise with 
competition law issues (with some exceptions). This institutional setup was amended slightly via 
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Decreto legislativo 2760 of 1979, which among other things, established that the President would 
appoint the fiscal.302 This setup would remain until the late 1990s. 
 
 According to Ricardo Paredes, between 1974 and 1992 the CR issued 367 decisions, 
while the CP issued 227 decisions.303 Most of these decisions refer to vertical agreements and 
unilateral acts, while decisions concerning vertical agreements and cartels are a minority. Between 
1974 and 1993, the CR issued 61 decisions involving horizontal agreements, 61 decisions 
concerning vertical agreements and 156 decisions involving abuse of dominance.304 In the same 
period, the CP issued 21 decisions about horizontal agreements, 40 decisions regarding vertical 
agreements and 57 decisions involving abuse of dominance.305  
 
 Some these decisions are worth commenting briefly. In 1974, the CR stated that a 
distribution agreement limiting the sale of magazines and newspapers to certain vendors was 
illegal according to DL 211. Such restriction, argued this comisión, was illegal because it unduly 
restricted the freedom to participate in a market.306 In two other cases differential treatment to 
distributers, the CP stated that selective rebates were lawful only to the extent that the rebates 
followed objective reasons related with the volume of goods supplied. In the first of these 
decisions, the CR declared that it was illegal to discriminate by offering different rebates to 
distributors based on the characteristics of their distribution facilities.307 In a related decision 
addressing a similar practice, the CR stated that differential treatment among suppliers had to be 
based on objective reasons for it to be legal.308 We observe similar lines of reasoning well into the 
1980s. For example, in resolución 202 of 1985 the CR fined laboratory Ricalcine for discriminating 
among its distributors by awarding them different rebates. The CR argued that the lab’s 
economies of scale did not justify offering less generous rebates to smaller distributors than to 
large ones.309  
 
 The relatively high number of decisions involving vertical restraints and abuse of 
dominance with regard to decisions involving horizontal agreement is puzzling. National and 
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international authors writing long after these decisions were issued argue that this pattern 
evidences the importance of economic freedom on Chile’s legal system.310 This is a reasonable 
explanation, but there still important gaps to fill. It may well be that DL 211 and the 1980 
Constitution were part of a wider political project with neoliberal undertones, but the former was 
enacted at a time in which this project was in its incipiency.  
 
III.B. Colombia 
 
 The adoption of the first CLR in Colombia took place in the middle of growing 
animosity between the military regime of Gustavo Rojas Pinilla and the country’s mayor business 
association, the Asociación Nacional de Industriales (hereinafter ANDI). This business association 
had supported Rojas during the coup against conservative president Laureano Gómez in 1953 to 
suppress the escalating violence between conservatives and liberals. However, in early 1955 this 
support turned into opposition. President Rojas and his minister of finance, Carlos Villaveces, 
announced the adoption of economic reforms that would increase the State’s revenues and its 
control over the economy.311 It is against this context that decree 2061 of 1955, known as the 
“estatuto Villaveces”, was enacted. However, the importance of this decree is not just about the 
date of its enactment or its historical context, but because it established the basic institutional 
framework that continues in place today.   
 
 Decree 2061 of 1955 has only five articles, and it addresses both substantive and 
procedural issues. Article 1 establishes a general prohibition forbidding agreements between 
producers, between distributors or between both that may impede free trade, including 
agreements about prices, margin sales, price discrimination, or agreements about sales margins or 
commissions. Later CLRs would continue this combination of general prohibition with a non-
taxative list of prohibited conducts. Procedure issues are developed in the remaining articles. 
Article 2 assigns the Ministry of Economic Development (known then as Ministerio de Fomento) 
the task of investigating potentially anticompetitive conducts that it finds out or that are 
denounced by third parties. If the Ministry finds that such conducts have taken place, it would 
issue an administrative pronouncement (known as a resolución) approved by the President in 
declaring their illegality and preventing the parties involved from engaging in further commercial 
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practices. Article 4 establishes the possibility of exempting the behaviors investigated by the 
Ministry. It states that the government may, through a decision by the Ministry approved by the 
President, allow such conducts when special economic or social conditions merit so. Through a 
similar procedure the government could also approve forbidden agreements celebrated prior to 
this decree if doing so is necessary for maintaining the order in markets and only for the time 
necessary to re-establish free trade. Article 3 states that the decisions mentioned in the previous 
articles were subject to the review of the highest administrative court, the Consejo de Estado. 
Finally, article 5 states that the decree is applicable since its enactment and suspends any 
disposition that is contrary to it.312 The allocation of investigative and decision-making faculties 
to an administrative body subject to presidential control would also be a defining feature of 
Colombia’s competition law for the decades to come. 
 
 There is no record that this decree was enforced by the government of general Rojas 
Pinilla, nor it is likely that it had much opportunity to do so. The political disagreements between 
the regime and the business and industrial sector worsened considerably in the months that 
followed. By early May 1957 a strike called by this business association and other social groups 
forced his resignation. A military junta assumed the direction of the country in that year while in 
the meantime the two main political parties conceived a plan for returning to democracy and 
ending their armed struggle. Such plan came to be known as the Frente Nacional and led to the 
return of democracy to Colombia with the election of Alberto Lleras as president in 1958.313 
 
 The election of Alberto Lleras also meant the adoption of new economic policies, this 
time through the regular political process. In 1958 Hernando Agudelo Villa was appointed 
minister of finance, two years after completing his postgraduate studies at the London School of 
Economics and after working for FENALCO, a trade association.314 Agudelo Villa presented 
before Congress a draft bill of a new CLR in November 18, 1958, which led for the first time to 
open discussions about the importance of competition. Representative Alvaro Posada Campo, 
who was assigned to present and discuss this bill before the lower chamber of Congress, made 
important amendments to the original project.315 
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 While an analysis of the congressional records of this law merits a lengthier analysis, we 
wish to highlight three different ideas present in it. First, the content of the bill is supposed to 
follow from the constitutional mandates pertaining to the State’s capacity to intervene in the 
economy and the competition law bill discussed. Congressman Posada made this argument 
explicitly in the written introduction to the draft bill.316 Second, this bill was explicitly presented 
as a complement to other economic policies in place that were necessary for controlling the 
development of economic power. Posada Campo characterized competition and monopoly as an 
issue concerning rivalry among producers within markets, and states that the “cruel truth” is that 
capitalism necessarily leads to business concentration, and hence to monopolies and 
oligopolies.317 Citing US economist Paul Samuelson, he argued that small producers are unable to 
reach efficient levels of production, and so the response should take this into consideration not 
by abolishing large industrial considerations but by improving their behavior.318 Thus he states 
that the law brings together antagonistic social actors for a common purpose.319 The 
congressional record of this law shows that minister Agudelo Villa had similar views regarding 
the complementarity of competition law and other policies.320 Third, according to Posada 
Campo, the protection of competition exhibited in other jurisdictions - and the draft bill 
overviews several CLRs from other States - have a limited application for a country that, like 
Colombia, was only beginning to become industrialized. The task at hand was to overcome the 
“current situation of underdevelopment” and enlarge the economic base, substitute imports, and 
expand the sources of foreign exchange. This meant not only extending a protection to large 
national industries, but also to small industries that could become sources of important 
economic activity in the future. Hence, the bill he presented aimed at protecting national 
industry, even small producers, in the context of fostering economic development.321  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
316 See Ibid. (Exposición de motivos) Pg. 486. (Quotes in the original text) 
317 Ibid. Pgs. 481 – 482. 
318 Ibid. Pg. 482. (Citing Samuelson, Paul A. Economics An Introductory Analysis.) 
319 Ibid. Pg. 481. Emphasis added. 
320 Ibid. Pgs. 474 - 475 
321 Ibid. Pg. 482. 
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 The bill was enacted in December 24 as law 155 of 1959.322 This law is widely considered 
to be the first CLR in Colombia. It is lengthier than its predecessor, as it includes provisions that 
different legal issues related with competition law, like unfair competition, and merger review. 
The main topics of this law can be gathered in three groups. The first group is about the basic 
elements of competition law enforcement. It includes article 1, considered the single most 
important provision of this law, which establishes a general prohibition and a paragraph 
establishing the possibility of an exemption regime. The general prohibition, very much like its 
Chilean counterpart, combined a general statement with a non-laxative list of forbidden 
conducts.323 The exemption, contained in the article’s only paragraph, states that the government 
may nonetheless authorize a prohibited conduct if doing so contributed to the stability of a basic 
sector of the economy.324 The definition of what counted as a basic sector was developed later 
on by decree 1302 of 1964. Other articles belonging to this first group establish authorizations 
for governmental intervention and prohibitions to particular firms. Among the former are article 
2, which states that firms with the capacity to determine market prices because of their control 
over the quantity of goods and services will be subject to State supervision. Similarly, article 3 
states that the government will intervene in the ways that weights and measures are established 
for the benefit of consumers.325 Even so, the article belonging to this group that more clearly 
embodies the ideas from the congressional record is article 17. It states that in order to comply 
with article 32 of the constitution, the government can intervene to set fixed prices to protect the 
interests of consumers, producers and traders. Moreover, government price-setting is one of the 
possible outcomes resulting from investigations of anticompetitive conducts. The other 
outcomes are the imposition of a compliance term for ending such conducts, and submitting the 
investigated enterprises to a supervision regime regarding their production and distribution costs 
as a compliance monitoring mechanism.326  
 
The second group of provisions addresses corporate law issues from a competition law 
perspective. Article 5 forbids board members and managers of banking institutions to take part 
in the management of firms involved in the production, distribution and consumption of rival 
goods and services that are worth more than seven million pesos.327 Article 6 also forbids 
                                                            
322 República de Colombia, Law 155 of 1959. 
323 Ibid. Art.1o. 
324 Ibid. Paragragh. 
325 Ibid. Articles 2& 3. 
326 Ibid. Art. 17. 
327 Ibid. Article 5. This article also has an exemption for insurance companies, which according to the law have 
a special regime for their operation involving a similar prohibition. The seven million pesos threshold 
corresponds roughly to 2100 USD. 
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interlocking directories between production and distribution companies organized as limited 
liability partnerships. This prohibition is extended to relatives and family members of the 
members of the boards.328 Article 8 forbids corporations that have their own distribution systems 
to engage in practices that monopolize the distribution of such goods.329 Article 9 establishes that 
when a firm producer of a good or service announces a selling price for final consumers, neither 
it nor its distributors can modify that price afterwards.330  
 
 This law is also of interest because it introduced a merger review regime for the first time 
in Colombian legal history. Inspired by the Clayton Act of the United States, which according to 
Minister Agudelo was a source of inspiration,331 article 4 introduces a merger review system. It 
states that corporations participating in production, distribution or consumption of a good, raw 
material or service, and whose individual assets amount to more than 20 million pesos, should 
inform the government of their intention to merge.332 According to paragraph 1 of this article 
the government has the duty to object a merger if it produces an undue restraint on free 
competition. The next paragraph provides a term of 30 days for the government to issue a 
decision, and if a decision were not issued during that period then the merger would be 
automatically.333 These provisions remained largely untouched until the early 1990s. 
 
 Finally, the third group of provisions of this law addresses the institutional arrangements 
established for enforcing the mandates of its different provisions. Notably, this law relies 
considerably on the arrangement established in decree 2061 of 1955, adding a few elements that 
would define this CLR for the decades to come. Article 12 relies on the Ministry of Economic 
Development for the investigation of anticompetitive conducts. However, it also states that the 
ministry’s superintendencies - a type of politically dependent administrative body in charge of 
oversight functions - were in charge of conducting investigations. The procedure followed by 
these agencies was straightforward. Investigations could result from complaints filed by third 
parties or from suspicions within the Ministry or the superintendencia related with the sector in 
which the allegedly anticompetitive conduct occurred. According to article 13, the investigations 
should rely on all the available evidence, including information about imports, exports, 
distribution and sales as well as visits to the investigated parties. After collecting evidence 
                                                            
328 Ibid. Article 6. 
329 Ibid. Article 8. 
330 Ibid. Article 9. 
331 Ibid (Exposición de motivos). Pg. 479. 
332 Ibid. Art. 4. 
  103 
collection, the Superintendencia had to issue a formal statement of its findings and make them 
available to the investigated parties so that they could defend themselves against the allegations 
stated in the claims. Once this has take place, article 14 states that the Ministry would decide the 
merits of the investigation based on a previous concept given by the Council of Economic Policy 
and Planning. If the Ministry decided to punish the actors, it could withdraw their shares from 
the stock market, revoke their functioning permit if they are recidivist, and impose a fine up to 
half a million pesos each.334 Article 15 the stated that the decision could be challenged before the 
Ministry for its reconsideration, and article 16 states that filing a claim against the decision before 
administrative courts suspends the collection of the fine.335 
 
 This law was amended several times between its enactment and the 1990s, but its 
structure and content remained untouched. Decree 1653 of 1960 assigned all the investigation 
proceedings to the Superintendence of Economic Regulation.336 Later on, decree 3307 of 1963 
modified the reference to consumers and producers of raw materials from article 1.337 Decree 
1302 of 1964 modified in turn the paragraph of article 1, stating that fundamental sectors are 
considered so because of their incidence in the population’s welfare, including the food sector, 
textiles, housing, fuels, banking, transport, public utilities and insurance services. It also clarified 
other issues regarding mergers, procedures and evidence.338 This enabled the application of the 
exception contained in this paragraph to several important sectors of the Colombian economy. 
During the late 1960s and early 1970s enforcement duties were passed around different 
administrative agencies involved in the oversight and enforcement of price controls. Through 
decree 2562 of 1968 the Superintendencia de Regulación Económica was transformed into the 
Superintendencia de Regulación de Precios and maintained its duties regarding competition law 
enforcement.339 However, in 1976 this superintendencia was abolished and its functions, including 
competition law enforcement, were given to the Superintendencia de Industria y Comercio (hereinafter 
SIC), which had also been created in 1968. This decree is important because it modified the 
internal structure of this entity. First, it created the figure of the Deputy Superintendent (known 
as Superintendente Delegado) whom was in charge of making the investigations. Second, the creation 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
333 Ibid. Art. 4, Pars. 1& 2. The merger review procedure would be further detailed by ordinances of the 
Superintendence of Industry and Trade. 
334 Ibid. Art. 14 
335 Ibid. Arts. 15 & 16. According to Colombian administrative law, a decision can be challenged before the 
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the application before the administrative judges. 
336 Colombia. Decreto 1653 de 1960. 
337 Colombia. Decreto 3307 de 1963. 
338 Colombia. Decreto 1302 de 1964. 
339 Colombia. Decreto 2562 de 1968 
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of this figure enabled the chief Superintendent to make the final decision based on the 
investigation carried by the Deputy Superintendent.340 This particular aspect was further 
reaffirmed with decree 2153 of 1992, which eventually gave to SIC its present-day structure.341 
 
 The enforcement record of the Superintendencias in charge of enforcing law 155 of 1959 is 
unclear, since there has been no systematic archival research and very little publications 
addressing the issue. As a result, there is a well-established belief that the law was not enforced. 
For example, the 2009 OECD Peer Review of Colombia’s CLR states that the law was seldom 
applied, and when it was applied it was to impose price controls.342 Alfonso Miranda states that 
this law did not lead to important decisions, and only mentions three competition law decisions - 
two merger decisions and one involving an agreement among leather producers.343 On the other 
hand, Javier Cortazar states flatly that the law was never enforced.344 It is commonly believed that 
in spite of the enactment of the law, it was not enforced until the 1990s. 
 
 Our own research found 22 resoluciones issued by the Superintendencia de Regulación Económica 
between 1961 and 1968. Of these, 13 decisions relate to 8 mergers (one particular merger 
involved 6 decisions), 5 decisions relate to 3 different investigations for price fixing, 3 decisions 
relate to 2 cases involving abuse of dominance, and 1 decision for a case involving interlocking 
directorates. They show that law 155 of 1959 was enforcer considerable more than what it is 
believed, but in the absence of a more systematic review it is not advisable to make claims about 
its overall level of enforcement. Table 4.1, contained in the annex, summarizes these decisions, 
organized by date and according to the type of procedure. 
 
 While a detailed analysis of these decisions would prove extremely useful for better 
understanding how competition law was understood in Colombia, doing so would exceed the 
scope of this chapter. Even so, we wish to highlight the State-centered ethos of competition law 
enforcement appreciated in some of these decisions. For example, in decision 005 of 1961, the 
Superintendencia decided against an association of leather producers that allocated production 
quotas among its members and contributed to en-bloc negotiations with corporations devoted to 
its processing and refinement. It considered that the annual increase in raw leather prices was 
                                                            
340 República de Colombia. Decreto 149 de 1976. 
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342 Petracola, Diego. "Colombia - Peer Review of Competition Law and Policy ." OECD - IDB, 2009. Pg. 12 
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Expedición Del Decreto 2153 De 1992." August 2, 2012. Slide 10. 
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due to the operation of this scheme, and condemned the advantage that it provided to the 
producers. It states “(…) the market for raw leather should be organized in a technical, 
economic, impartial and effective with the purpose of maintaining a fair balance between all the 
interested sectors, that are: the production, acquisition and processing [of raw leather].”345 A 
similar rhetoric can be found in early merger review decisions. For example, in decision 0008 of 
1962, the Superintendencia approved a merger between a national producer of glass cups and vases 
with a foreign-owned corporation that produced different varieties of glass. In this decision, the 
agency evidences the link between the promotion of competition and economic development as 
they were understood at the time. According to the decision, the merger would increase the 
national production of glass-made products, diminish the necessity of importing this good, and 
transform the country into a potential exporter. This in turn, would enable a new source of 
foreign currency inflows [thus contributing to maintaining a healthy balance of payments]. Also, 
it would bring about an increase in local production that would diminish prices for the benefit of 
consumers, enable Colombia to become a global competitor in related markets, increase the 
amount of labor involved, substitute imports and thus bring savings to the expenditures in 
foreign currencies.346 
 
III.C. Mexico 
 
 Similarly to Colombia, the lack of research about Mexico’s CLRs has contributed to the 
myth that they were seldom enforced. As we will show below, different governments sought to 
develop the contents of article 28 of the 1917 Constitution through several laws and bylaws. 
Below we will describe these laws briefly. Unfortunately, the picture is considerable less clear 
regarding their enforcement; we have found it impossible to identify all the decisions issued by 
the enforcing agencies or the lower courts before the 1990s. Unfortunately, the limited 
information available prevents us from presenting a clear picture about the actors and strategies 
involved in the consolidation of competition law as part of the State-centered project; however 
this subsection provides useful insights about this situation.  
 
 Article 28 of the 1917 Constitution established a series of broad lines for the government 
to develop a program of economic governance, as opposed to other constitutional provisions 
that were enforced directly without statutory development (like article 27). Between its 
enactment and the 1990s, the federal congress – following the initiative of the government –  
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adopted four laws that developed the substantive content of this article and 15 bylaws that 
established the conditions and requirements for their enforcement. Table 4.2, also included in 
the annex, identifies them all. 
 
 The above mentioned laws develop the content of article 28 of the 1917 in different 
ways, emphasizing the importance of preventing monopolies and anticompetitive practices in 
particular sectors of the economy. A first law dating from 1926 prohibited monopolies and 
anticompetitive practices without providing any definitions as to what conducts counted as such 
and focused on the supply of basic staples and consumption goods. This law also established a 
series of limitations to vertical integration in the milling and credit industry. Finally, it also 
combined regulatory with adjudicatory functions; while administrative bodies determined the 
tariffs and applicable to the goods and services mentioned in the law, the actual enforcement of 
the duties was left to courts; the infringement of the law had criminal consequences.347 In turn, a 
second law enacted in 1931 provided clearer definitions of both a monopoly and anticompetitive 
practices leading to monopolization, including price-fixing and market allocation agreements. 
While this law also focused on basic staples and consumption goods, it had a wider approach 
reaching all economic sectors.348 Finally, both laws established imprisonment and the payment of 
fines as punishments for trespassing the duties they establish. 
 
  A third law, enacted in 1934, evidences a trend towards relying considerably more on 
price controls than on competition law for the regulation of particular economic activities. This 
can be appreciated in several of its substantive provisions in which a general prohibition is 
followed by a series of exemptions based on price controls. Hence, for example, while the first 
prohibition of article 5 relates to selling below production costs, it is followed by three 
exceptions allowing such conduct: the introduction of a new good or service, the sale of 
depreciated goods or the result of an auction. Finally, this law did not enable the judicial 
enforcement of the substantive provisions, relegating them entirely to administrative agencies.349 
A fourth law enacted in 1950, although not directly connected with article 28, enabled the 
government to set prices for an important number of goods and services - not just those 
considered of necessity - thus extending the governmental control of the main economic 
activities.350 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
346 República de Colombia. Superintendencia de Regulación Económica. Resolución 0008 de 1963. Pg. 2. 
347 México. Ley reglamentaria del articulo 28 constitucional (1926). 
348 México. Ley Ley orgánica del articulo 28 constitucional, relativa a monopolios (1931) 
349 México. Ley orgánica del articulo 28 constitucional en materia de monopolios (1934) 
350 México. Ley sobre atribuciones del ejecutivo federal en materia económica (1950) 
  107 
 
 The enforcement structure of these laws was set originally in a 1926 decree and then 
amended in 1931. The provisions of the 1931 amendment were complemented throughout the 
years, until the decree issued on January 10 of 1951 established a new enforcement system. The 
enforcement system established in the 1931 and 1951 decrees were very similar, as they relied on 
the same governmental institutions. Enforcement activities were assigned to committees that 
were part of the Secretaría de Economía, which studied the market conditions of different goods 
and services, and could establish the prices of particular goods. However, there is an important 
difference between the committees established in 1931 and those established in 1951, and which 
consists in that the first were transitory while the latter were permanent.351 We contend that the 
changing nature of these committees marks the tipping point in which competition law 
enforcement cedes before direct price controls.  
 
 There is no clear record of the number of administrative decisions issued by these 
enforcement bodies. Some secondary sources mention a few decisions, both administrative and 
judicial, but do not mention the total number of decisions or how to access them.352 The current 
competition law enforcement agency, the Comisión Federal de Competencia Económica, does not have 
in its database decisions prior to 1992, and our search in the online official database (the Diario 
Oficial) for decisions by the administrative enforcers did not produce any results. On the other 
hand, the database of decisions issued by the Supreme Court produced about 120 decisions 
regarding the constitutionality of laws and bylaws according to article 28. Of these, 93 decisions 
contain novel statements, known as tesis, about these issues. These decisions show that article 28 
was a matter of recurring litigation before courts. Table 4.3, included in the appendix, identifies 
all the original tesis. 
 
 Although the decisions reviewed address various issues, there are a series of tesis that 
address common topics. Many of the decisions issued by the Supreme Court issued during the 
1920s and 1930s concern regulations that limited the number of mills and bread stores that could 
be found in a given geographic area. In these, the Court wavered in its position regarding the 
constitutionality of bylaws that fixed the number of mills and stores dedicated to the production 
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and sale of bread and nixtamal.353 Other decisions from the 1960s onwards address similar issues 
concerning transport routes, although the Court reaches a different conclusion; if Congress 
wanted to have free competition in such sector, it would have crafted different regulations to 
begin with.354 Overall, the decisions show the extent to which both competition and price-
control regulation are the result of political choices, without being clear that one system of 
economic governance is preferable to the other. In doing so, the Court’s decisions seem to 
follow the flexibility of the laws and bylaws that developed article 28 of the 1917 Constitution. 
  
IV. Conclusions 
 
In order to address the shortcomings of the relevant literature on the history of competition 
law in Latin America, this chapter offers a new account of the first CLRs enacted in Chile, 
Colombia and Mexico. We argued first that the adoption of these CLRs followed from a process 
of constitutional transformation in which 19th century constitutionalism gave way to new ideas 
about the role of the State in the direction of social and economic processes. This process took 
place in the guise of constitutional discussions about the “social function” of property rights and 
governmental capacity to regulate social issues. Then, by looking at the CLRs themselves, we 
noted how they relate to the different constitutional mandates, described their main features and 
discussed briefly some aspects of their enforcement. In the case of Chile, we noted how the first 
CLR followed from an attempt to liberalize the economy, and was followed by a second CLR, 
with similar provisions, that became inscribed in the neoliberal project. In the case of Colombia 
and Mexico, besides noting the lack of research on the matter, we noted how the CLRs granted 
considerable discretion to the enforcement authorities and discussed briefly their enforcement 
record, which is more ample than what is often conceded. Overall, the different features of the 
first Chilean CLR and the Colombian and Mexican regimes evidence the influence of the State-
centered project. 
 
To be sure, the regimes we have described in this chapter show important similarities, most 
of which stem from their proximity with constitutional ideas. Among these are the combination 
of goals, which include issues of social justice, the rational organization of economic activities, 
and the protection of consumers. The combination of criminal and administrative punishments 
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in Chile and Mexico is also quite interesting. Consider, moreover, the importance of Duguit’s 
doctrines in the constitutional changes taking place in Chile and Colombia. There are important 
differences as well. Perhaps the most notable is the early advance of neoliberal ideas into Chilean 
competition law after the enactment of DL 211 in 1973; not only did this particular issue set it 
apart from its Colombian and Mexican counterparts, it also set it in a completely different 
trajectory. Even so, these regimes developed mostly (but not entirely) according to the 
institutional backgrounds that characterized the social and legal system they were part of. 
 
This state of affairs changed considerably during and after the 1990s. As we will see in the 
next three chapters, the CLRs of these three countries went through considerable changes 
resulting from internal and external influences and pressures. And while there are institutional 
continuities that are often overlooked, the most important development, at a regional level, is the 
increasing efforts to bring about convergence towards a series of actors, ideas and institutions 
that were not present before. We will see, for example, how foreign legal and economic doctrines 
exercised a considerable influence on local discussions about the goals (and roles) that these 
CLRs were meant to play. We will also see a convergence towards politically autonomous 
enforcement institutions that rely mostly on neoclassic and neoinstitutional economic analyses to 
ground their decisions. Finally, we will also see how international actors, ranging from the 
OECD, investors and foreign advisors, play more prominent roles in the design and 
enforcement of the CLRs adopted. In sum, these changes signal the demise of the State-centered 
project and the advance and consolidation of its neoliberal counterpart.  
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5. Chile 1990 - 2015: Variants of Neoliberalism  
 
I. Introduction 
  
 On March 16, 2015 president Michelle Bachelet officially submitted before the Chilean 
congress a bill amending this country’s competition law regime. The bill proposes to subject 
hard-core cartels to criminal liability, aims to improve the effectiveness of the leniency regime, 
and suggests the creation of a mandatory merger review regime. The government’s bill comes at 
a period of public indignation following some recent investigations regarding collusive 
agreements in highly visible markets. As president Bachelet stated during the official ceremony 
“(i)t is unacceptable that a group of individuals agree to harm others, and that this is not subject 
to effective criminal punishments.”355 This statement, and the public responses to recent cartel 
cases, suggests that more socially - oriented perspectives regarding this field of law are finding 
their way into Chile’s competition law community.  
 
In this chapter we unpack the trajectory of Chile's competition law regime (or CLR) between 
1990 and 2015 as a field where different actors - politicians, lawyers, economists, international 
organizations and others - compete and collaborate for the power to determine this field of law. 
We do so by tracing the different ideas behind the legal changes taking place during this period 
and the struggles and collaborations between the different actors advancing these ideas. In 
particular, we focus on the reforms to the different enforcement bodies in place by the 1990s 
and collusion cases between 1990 and 2015 as a window for identifying how changes take place 
within the neoliberal competition law project.  
 
 The following sections of this chapter develop these ideas. In Section II we identify three 
periods of institutional change guided by the interactions between different social actors and the 
ideas about how this CLR should be. We argue that what began as a process of institutional 
change during the late 1990s and early 2000s produced a situation of maladjustment, as 
evidenced in the low record of price collusion convictions between 2003 and 2009. As further 
institutional changes were sought to address this maladjustment, new forces began challenging 
the established perceptions of competition law. Finally, in section III we offer some conclusions.  
                                                            
355 Sáez, Sergio. "FNE tendrá potestad exclusiva para querellarse en casos de colusión." Pulso, March 17, 2015. 
 
  111 
 
II. The Coming of Age of a Neoliberal Competition law Project  
 
     In this section we trace the transformation of Chile’s CLR resulting from the pressures 
for change that were mounting in the 1990s. We divide this process in three periods. During the 
first period, pressures to adapt the CLR according to emerging neoliberal views contributed to 
the mounting pressure for change. Then, during the second period the new institutions began to 
produce unexpected results that challenged the overall effectiveness of the regime. In the third 
period, a different set of unexpected consequences related to enforcement raised the public 
profile of competition law enforcement and led to changes more in line with a contemporary 
neoliberal project.  
 
 II.A. Updating Neoliberal Competition Law (1990 - 2003) 
 
The transition to democracy in 1990 did not amount to a redefinition of the legal and 
political order in Chile, but rather led to its continuation. The 1980 Constitution, established by 
the military regime, aimed to preserve the status quo, both political and economic, resulting from 
the military regime. This was achieved through a combination of highly demanding requirements 
for obtaining majorities in Congress, their membership and conformation, and rules pertaining 
to the State’s intervention in economic activities, which narrow unduly the space of political 
action. This hampered the political maneuverability of the forces that participated in Chile’s 
congress after the return to democracy that took place in 1990. The most important political 
group, Concertación, was a coalition of different forces that had previously defeated the military 
regime in the 1988 plebiscite regarding the continuation of the military regime. Even so, because 
of the constitutional set-up, the Concertación coalition could not adopt laws that would undermine 
the foundations of the status quo. Moreover, Concertación governments sought consensus with 
different political actors – inside and outside of Congress – and were thus limited by the veto 
power of those opposed to its plans.356 As a result, we contend that the narrowness embedded in 
the constitutional order prevented the development of alternative ideas and institutions to those 
of neoliberal inclination that it harbored. Such narrowness left lawyers, economists and other 
professionals engaged in the (re)design of the State with a limited ideational space for 
reinterpreting what competition could be about.  
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Given this background, the return to democracy posed unique challenges to the reforms of 
economic policies. The first Concertación president, Patricio Aylwin (1990 - 1994) announced the 
continuity of the economic model,357 and the fiscal appointed by president Aylwin, Gilberto 
Villablanca, maintained the same position regarding the enforcement of competition law.358 
However, the Concertación alliance decided during the term of President Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle 
(1994 - 2000) to address the uneven regulatory performance that started to become an issue. 
President Frei commissioned several studies about the state of regulation in Chile - including the 
Comisión Jadresic - that brought forth a stark diagnosis for the different regulatory bodies and 
regimes. Regarding competition law, these studies pointed to the lack of technical capabilities 
and other resources of the different enforcement bodies as the root of their inadequacy.359  
 
The studies made by these commissions addressed the competition law enforcement bodies 
that were in place since the early 1970s and which had been established in Decreto ley 211 of 1973 
(hereinafter DL 211). These consisted of i) the Fiscalía Nacional Económica (hereinafter FNE), ii) a 
comisión resolutiva (hereinafter CR) iii) several comisiones regionales and iv) a comisión central preventiva 
(hereinafter CP). (All the comisiones disappeared in 2003.) The FNE is an administrative body that 
investigates anticompetitive conducts and had to submit its findings to the CR. This comisión was 
also an administrative body, but had a quasi-judicial function. It decided upon the findings of the 
FNE whether a conduct was anticompetitive or not, and imposed sanctions both criminal and 
administrative. The CP was a consultative body and did not have the competence to change any 
legal arrangement. Its opinions were about the legality of particular arrangements, and it could 
submit particular cases to the CR for their review. The comisiones regionales were also consultative 
bodies located in the different regions of this country. Notably, several members of the CP, the 
CR and the fiscal were appointed by the executive power, and the FNE aided the CR with 
bureaucratic tasks since it did not dispose of any staff. This was because the CR and the CP were 
conceived as non-permanent bodies; they only functioned occasionally, its members were drawn 
from other State institutions, and they had little expertise with competition law issues (with some 
exceptions). The administrative nature of this regime - which gave away its mixed origins 
between State-centered organizations and its original neoliberal objectives - made it prone to the 
criticisms of the evolving neoliberal views taking place in the 1990s.  
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The findings of these studies were similar to the diagnosis offered by members of the 
competition law community since the late 1980s. In 1989, fiscal Waldo Ortuzar proposed an 
amendment to DL 211, which redefined the conducts considered anticompetitive and aimed to 
improve the performance of the enforcement bodies. This included the proposal to pay the 
members of the comisiones for their work.360 As we already pointed out in chapters 3 and 4, the 
economist Ricardo Paredes also supported the move towards greater professionalization of the 
enforcement bodies. He advocated a more economic reading of this CLR, suggesting that 
“economic theory should be the basis of this regime, and thus should be followed”.361 He also 
identified three issues that were troublesome with the state of the legislation. First, since the 
executive branch appointed several members of the CP, the CR and the fiscal, it could overcome 
the independence of these bodies and manipulate their decisions.362 Second, like Ortuzar, 
Paredes agreed that the lack of payment to the members of the commission was an issue. 
However, he argued that remunerating the members of the comisiones could have uncertain 
effects. Working in these bodies merited compensation, but the payment could also incentivize 
their members to start unmerited investigations.363 Finally, he observed vagueness of the text of 
the law, especially regarding the scope of the exemptions established in article 5 of this decree, 
which reaffirmed the regulation in place regarding several economic activities and the 
prerogatives of State bodies concerning price controls. The vagueness of this article, Paredes 
argues, could be addressed by the comisiones themselves through the development of doctrines.364 
He concluded by pointing that any changes to the CLR should not affect in any way the 
decision-making processes of the different comisiones.365  
 
  The arguments presented by Paredes are important because they evidence the growing 
influence of neoclassical economic analyses and the erosion of the prevailing way of framing 
competition law issues in Chile. As we argued in Chapter 4, during the 1970s and especially 
during the 1980s, competition law issues were framed from a distinctive legal perspective. Rather 
than assessing particular contractual arrangements on their efficiency or other consequences, the 
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FNE and the different comisiones assessed the extent to which such agreements restricted unduly 
the commercial freedom of the parties engaged as a matter of principle.366 By bringing economic 
analyses into the discussion, Paredes argued for the abandonment of this legalistic perspective 
and the adoption of perspectives similar to those in use in US antitrust law. We contend that his 
writings show how the discursive changes taking place within the neoliberal project. 
 
 Despite the publicity given to the studies and the diagnosis offered by Ortuzar and 
Paredes, historian Patricio Bernedo argues that the political force that led to first broad 
amendments of DL 211 was fiscal Rodrigo Asenjo. He had experience in public office but was 
not an expert on competition law issues. Nonetheless, soon after he assumed office he realized 
that this regime had the limitations diagnosed before and began a campaign to strengthen its 
capabilities.367 By the mid 1990s Asenjo had already acquired notoriety because of his stance in 
some of the investigations conducted by the FNE.368 Moreover, he renewed the role of the fiscal 
as a proactive actor in legal reform processes; future fiscales would take this further by acting as 
brokers between local politics and international expectations. 
 
Asenjo was able to mobilize the government’s support to amend the CLR as established in 
the DL 211, but not without considerable efforts. On one hand, although he had presented a 
proposal for discussion within the government in 1996, the actual support for this enterprise 
came in late 1997, after he complained publicly about the government’s lack of commitment. On 
the other, the draft presented before congress only addressed the FNE. Apparently, the 
government was more committed to the criminal law reform that was taking place and was not 
willing to exhaust its political capital with a bill that changed importantly this CLR. Also, this was 
supposed to be the preferred option of fiscal Asenjo, who considered that a more thorough 
reform would have little chances of being adopted.369 The government officially submitted 
before Congress a bill amending title IV of DL 211 in September 17, 1997. The congressional 
record of this bill somehow challenges these considerations, members of congress stated that 
they will discuss amending only the FNE because the government agreed to submit a bill 
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containing more thorough changes, like the creation of a specialized tribunal, later on.370 This bill 
was enacted, with a few changes, as law 19.610 of 1999.371 
 
As expected, the law augmented considerably both the prosecutorial powers of the FNE and 
its resources. The law replaced the entire title IV of DL 211, which contained the core provisions 
of the legal nature, composition and duties of this agency. It gave to the FNE more 
independence from other administrative bodies, although the appointment of the fiscal remained 
a matter of the president.372 This body was now entrusted with the protection of the “general 
interest of the collectivity within the economic order”.373 The law also allowed the FNE to 
commence investigations of allegedly anticompetitive conducts without notifying the 
investigated parties if cleared to do so by the CR.374 Also the fiscal could now ask any entity, 
public or private, to provide information and submit documents pertaining to the investigations 
it underwent. The CR could overturn such requests, but in order to do so the affected parties 
had to argue that providing such information creates an unnecessary burden for them or for 
third parties.375 Finally, the law almost doubled the number of staff position belonging to this 
agency.376 
 
The congressional record of the law foreshadowed the institutional changes that will take 
place in the future. It shows the extent to which this law combined elements from the doctrines 
mentioned before with elements from the original neoliberal variant prevalent until then. First, it 
continues to rely on the “economic constitution” and punitive administrative law doctrines 
prevailing at the time (see chapters 3 and 4). The presidential message that accompanied the bill 
as submitted to congress provides evidence of that, as it begins by placing economic freedom in 
the “public economic order” established by the “economic constitution”. It also states that since 
free competition is a “legally protected good”, this CLR is not about the freedom of producers 
or consumers nor preventing harms to market actors.377 Second, the law reinforces a system of 
public enforcement by giving more powers to the FNE and subdues private complaints and 
actions to the “general interest”. This institution serves a “transcendental finality” since it 
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protects the collective interests that are part of the economic order. Strengthening this 
governmental institution improves the protection of such interests and of the economic order as 
a whole.378 As a result, the law increases the protection of competition by strengthening the State 
institution in charge of conducting investigations for such purpose. We contend that this is 
consistent with neoliberal ideas about having the State participate actively in the protection of 
competition.379  
 
The public reception of law 19.610 of 1999 was mostly critical. According to El Mercurio, a 
well-known local newspaper with an affinity towards conservative ideas, by amending only the 
rules pertaining to the FNE, the law had altered the balance between this institution and the CR 
and CP. As mentioned before, the FNE conducted investigations for the CR, managed its 
bureaucratic tasks, and set the agenda of cases to be tried before it. Hence, with its new legal 
faculties and resources, the FNE could overcome the capacity of the CR and further determine 
the outcomes of the cases it decides.380 This newspaper’s note included the opinions of members 
Waldo Ortuzar and Ricardo Paredes, who argued that the comisiones had to be updated in order to 
counteract the FNE. They proposed the creation of a tribunal, independent of the FNE, 
composed of full-time appointees, independent of the executive branch, and with expertise on 
competition law topics.381 Interestingly, this note also suggested that the creation of the tribunal 
was a matter of adequate institutional design with emphasis on due process guarantees.382  
 
The new powers of the FNE, its resources and its visibility were not easy to manage. 
President Ricardo Lagos (2000 - 2006) appointed Francisco Fernandez, an expert lawyer in 
consumer protection as fiscal. He had to address several complex issues. First, he had to continue 
with the efforts to update the CLR after the changes introduced by law 19.610 of 1999. 
However, more than a year after this law’s enactment the government had not been able to 
consolidate a reform project that could be submitted to congress.383 Second, he continued with 
the cases advanced by his predecessor, and imprinted on them a distinctive consumer protection 
perspective. Members of the competition law community criticized this approach, arguing that it 
lacked focus.384 Thirdly, some of the cases he advanced involved other governmental bodies with 
interests in their outcome. In two cases the fiscal clashed with cabinet members that had interests 
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in the outcomes of the anticompetitive conducts investigated. Feeling he lacked the political 
support he expected, he resigned in August 2001.385 El Mercurio noted that his resignation did not 
come as a surprise since his interventionist stance with regard to markets came across as 
excessive in what was supposed to be an open economy.386 
 
The appointment of a new fiscal, Pedro Mattar, contributed to creating favorable conditions 
for amending DL 211 for a second time. The press portrayed him as having a technical profile, 
since his experience related to competition law issues and with legal reforms.387 A few months 
after his appointment, he informed that the government was well ahead in this project. He also 
professed a view of competition that was more amenable to economic analyses and which thus 
contrasted to the more legal approach of his predecessors.388 When considered together, these 
aspects suggest that fiscal Mattar’s appointment soothed any worries resulting from the activities 
underwent by his predecessors and aimed to regain the trust of the private sector. At about the 
same time that Mattar was appointed, the business association Sociedad de Fomento Fabril and the 
government underwent a large-scale revision of this country’s regulation. One of the plans the 
government agreed was, as mentioned by fiscal Mattar, the creation of a specialized competition 
law tribunal.389 Moreover, this plan was also congenial to the efforts of Libertad y Desarrollo, a 
conservative think-tank that since the early discussions of law 19.610 argued for similar 
measures.390 The alignment of different local actors - ranging from Concertación government 
members to conservative think tanks - suggested that a thorough reform of DL 211 was indeed 
possible. 
 
Another element that contributed to the reform of DL 211 was the Peer Review prepared by 
the Organization for Economic Co-Operation (hereinafter OECD) in 2003 and published in 
2004.391 This review is the first of several influential documents elaborated by this organization 
and its suggestions have been taken into consideration in various legal reforms. This review 
aimed to bridge the administrative, discretionary regime of the past with a proposal, for future 
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institutional developments, based on having a specialized tribunal that addresses competition law 
issues according to the doctrines developed in other jurisdictions. This can be evidenced in 
several of its aspects. First, the review offered some historical background on the history of the 
CLR, although it narrated it according to the more US oriented discussion of the goals of 
competition law.392 Second, it argued that the application of the substantive framework was 
unclear, among other things, because of the uncertainty about how the law is applied. It also 
suggested that the FNE issue guidelines or “policy statements” to address this issue.393 Thirdly, it 
suggested the adoption of a merger review regime to treat mergers and anticompetitive conducts 
differently.394 Finally, it put forward the proposal of replacing the different comisiones with a quasi-
judicial tribunal, which suggests a shift from administrative discretion to a form of “Rule-of-law” 
adjudication.395  
 
We highlight two particular developments. To begin with, there are remarkable similarities 
between the observations and propositions of this review and the criticisms of this CLR made by 
local actors are quite important. These similarities are twofold. First, the review shares the 
suggestions made by local actors about replacing the current enforcement bodies with a more 
specialized enforcement body, like a tribunal.396 Arguably, this is so because the review included 
the ideas presented by local actors in order to give them the full sway of being part of an OECD 
review. Second, this review shares with local neoliberal accounts the idea of reshaping the 
Chilean CLR as being about economic efficiency without further consideration for other goals.397 
Just as well, the drive for the “internationalization” of this regime is remarkable. (By 
“internationalization” we refer to the idea that for this regime to become more effective it should 
develop institutions based on ideas and insights taken from foreign competition law regimes.) 
The combination of these two elements placed this OECD’s review and the local accounts of 
this regime well within the neoliberal competition law project, although within it they seem to 
perform different functions. The local accounts became the core inputs for the legal reforms that 
would be to come; in turn, the review assured that those reforms were in the right direction from 
the perspective of international actors.  
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Given the favorable conditions described, the government submitted a bill before Congress 
that addressed the issues created by law 19.610 of 1999. This bill was enacted (with few 
modifications) as law 19.911 of 2003. This law was considerably more ambitious than the 
previous legislation that it amended, as it redefined important aspects of this regime in light of 
the more recent neoliberal variants. First, it states explicitly that the goal of this competition law 
regime is to protect “free competition in markets”.398 In doing so, it aimed to dispel the 
uncertainty surrounding this regime’s goals that has occupied academic discussions until then.399 
In particular, it dispelled the idea that this regime protected consumers as a class over other actors 
in the competitive process.400 Moreover, the law also introduced more precise definitions of the 
prohibited conducts. It contains a general prohibition followed by particular prohibitions of 
agreements and concerted practices, abuses of dominance and predatory prices. The new law 
also eliminates the criminal liability for anticompetitive conduct, leaving only administrative and 
civil liabilities in place.401 To compensate this, it doubles the fines that could be imposed and 
established as criteria for their application the benefit resulting from the conduct, its seriousness, 
and whether it is form of recidivism, or not.402 
 
Second, this law replaced all the comisiones with the Tribunal de Libre Competencia, or TDLC, an 
independent tribunal specialized in competition law issues.403 Its main purpose is firstly to decide 
the cases brought before it by the FNE and private individuals. It can also provide advice about 
non-litigious acts or contracts to be celebrated, issue general guidelines for private parties to 
follow, and counsel the government about the competitive features of current or proposed 
regulation.404 The Tribunal is composed of five, fully paid members - three lawyers and two 
economists - which should devote exclusively to their work in this institution although they may 
hold academic posts.405 The president can choose one lawyer and one economist from two lists 
made by the Chilean Central Bank of candidates, which are selected from a public list. Two other 
members - also a lawyer and an economist - are selected from a public list and appointed by the 
Central Bank. In turn, the president of the TDLC should be a lawyer appointed by the President 
and selected from a list made by the Supreme Court with candidates that meet a series of 
requirements. Regarding the FNE, the law did not limit its powers, but presented some of them 
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in a more straightforward way.406 Finally, the new law opened up the possibility that the Supreme 
Court, through a “recurso de reclamación” could review any decision issued by the TDLC 
imposing a sanction, thus increasing the opportunities for review.407 
 
It is important to identify the elements that enable this law to counterbalance the reforms 
introduced by the previous law 19.610 of 1999. First, it further opened competition law 
enforcement to the profession of economics at different levels. At the level of defining the goals 
of this regime, it established a goal that is more consistent with economic doctrines and less so 
with legal doctrines. This is also evident in how the different anticompetitive conducts were 
defined, as well as with the decision to raise the fines. At a more practical level, the new 
legislation opens competition law decision-making to economists by establishing that two of the 
five posts in the TDLC are reserved for those professionals. It does something similar for this 
institution’s staff. Both aspects suggest that underlying this law is the view that competition law 
enforcement cannot be properly understood only as a legal issue - an insight confirmed by the 
congressional record of this law.408 Second, the creation of the TDLC was conceived as 
necessary to counterbalance the stacked process that investigated parties had to face given the 
FNE’s new functions. The idea of having separate (and independent) institutions contrasts with 
the previous collaborative architecture between the FNE and the different comisiones. Thirdly, the 
idea of establishing a judicial institution, coupled with the redefinition of the goals and 
anticompetitive conducts, was understood as necessary for making this regime more rule-bound. 
The congressional record shows that having a politically independent decision-making institution 
(like a court), and a precise drafting of legal provisions, were the mechanisms used to achieve 
this aim.409 This aspect was reinforced by allowing the Supreme Court to review any decision by 
the TDLC that imposes a sanction, because such review procedure can be understood as an 
additional guarantee for the investigated parties. Because of all these aspects, this law redefines 
core aspects of this regime and gives prevalence to a more recent (and international) variant of 
the neoliberal competition law project 
 
II.B. Price Collusion and the FNE (2003 - 2009) 
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As mentioned in the previous chapter, collusive agreements were not at the core of the 
enforcement activities of the FNE or of the comisiones. According to Eliana Cruz and Sebastián 
Zárate, between 1973 and 2003 the different comisiones decided a total of 127 collusion cases, 
which roughly amounts to 6.3 per cent of all the cases decided.410 DL 211 states that the 
evidence of collusion, as well as of any anticompetitive conduct, could come from any of the 
means of evidence stated in the Code of Civil Procedure, and the indications of the TDLC. It 
also stated that any prior record or indirect evidence that the CR considers relevant could be 
used to ascertain the established facts.411 The standard of proof, therefore, was based on the 
general evidence regime and did not require any specific type of evidence for the proof of 
anticompetitive conducts. Even though the substantive content of the law did not change, the 
decisions issued by these bodies evidence a shift towards a more nuanced analysis of the 
conditions that were part of each investigation, both numerically and substantively, during the 
second half of the 1980s and unto the 2000s. Before then, collusion decisions were based mostly 
on price parallelism, where similarities of price levels or other aspects related with price 
determination were taken as a sign of collusion.412 The number of convictions for collusion cases 
was about 3 per year. Beginning in the late 1980s, a change regarding how collusion occurred; 
price similarities were not considered anymore as a distinctive evidence of collusion. The turning 
point can be found in decisions like resolución 244 of 1987 by of the CR, in which this body stated 
that, as economic theory indicates, price identity could also indicate strong market 
competition.413 Once this change took place, the number of convictions lowered considerably 
reaching an average of less than one decision per year.414  
 
Resolución 432 of 1995 is an illustrative example of how the CR analyzed price collusion 
during this period. In this decision, the CR fined three retail pharmaceutical stores for engaging 
in collusive pricing. In 1993 the store Cruz Verde decided to incur into the market of Santiago, 
triggering a response by the other three incumbents in this market that lowered their prices. 
However, by late 1993 Cruz Verde and the other incumbents raised their prices in a coordinated 
fashion until April 1994. This resulted from an agreement between them, as proved by FNE 
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with evidence showing the similarity of the price increase and on the basis of testimonies by 
employees who had actively exchanged price information. The CR accepted the evidence 
presented by the FNE and fined all four incumbents, but it did not address the argument, 
presented by one of the defendants, that price parallelism was not a definitive evidence of 
collusion.415  
 
This decision shows that for the CR it was important to have direct evidence of an 
agreement to rule against the instigated parties. However, it was unclear at the time whether only 
direct evidences meets the standard of proof required to punish price collusion, or if indirect 
evidence, like a presumption following from price parallelism, sufficed. This is so because the CR 
stated that even in the absence of the direct evidence obtained by the FNE, the existence of an 
anticompetitive agreement could be inferred from the similarities of the prices and the timely 
coordination of the conduct.416 Hence, the evidentiary standard that the CR relied upon to 
punish price collusion was not altogether clear.  
 
This situation became more complex when the TDLC began deciding the price collusion 
cases presented by the FNE, and then when the Supreme Court reviewed those decisions. 
Between 2004 and 2009, the Supreme Court reviewed 6 price collusion cases; it affirmed 4 
decisions issued by the TDLC where the tribunal had ruled against the FNE and other parties 
involved, and revoked 2 decisions where this tribunal ruled after the claims presented by the 
FNE. During this same period, the TDLC decided 7 cases regarding price collusion. Of these, it 
ruled against the investigations presented by the FNE or the plaintiffs in 4 decisions and ruled in 
favor of them in the remaining 3.417 Table 5.1 relates the outcomes of the decisions issued by the 
TDLC and the Supreme Court: 
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Table 5.1. Price Collusion Decisions Issued by TDLC and Supreme Court 
 
Decision 
# 
Defendant 
Parties 
Decision TDLC 
(outcome) 
FINE 
TDLC (in 
USD)418 
Date 
Decision Supreme 
Court 
(affirms/revokes ) 
Date 
18/2005 Copec, et.al Revokes CP decision 
and FNE’s complaint 
- 10/06/2005 Affirms 26/10/2005 
38/2006 ASOEX 
Accepts FNE’s 
complaint; sanctions 
defendants 
433,878.5 
7/06/2006 
Revokes; evidence 
insufficient to 
conclude collusion, 
nor intent. 
28/12/2006 
43/2006 AirLiquide 
Partially accepts FNE’s 
complaint on charges of 
collusion 
128,695 
7/09/2006 Revokes 22/01/2007 
57/2007 ISAPRES  
(various) 
Rejects FNE’s 
complaint, insufficient 
grounds for collusion 
 
18/07/2007 
Affirms; details 
evidence standard 
for collusion. 
28/01/2008 
74/2008 
AMPatagoni
a 
Partially accepts FNE’s 
complaint 
94’506,260.2
5 
02/09/2008 
Affirms, but lowers 
fines to 7’518,496 
31/12/2008 
79/2008 Asfaltos Rejects FNE’s 
complaint 
 10/12/2008 Affirms 16/04/2009 
87/2009 Copec et.al 
Rejects complaints for 
lack of evidence of 
collusion. 
 
13/08/2009 NA NA 
 
As the voting patterns of the major decisions involved suggests, the TDLC’s hostility 
towards the use of indirect evidence to prove price collusion was the result of the efforts of this 
tribunal to adapt to the evidentiary standard of the Supreme Court on this matter.419 In ASOEX, 
all five members of the TDLC ruled against the defendants based on the indirect evidence 
presented by the FNE.420 The Supreme Court revoked the TDLC’s decision and established that 
collusion cases require proof that the behavior of the investigated parties is the result of a 
concerted practice (and not of a lawful alternative) and the existence of an anticompetitive intent 
by these parties.421 In AirLiquide, the TDLC ruled against the defendants based once more on the 
evidence presented by the FNE;422 However, in his dissent minister Menchaca argued that there 
was not enough evidence to support the occurrence of a collusive agreement, and that to punish 
                                                            
418 Total fines levied against all firms involved, but not including fines against individuals except for Decision 
74/2008. The values are approximations expressed in US dollars based on rates of July 10, 2015. 
419 Cruz & Zarate, Op.cit. Pg. 174. 
420 Chile, Tribunal de Defensa de la Libre Competencia (hereinafter TDLC). Sentencia 38/2006 de 7 de Junio de 
2006. 
421 Chile, Corte Suprema de Justicia (hereinafter CSJ), Proceso 38/06, sentencia de 28 de diciembre de 2006. 
  124 
a collusive agreement it was necessary to prove that the parties involved in such agreement 
abused of the market power resulting from such agreement in the first place.423 The Supreme 
Court also argued that the occurrence of an agreement had not been properly proved and 
revoked the TDLC’s decision.424 Finally, in ISAPRES the TDLC rejected a complaint brought 
against several health insurers that had simultaneously lowered their coverage rates in similar 
proportions. This time, the Tribunal ruled in favor of the defendants. It endorsed the elements 
mentioned in the previous decision for proving collusion and argued that certain conditions like 
barriers to entry and information exchange between parties were not enough to conclude that 
collusion had taken place.425 The Supreme Court confirmed the decision of the TDLC. Besides 
stating again the elements necessary to prove the occurrence of collusive agreements, the Court 
added that only direct evidence was satisfactory for proving collusive agreements.426 In doing so, 
the Court limited considerably the scope of article 18f of the DL 211, according to which 
anticompetitive conduct could be proved using any evidence available.427 The doctrine resulting 
from these rulings was that if economic theories could provide a lawful explanation of the 
conduct investigated, then the conduct and its allegedly anticompetitive nature had not been 
adequately proven.  
 
The increasingly more demanding evidentiary standard that the courts required for proving 
collusive agreements had impacted the FNE’s work. As Francisco Caravia, a member of this 
institution, casually stated in a presentation, “(w)e were in the worst of all worlds: a demanding 
evidentiary standard and without any proper means of investigation.”428 This situation came 
across as unbalanced and unstable because the FNE could not turn investigations into 
convictions with the limited investigative tools established in the law. Moreover, these outcomes 
were also unanticipated consequences of having the Supreme Court deciding more competition-
related cases than it had before the 2003 amendment.429 
 
The response by the government and the FNE to these events was complex and involved 
action in several fronts, turning this otherwise problematic situation into an opportunity for 
change. Firstly, fiscal Enrique Vergara (who replaced Pedro Mattar in 2006) redirected the efforts 
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of the FNE towards investigations where direct evidence of anticompetitive conduct was 
available in order to prevent adverse rulings by the courts.430 This was aligned with the OECD 
reports that advised that competition law enforcement authorities to prioritize their 
investigations and channel their resources into those investigations that would bring the highest 
pay-offs.431 This strategy paid-off in an investigation involving department stores Almacenes Paris 
and Falabella whom colluded to prevent suppliers of household goods from participating in a 
special event organized by a bank that offered a credit card system that rivaled the system 
developed by the stores. The FNE obtained direct and indirect evidence of the intent of these 
stores to sabotage the bank, including emails and other communications. The TDLC ruled 
against the defendants,432 and the Supreme Court confirmed the TLDC’s decision but lowered 
the fines imposed to the condemned parties.433 Secondly, the government submitted before 
congress a new bill amending DL 211, which eventually was enacted as law 20.361 of 2009. 
Because of the particular conditions that led to the enactment of this law, we will consider it in 
more detail in the following Section.   
 
II.C. Legal Reform and Competition Law Decisions (2009-2014). 
 
 The year 2009 is of symbolic importance to the Chilean CLR because of two different but 
related events. First, it was the year in which law 20.361 was enacted. This law introduced 
important changes in this CLR, like providing the FNE the power to conduct raids and seize 
documents and information, and the adoption of a leniency regime. As we will show below, 
these reforms were aimed at strengthening the State’s prosecutorial capacities in order to protect 
competition. Second, in 2009 the investigations conducted by the FNE became the subject of 
intense coverage by the media. In particular, the price collusion investigations in the farmacias 
(“drugstores”) case drew an unanticipated amount of public attention, and contributed to the 
enactment of law 20.361 of 2009. The FNE’s apparent strategy of harvesting public awareness 
by offering to the media details of the investigations in order to sow public support for its 
activities paid off. Hence this year marked the beginning of a new period characterized by the 
consolidation of the a variant of the neoliberal project. Even so, a few limited elements of State-
centered project, like the reliance on the State to solve competition-related issues, became 
noticeable.   
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 Our analysis begins with an overview of law 20.361 of 2009 in congress. The main facets of 
this law consisted in granting new investigative powers to the FNE like the capacity to seize 
information obtained through dawn raids,434 an increase of the applicable fines435 and the 
establishment of a leniency regime.436 The first two elements were considered necessary for the 
proper functioning of the leniency regime, for higher fines and intrusive investigative powers 
raise the incentives for denouncing collusive agreements.437 The congressional record of this law 
showed that with regard to the adoption of a leniency regime there were two different positions. 
On one hand, there was a group of politicians and commentators that viewed this institution 
with skepticism. Their arguments varied, but they generally gravitated towards two ideas. First, 
that leniency regime was foreign to Chilean commercial law, and was used only in criminal law 
cases involving illicit drug dealings and terrorism - two types of highly dangerous crimes. Hence, 
to introduce such a regime, and granting the FNE more intrusive investigative faculties, meant 
treating collusion cases as if they had the social relevance of the above-mentioned crimes.438 
Second, it was felt that establishing leniency regimes and combining them with more 
investigative faculties to the FNE endangered individual rights by giving the State almost 
unchecked powers.439 On the other, there were other members of congress that were in favor of 
adopting a leniency regime, as it would contribute to address more effectively the undiscovered 
anticompetitive conducts that were taking place.440 Representatives like deputy Burgos went as 
far as to state that this bill was important in tackling private sector corruption.441 Even though 
the majority of representatives were in favor of the changes proposed, its process through 
Congress became increasingly complicated because of differences on these and other issues.442 
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As the discussion of this bill lingered in congress, the FNE was conducting one of its most 
publicized price collusion investigations to this day. In April 2006 this institution requested all 
communications between pharmaceutical laboratories and three retail chain stores (Salco Brand, 
Cruz Verde and Ahumada) as well as between the personnel of the retail stores. Among the 
communications requested was information regarding the prices of prescriptions medicines since 
2006. With the different pieces of evidence collected, the FNE determined that a collusive 
agreement was taking place between the chain stores and that the laboratories were also involved 
in the coordination of their actions (a “hub and spoke” conspiracy). The conduct of these 
farmacias led to an excessive pricing of many medicines, including those for epilepsy and diabetes. 
The formal complaint was lodged before the TDLC in 2008,443 but in 2009 the FNE and one of 
the drugstores reached a settlement agreement that resulted in the FNE disposing of direct 
evidence about the occurrence of the anticompetitive agreement. The TLDC and the Supreme 
Court reviewed the settlement and decided in favor of its legality;444 for all practical matters, this 
settlement amounted to the exercise of an informal leniency procedure.  
 
The farmacias case is highly important because it produced effects well beyond the matters 
litigated. This was not the first case that the FNE had tried regarding the pharmaceutical sector, 
for it had conducted investigations against laboratories and pharmacies during the 1990s.445 
However, it was the first of these cases that received massive media coverage and was turned 
into a “scandal”.446 In the past, the media had commented other cases.447 However, none of these 
cases were taken to be so emblematic of abuse from the private sector, nor did they cause much 
political stir. This investigation gave a major impulse to the enactment of law 20.361 of 2009 and 
became a rally cry for reformers denouncing private firms’ market abuse and the moral failings 
of Chilean capitalism.448 This impulse can be appreciated in two different but related instances. 
First, the settlement between the FNE and one of the participants showed the advantages of 
having a leniency regime. Minister of Finance Hugo Lavado stated before Congress that the 
outcome of the farmacias case had created a favorable situation for establishing a leniency regime 
like the one in the bill before congress.449 Second, the details of this case contributed to a 
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collective sense of indignation against the behavior of the investigated parties, which in turn 
buttressed the importance of punishing more severely anticompetitive conducts. This appears 
several times in the congressional record of the bill, and was presented as a reason for enacting 
the law.450 Furthermore, it led to some manifestations of remorse for eliminating the criminal 
sanctions established in the original text of DL 211.451 Senator Allende presented a more social 
justice approach to the issue as she stated that “[t]his case is the best example of how economic 
concentration, profiteering and greed lead to situations that, regrettably, as usual, the 
consequences of are faced by the most vulnerable.”452 
 
In parallel to these developments, Chile became officially a member of the OECD in 2010. 
The 2010 accession review (drafted and discussed in 2009, but published in 2011) offers a 
general overview of the history of the enforcement of this CLR and proposes a series of ideas 
about its direction over time.453 Interestingly, the report approves of the new enforcement 
priority given to investigations regarding collusive agreements, but expresses skepticism on how 
the TDLC and the Supreme Court addressed vertical agreements and abuses of dominance.454 In 
particular, it approves of the more economic oriented jurisprudence issued by the TDLC, as well 
as the emphasis given to the prosecution of cartels.455 This is consistent with the OECD’s own 
views, especially with the idea that hard-core cartels are the most damaging of all anticompetitive 
conducts and their prosecution should be a priority.456 Secondly, the review approved the 
voluntary merger review regime, because its voluntary character prevented all actors from 
incurring in unnecessary costs, thus unnecessary burdening productive arrangements.457 Overall, 
the review supports the recent reforms of this CLR. 
 
The leniency regime established in law 20.361 of 2009 was quickly used by the FNE. Fiscal 
Felipe Irarrazabal managed the first case, which involved two manufacturers of compressors for 
refrigerators and freezing cabinets that were already taking part of a leniency process in Brazil. 
One of these manufacturers, Tecumseh do Brasil S.A., had asked for leniency in exchange of 
information regarding an international cartel of freezers in which it had participated between 
2005 and 2008. The information presented by this actor included emails and testimonies that 
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detail the existence and functioning of the cartel. The TDLC ruled favorably to the FNE in 2012 
and granted the leniency to the applicant.458 Since this case, however, the effectiveness of the 
leniency regime has been questioned, which perhaps explains why until 2014 there have been 
only two other cases - one involving a collusion between transport companies and another one 
involving asphalt vendors.459 The President of the TDLC stated in his 2013 yearly speech that 
this was an “ineffective tool” in the fight against collusion because it did not clear firms that 
came forward from criminal liability. He was referring to the rather surprising decision by the 
office of the public prosecutors to enforce an arcane article from the Criminal Code to sue all 
the participants of the farmacias case, including the party that benefitted from leniency.460 This 
was an unintended, yet not unexpected, consequence of the same public indignation that the 
government took advantage of for the enactment of law 20.361 of 2009. 
 
The impact of the farmacias investigation had not subdued when the FNE unearthed a 
collusive agreement between three chicken-growing firms that amounted to more than 90 per 
cent of Chile’s market and their business association.461 As in the farmacias case, this investigation 
touched upon a social fiber because of the widespread consumption of the products involved. 
The FNE showed that the parties had colluded and maintained prices for a period of 10 years. 
Because of the duration of the practice, and the widespread consumption of chicken, the FNE 
argued for the imposition of the highest fines to the producers before the TDLC.462 This court 
confirmed entirely the complaint filed by the FNE in a 2014 decision, and proceeded to impose 
the highest fines possible according to the law;463 in a decision issued on October 29, 2015, the 
Supreme Court confirmed the ruling of the TDLC, including the amount of the fine imposed.464  
 
Both the farmacias and the chicken cases were presented by the media as examples of abuses 
committed by powerful firms. However, they were not the only cases that amounted to scandals, 
especially during 2011. Earlier that year, the securities regulator discovered that one of Chile’s 
emblematic retail stores, La Polar, had misrepresented its financial situation. The fraud began 
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with the unilateral amendment of the terms and conditions of overdue consumers’ contracts; it 
was unearthed by a consumer defense association when inquiring about the numerous 
complaints against this retailer. This case also evidenced the inadequate level of supervision 
exercised by the regulatory authorities.465 Just as well, that same year the construction of 5 dams 
in the southern region of Aysén became a politically contested issue.466 Different actors - 
including politicians, environmentalists and civil rights activists - opposed to the project arguing 
that it would lead to irreversible ecological damages, affect minorities and resulted from corrupt 
practices.467 Although the Bachelet government decided to discontinue the project in 2014, the 
media coverage of its different aspects had already cast a shadow over the political and economic 
establishment.468 Finally, 2011 was also the year of the massive student protests. The student 
movement demanded more public expenditure on education institutions, free from charge 
programs, and the end of the business-like features of this activity; basically, to change the 
system established during the military regime.469 Underlying all these events was the notion that 
the legal, political and economic model established in the 1980 constitution was unable to care 
for the demands of an active citizenry and the lower income ranks of the population.470  
 
The popular indignation surrounding these scandals served as a context against which the 
reintroduction of criminal liability for anticompetitive conducts was disclosed. In congress, 
several politicians argued for such a reform.471 The government of President Piñeira (2010 - 
2014) established a committee composed of local members of the competition law community 
to address this issue. The final report of this commission, published in 2012, shows a division on 
this topic among its members; while some argued for raising the fines so that they were 
proportional to the harm caused, others argued for reintroducing criminal liability because it 
could dissuade anticompetitive conducts more effectively.472 However, the government did not 
pursue changes after the publication of this report, even though this discussion continued within 
the competition law community, including the enforcement institutions. The president of the 
TDLC, Tomás Menchaca, acknowledged that the eventual reintroduction of criminal liability 
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resulted from the public indignation that the farmacias and chicken cases caused in the Chilean 
society.473 In turn, the OECD’s Peer Review follow-up report is favorable to the FNE’s decision 
to emphasize prosecuting collusive agreements but did not comment on the possibility of 
reintroducing criminal fines or on the effectiveness of the leniency regime.474 In the meantime, 
the FNE continued with its investigations regarding price collusion. In 2012 it filed a claim 
against the transporters of the city of Valdivia,475 and in 2013 it filed a claim against the 
gynecologists in the region of Ñuble engaging in this conduct.476 Both claims highlighted the 
social costs of the anticompetitive practices involved.  
 
A few months after Michelle Bachelet began her second presidential term in 2014, the TDLC 
confirmed the FNE’s assessment of the anticompetitive conduct involved in the chicken case 
and ruled against the defendant.477 This decision was followed by an announcement by the 
government’s cabinet that it was seriously considering a new reform to the DL, including the 
reintroduction of criminal liability.478 In the meantime, the FNE commissioned a new study, this 
time to foreign experts, on how to improve the punitive elements of this regime based on the 
experiences of other jurisdictions.479 The OECD had also participated in the discussion of how 
to improve this CLR, but this time from the perspective of the merger regime. Surprisingly, a 
2014 report on the matter contradicted the 2010 accession review, and argued that the voluntary 
notification system created too much uncertainty and was highly inadequate. It therefore 
proposed the creation of a mandatory pre-merger notification regime guided by the standards 
based on economic efficiency found in other areas of law and the other OECD member 
countries.480 With the inputs provided by these studies and the popular demands to punish more 
severely the participants in anticompetitive agreements, early 2015 seemed adequate for 
presenting a new reform.  
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The bill introduces a variety of issues, but it focuses on collusive agreements and leniency, 
merger control and market studies. Regarding the collusive agreements, the bill introduces 
several changes, of which we consider here only the most salient. First, it proposes the 
criminalization of collusive agreements (thus amending the criminal law code) with a term 
between 5 and 10 years of prison, among other sanctions. The bill also proposes that the only 
actor that can file a criminal claim is the FNE.481 Second, it proposes that the baseline for 
imposing fines should be that they reflect the economic benefit resulting from collusive 
agreements. It proposes the imposition of fines amounting to twice as much as the economic 
benefit, or to 30 per cent of the sales of the actors involved during the period in which the 
conduct took place.482 Thirdly, it proposes to widen the scope of this prohibition to all 
agreements irrespectively of whether they have an effect on a market or not.483 Finally, regarding 
to leniency, the bill proposes that beneficiaries should also be absolved from the civil and 
criminal liabilities associated with their conducts. This would prevent them from being absolved 
on the administrative dimension and yet be considered by a court as criminally liable and subject 
to pay damages. It also proposes to offer lesser benefits to actors that file for leniency after the 
first applicant.484 Regarding merger control, the bill proposes to incorporate a mandatory pre-
merger notification regime administered by the FNE. This change aims to overcome the current 
state of affairs, which is based on voluntary submissions. The new regime would enable the FNE 
to rule whether a planned merger would “lessen competition substantially” and thus to approve 
it or not. Its decision, in turn, could be reviewed by the TDLC.485 Finally, concerning market 
studies, the bill proposes two changes. First, to give to the FNE the faculty only to undergo 
studies of the competition taking place in any market, in order to identify regulatory failures that 
affect competition, and to initiate competition law investigations. Second, in order to 
complement this change, to transfer the power to issue non-binding opinions about the 
adequacy of legal institutions from a competition law perspective currently held by the TDLC to 
the FNE.486 Overall, the bill aims to grant to the FNE more control over the different variables 
that determine the effectiveness of the leniency regime as well as tools and capacities to exercise 
a better oversight of how competition takes place in markets. 
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This bill contributes to the further establishment of the more recent neoliberal competition 
law project as well as to its convergence towards the standards set by international organizations. 
First, the bill continues relying on the idea that “hard core” cartels are the most damaging of all 
anticompetitive conducts. This idea aligns to the economic views of international organizations 
like the OECD, which suggest precisely focusing on those practices, but also to the social 
indignation resulting from the farmacias and chicken collusion cases. In doing so, it aligns the 
interests of government members involved in competition law with the interests of other 
government members that want to show that the government is taking the appropriate measures. 
Second, the bill furthers the discretion of the FNE to exercise its mandates, as well as grants it 
with new powers to oversee and control how competition takes place. In particular, it grants the 
FNE the power to control different elements associated with the leniency regime that until now 
escaped its control, like the issue of criminal liability. Although doing so may improve the 
effectiveness of leniency, it also augments the margins of the FNE’s discretion as far as the new 
rules allow it. In doing so, the FNE would be subject to the same rules than the public 
prosecutor's office and their control by the courts; whether this regime is effective or not in 
curtailing potential abuses remains to be seen. Just as well, the introduction of a mandatory 
merger review enables this body to weigh on the structure of the markets in which the merging 
actors are active, as well as on the transactions that take place in them. Similarly, it grants this 
body the capacity to detail how competition takes place in any market, and to make 
recommendations to other governmental bodies to remove or replace particular barriers 
entrenched in legal rules. It is important to note that there are important similarities in the new, 
proactive role that this bill awards to the FNE with the one inspiring law 19.610 of 1999. 
 
Thirdly, we note that this bill draws heavily on foreign experiences to justify the changes it 
suggests. In particular, all the changes that the bill proposes can be traced back to the studies 
mentioned above about fines and merger review. This reflects the influence of organizations like 
the OECD have in how this CLR is conceived, as well as the capacity of the members of the 
Chilean government - especially the FNE - to use the comparative knowledge to further their 
own reform agenda. It also reflects how both local and international actors collude in order to 
pursue their own agendas. In particular, the OECD’s change of heart regarding merger reviews is 
quite difficult to explain from a theoretical perspective alone; it comes across as rather blunt, 
although it can reflect that the government finally ceded to different pressures and accepted to 
introduce such regime. It also reflects the loss of capacity to influence how competition law is 
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conceived by local actors that do not have the international connections of their counterparts. 
Even so, these actors have manifested their doubts about the bill and promised a challenge.487 
 
III. Conclusions 
 
At the introduction of this chapter we argued that Chilean competition law was a site of 
interaction between different actors and their projects competing for the power to determine the 
content and the structure of the legal rules that make it up. In this section, we evaluate the 
transformation of the legal rules making up this field and the general trends they suggest in terms 
of this interaction. 
 
The most notorious issue is that in the time-period here considered shows the opposition 
that actually took place within the neoliberal competition law project between two variants 
described in chapter 2, one of which focuses on the constitutional protection of individual 
freedoms, while the other emphasizes economic efficiency and welfare. The alternative, a full-
fledged conflict between different versions of the neoliberal competition law project and its 
State-centered counterpart has not taken place in Chile as it has in Colombia or in México. What 
we find in Chile is the reiteration of a common pattern in which the neoliberal project 
predominates, especially at the level of substantive choices. In the process of doing so, however, 
it is running the risk of building up the tensions this particular variant has with its older 
counterpart within the neoliberal competition law project. The tension verges upon a series of 
instances in which classic liberal rights are relativized in the name of facilitating competition law 
investigations and prosecutions. We refer, in particular, to the procedural instances in which the 
FNE can access an individual's mail without his permission, can wiretap communications with a 
summary judicial order or can withhold evidence from third parties, all in the name of making 
enforcement more expeditious. These practices have become commonplace; however it is 
unclear that a “classic” neoliberal thinker like Hayek would agree to give an competition law 
enforcer the prerogative to do all those things in the name of efficiency. Moreover, this tension 
could be particularly disruptive if different actors can mobilize their agendas towards a common 
opposition. It is not hard to imagine adherents to the first variant of neoliberalism joining forces 
with liberal think tanks to oppose these measures by arguing for government transparency and 
respect for privacy, the protection of personal information, and due process - all classic liberal 
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ideals. It may well be that an important challenge to the more recent neoliberal reforms comes 
from this variant of neoliberalism itself. 
 
Elements associated with the State-centered project were not entirely absent during the 
period here considered. Even so, in this period there were no efforts to develop such project 
specifically for competition law, neither at the level of academia, nor of professional practice. We 
contend that this is because of the lasting heritage of the military regime, and in particular, of the 
lack of political viability of developing such project in a highly adverse context. As a result, the 
ideational space of conceiving competition law issues remains considerably narrow, especially 
more so since the economic neoliberal doctrine that emerged in the 1990s prevailed over the 
alternatives. Even so, the recent emergence of ideas related to the State-centered project can 
bring about important changes. We discussed above a few instances in which different ideas 
relating to this project became noticeable; one example is the political statement that punishing 
anticompetitive practices like cartels is important because such practices are patently unjust and 
unfair.488 As the public opinion turns towards issues of distributive fairness when discussing in 
anticompetitive practices, we expect that these themes will become more important in the public 
discussions about the future of Chile's CLR.  
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6. The Persistence of State-centered Competition Law in 
Colombia 
(1990 - 2015) 
 
I. Introduction 
  
In June 1 2015, Colombia’s competition law enforcement agency, the Superintendencia de 
Industria y Comercio (hereinafter SIC) presented a statement of objections accusing 12 sugar mills 
and their business associations of operating a cartel.489 While SIC has fined this firms and 
associations in the past for similar conducts, what is special of this new proceeding is that this 
agency linked the behavior of these actors to agricultural policies that have been in place for 
decades, and therefore is making a case for their curtailment in the name of competition. The 
backlash against this statement of objections has been considerable, as the investigated parties 
stated that they would challenge it through all the available means.490 The outcome of this clash is 
unclear. The government depends critically on the support of the business and commercial 
sectors for the successful conclusion of the current peace dialogues with leftist guerrilla FARC. 
However, following this process through would make clear the government’s commitment with 
competition law before the eyes of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (hereinafter OECD), an organization the current government aspires to Colombia 
join. As we pointed in chapter 4, tensions between business associations (hereinafter BA’s) and 
competition law enforcers have been at the heart of Colombia’s CLR since the 1950s.491 
 
In this chapter we unpack the trajectory of Colombia’s competition law regime (or CLR) 
between 1990 and May 2015 as a field where different actors - politicians, lawyers, economists, 
international organizations and others - compete and collaborate for the power to determine the 
content and structure of the law. To do so, we use the interaction between BAs and competition 
                                                            
489 Revista Semana Azucareros bajo la lupa May 30, 2015. 
490 La República “Hoy los colombianos adquieren el azúcar a un precio menor que hace cuatro años” June 23, 
2015. 
491 We refer to two types of business associations in this chapter. The first type is composed of competing firms 
from a single economic sector. Most of the decisions issued by SIC we analyse here are addressed against this 
type of associations. The second type is composed of firms from different economic sectors. Associations of this 
type have not been sanctioned by SIC. Some of the latter associations are politically very active and provide 
scenarios for discussing regulatory issues with the government. Regarding the different types of business 
associations, see Schneider, Ben Ross. Business Politics and the State in Twentieth-century Latin America. 
Cambridge University Press Cambridge, 2004. Chapter 1. 
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law enforcers as a window for identifying how the interplay between the projects described in 
chapter 2 occurred, and especially the dominance of the neoliberal project. We also focus on this 
interaction because it is particularly useful for tracing the interplay between competition law and 
other regulatory regimes in a setting in which competition law enforcers lack de jure political 
autonomy and are subject to various political pressures.  
 
 The following sections of this chapter develop these ideas. Section II shows how SIC, 
mobilized its resources to challenge anticompetitive conducts by influential BAs, which in turn 
aimed to defuse SICs efforts by using different political strategies. Although SIC has had 
setbacks, it is set on a trajectory in which challenging anticompetitive agreements has also 
become a struggle about its political autonomy, a trajectory that has been reinforced by the 
efforts of local and international actors. Finally, section III offers some conclusions.  
 
II.A. The Promises and Perils of Constitutional Principles (1990 - 1998) 
 
The first period addresses the constitutional dimension of the tension between the right to 
free association and the right to competition in Colombia’s 1991 Constitution, and its 
development through different laws and decrees. This development was colored by the political 
conditions of the moment and led to the erosion of competition as a constitutional right and an 
organizing principle of economic activity. The constitutional tension between the right to free 
association and competition would lead to conflicts regarding the proper scope of competition 
law rules.  
 
II.A.1 Constitutional Promises 
 
The 1991 Constitution embodies uneasy compromises between the different actors involved 
in it's drafting, ranging from demobilized guerrilla groups like M-19, student movements, the two 
major political parties, and the incumbent administration of president Cesar Gaviria (1990 – 
1994).492 The result is a Constitution that establishes a welfare State based on an ample chapter 
on human rights, a commitment to free trade, regulated markets and the efficient provision of 
public goods and utilities. In doing so, it combines elements taken from liberal constitutionalism 
with more social-oriented elements that result from earlier political movements that developed 
along the 20th century.  
                                                            
492 See, for example, Rodríguez Garavito, Op.cit. 
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One of the rights that the Constitution takes from the liberal tradition is the right to free 
association, established in article 38. It states the following “(t)he right to free association for the 
development of the different activities that people realize in society is guaranteed”.493 This right 
is also acknowledged in article 39, which states that both employees and employers can be part 
of labor unions and associations, and that both types of associations are subject to the legal order 
and democratic principles.494 While in abstract these two articles address any number of valid 
associations, against the Colombian context they have a very important role in protecting 
particular associations that can be contentious from the perspective of competition law, like 
BAs.495 This is so because they extend a constitutional protection to these associations, and their 
goals, by relying upon legal rules that structure their existence and functioning in place at the 
time of the Constitution's enactment. In this sense, it is important to note that the development 
of these two constitutional articles did not require the adoption of new regimes, for they provide 
new constitutional validity to already existing legal rules. Moreover, both articles are in the 
charter of fundamental rights established in the Constitution, and therefore subject to a special 
protection by the State.  
 
For our purposes, articles 38 and 39 are important because of the history of BAs in 
Colombia and their role in the corporativist, State-centered institutional arrangements that 
characterize Colombia’s political economy. They are related with other constitutional provisions 
that contribute to cement such arrangements. For example, article 150.12 of the 1991 
Constitution states that Congress can create special destination funds to be managed by sector-
specific BAs - the so-called contribuciones parafiscales.496 These are tax-like contributions that the 
members of the different associations have a legal duty to pay. The constitutional establishment 
of these funds evidences the role that such associations play in political and economic 
development of specific sectors. Both sets of constitutional articles are related, for the 
administration of the funds established in article 150.12 could not be possible without the right 
to free association established in articles 38 and 39. An example of how they work in practice is 
the influential Federación Nacional de Cafeteros. Based on the contribuciones and subsidies, this 
association manages a coffee grain price-stabilization mechanism and offers affordable credits 
                                                            
493 Colombia. Constitución Política de 1991. Article 38. 
494 Ibid. Art. 39. 
495 We found Santofimio’s work very relevant on this particular issue. See Santofimio, Emilio. "La Aplicación 
Del Régimen De Libre Competencia Frente a Las Asociaciones Gremiales." Especialización en Derecho 
Comercial, 2012: Pontificia Universidad Javeriana, Facultad de Ciencias Jurídicas. 
496 Constitución Política de Colombia. Articulo 150 num. 12. 
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for issues related with crop management. The Federación became a model for other business 
associations in the agricultural sector. From this perspective, the different articles here 
mentioned enable the constitution of these associations and facilitate their management of the 
funds at their disposal.   
 
In contrast with articles 38 and 39, other constitutional provisions did require the 
development of new regulatory regimes for their fulfillment.  These other provisions resulted 
from within the assembly, and reflect the ambition to adopt new market-based regulatory 
regimes geared towards the efficient allocation of resources.497 The constitutional assembly was 
divided in commissions, and the members of the fifth commission, who were in charge of 
discussing economic issues among others, held different views about how to address monopoly 
power and dominance. Their original position was that the State should put an end to any form 
of economic concentration and monopolies that harm the community at large. They also 
considered that free competition is a right that also implies duties, in line with the way private 
property is conceived. This position was tempered later on, and the commission’s members 
opted for prohibiting abuse of dominance rather than dominance itself, but all the other 
elements remained. In tempering their position, they acknowledged that national firms could 
become of considerable size in order to feign off the pressure exercised by their international 
rivals.498 The final wording of article 333 reflects this combination of ideas about the duties of 
the State in protecting competition and the prohibition against abuse of dominance. The text of 
this article reads as follows: 
 
“Article 333. Economic activity and private initiative are to be freely pursued 
within the limits of the public good. For their exercise no one may demand 
permits or licenses to exercise economic activity except when authorized by 
law. 
 
Free economic competition is a right of every person that entails duties. 
 
                                                            
497 See in general Palacios Mejía, Hugo. La Economía En El Derecho Constitucional Colombiano. Derecho 
Vigente (2001) 
498 Miranda, Alfonso. El Derecho De La Competencia En La Constitución De 1991. 20 Años de la Constitución 
Política de Colombia (2011). Pgs. 12 & 13. 
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The enterprise, as a basis of development, has a social function that implies 
duties. The State will strengthen cooperative organizations and stimulate 
business development. 
 
The State, through the law, will prevent impediments to or restrictions of 
economic freedom and will curb or control any abuses caused by individuals 
or enterprises due to their dominant position in the national marketplace. 
 
The law will limit the scope of economic freedom when the social interest, the 
environment, and the cultural patrimony of the nation require it”.499 
 
The discussions about efficiency and regulation were not exhausted with the debates within 
the fifth commission of the constitutional assembly about the role of free competition, but 
continued throughout those concerning public utilities regulation. Although the members of the 
this commission had different views on the matter, they all agreed that providing quality public 
utilities is a way of making the welfare State a reality. Their discussions led to three principles, 
which were established in articles 365 through 370 of the 1991 Constitution. First, private firms 
could provide these public utilities, not only the State. Second, their regulation should make their 
provision be cost-effective and fair. Thirdly, the President has the duty to oversee the provision 
of these utilities, and he can delegate it to the Superintendencia de Servicios Públicos Domiciliarios, an 
agency created in article 370 for such purpose.500 In doing so, these articles provide the 
foundations for the regulation of public utilities and the introduction of market-like regulatory 
schemes in related sectors. Moreover, they also contributed to the enactment of sector-specific 
competition law regimes. 
 
The scope of all these constitutional provisions was unclear until this was spelled out in 
specific legal regimes and until the courts adjudicated disputes involving them. For our purposes, 
the most important tension is between the right to free association and the right to competition. 
In its simplest terms, the tension can result in one of several outcomes where one right limits the 
application of the other. A first outcome is that the right to free association limits the right to 
free competition in all possible scenarios. This outcome is feasible because of the fundamental 
character of the right to free association as explicitly stated in the 1991 Constitution. A second 
possible and opposite outcome is that the right to free competition limits the right to free 
                                                            
499 Colombia, Constitución Política de 1991. Article 333. 
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association, perhaps even outlawing associations that restrict competition. This outcome is 
feasible because of the explicit connection between competition and the public good as 
established in article 333 and other constitutional provisions. Given this situation, addressing the 
tension between these rights became a matter for SIC and the courts to address. Notably, a very 
similar tension takes place within article 333 between fostering competition, on one hand, and the 
State’s duty to promote associations and foster industrial development. 
 
II.A.2 Regulating Business Associations and Competition 
 
President Gaviria and his cabinet approached regulatory reforms from a neoliberal 
perspective, albeit within the limits resulting from the 1991 Constitution and the political 
landscape at the time.501 In doing so, the new regulations balanced the interests of BAs and the 
"general interest" associated with competition. 
 
As mentioned before, articles 38 and 39 of the 1991 Constitution did not require the 
development of new regulatory regimes for their implementation, for they provided a new 
constitutional support to preexisting legal regimes. This did not prevent other developments 
from taking place. In 1991 a new BA that grouped different associations, the Consejo Gremial 
Nacional, was created with the purpose of helping the government in its relations with the private 
sector especially with regard to opening the economy.502 Just as well, this administration 
developed policies that extended the role that some associations had in their respective sectors 
and which includes, among other things, mechanisms that restricted competition. For instance, 
law 101 of 1993, includes a price-stabilization mechanisms that was extended to sugar-cane 
producers, known as ingenios, from market fluctuations by fixing the prices that each producer 
received depending on their production quality and volume. Mechanisms like these, which entail 
an anticompetitive agreement regarding the prices to be paid, became common in other 
agricultural sectors in Colombia. The corporativist, State-centered relationships between the 
government and some business associations continued as the new constitutional regime 
developed. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
500 Ibid. Articulo 365 – 370. 
501 See Edwards, Sebastián, and Roberto Steiner. La Revolución Incompleta: Las Reformas De Gaviria. Norma 
(2008) 
502 See Rettberg, Angelika. "Empresarios Y Política En Colombia: Un Estudio De Caso Del Gobierno Samper 
(1994-1998)." Revista de Estudios Sociales 12 (2002). Pg. 54. 
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The constitutional reach of articles 38 and 39 was unclear. Beginning in 1993, the 
Constitutional Court issued a series of rulings that limited the right to free association. Among 
these, is the decision C-265 of 1994, in which the Court reviewed the constitutionality of a law 
that established requirements for the creation of new associations for copyright management and 
royalties’ collection. The Court distinguished between civil and commercial associations, and 
argued that since commercial associations are for making and managing profits, they can be 
subject to the regulations that stem from the 1991 Constitution. These regulations are not 
subject to a strict scrutiny precisely because of the ample room the Constitution grants to the 
regulation of economic arrangements.503  
 
The political viability of the development of article 333 was also unclear. Contrary to articles 
38 and 39, this provision did require the development of new regulations, and their enactment 
was a task that the Gaviria administration assumed after the enactment of the 1991 Constitution. 
The government received the help of consultant Dr. Shyam Khemani for designing a new CLR. 
His approach to this task considered issues pertaining to the size of the Colombian economy, 
taking a consumer welfare perspective.504 After assessing the different materials, the government 
discussed the initiative with Congress representatives and was discouraged from submitting a 
new CLR to Congress. This was so because such a regime would affect negatively the relations 
with BAs, with whom the government had good relations at the time. This political roadblock 
posed a considerable difficulty. As an alternative, the government decided to use transitory 
article 20 of the 1991 Constitution, which gave the President limited powers to enact laws related 
with the structure and functions of State institutions.505 It was understood then that this was 
risky because the new provisions had to be framed as if they were about the functions of SIC. 
This strategy was embodied in Decreto Legislativo 2153 of 1992 (hereinafter DL 2153), which 
updated the administrative functions of SIC and detailed the substantive provisions enforced by 
this agency as established in law 155 of 1959.506 In 1993 the Consejo de Estado, Colombia’s highest 
administrative court, ruled that notwithstanding its substantive provisions, DL 2153 was 
constitutional.507  
 
                                                            
503 Colombia. Corte Constitucional. Sentencia C-265 de 1994. 
504 Interview with Shyam Khemani, St. Petersburg. June 23, 2015. 
505 Colombia. Constitución Política de Colombia. Articulo 20 Transitorio. 
506 This story is told by one of its participants, Emilio José Archila, in the video “Historial del Derecho de la 
Competencia Parte 1”, made by the Centro de Estudios del Derecho de la Competencia – CEDEC. Available at: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3gKyO_QXu4Q. 
507 Colombia. Consejo de Estado. Sentencia de 7 de Diciembre de 1993. 
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DL 2153 did not introduce major changes to the SIC’s administrative structure and extended 
previous institutional arrangements, including law 155 of 1959.508 For our purposes, this decree 
meant the continuation of the State-centered institutional features established in the 
aforementioned law. SIC continued as an administrative body with little political autonomy and 
dependent on the executive branch. The separation of investigative and decision-making 
functions within this body, in place since the 1970s, was maintained. Article 2 of DL 2153 states 
that the purpose of the activities developed by this agency (including competition law 
enforcement) is the improvement of Colombian productive sectors. Articles 11 and 12 
delimitated the functions of the Delegatura para la Promoción de la Competencia, an office in charge of 
providing support with the investigations, directed by the deputy superintendent for competition 
law and known as the delegatura. Both the director of SIC and the deputy superintendent can be 
freely appointed and removed by the President.509 Article 24 created an advisory council, also 
appointed freely by the President, composed of five experts on issues related with competition 
law to advise SIC’s director during investigations that may involve injunctions, cease and desist 
orders, or the imposition of fines.510 Article 52 establishes the procedure of the investigations, 
which are for the most part conducted by the deputy superintendent. If he obtains adequate 
evidence, he presents a statement of objections to SIC’s director in which he details the reasons 
that lead him to suggest the imposition of sanctions. SIC’s director may refer to this statement, 
as well as to the advice of the aforementioned counsel, but is not bound by either of them.511 
Once an investigation starts, the investigated parties may ask to end the proceedings through a 
settlement if SIC accepts their commitments to amend their behavior in ways that strengthen 
competition. A particularity of these settlements is that no judgment is passed on the legality of 
the conduct of the investigated parties.512 Finally, article 51 of this decree also amended the 
merger review by introducing what is called the “efficiency clause,” which works as an 
exemption to how SIC analyses mergers according to law 155 of 1959. According to this 
provision, SIC cannot block a merger if the merging parties prove that it brings about 
efficiencies, through cost savings that cannot be achieved otherwise, without diminishing the 
supply in the relevant market.513 The introduction of this “efficiency clause” evidences the 
inroads of neoliberal ideas in a State-centered institutional context.  
                                                            
508 Colombia. Decreto Ley 2153 de 1992. Art. 44. (This article states clearly this purpose and explicitly 
reaffirms the legality of law 155 of 1959.) 
509 For both the SIC’s director and the deputy director for competition law see Constitución Política de 
Colombia, Art. 189 num 13. Also, for the SDC, see Decreto Ley 2153 of 1992, Op.cit. Art. 4, num 19. 
510 Decreto ley 2153 de 1992, art. 24. 
511 Ibid. Art. 51. 
512 Ibid. Art. 4 Nums 11 and 12. 
513 Ibid. Art. 51. 
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Articles 45 through 50 of DL 2153 introduced important changes regarding anticompetitive 
agreements and abuse of dominance. All of these articles are supposed to clarify the content of 
article 1 of law 155 of 1959. Notably, the drafters of the law used articles 101 and 102 of the 
Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union (hereinafter TFEU) as a template for these 
provisions. We contend that this evidences an effort to realize neoliberal goals by adopting 
foreign legal materials to the State-centered institutions in place. Article 45 defines terms and 
expressions such as agreement, act, control, dominant position and product for enforcement 
purposes.514 Control is defined as the possibility to influence directly or indirectly the decision of 
a firm, including its capacity to begin, terminate or modify its activities, as well as the goods or 
rights essential to the abovementioned firm’s activities.515 Dominance, in turn, is defined as the 
capacity to determine, directly or indirectly, the (working) conditions of a market.516 Article 47 
provides a list of nine agreements considered anticompetitive by object and by effect, and which 
include price fixing, market allocation, fixing production quotas, and others.517 Article 48 refers 
to three anticompetitive acts, which are infringing consumer protection rules regarding publicity, 
influencing a third party so that it raises or desists to lower its prices, and retaliating against a 
third party’s pricing policy by denying to sell a product, perform a service or discriminate against 
it.518 Notably, these articles are followed by three exceptions contained in article 49. This 
provision states that joint ventures (including those for developing new technologies), adhesion 
to non-mandatory standards and non-exclusionary measurements, and the use of common 
facilities, are not considered anticompetitive.519 These exemptions resemble those of article 101.3 
TFEU. Article 50 provides a non-exhaustive list of five conducts that are considered to be 
abuses of dominance, including price predation, tied sales, and discriminating between similar 
consumers or distributors. In doing so, it resembles article 102 TFEU.520 Article 46 also 
establishes that any act, conduct or agreement in violation of the previous articles is void.521 
Table 6.1 summarizes the main similarities between the provisions contained in DL 2153 and 
articles 101 and 102 TFEU. 
 
                                                            
514 Ibid. Art. 45 
515 Ibid. Art. 45.4. 
516 Ibid. Art. 45. 5. 
517 Ibid. Art. 47. A tenth type of forbidden agreement was added by law 590 of 2000 which refers to access to 
commercialisation channels. 
518 Ibid. Art. 48. 
519 Ibid.Art. 49. 
520 Ibid. Art. 50. 
521 Ibid. Art. 46. This article, which resembles a similar one in law 155 of 1959, explicitly relates to the 
provisions of the Civil Code pertaining to the nullity of contracts and legal acts. 
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Table 6.1. Relationship between TFEU y DL 2153 
 
Content Articles TFEU Colombian Provisions (DL 2153) 
Prohibition of agreements and 
parallel practices  Article 101(1) 
Arts. 45 (definition of 
acts, agreement and practices) 
& 47 (list of forbidden 
agreements) 
Nullity Article 101(2)  Article 46  
Exceptions Article 101(3) 
Article 49 (extended to 
R&D, common standards 
and common facilities) 
Prohibition of Abuse of 
Dominance  Article 102 
Arts. 45 (definition of 
conducts and dominance) 
and 50 (list de conducts) 
Prohibition of anticompetitive 
acts  - 
Arts. 45 & 48 (list of 
anticompetitive acts). 
 
The history and content of DL 2153 gives important clues as to the compromise it 
embodies. On one hand, the enforcement of the substantive provisions remains a task for SIC, 
which has close ties with the executive branch and concentrates investigatory and adjudicative 
functions. Moreover, these ties touch upon its capacity to coordinate its activities with those 
carried by other governmental bodies.522 Hence we contend that this decree reaffirms SIC’s 
State-centered origins and development. On the other, the substantive provisions suggest an 
inclination towards the neoliberal competition law project. This is so because they embody a 
view of competition law based on market rivalry and efficiency that is consistent with such 
project. Moreover, article 51 hints to these neoliberal traits by establishing an efficiency 
exemption to the regular merger analysis done by SIC. Hence the compromise embedded in this 
degree is a paradox; it gives continuity to a State-centered competition law agency (lacking 
political autonomy) that enforces neoliberal substantive provisions.  
 
The difficulties faced by the Gaviria administration in mustering the support for establishing 
a new CLR were decisive in later efforts to carry forth the constitutional mandate of protecting 
competition. In particular, as these difficulties began to unfold, other voices proposed that the 
protection of competition could be better served through a different strategy. In a 1992 
conference about public utilities in Colombia, former finance minister Hugo Palacios Mejía 
argued that their regulation had to rely on a new framework based on efficiency and competition. 
                                                            
522 Contrary to similar enforcement bodies like the EU Commission, SIC is a national entity bound by the local 
politics of the State it is part of, and its director is not part of an independent civil service but can be appointed 
by the President at will. Moreover, it is not a collegial institution. 
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On one hand, he argued that there was little will to enforce law 155 of 1959. On the other, the 
1991 Constitution placed special emphasis on the efficiency of regulation of public utilities. 
Hence, this emphasis should be taken as an opportunity to enact sector-specific regulations 
containing competition law provisions to be enforced by new administrative institutions.523 Two 
years later, law 142 of 1994 embodied these ideas. This law created a regulatory framework based 
on guaranteeing a cost-effective, market-like provision of public utilities. It contains several 
articles that refer to anticompetitive practices in general, but has a decisive focus on abuse of 
dominance. It also assigned to the Superintendencia de Servicios Públicos Domiciliarios, mentioned 
before, the duty to investigate and sanction firms for engaging in anticompetitive practices as 
defined in this law.524 The pairing of competition law provisions embedded in sector-specific 
regulations and specialized enforcement agencies became the preferred strategy for the 
development of competition law in Colombia. Table 6.2 summarizes the main competition law 
provisions enacted during the Gaviria administration besides DL 2153. 
 
Table 6.2. Sector-specific Competition Law Provisions issued between 1990 and 1994 
 
Sector 
Competition law 
Provisions 
Enforcement Authority 
Financial services 
Decrees 1730 of 1991 and 
663 of 1993 
Banking Superintendence 
Public Utilities (general) Law 142 of 1994 
Superintendence of Public 
Utilities 
Public utilities (electricity) Law 143 of 1994 
Superintendence of Public 
Utilities 
Public utilities (telecoms) 
Decrees 1900 of 1990, 1794 
of 1991, 2122 of 1992, law 37 of 
1993, decree 741 of 1993 and law 
142 of 1994 
Superintendence of Public 
Utilities 
Healthcare 
Law 100 of 1993, decree 
1664 of 1994 
Healthcare Superintendence 
Transportation Law 105 of 1993 
Ministry of 
Transport/National Police 
                                                            
523 See Palacios Mejía, Hugo. Instituciones para la competencia en los servicios públicos domiciliarios. 
Departamento Nacional de Planeación. Seminario Internacional Eficiencia en la Prestación de los Servicios 
Públicos de Agua Potable y Saneamiento Básico. Bogotá, DNP, 1992. (Conference proceedings) 
524 Colombia. Ley 142 de 1994. 
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By the end of the Gaviria administration, a combination of constitutional and political 
factors shaped the development of the rights discussed at the beginning of this section. Firstly, 
the right to free association found an immediate expression in corporate law, and through it, in 
the continuation of corporativist practices. The influence of BAs continued, as evidenced in the 
government’s reliance on them for the development of sector-specific policies and the 
management of public funds. Even so, the Constitutional Court issued a series of ruling that 
diminished the constitutional protection awarded to such associations.525 Secondly, the 
development of the constitutional right to competition was limited and the government opted 
for adding what could be characterized as neoliberal provisions in a State-centered institutional 
setting. Also, the skepticism surrounding the enforcement of law 155 of 1959 and the more 
detailed content of articles 365 to 370 led to the development of sector-specific CLR’s, which 
were also enforced by non-independent administrative authorities linked to the government. 
Politically, the right to free association that enables the development of BAs and their activities 
prevailed over the right to competition; however, in the absence of an explicit confrontation the 
extent of the dominance of one over the other remained unclear.  
 
II.A.3 Competition law and Business Associations: The Early Years (1994 - 
1998) 
 
The Gaviria administration ended its term after transforming Colombia’s legal landscape and 
developing the mandates contained in the 1991 Constitution. The enforcement of the different 
legal regimes, including the enforcement of those pertaining to competition law, fell upon the 
administration of Ernesto Samper (1994 - 1998). As a result of enforcement, the constitutional 
and political tensions between BAs and competition law enforcers started to build up as concrete 
confrontations. Enforcement activities led to the judicial reviews of SIC's competition law 
decisions involving BAs.  
 
The trust placed in the capacity of their CLR to address such conducts contrasts with SIC’s 
enforcement activities during the Samper administration. This was, perhaps, a manifestation of 
the uneasy relations this government had with the industrial and business sector.526 Throughout 
1994 the government appointed and removed several individuals as directors of SIC, until the 
                                                            
525 See Colombia. Corte Constitucional. Sentencia C-399 de 1999, Sentencia C-424 de 2005 and Sentencia 354 
de 2009. 
526 See Retberg, Op.cit. 
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final appointment of Marco Aurelio Zuluaga in March 6, 1995. According to the newspaper El 
Tiempo, the changes in appointments were part of the Government’s last minute political 
arrangements.527 Then SIC embarked in what arguably was a low-resistance enforcement agenda 
based on public advocacy activities. On one hand, SIC organized different events presenting its 
functions to different sectors, including those related with competition law enforcement after the 
amendments introduced by DL 2153.528 On the other, it also conducted enforcement activities 
mostly in a non-contentious manner. SIC conducted around 40 investigations that ended in 
administrative settlements with the investigated parties.529 As of 1998 SIC had not imposed fines 
or sanctions resulting from investigations of anticompetitive conducts.530 Overall, SIC did not 
aim to assert its independence from the executive branch during this period of time. 
 
The first concrete conflict between the right to free association and the right to competition 
provides an example of the difficulties lying ahead. One of SIC’s first decisions involved 
Fedepalma, a BA organized around an association of palm and palm oil producers. The 
association facilitated an agreement among its members for the adoption of a minimum 
commercialization price of palm seeds, a key input in this sector. In spite of its original intent of 
sanctioning this agreement, SIC ended up accepting its legality. In its final decision, this agency 
stated that the agricultural sector was covered by the exemption established in paragraph 1 of 
article 1 of law 155 of 1959.531 SIC’s decision was challenged before the Consejo de Estado, and this 
court ruled that the policy mechanism under dispute was a legitimate manifestation of economic 
intervention that can take place alternatively to competition law. In doing so, this ruling granted 
immunity to industrial policies from the application of the principle of free competition 
established in article 333, a victory for BAs.532 Other decisions by the Constitutional Court argue 
similarly that competition-distorting policies can be valid if they attain other constitutional goals, 
like strengthening agricultural sectors.533 By the end of the Samper administration, the 
constitutional promise of having a right to free competition had been displaced by the political 
                                                            
527 El Tiempo Desidia por las Superintendencias. Octubre 16, 1995 
528 See Colombia: Report on Developments and Enforcement of Competition Policy and Laws (1992 - 1996). 
Area de Libre Comercio de las Americas. (1997). Section VII. Available at http://www.ftaa-
alca.org/Wgroups/WGCP/English/dae/daecol3e.asp. Also Revista Dinero La Superindustria Camina Published 
on December 1, 1995. 
529 Miranda, Alfonso. "El Control Jurisdiccional Del Regimen General De Promoción De La Competencia Y 
Prácticas Comerciales Restrictivas." In: Comisión de libre competencia y asuntos del consumidor Panamá 
Primer Congreso Internacional sobre Competencia (1998). Pgs. 4 & 5. 
530 Miranda, Op.cit. "El Control Jurisdiccional Del Regimen General De Promoción De La Competencia Y 
Prácticas Comerciales Restrictivas." Pg.4. 
531 Colombia, SIC, auto del 2 de junio de 1995. 
532 Colombia, Consejo de Estado, Sala Primera, Sentencia de Febrero 20 de 1997. 
533 See for example Corte Constitutional de Colombia. Sentencia C-398 de 1995. 
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conditions that shaped the development of regulation after the 1991 Constitution. Hence even 
though the right to free association did not extend a strong constitutional protection to business 
associations, these continued to have the political capital to shape the development of 
competition law. However, the prevalence of BAs over competition law would not last long. 
 
II.B. Competition law Fights Back (1999 - 2009) 
 
This second period is concerned with the efforts of competition law enforcers and BAs to 
shape the scope of provisions regarding anticompetitive agreements and the exemptions to this 
CLR. Beginning in 1999, SIC would attempt to sanction BAs for infringing competition law 
provisions regarding anticompetitive agreements. While this agency met with some initial 
difficulties, it was able to reassert the predominance of competition law over other 
considerations, and by the mid-2000s it imposed a considerable number of sanctions in this 
matter. However, the initiative to enact a new statute in line with international recommendations 
was met with skepticism by the government, which in turn opted for preserving the pre-existing 
compromise. By the end of this period the tension between freedom of association and 
competition law had changed considerably in favor of the latter. 
 
II.B.1 Repositioning SIC 
 
Competition law enforcement geared up with the appointment of Emilio José Archila as 
director of SIC by president Andrés Pastrana (1998 - 2002). Archila studied law in Universidad 
Externado de Colombia and obtained an LL.M. degree from New York University School of 
Law. Moreover, he had worked with the Gaviria administration during the enactment of DL 
2153.534 Under his direction, SIC imposed the first sanctions for anticompetitive practices and 
continued with the practice of closing investigations with settlements. The more demanding 
approach of SIC can be evidenced in a 2001 decision rejecting a 4 to 3 merger between two 
airlines with high market shares in Colombia’s air transport sector - Aces and Avianca. The merger 
was presented as a way of improving the financial health of Avianca, which was owned by the 
business group directed by the Santo Domingo family. SIC's decision argues that because of 
their routes, their market power and the absence of competitors in the national market the 
proposed merger would harm consumers.535 This decision triggered a series of political events 
that ended with Archila resigning from his post, as the merging parties questioned his 
                                                            
534 See his profile at http://www.archilaabogados.com/socios/emilio-jose-archila-penalosa 
  150 
objectivity.536 Even though the merger decision was cleared later on, Archila’s removal 
highlighted the political frailty of SIC’s autonomy. His replacement, Mónica Murcia, a lawyer 
from Universidad del Rosario, faced some challenges of her own but nonetheless remained in 
office until April 2003. 
 
Based on SIC’s archive and other sources,537 we found that between 1999 and April 2003 SIC 
advanced several investigations concerning business associations and anticompetitive 
agreements, which led to the decisions presented below in table 6.3. 
 
Table 6.3. Decisions Involving Business Associations and Anticompetitive 
Agreements (1999 - 2003) 
 
Year 
Decision 
No. 
Case (Defendants) Product Market  Decision 
Fine (in 
USD) ⁠538 
1999 17464 
Instituto Colombiano de 
Productores de Cemento 
Cement Settlement  
1999   22759 
Corporación Lonja de 
Propiedad Raíz de Bogotá & others 
Real estate services Sanction   80,460 
1999 22760 
Corporación Lonja de 
Propiedad Raíz de Cali & others 
Real estate services Sanction 60,345 
1999 27762 
Cooperativa Lechera Colanta 
Ltda. & Derilac S.A. 
Milk Sanction 80,460 
1999 27761 Algarra & others Milk Settlement  
2000 25983 ALAICO & others Airline services Settlement  
2000 29302 ANDEVIP and others Security services Sanction 218,000 
2001 25402 Maersk and others Freight tariffs Sanction 127,245 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
535 SIC, Resolución 19354 de 2001. 
536 El Tiempo, La integración paso a paso. December 12, 2001. 
537 In particular Gutiérrez-Rodríguez, Juan David. "Tacit Collusion: Theory and Case Law in Argentima, Brazil, 
Chile, Colombia and Panama (1985-2008)." Revista de Derecho de la Competencia 5 (2009). Also, OECD 
”Peer Review of Competition Law and Policy in Colombia ." 2009 
538 Approximation based on the Colombian peso/US dollar rate of May 21, 2015. Includes only the fines levied 
against firms, not individuals. 
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2002 10713 ASONAV & others Freight tariffs Settlement  
2002 25420 ADICONAR and others Retail gasoline Sanction 19,090 
2003 03351 
Federación Nacional de 
Cafeteros and other 
High quality coffee for 
exportation 
Settlement  
2003 01610 ASOMEDIOS Media advertisement Settlement  
 
It is important to note that the decisions show how the associations could be involved in 
different ways in the development of anticompetitive practices. In some of them, the association 
fostered the anticompetitive behavior by requiring its members to abide to certain practices and 
to acknowledge certain duties. In others, the associations acted as coordinating mechanisms for 
the member firms, not taking the initiative regarding the anticompetitive behaviors to follow but 
nonetheless facilitating their occurrence. In all of them, however, the evidence collected portrays 
the anticompetitive practice investigated as being closely related with the purpose of their 
respective BA in the first place. Finally, it is also important to note that around 50 per cent of the 
investigations ended in settlements.  
 
Resolución 29302 of 2000 is an interesting example of SIC’s assessment of the role of BAs 
during this period. In this decision, the agency sanctioned a BA (ANDEVIP) and its fourteen 
members for fixing the prices they charged for their services. The defendants offered a variety of 
defensive arguments that ranged from their allegiance to a "gentleman's pact" to being bound by 
a price guide issued by the Superindentencia de Vigilancia para la Seguridad Privada in 1995. The latter 
argument could have some traction because it suggested that the investigated parties were 
exempted from competition law enforcement because it was a government-induced conduct. 
However, SIC argued that the parties were not bound to follow the prices established by the 
government, for the act that established such prices was annulled in 1996, before SIC's 
investigation began. Therefore, it was clear for SIC that the parties had incurred in a violation of 
DL 2153 and proceeded to sanction them.539 The defendants challenged SIC's decision before 
the administrative courts. They argued that SIC's interpretation of DL 2153 was unconstitutional 
because it did not take into consideration malice or intent, but simply the factual occurrence of a 
behavior deemed anticompetitive. At first, an administrative court ruled in favor of the 
                                                            
539 SIC, resoluciones 29302 de 2000 y 00670 de 2001. 
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defendants.540 On appeal, the top administrative court, the Consejo de Estado ruled in favor of SIC, 
stating that this agency did interpret DL 2153 correctly and that it did consider the intent of the 
actors investigated and other conditions involved in the investigated conduct.541  
  
However, SIC soon found out that some BAs were harder to challenge than others when it 
investigated the role of Federación Nacional de Cafeteros in the occurrence of anticompetitive 
practices in the coffee sector. SIC found that the Federación was allocating sale quotas to 
particular producers and fixing the price of coffee through an export arrangement with private 
exporters. However, SIC settled with the Federación in a rather particular way, for some of the 
duties that are part of the settlements state that the Federación would continue with its practices. 
Moreover, the core of the settlement seems to be that the government authorized the allegedly 
anticompetitive conducts, and so they were exempt as per the application of the paragraph of 
article 1 of law 155 of 1959.542  
 
By the end of the Pastrana administration (1998 - 2002) it was clear that competition law was 
highly susceptible to the political capital of the major business groups and associations in 
Colombia. However, not all BAs were equally influential, and SIC could measure up against 
those that lacked the political capital of other, more powerful associations. This suggested that 
SIC's de facto autonomy could be enlarged given the right conditions, and it was only a matter of 
continuing with investigations and imposing sanctions to gain more ground.  
 
In a certain way, this is what happened during the government of Alvaro Uribe Velez (2002 - 
2006, 2006 - 2010). Jairo Rubio Escobar, a lawyer from PUJ who also had worked in SIC during 
the Gaviria administration, was appointed as director of this agency in 2003 and remained in it 
until 2007. During his term SIC’s activity increased in areas such as price collusion investigations 
and mergers. His resignation in 2007 did not come as a surprise precisely because of the 
contentious decisions he made, although he claims that it was because of personal reasons.543 His 
successor, Gustavo Valbuena, came directly from the President’s office at Casa de Nariño, and 
was SIC’s director until the end of the Uribe administration in 2010. Contrary to Rubio, 
Valbuena did not have any previous experience with competition law issues. Besides continuing 
with previous investigations for anticompetitive practices and beginning new ones, Valbuena also 
                                                            
540 Colombia, Tribunal Administrativo de Cundinamarca, Sentencia de Noviembre 27 de 2003. 
541 Colombia, Consejo de Estado, Sentencia de Enero 28 de 2010. 
542 SIC, resolución 3351 de 2003. 
543 El Tiempo, Gustavo Valbuena fue designado Superintendente de Industria y Comercio September 17 of 2007
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contributed to the enactment of a new law amending this CLR, law 1340 of 2009. Table 6.4 
presents the decisions involving BAs and anticompetitive agreements issued between 2003 and 
2010, covering the periods of both Rubio and Valbuena as directors of SIC. 
 
Table 6.4. Decisions Involving Business Associations and Anticompetitive 
Agreements (2003 - 2010) 
 
Year Decision No. Case (Defendants) Product Market  Decision 
Fine (In 
USD)544 
 2005  06816 and 06817 
Redeban Multicolor 
S.A & Credibanco 
Charges for 
credit and debit 
network services 
Settlement  
2005 22625 
Molinos Roa & 
others 
Rice (paddy 
kind) 
Fine 8’880,085.20 
2008 39869 
Luis Francisco 
Cardozo & others 
Onions 
(scallions) 
Fine 1312.00 
2009 4946 
Compañía Nacional 
de Chocolates 
Cocoa Fine 640540.00 
2010 6839 
Ingenio del Cauca 
and others 
Sugar cane Fine 4’490000.00 
 
The involvement of BAs in the anticompetitive conducts investigated by SIC is quite similar 
to the one noted in the previous period. The associations facilitated the anticompetitive conducts 
proposed by one of the parties, or encouraged their development by all the members involved. 
Even so, there are important changes that deserve a brief mention. Firstly, the number of 
decisions is smaller, even though the period of time we consider here (2003-2010) is 2 years 
longer than the previous one (1998 - 2003). Second, the number of settlements is also smaller. 
Thirdly, the investigated parties here considered are more influential than the ones investigated 
by SIC in the previous period (except for the Federación Nacional de Cafeteros). SIC’s enforcement 
priorities also evidences some changes. In particular, in 3 of the 5 decisions issued during this 
period (resoluciones 22625 of 2005, 39869 of 2008 and 4946 of 2008) SIC did not address the BAs 
in spite of evidence that they might have been involved in the practices investigated. Even so, we 
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interpret these decisions as part of a rather successful continuation of SIC’s to assert its de facto 
autonomy.   
 
Resolución 6839 of 2010 is an interesting example of SIC challenging a BA in a sector where 
the line between competition law enforcement and the exemption granted to industrial policies 
for the agricultural sector is unclear. SIC found evidence that the largest sugar mills had fixed the 
buying prices of sugar cane crops, as well as allocated between themselves the different 
producers of this input. Among the evidence supporting these findings, SIC found important 
similarities in the prices paid and the conditions for the acquisition of sugar cane, as well as 
contract clauses the prevented the producers from switching buyers. Also, SIC found a written 
agreement between the managers of the mills, which could not be used as evidence because of 
the statute of limitations, that nonetheless constituted a price agreement between the mills.545 In 
a follow-up case, SIC also found that two business associations, which gathered the mills and the 
sugar cane growers, contributed to reaching and maintaining the price agreements involved in 
the previous investigation, 546 and thus imparted them with fines.547 
 
II.B.2 Law 1340 of 2009 - A New Compromise? 
 
The notion that the institutional architecture of the Colombian CLR required considerable 
amendments continued to permeate discussions about this field of law. Several issues were 
considered problematic by SIC's directors, especially by Jairo Rubio. Among these were the non-
dissuasive nature of low fines, the dispersion of related legal provisions and enforcement 
authorities, and SIC's lack of autonomy. And even though SIC conducted investigations and 
imposed fines, there continued to be a sense that this regime was only half-developed. As we will 
show below, the efforts to amend this regime by targeting this particular issues evidences a new 
alignment between actors. 
 
At the international scene, the OECD and the Inter-American Development Bank 
established in 2003 the Latin American Competition Forum (hereinafter LACF), a regional 
platform for the discussion of competition law issues in Latin America. According to Paul 
Crampton's presentation of the objectives of such forum, Latin American States need a platform 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
544 Approximation based on the Colombian peso/US dollar rate of May 21, 2015. Includes only the fines levied 
against firms, not individuals. 
545 SIC, Resolución 06839 de 2010. 
546 Colombia, SIC, Resolución 33141 de 2011 
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that enables them to pursue policies that strengthen competition and efficiency as a matter of 
"first principles". The forum's purpose would be to channel resources for the development of 
adequate regulatory policies by these States.548 At about the same time, the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (hereinafter UNCTAD) developed the program 
Competencia y protección al consumidor en America Latina (hereinafter COMPAL), with the purpose of 
helping Latin American States with the development of their CLRs.549 The result of this was that 
Colombia's CLR became a subject of interest to these international organizations. This interest 
manifested itself in the preparation of different activities and documents; as an example, we 
point here to a study about Colombia's CLR that was issued in 2004 during the second annual 
meeting of the LACF. The study is a 6-page document that offers an overview of this country's 
CLR, its difficulties and challenges.550 Regarding the difficulties, the study argues that the most 
important one is the dispersion of competition law provisions and their enforcement. Hence, the 
study concludes that the most important challenge this CLR faces is about making SIC the sole 
enforcer of the different competition law provisions.551  
 
In contrast with the clarity of purpose of the aforementioned study, local actors in Colombia 
had differing views about the priorities involved in competition law. This was made evident 
through the efforts of several actors that participate in this field. In 2005 liberal senator Alvaro 
Ashton submitted before Congress a short 6-article bill that made SIC the sole competition law 
enforcer and suggested to raise the fines applicable to anticompetitive conducts.552 A modified 
version of this bill received considerable support during the first of the four debates,553 but 
floundered because of lack of governmental support. Even so, Senator Ashton insisted and 
submitted again a bill, drafted with the help of Rubio, in late 2007. Like its predecessor, this bill 
aimed to make SIC the only competition law enforcer, to increase its political autonomy, and to 
make it more effective in the prosecution of anticompetitive practices. The bill contained various 
provisions addressing these goals. Firstly, it established this agency as the unique competition law 
enforcer and gave it pre-eminence over other administrative bodies that issued regulations. 
Second, the bill also granted to this agency judicial functions regarding the investigation of 
anticompetitive practices, thus making it autonomous as a judge vis a vis the government. Finally, 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
547 Ibid. 
548 Crampton, Paul. Competition As An Organising Principle For All Economic and Regulatory Policymaking 
(2003). Pg. 2. 
549 See http://www.unctadxi.org/templates/Startpage____1529.aspx 
550 OECD/IDB COLOMBIA: Desafíos institucionales para promover la competencia (2004) 
551 Ibd. Pgs. 4 - 6. 
552 Colombia, Proyecto de ley 108 de 2005 Cámara. 
553 Colombia, Cámara de Representantes, Gaceta 205 de 2006. 
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it also amended the procedures for investigations and merger control, established a general 
leniency clause, and raised the applicable fines that can be imposed to parties found responsible 
of engaging in anticompetitive practices.554  
 
Rubio notes that this effort to amend Colombia’s CLR met with considerable resistance 
from several ministers and other members of the presidential cabinet.555 However, rather than 
simply forcing the neglect of this second bill, the government decided to take advantage of this 
opportunity by addressing the same issues from a different perspective.  Firstly, it made SIC the 
only competition law enforcer, and proposed the creation of a new institution, the Consejo 
Superior de Protección de la Competencia, composed of different cabinet members, which would 
preside over SIC and have the last word on competition law issues. Moreover, it also introduced 
an exemption for policy instruments used in the agricultural sector that restricted competition. 
Second, the bill did not change SIC's administrative ethos, but rather reaffirmed it and reinforced 
the administrative nature of its procedures. Thirdly, this bill also amended some of the aspects of 
merger control, included a leniency clause and raised the fines that could be imposed for 
anticompetitive practices.556 Notably, the government's bill and its later amendments are more 
detailed than the ones of the Ashton/Rubio bill and evidence awareness of the competition law 
developments in other jurisdictions. Moreover, the differences between the government's bill 
and the Ashton/Rubio bill on these two issues were minimal when compared to issues such as 
the autonomy of SIC. 
 
The existence of both bills led to discussions regarding their integration into a single bill. 
This process led inevitably to the question of which of the bills would prevail.557 The contention 
focused mostly on the issues in which both of them had differing views, including the autonomy 
and exclusivity of SIC as a competition law enforcer. Rubio opposed publicly the creation of the 
above-mentioned Consejo Superior. As he stated in a newspaper article, it meant politicizing 
competition law enforcement by giving to cabinet members subject to different pressures a say 
on competition issues. In doing so, Rubio referred to the recommendations given by the IDB, 
the World Bank and other institutions regarding the importance of making competition law 
enforcers autonomous.558 Rubio's argument was partially accepted as Congress rejected the 
                                                            
554 Colombia, Senado de la República, Proyecto de Ley 195 de 2007 Senado. 
555 See Escobar, Jairo Rubio. "La Experiencia, Efectividad E Independencia De La Autoridad De Competencia 
En Colombia." Revista de derecho de la competencia CEDEC, No. 9 (2013): 357-370. Pg. 362. 
556 Colombia, Senado de la Republica, Proyecto de Ley 277 de 2008 Senado. 
557 See Colombia, Senado de la Republica, Gaceta 340 de 2008. 
558 Rubio Escobar, Jairo. La modificación de la ley de competencia. In Portafolio, May 12, 2008. 
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creation of such Consejo Superior; however, in almost every other matter the government's bill 
prevailed in congress. The resulting law reaffirmed SIC's administrative ethos (and hence the 
President's control over it), and although it made it the only competition law enforcer, it also 
established considerable exemptions for various sectors. Moreover, the law amended provisions 
in law 155 of 1959 and DL 2153 rather than constituting a new regime all by itself (even though 
several other additions were made). The result then is an uneven compromise between 
strengthening SIC and preserving the status quo embedded in the administrative structure and 
functions of the State's executive branch. 
 
The different provisions that make up law 1340 of 2009 reflect this uneasy compromise. 
They address three general topics: the functions of SIC and the reach of competition law 
provisions, amendments to the merger review regime and the establishment of a leniency 
program. Regarding the first topic, we evidence a tension between the provisions that extend 
SIC's powers and those that curtail them. Firstly, SIC is made the only competition law 
enforcer,559 but at the same time the aeronautical and financial authorities continue to decide the 
joint exploitation of assets560 (in the case of the former) and mergers (for the latter) in these 
sectors.561 Second, the law states that any competition law provisions bound all actors,562 
independently of the sector they belong to, or how they relate to economic activities.563 It also 
states that the goals that should guide competition law enforcement are the free participation of 
firms in markets, the welfare of consumers, and economic efficiency.564 However, policy 
instruments such as price stabilization funds, the fondos parafiscales for agricultural development 
and others are allowed State interventions as per article 333 of the 1991 Constitution.565 The 
exemption stated in paragraph 1 of law 155 of 1959 is explicitly extended to the agricultural 
sector, and this sector's ministry is given the authority to approve anticompetitive agreements for 
the stability of different sub-sectors.566 Third, this law also enables the State to intervene when 
external situations affect internal markets negatively by adopting measures that address market 
conditions and that guarantee fairness and the competitiveness of national producers.567 Finally, 
the law also establishes that SIC should be able to assess the effects on competition of 
                                                            
559 Colombia, Ley 1340 de 2009. Art. 6 
560 Ibid. Article 8 Paragraph. This exemption was added at the last debate of the law, but was declared 
constitutional by the Constitutional Court on Sentencia C-277 de 2011. 
561 Ibid. Articles 9 (last paragraph) & 28 
562 Defined in Ibid. Art.4 
563 Ibid. Art. 2. 
564 Ibid. Art. 3. 
565 Ibid. Art. 31. 
566 Ibid. Art. 5 
567 Ibid. Art. 32. 
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regulations before their enactment, but it also states that SIC's observations are not binding.568 
Overall, the compromise embedded in this law follows to some extent that present in DL 2153; 
the law follows the distinctive neoliberal focus on economic efficiency while reaffirming the 
State-centered elements that characterized this regime since its inception.  
 
As to the other topics of the law, the differences between the bills were much less 
pronounced and contentious. Regarding mergers, the law introduces a two-tier merger regime 
based on thresholds that were considerable higher than the ones prevailing until then.569 The law 
introduces officially the figure of merger remedies - SIC had been declaring them without a clear 
basis since the 1990s - as well as that of merger reversal, reserved for un-notified mergers and 
other instances of inattention to legal requirements.570 Also, the law amended the efficiency 
exception established in article 51 of DL 2153 and added that a merger can be cleared if external 
conditions guarantee free competition in local markets.571 As for leniency, the law creates such 
figure for parties engaged in anticompetitive activities except for their promoter, and the degree 
of exoneration depends on the opportunity and quality of the information provided.572 Finally, 
the law also amends other aspects of the procedure conducted by this agency. Among other 
issues, the law also changes the amount of the fines and their application. It raises the maximum 
amount of fines that can be imposed to 100,000 (one hundred thousand) minimum monthly 
Colombian wages (about US 25 million dollars) or 150 per cent of the utility resulting from the 
anticompetitive conduct.573  
  
The first OECD Peer Review of Colombia's CLR was presented shortly after the enactment 
of law 1340 of 2009. This Review offers a general description of this CLR, especially concerning 
decisions and the overall enforcement activity of SIC.574 Because it was published after the 
enactment of the above mentioned law, the possibility to engage in legal reform using its 
recommendations diminished considerably. The Review praises the new law for concentrating 
competition law enforcement, raising fines and the introduction of leniency, although it 
recommends protecting lenient parties from damages claims resulting from civil litigation.575 
Moreover, the Review also recommends explicitly granting the competition law enforcer with 
                                                            
568 Ibid. Art. 7. 
569 Ibid. Arts. 9 - 11. 
570 Ibid. Art. 13. 
571 Ibid. Art. 12. 
572 Ibid. Art. 15. 
573 Ibid. Art. 26. 
574 Petracola, Diego. “Colombia- Peer Review of Competition Law and Policy in Colombia” OECD-IDB, 2009. 
575 Ibid. Pg. 59. 
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more political autonomy, and even suggests the creation of a collegiate body for deciding 
cases.576 Overall, this Review evidences the distance between what the OECD considered should 
be Colombia's CLR, and the political, legal and economic status quo that can be ascertained from 
the legal provisions that make this regime. Moreover, it also shows that the process that led to 
law 1340 of 2009 shortened the distance resulting from the perspectives of the different actors.  
 
II.C. Challenging Gremios (2010 - 2015) 
 
 Between 1999 and 2009 SIC used competition as a limit to freedom of association, thus 
sanctioning businesses and their associations for engaging in anticompetitive agreements. During 
this third period, the influence of both local and international actors (like the OECD) would 
keep SIC (and the government) from caving to the interests of BAs. As a result, even though the 
government has curbed SIC, it has not prevented enforcement aimed at BAs from taking place.  
 
  
 
 
II.C.1 Aiming at Gremios  
 
The success of SIC in challenging business associations and their members for engaging in 
anticompetitive practices for the past decade, and the provisions of law 1340 of 2009, 
empowered this agency. Colombian magazine Semana noted that SIC had become a new actor 
with which business and political actors had to contend with. The days in which SIC could be 
pushed over seemed to be in the past.577 
 
The 2010 election of Juan Manuel Santos (2010 - 2014, 2014 - 2018) as President led to 
important changes in the structure and ethos of Colombian regulation. One of the most notable 
changes was the beginning of a program aiming to the admission of Colombia as a formal 
member of the OECD. This process would become particularly important for the more recent 
developments of competition law in Colombia. But even before the formal announcement, 
which took place in 2013, the Santos administration made two appointments with clear 
international profiles at SIC. The President appointed José Miguel de La Calle as director of this 
agency and Pablo Marquez as deputy Superintendent for competition law. De La Calle is a 
                                                            
576 Ibid. Pg. 60. 
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corporate lawyer from Universidad del Rosario with little background on competition law before 
joining SIC, since his professional practice until then was mostly on corporate law.578 In turn, 
Marquez comes from the ranks of PUJ's Faculty of Law, where he worked closely with Alfonso 
Miranda and is a professor in this faculty. Moreover, he had previously worked in SIC as an 
advisor to Rubio and, a few years later, partnered with Miranda in a few investigations where the 
latter was the attorney for the investigated parties.579 Notably, they share an interest in policy and 
regulation. De La Calle published a book about the difficulties of Colombia's judicial system580 
before joining SIC and Marquez has published several papers on regulation.581 Moreover, both of 
them have an LL.M. Degree from Harvard Law School, and Marquez obtained his D.Phil in law 
from Oxford shortly after assuming his deputy position in SIC. 
 
During the two years that De La Calle and Marquez worked together, SIC had an 
unprecedented surge in decisions regarding anticompetitive agreements, including those 
pertaining to BAs and their members. As table 6.5 below shows, SIC issued 11 decisions 
involving anticompetitive agreements between 2010 and 2015. Of these, 8 decisions were issued 
in 2011. Moreover, some of the decisions issued by this agency during this period address 
anticompetitive agreements in sectors that before law 1340 of 2009 where under the supervision 
of other agencies, like healthcare. Also, the number of settlements diminished drastically to zero 
during this period. However, the number of decisions concerning these agreements drops 
considerably during 2012 and after. We will argue below that this change was the result of the 
political conditions that SIC and the government faced at the time. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
577 Revista Semana El ‘Super-Poderoso’ August 15, 2009. 
578 See José Miguel de la Calle (profile) http://lasillavacia.com/quienesquien/perfilquien/jose-miguel-de-la-calle-
restrepo. Accessed on July 3, 2015. 
579 In particular, the cement cases. 
580 De la Calle Restrepo, José Miguel. La reforma judicial que necesita Colombia. Legis. (2010) 
581 See http://www.iicom.org/telecommunications-media-forum/tmf-miami-2014/tmf-miami-2014-regional-
irf/151-telecommunications-media-forum/tmf-miami-2014/773-dr-carlos-pablo-marquez-escobar. Retrieved on 
July 3, 2015. 
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Table 6.5. Decisions Involving Business Associations and Anticompetitive 
Agreements (2011 - 2015) 
 
Year 
Decision 
No. 
Case (Defendants) Product Market  Decision Fine (In USD)582 
 2011 23890 IBOPE and others Advertisement research Fine 1’392,861 
2011 33141 
PROCANA & 
AZUCARI 
Sugar cane crop Fine 6,464.14 
2011 37033 CDA Cordoba Car mechanical revisions Fine 27,902 
2011 46111 ACEMI Healthcare insurance Fine 6’136,851 
2011 41687 ASHORALDA Medical services Fine 1,910 
2011 70736 CDA Caldas Car mechanical revisions Fine 5’4630 
2011 71792 
Sociedad Colombiana 
de Pediatría 
Paediatric services Fine 12,274 
2011/ 
2012 
71794/116
51 
FENDIPETROLEO Gasoline retail Fine 1’380,792 
2012 12483 AHCS Caldas  General medical services Fine 1,910 
2012 13483 CDA Ibagué Car mechanical revisions Fine 49,863 
2013 2587 ASOHOSVAL Medical services Fine 1,910 
 
The ACEMI decision is interesting because it addresses the role of a business association in 
thwarting competition in the healthcare sector. According to Colombian law, citizens have to 
contract their healthcare services through firms called Empresas Prestadoras de Salúd (or EPS). In 
turn, EPS’s should offer to their affiliates a variety of services and medications taking as a 
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reference the minimum coverage duties established in the law and jurisprudence. ACEMI is the 
BA that groups all EPS. According to SIC, the healthcare sector works like a two-sided market, 
where healthcare providers broker between the demand for healthcare by affiliates and the 
government’s resources destined to attend such demand given the system’s budget. Because of 
the particular position of healthcare providers, ACEMI could exercise an inordinate influence in 
the competitive nature of different actors involved. SIC found that ACEMI contributed to three 
different but related anticompetitive agreements. Firstly, it enabled the EPS to coordinate the 
offer of medicines and treatments to patients, thus preventing competition between them. 
Second, it enabled the EPS to share information about their costs, and gave instructions as to the 
type of cost information that each one of them gave to the regulator (for the purposes of 
budgeting healthcare attention). Thirdly, it enabled the different EPS to fix the amount of the 
payments they received from the State because of their activities, thus indirectly fixing the price 
of the insurance citizens have to acquire.583 Overall, this decision stands out for its strong stance 
against BAs and the novel use of industrial organization literature. 
 
The ACEMI decision also evidenced the growing importance that economists were having in 
SIC. In 2012 the group of economic studies was formally created, although its director, 
economist Juan Pablo Herrera, had been working as advisor to SIC’s directors since 2008. 
Herrera was hired by Gustavo Valbuena precisely in order to strengthen this agency’s economic 
analyses, and since then he provides advice to both SIC’s director and the deputy superintendent 
for competition law on various issues. As the OECD’s follow-up on competition law and market 
investigations points, the economics group at SIC is an example of a success because of the 
economic input in SIC’s analyses.584 Moreover, because of the increasing importance of 
economic analysis in Colombian competition law reasoning, the institution of such group is 
opening a new space for economists in a field dominated by lawyers.  
 
SIC’s activism led to two different reactions. The first reaction was patently political. During 
the first two years of government, the relationship between the Santos government and the 
business and industrial sectors was not the best, among other things because of SIC’s decisions. 
In 2012 SIC was preparing a set of guidelines regarding competition law compliance for these 
associations in which it stated the illicit nature of sharing sensible information and taking part in 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
582 Approximation based on the Colombian peso/US dollar rate of July 2, 2015. Includes only the fines levied 
against firms, not individuals. 
583 SIC, Resolución 46111 de 2011 
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anticompetitive agreements. The draft of these guidelines was presented by SIC to different 
gremios, which received it coldly. Luis Carlos Villegas, then director of ANDI, complained before 
the President that SIC aimed to end these associations altogether. Moreover, Villegas was not 
alone in his criticism of SIC’s activities; the director of the Association of Banks 
(ASOBANCARIA) and of agricultural producers (SAC) also felt that SIC was acting unduly 
against their interests.585  
 
A second reaction involved strategic litigation before Colombia’s Constitutional Court. The 
targets of these challenges were several provisions of law 1340 of 2009. A first challenge 
involved making SIC the sole competition law enforcer; if the claim against SIC’s powers were 
successful, this agency would lose oversight over various sectors. The challenge against this issue 
was framed in terms of articles 365 through 370 of the 1991 Constitution, which refer explicitly 
to the Superintendencia de Servicios Públicos as the agency that oversees compliance regarding public 
utilities. The Constitutional Court ruled that law 1340 of 2009 only removed oversight regarding 
the application of competition law to public utility companies, while the remaining issues 
continued to be allocated to the Superintendencia.586  
 
The pressure that SIC was facing during mid 2012 was defused politically, and we contend 
that it was part of a strategic move from the government to obtain support for the peace 
negotiations with the leftist guerrilla FARC that began in 2012. The government appointed a 
negotiation team led by Humberto de La Calle, the father of José Miguel de La Calle, SIC’s 
director.587 This led to the director of SIC to step down, arguing personal reasons for doing so.588 
Pablo Marquez was considered initially to replace him, but apparently the sugar mills vetoed him 
because of his participation in the investigations in this sector (when he was an advisor to 
SIC).589 These situations raised the question of who would be appointed in these key positions in 
SIC. The government took advantage of this situation to appoint individuals that were close to 
its high-ranking members. Pablo Felipe Robledo, a lawyer from Externado university who had 
worked with the current Vice-President Germán Vargas Lleras when he was minister of Justice, 
was appointed as director of SIC.  
                                                                                                                                                                                        
584 OECD, Competition and Market Studies in Latin America The case of Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico, 
Panama and Peru (2015) 
585 Revista Semana Por qué están bravos February 25, 2012. 
586 Corte Constitucional de Colombia. Sentencia C-172 de 2014. 
587 Revista Semana Humberto de la Calle, jefe del equipo negociador September 5, 2012. 
588 El Espectador José Miguel de la Calle renunció a Superindustria September 14, 2012. 
589 See "COMPAL- REUNIONES SIC. MISIÓN COLOMBIA Reunión del 5 al 9 de Noviembre, 2012." 
http://programacompal.org/mision-colombia-reuniones-sic.html (accessed July 3, 2015) 
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Following this change in SIC’s direction, there have been changes in its enforcement 
priorities. On one hand, SIC began in 2013 an advocacy campaign to “educate” BAs in issues 
raised by competition law enforcement.590 We believe that this explains the subsequent drop in 
the number of decisions concerning business associations. On the other, SIC focused its 
enforcement activities in two fronts. Firstly, working closely with the Comisión de Regulación de 
Telecomunicaciones (or CRT), where Pablo Márquez was appointed commissioner,591 SIC fined 
mobile telecom companies, like Telmex (now Claro), for infringing their duties to consumers and 
other telecom operators.592 While the link between the CRT and SIC dates before these events, 
their joint efforts began to attract the attention of Colombian media after late 2012.593 Second, it 
switched its efforts from competition law enforcement to consumer protection issues, perhaps 
taking advantage of the fact that law 1480 of 2012 raised the fines and facilitated the procedure 
for their investigation.594 The number of competition law decisions involving anticompetitive 
practices issued per year dropped considerably. According to information provided by SIC, in 
2011 this agency made 10 infringement decisions, in 2012 it made 6, in 2013 it made 9, and made 
7 in 2014.595 We contend that these changes evidence the efforts within SIC to come closer to 
the interests of the government, for it enforced the CLR in a manner that was more lenient with 
local BAs than before.   
 
Even so, the path ahead was less than clear. By taking a softer approach towards BAs, SIC 
was distancing itself from the positions of local but also international actors that had played so 
far an important role in the development of competition law in Colombia and who argued for an 
increase of the levels of competition law enforcement and its effectiveness. First, local actors - 
most notably lawyers and economists - became very vocal about certain aspects of this CLR’s 
institutional design that they considered required urgent changes. For example, former Director 
De La Calle wrote in 2013 a newspaper article that law 1474 of 2011 contributed to the lack of 
clarity of leniency by making bid-rigging a criminal offence as well as an administrative one 
                                                            
590 SIC, Superintendencia de Industria y Comercio Capacitará a los afiliados de 21 gremios empresariales de 
todos los sectores económicos. Available at: http://www.sic.gov.co/drupal/node/6754. Visited on June 2, 2015. 
591 Ministerio de Tecnologías de la Información y las Comunicaciones. Isabel Fajardo y Carlos Márquez, 
nuevos comisionados de la CRC. Octubre 25, 2012. 
592 According to law 1341 of 2009, certain telecoms regulations issued by the CRT can be be enforced by SIC. 
593 See for example Portafolio 'No hemos sido notificados sobre sanción': Telmex September 24, 2012. Also 
Revista Semana Sancionan a Telmex-Claro por no responderles a los usuarios November 13, 2014. 
594 For an assessment of the increasing importance of consumer protection decisions, see Revista Semana, La 
hora del consumidor December 20, 2014. 
595 Datos Estadísticos Gestión Institucional, Superintendencia de Industria y Comercio, 2015. 
Estadisticas_DIC_12_2014.pdf (accessed November 12, 2015). Pg. 2. 
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without sorting the issues resulting from their combination.596 In a conference organized in 
August of that year by Fedesarrollo, a leading Colombian think-tank, lawyers, economists and 
members from Congress gathered to discuss the competition law reforms.597 This event showed 
that there was a local competition community aware of the issues taking place in other 
jurisdictions, and bent on replicating them in their own context. This is particularly clear in the 
economic analysis presented by Fedesarrollo’s  economists regarding the substantive law provisions 
of Colombia’s competition regime and its institutional architecture.598 Second, one may witness 
the increasing influence of the “soft power” of international actors in the development of 
Colombian competition law. The OECD played an important role in this context following the 
announcement in 2013 that it welcomed Colombia’s accession plan to become a member 
State.599 Part of the accession plan involved the revision of Colombia’s CLR, and the 
recommendations of the 2009 OECD Peer Review became an issue for the government’s 
accession plan to the OECD as no changes to the existing regime had been made. The distance 
between these actors and SIC led the latter to adopt a rather defensive attitude. In a newspaper 
article published in 2013, Director Robledo stated that since the OECD did not provide advice 
on what counts as the adequate institutional design of competition law authorities, SIC’s own 
design was not a matter of concern.600 However, in the 2014 Economic Survey the OECD stated 
that SIC’s autonomy should be increased, its effectiveness improved and its policies more 
transparent, thus ending the discussion about its own recommendations.601  
 
The management of the first leniency applications provided SIC an opportunity to show its 
commitment for competition law to these actors. Acting on information concerning a cartel in 
the market for baby diapers, SIC conducted an administrative visit in 2013 in order to gather 
information. Following this visit, one of the firms involved came forward and became the first 
leniency applicant. In August 2014, SIC publicized the statement of objections against all the 
cartel members, which made the headlines of all the national media.602 Moreover, this statement 
                                                            
596 See De La Calle, José Miguel. La figura de la delación en el derecho a la competencia. Ambito Jurídico. 
March 27, 2013. 
597 ¿Cómo estamos y qué nos hace falta? – Apuntes del Foro sobre Política de Competencia en Colombia. La 
Libre Competencia. August 7, 2013. 
598 See Bardey, David, Alejandro Becerra, and Cabrera, Pilar. Análisis Económico de la Normativa de Libre 
Competencia en Colombia, Cuadernos Fedesarrollo 44, FEDESAROLLO, May, 2013 
599 OECD,"OECD formally launches Colombian accession process in Bogotá on 25 October." 
http://www.oecd.org/countries/colombia/oecd-formally-launches-colombian-accession-process-in-bogota-on-
25-october.htm (accessed July 3, 2015) 
600 Robledo, Pablo Felipe. Proceso de adhesión a la OCDE y su posible impacto en la institucionalidad de la 
libre competencia en Colombia. Ambit Jurídico. October 30, 2013. 
601 OECD, Economic Surveys: Colombia 2015. Pg. 34. 
602 See for example El Espectador El cartel de los pañales. August 4, 2014 
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included direct evidence provided by the whistle-blowers that had not been known or challenged 
by the other investigated firms, an issue that would raise concerns at the later stage.603 SIC’s 
announcement appeared a week before ANDI’s annual meeting, where it was widely discussed 
and criticized.604 However, newspaper El Tiempo leaked that because of this administrative visit 
SIC was now conducting investigations in the adjoining markets of soft tissue paper and 
notebooks.605 The statement of objections resulting from these new investigations appeared, 
without the surprise expected, in November 2014606 and February 2015.607 
 
In spite of the media display that accompanied the announcement of these statements, the 
procedural management of the leniency investigations proved more difficult than expected. 
According to magazine Dinero, SIC became embroiled with litigation resulting from the poor 
management of confidential information, which has prevented the adoption of the final 
decisions. This has made SIC a target of criticisms, while it also constituted one of the drivers of 
the amendments that SIC’s director has been announcing for some time.608 Moreover, these 
procedural hassles reaffirm the OECD’s diagnoses about SIC’s (in)effectiveness.  
    
During the first months of the present year, business associations like ANDI and 
government officials discussed whether high sugar prices were affecting national industries and 
driving investors to other countries.609 This discussion also echoed the recommendations issued 
by the OECD in 2014 regarding agricultural policies.610 Amidst this discussion, SIC’s director 
announced that the statement of objections mentioned at the beginning of this chapter was sent 
to 12 sugar mills and their BAs for using agricultural policies, like price-stabilization funds, for 
anticompetitive purposes. According to the statement, the sugar mills used this policy to share 
sensitive information, limit the supply of sugar, fix prices and prevent the importation of sugar 
for more than a decade. Notably, the statement shows the extent to which such policies can be 
easily manipulated to cover for anticompetitive practices.611 The sugar mills and their associations 
responded through public statements announcing that they will fight these accusations.612 Even 
                                                            
603 Portafolio. Interés Oculto. August 19. 2014. 
604 Revista P&M, ANDI se pronuncia sobre el caso del "Cartel de los pañales" August 6, 2014. 
605 El Tiempo, 'Cartel de los pañales' salpica a 4 países y a otros productos. August 9, 2014. 
606 SIC, Resolución 69518 de 2014. 
607 SIC, Resolución 7897 de 2015 
608 Revista Dinero La Superindustria quiere más autonomía y herramientas. May 14, 2015. 
609 See for context EL Espectador. El rifirrafe por el precio del azúcar. June 1, 2015. 
610 OECD Review of Agricultural Policies: Colombia (2015) 
611 Revista Semana Azucareros bajo la lupa May 30, 2015 
612 La Republica “Hoy los colombianos adquieren el azúcar a un precio menor que hace cuatro años” June 23, 
2015. 
  167 
though SIC has not issued a final ruling, this statement of objections will surely prompt more 
discussions about competition law in the agricultural sector. The development of this particular 
investigation shows the extent to which local and international actors exert their influence in 
shaping competition law enforcement, even preventing SIC from backsliding into a reactive role. 
 
 III. Conclusions 
 
Throughout this chapter we have argued that the tension between BAs and competition law 
shows that Colombia’s CLR has developed within the State-centered competition law project, 
even though it harbors elements that can be traced directly to its rival competition law project.613 
These changes result from and lead to interactions between the different actors involved in this 
field - lawyers, economists, consultants, politicians - all of whom have stakes in the development 
of this field of law and attempt to influence its direction.  
 
As suggested above, the trajectory of the development of Colombia’s CLR has been 
characterized by a tension between the right to free association and the right to competition, 
both of which have relatively equally strong constitutional foundations. At the constitutional 
level, this tension remained abstract until the Courts stated that BAs may be subjected to duties 
relating to the preservation of competition, and that policies restricting competition can be valid 
alternatives to competition law enforcement. Moreover, the duty to preserve competition is 
extended to all firms, not just to dominant firms as is the case in other jurisdictions like the EU. 
As new laws were enacted, the tension remained present, reminding us that constitutions provide 
the background for political negotiations. This is the case of DL 2153 and law 1340 of 2009; in 
the enactment of both laws the government aimed to maintain a compromise by extending 
exemptions to competition law rules. Even so, the progression of this tension from the abstract 
to the concrete, and from the few to the many, did not render the tension unchangeable. We 
noted an important change around 2003, when SIC began asserting once again the preeminence 
of competition over freedom of association. Since then, the competition law community had not 
questioned if competition could limit BAs, but rather how far did the limits go.  
 
It is important to note that this tension has not led to “pendulum swings” regarding the 
design or application of specific competition law provisions; Colombian competition law 
remains true to its State-centered origins, even though this may change in the near future. As 
                                                            
613 For a detailed analysis of these projects, see chapter 2. 
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suggested above, in the few historical circumstances in which drastic shifts may have taken place, 
the government - which continues to be the main responsible for the development of this field - 
preferred to maintain the compromises rather than to adopt drastic changes. All of this points to 
an underlying continuity regarding Colombia’s CLR that, as mentioned in chapter 3, has been 
misapprehended or simply ignored. The fundamental changes we identify take place in the long 
run. In particular, SIC seems to be set in a trajectory to further or at least maintain its de facto 
independence that has been reinforced by the efforts of different actors (and perhaps at the 
expense of the government’s own will). 
 
Overall, the pervasiveness of the State-centered project in the development of Colombia’s 
CLR is mostly a result of the close political control that the government has exercised over 
competition law enforcement for most of its history. From this perspective, the degree of de facto 
autonomy that SIC has exercised in the period here considered is remarkable. The fact that SIC 
has been able to investigate and fine BAs belonging to different economic sectors is a 
remarkable feat in an adverse institutional context. It may well be that SIC’s experience will tip 
the balance in favor of institutional changes when conceiving an autonomous competition law 
enforcer does not seem a far-fetched idea.  
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7. Plots, Heroes and Villains: Competition Law in México  
1990 - 2015 
 
I. Introduction 
  
In 2013 Mexican president Enrique Peña Nieto promoted an amendment to article 28 of the 
Mexican Constitution that changed this country’s competition law and telecommunications 
regimes. By creating new agencies with extensive powers and delimitating procedural issues, we 
will argue in this chapter that the amendment is a new step in the confrontation between 
enforcers and dominant actors in the telecoms sector. The confrontation just mentioned shaped, 
like few other interactions, the transformation of competition law in Mexico. Beyond first 
impressions, this amendment contributes to “settle in” a model of competition law enforcement 
that had been in the making for the last decade or so, and that differs considerably from the CLR  
that was adopted in the early 1990s. How, then, did the new model emerge? 
 
In this chapter we unpack the trajectory of Mexico's competition law regime (hereinafter 
CLR) between 1990 and 2015 as a field where different actors - politicians, lawyers, economists, 
international organizations and others - compete and collaborate for the power to determine the 
content and structure of this area of law. We do so by focusing on the interactions between 
competition law enforcers and dominant telecoms corporations as a window for identifying how 
the interplay between the two projects described in chapter 2 has taken place. We also consider 
this struggle to be particularly revealing because it shows the extent to which local conditions 
transformed neoliberal ideas and institutions. 
 
This chapter is divided in the following parts. In section II we argue that originally both the 
telecoms regime resulting from the privatization process and the CLR were conceived separately, 
but drawing from the same pool of neoliberal ideas. However, once these regimes were in place, 
we see a series of conflicts between different actors, all of which involve competition law in 
different ways. As these conflicts unfold, we trace their impact on legal reforms such as the 2013 
constitutional amendments and the enactment of a new competition law statute the year after. 
All of these changes evidence new compromises resulting from the competition and 
collaboration of the different actors involved. Finally, in section III we offer some conclusions.  
  170 
 
II. Mexican Competition Law at the Crossroads 
 
This section describes the interplay between the neoliberal competition law project and its 
State-centered counterpart by focusing on the struggle between Mexico’s telecommunications 
enterprise, Telmex, and competition law enforcers. First it describes the legal changes that led to 
the privatization of the aforementioned company in 1990 and to the enactment of a new 
competition law statute in 1992, the Ley Federal de Competencia Económica, or LFC. The 
development of these processes constitutes the first phase. Although apparently unrelated, both 
processes were connected because they embody an uneven balance between the two projects 
here considered. This relation consists, first, of the relative insulation of Telmex from 
competition law enforcement as per the terms of the privatization process, and second, of the 
relative inability by design of the CLR to address sheer monopoly power. However, it was a matter 
of time before the balance resulting from this institutional arrangement changed. A second phase 
took place as reactions against the uneven balance embodied in the institutional arrangements 
unraveled in different scenarios, evidencing the growing influence of the State-centered 
competition law project. We will show how certain key decisions made the background political 
agreements supporting the aforementioned balance politically untenable and led to a activist 
enforcement agenda. Finally, this section ends in a description of a third phase. During this 
phase, a realignment between the actors, strategies and ideas making up each project, which led 
to a new compromise - not the abandoning of one project or the other. This compromise was 
embodied in legal provisions, like the 2013 constitutional amendment and the 2014 competition 
law statute  
 
II.A. Neoliberalism a la Mexicana  
 
The first phase of our analysis concerns the initial positions of competition law enforcers in 
the Comisión Federal de Competencia Económica, or CFC, and Telmex. The confrontations that 
followed between them were the result of deliberate choices and could have been solved in favor 
of one or the other. As mentioned above, the initial stage was characterized by the relative 
insulation of Telmex from competition law enforcement as per the terms of its privatization, and 
the relative inability by design of the CLR to address sheer monopoly power. However, it was a 
matter of time before the balance resulting from this institutional arrangement changed, leading 
to confrontations.  
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II.A.1 The Privatization of Telmex 
 
Our analysis begins with the privatization of Telmex. This operation took place during the 
presidential term of Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988 - 1994) and is considered a high point in the 
deployment of Mexican neoliberalism. The Salinas government decided to offer Telmex as an 
unregulated, vertically structured dominant enterprise only to national investors. This was a 
controversial idea even within the team of government consultants working on the issue, but 
nonetheless it prevailed.614 Selling Telmex under such conditions was considered necessary to 
make the enterprise attractive, and therefore for the government to receive a considerable price 
for it; but also because monopoly rents would enable the acquiring parties to invest in updating 
its infrastructure and extending services to low-income, under-serviced households. Carrying the 
privatization under such terms arguably strengthened Salinas’ standing vis a vis other actors. It 
could bring financial support for his party (the Partido Revolucionario Institucional, or PRI) during 
future elections, benefit the union members that already had owned company shares, and even 
party members who were unwilling to let foreign investors control previously owned state 
institutions.615 Furthermore, the decision to sell Telmex as a monopoly was also supported by the 
World Bank, which according to Judith Mariscal, cautiously supported this way of proceeding.616 
 
The legal framework of Telmex’s functions was embodied in a Título de Concesión, a public 
contract between the State and the acquirer of the company made public in December 10, 
1990.617 It contains several provisions stating the rights and duties of Telmex with regard to 
customers and third parties that access its network infrastructure relevant to competition 
(including short distance, long distance - national and international - and cell phone capabilities). 
Section 2-4 states that during the next six years the government can extend a similar arrangement 
to a third party only if Telmex fails to fulfill its duties regarding network expansion and 
effectiveness. Section 5-4 states that only after January 1st of 1997 Telmex could be forced to 
grant access to third parties to its network infrastructure. Finally, section 5-5 states that Telmex 
cannot celebrate agreements with international third parties over long distance connections that 
                                                            
614 See Noll, Roger. "Priorities for Telecommunications Reform in Mexico.” Available at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTMEXICOINSPANISH/Resources/noll-paper.pdf. 
615 Manzetti, Luigi. "Are You Being Served-The Consequences of Telmex Monopolistics Privatization." Law & 
Bus. Rev. Am. 16 (2010): 781, 784 - 790 
616 Regarding the World Bank’s endorsement of the sale of Telmex, see Mariscal, Judith. “Telecommunications 
Reform In Mexico From A Comparative Perspective." 46 Latin American Politics and Society 83, 91 - 92 
(2004) 
617 México, Diario Oficial de la Federación. December 10, 1990. 
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exclude or restrict the access to local enterprises.618 All three provisions amount to protecting a 
monopoly, given certain conditions. Section 8-4 states two sanctions for engaging in 
anticompetitive practices. First, if Telmex engages in an anticompetitive practice in a service 
market where an authorization is required, the authorization itself can be revoked. It also 
prohibits the company from participating in the service market for a term not shorter than five 
years.619 Regarding the duties, section 2-9 states that the company cannot engage in monopoly 
practices (“prácticas monopólicas”) that prevent a fair competition with other enterprises 
concerning the activities that it undergoes directly or indirectly. It also prohibits acts, agreements 
or combinations with the purpose of establishing an undue advantage for itself or for third 
parties, or that it monopolizes markets complementary to the ones offered. Section 2-10 
prohibited extending crossed subsidies to its affiliates or subsidiaries, or to cross-subsidize 
services when competing with other firms.620 In charge of observing Telmex’s compliance with 
these terms was the Secretaría de Comunicaciones y Transporte, or SCT, an administrative agency that 
oversaw the operation of ports, highways and radio operation with little political autonomy.621 
 
After the publication of the Título de Concesión, a bid for the company followed. The winner 
of the bid was the Grupo Carso, owned by Mr. Carlos Slim - a self-made entrepreneur with close 
ties to the PRI in spite of not coming from the traditional Mexican business elite. He was a 
supporter of the economic reforms advanced during the Salinas government and participated in 
the negotiations of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which took place 
during Salinas’ term.622 The apparent close ties between Slim and Salinas have been de-mystified 
by Salinas himself, who in a recent interview stated that Slim took advantage of the lack of 
effective regulation and turned Telmex into a de facto monopoly.623 
 
The legal framework of Telmex would remain confined to the Título de Concesión until the mid 
1990s. In 1995 the Mexican congress enacted a law, the Ley Federal de Telecomunicaciones, or LFT, 
regulating the telecommunications sector and, in particular, access to public and private 
infrastructure related with the provision of telecoms. The law has several provisions that address 
competition issues. For example, it states that one of the goals of telecoms regulation is to 
                                                            
618 Ibid. Sections 2-4, 5-4 and 5-5. 
619 Ibid. Section 8-4. 
620 Ibid. Sections 2-9 and 2-10. 
621 Ibid. Section 7-1. 
622 Ibid. Pg. 788. 
623 See Salinas de Gortari, Carlos. Telmex, una privatización exitosa que terminó cuestionada. Periódico El 
Financiero, Dic. 15 and 16, 2014. Available at http://www.elfinanciero.com.mx/economia/telmex-una-
privatizacion-exitosa-que-termino-cuestionada.html. 
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ensure the development of prices and quality competition.624 It states that enterprises 
administering telecom networks have the duty to grant access to third parties on competitive 
terms and are forbidden to engage in practices, like cross subsidies, which affect competition.625 
If such enterprises refuse to grant access to third parties, jeopardize their access, or fail to fulfill 
the duties stated in their contracts for more than three times, they risk losing their rights over the 
network.626 As with Telmex’s contract, the enforcing agency is the SCT, although the functions of 
this agency according to the law do not mention anything about competition.627 On the other 
hand, the law also states that enterprises aiming to have rights over the network require a 
positive statement by the CFC.628 (The CFC was created by the LFC three years before this law). 
It also states that, in case the CFC finds that an enterprise has dominance in a particular market, 
the SCT can issue a differential tariff system for that enterprise.629 
 
Because the SCT was not a specialized regulator that could keep up with the functions stated 
in the LFT, in 1996 president Ernesto Zedillo (1994 - 2000) created, through an administrative 
decree, the Comisión Federal de Telecomunicaciones, or CFT, an autonomous administrative body 
attached to the SCT. Because it was created through an administrative decree and not through a 
law, the legitimacy of this agency was questioned early on. Moreover, the decree creating this 
agency did not establish a term-time for its members, which made their appointment and 
removal an intense political issue.630 This agency was partially reformed in 2006, and in 2013 
another body created in the constitutional amendment to article 28 superseded it. 
 
This brief account of Telmex’s regulatory framework highlights the main elements that are 
related to competition. However, it is important to note that under this framework the company 
was relatively insulated from competition law enforcement. This is so because both the Título de 
Concesión and the LFT established a specific regime for this company. Also, the LFT states that 
potential telecoms providers need the approval of the CFC to enter a market, but does not state 
that this competition law enforcer can punish anticompetitive practices in the telecoms sector. 
Therefore, in order to understand how Telmex ended confronting the CFC we need first to 
describe the enactment of the LFC and the creation of this agency. 
                                                            
624 México, Ley Federal de Telecomunicaciones de 7 de Junio de 1995. Article 7. 
625 Ibid. Arts. 41 - 44. The explicit prohibition against cross subsidies is in art. 62. 
626 Ibid. art. 38. 
627 Ibid. art. 7. 
628 Ibid. Arts. 16 & 35. 
629 Ibid. Art. 63. 
630 See Rivera, Eugenio, and Judith Mariscal Avilés. "Regulación Y Competencia En Las Telecomunicaciones 
Mexicanas." (2007). 
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II.A.2 (Re) Inventing Mexican Competition Law  
 
The 1917 Mexican Constitution addresses competition issues explicitly in its article 28 (see 
also chapter 4). This article contains a straightforward prohibition against monopolies and 
“monopolistic practices” that force consumers to pay “excessive prices”, and against any undue 
advantage for a group of individuals, which could be exercised at the expense of the general 
public. It also orders the authorities to investigate monopolies without delay and for the law to 
punish them severely, along with other practices leading to the outcomes just described.631 The 
content of this article was developed through several laws over time, notably the 1934 Ley 
Orgánica del article 28 constitutional en materia de monopolios. As argued in chapter 4, the 1934 law both 
had a distinctive developmental ethos that views competition as one among several policy 
instruments governments dispose to control economic processes.  
 
The drafters of the 1992 Ley Federal de Competencia (CFC) were conscious that the adoption of 
a new CLR would change how competition law was understood in México. In particular, it was 
an opportunity to incorporate law and economics concepts that were foreign until then to 
Mexican competition law.632 The drafting team - which included Gabriel Castañeda and Santiago 
Levy - were lawyers and economists with graduate studies in the US and Europe working at the 
Secretaría de Comercio y Fomento Industrial  (SECOFI) under the direction of Jaime Serra Puche.633 
Gabriel Castañeda is a lawyer from the Escuela Libre de Derecho and obtained an LL.M. from the 
London School of Economics before returning to head the legal services area of SECOFI.634 In 
turn, both Levy and Puche are economists with PhD degrees from Boston University and Yale 
University, respectively.635 As noted in chapter 3, the drafters aimed to finalize a statute based on 
rigorous economic concepts that would keep market interventions by the State to the minimum, 
                                                            
631 México. Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Méxicanos de 1917. Although article 28 has been 
modified several times, the prohibitions here quoted have not been amended. See Nava, Liliana. "Reseña 
Legislativa La Ley Federal De Competencia." UNAM. Reseñas Legislativas UNAM. 
https://www.google.es/search?hl=en&q=%E2%80%9CLiliana+Nava%22+competencia (accessed January 10, 
2015) 
632 See for example Castañeda, Gabriel. Origenes, Avances y Dificultades De La Política De Competencia En 
México (1993 - 2003). El Nuevo Milenio. Universidad Autónoma Mexicana, 2005. (Referred to as Castañeda). 
Also Castañeda, Gabriel, Santiago Levy, Gabriel Martínez, and Gustavo Merino. "Antecedentes Económicos 
Para Una Ley Federal De Competencia Económica." El Trimestre Económico (1993): 230-256. 
633 Rangel, Manuel Palma. "Reforma Microeconómica Y Arreglos Institucionales: La Política De Competencia 
Económica En México/Microeconomic Reform and Institutional Arrangements: Economic Competition Policy 
in Mexico." Revista mexicana de sociología (2007): 39-68. Pg. 48 
634 Regarding Gabriel Castaneda, see http://whoswholegal.com/profiles/59219/0/castaneda/gabriel-castaneda/ 
635 Regarding Levy, see http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/experts/l/levys/levys_cv.pdf. Regarding Serra 
Puche, see http://www.sai.com.mx/es/sai-group/. 
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and that when these were required the interventionist framework will be kept simple. Robert 
Bork's The Antitrust Paradox636 constituted one of the sources explicitly considered by the drafters. 
Before submitting the draft law to the Mexican congress, the drafting team presented the law to 
various actors, including other government agencies, business associations, and the OECD.637 
Regarding the latter, the reviewers of the draft law commended it, noting that it was very similar 
to the regimes of other jurisdictions.638 Since the draft law had the support of the President and 
was sent with a note of urgency, it is not surprising that congressional approval and enactment 
took place in one month.639 Moreover, all the proposals to introduce major amendments during 
the legislative process were defeated.640 The law was formally enacted in December 24, 1992 and 
came into force in June 1993. 
 
The LFC established a sui generis regime that combines competition law enforcement and 
regulation. Regarding the former, this law addressed coordinated practices (like cartels), unilateral 
practices and mergers. Article 3 of the law states that it is applicable to all markets and their 
participants, including state-owned enterprises.641 Article 8 establishes a general prohibition 
against monopolies and other practices that diminish, affect or prevent competition in the 
production, distribution and commercialization of goods and services.642 Article 9 introduces the 
category of “absolute monopoly practices” (prácticas monopólicas absolutas), which are practices that 
are straightforwardly prohibited without any possibility of showing that they may bring about 
advantages or benefits. These include price-fixing agreements, fixing production or 
commercialization quotas or volumes, market allocation and bid rigging. This article also states 
that these agreements are null and void.643 In turn, article 10 introduces the category of “relative 
monopoly practices” (prácticas monopólicas relativas) which are practices considered beneficial unless 
practiced by a dominant enterprise within a relevant market. These practices include exclusive 
distribution agreements, resale price maintenance, tying, boycotts, refusal to deal and according 
to its section VII “any act that affects competition in the production, distribution and 
commercialization of goods and services”.644 The following articles provide the framework for 
determining when these practices are deemed anticompetitive. Article 11 states the conditions of 
finding dominance in a relevant market for ascertaining liability, while article 12 refers to the 
                                                            
636 Op.cit. Castañeda. Pg. 341 
637 Ibid. Pgs. 344 - 353. 
638 Opcit. Palma Rangel Pg. 60. 
639 Ibid. Pg. 48 
640 Ibid. Pg. 52 
641 México. Ley Federal de Competencia Económica (1992). Art. 3. 
642 Ibid. Art. 8 
643 Ibid. Art. 9. 
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definition of the relevant market and article 13 states the conditions for dominance.645 Articles 16 
to 22 establishes the merger review regime, which is based on ascertaining whether the resulting 
enterprise from a merger can become dominant in a relevant market in the terms of articles 11 
and 12.646  
 
Regarding the regulatory provisions, the idea was to position the CFC as an advocate for 
competition with regard to other state agencies and bodies.647 Articles 14 and 15 of the law state 
that acts adopted by federal authorities that limit inter-state commerce are forbidden, and the 
CFC can declare their nullity.648 Article 24, which sets out the general functions of this agency, 
states that it must i) issue statements regarding amendments to federal programs and policies 
when they may impact competition, ii) issue statements by request of the executive branch on 
how changes to laws and decrees affect competition and iii) issue, by its own volition, non-
binding opinions on that same matter.649  
 
The composition of the CFC and the proceedings conducted before it were also an 
opportunity for shaping competition law enforcement according to neoliberal precepts. 
Regarding its composition, the idea was to make it politically independent.650 Article 23 of the 
LFC defines the legal nature of the CFC as an independent administrative agency.651 Article 24 
sets out its functions, which include both investigating the occurrence of anticompetitive 
practices and deciding the liability of the parties, and the regulatory functions above 
mentioned.652 The main organ of the CFC is the Pleno, which is a collegiate body composed of 
five commissioners appointed by the Mexican President for a period of ten years and who can 
only be removed if they commit a serious crime or administrative misdemeanor.653 The Pleno is 
led by a President, whose main duties are to oversee the fulfillment of the functions of the CFC 
established in the law.654 Article 29 states that the CFC will dispose of an executive secretary, 
appointed by the President of this agency, in charge of the operative and administrative tasks 
involved in its activities.655  
                                                                                                                                                                                        
644 Ibid. Art. 10. 
645 Ibid. Arts, 11 - 13. 
646 Ibid. Arts. 16 - 22. 
647 Castañeda, Ibid. Pg. 357 
648 Ibid. Arts. 14 and 15. 
649 Ibid. Art. 24. 
650 Castañeda, Op.cit. Pg. 353. 
651 Ibid. Art. 23. 
652 Ibid. Art. 24. 
653 Ibid. Arts. 25 -27. 
654 Ibid. Art. 28 
655 Ibid. Art. 29. 
  177 
 
With regard to its proceedings, Castañeda argues that the LFC meant to foster private 
enforcement activities by private parties and, correlatively, to rely on the public enforcement 
powers given to the CFC only under circumstances that merited such interventions.656 Article 30 
of the law established that competition law investigations may begin because of a complain filed 
by a private actor or by the agency itself; however, only directly affected private actors can file 
complaints involving relative monopoly practices.657 Once a complaint has been filed, the CFC 
proceeded to notify the investigated party, who in turn could present evidence in its favor. After 
reviewing such evidence, both parties could present final allegations before the Pleno, which in 
turn had to make a decision in the next sixty days.658 If the CFC found the investigated parties 
liable, it could order the amendment or cessation of the anticompetitive conduct, the reversal of 
unapproved or anticompetitive mergers, and the imposition of fines for providing false 
information or for incurring in absolute or relative monopoly practices.659 If the conduct is 
particularly problematic, the CFC may impose instead a fine corresponding to ten per cent of the 
annual sales of the parties involved.660 The law also states that the private actors proving harm 
from the anticompetitive conduct may claim damages before courts. The latter can use the 
CFC’s estimate of the damages when considering the amount of the awards.661 In turn, according 
to Castañeda, public enforcement powers should only be used on occasions that merit the 
unavoidable institutional “wear-and-tear”, like high impact decisions and regulatory opinions.662 
Even so, the law is not entirely adequate regarding those instances in which the CFC uses its 
investigatory powers. Since the law allocated investigative functions to the executive secretary 
and left adjudicative functions to the Pleno, public enforcement turned the agency into an 
adjudicator of the conducts it investigated.663  
 
All things considered, it is important to note a “slippage” between the content of article 28 
of the Mexican Constitution and the LFC. While article 28 prohibits monopolies and orders that 
the law punish them severely, the LFC simply reiterates the prohibition but does establish any 
punishment mechanism or the possibility of breaking them up. That is, the law punishes absolute 
and relative monopoly practices, not monopoly in itself. This is consistent with the idea that the 
                                                            
656 Castañeda, Opcit. Pgs. 356 - 357. 
657 Ibid. Arts. 30 & 32. 
658 Ibid. Art. 33 
659 LFC, Ibid. Art. 35. 
660 Ibid. Art. 37. 
661 Ibid. Art. 38. 
662 Ibid. Pgs. 356 - 357. 
663 Castañeda, Op.cit. Pg. 355. 
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CLR should meddle as little as possible with markets; it also becomes a way of protecting the 
entitlements resulting from the privatization process and settling the status quo. This brings the 
privatization of Telmex back to our attention. This “slippage” turns out to be highly convenient 
for monopolies and dominant enterprises because, even in light of an explicit constitutional 
prohibition, the law does not provide an action or a remedy to challenge such monopoly in the 
first place. Also, article 14 of the Mexican Constitution prevents the retroactive application of 
the law to legally relevant facts that occurred before the law’s enactment. Because of these 
factors, at this phase the LFC comes across as being relatively unable, by design, to address the 
sheer monopoly power of companies like Telmex.  
 
The relative insulation of Telmex from competition law enforcement and the relative inability 
by design of the CLR to address sheer monopoly power during this first phase are not 
coincidental. Manuel P. Rangel argues that the LFC was not meant to unravel the consolidation 
of the power of Carlos Slim, President Salinas and the PRI resulting from the privatization; but 
rather is part of the institutional arrangements resulting from Mexico’s neoliberal reforms of the 
1990s.664 We complement this by noting that this processes led to the redefinition of Mexican 
competition law as a field. The “slippage” between the mandate of article 28 and the content of 
the LFC gives away that there is a change in how competition law is understood and represented 
- its “common sense”. The embodiment of this new understanding in the institutional 
arrangements, and in particular in the LFC, resulted from the alignment of different actors - 
entrepreneurs, politicians and technocrats - all participating in the making of this field.  
 
II.A.3 The Unraveling of Telmex and Competition Law Enforcement 
 
The alliance between entrepreneurs, politicians and technocrats which characterized of this 
first phase proved to be short-lived and unraveled during the second half of the 1990s as a result 
of the enactment and application of both the LFC and the LFT. The unraveling took the shape 
of administrative and judicial proceedings regarding the applicability of the LFC to Telmex as per 
the terms established in both the Título de Concesión and the LFT. At a different level this 
unraveling was about repositioning technocrats and politicians against dominant economic actors, 
a change that would contribute to the erosion of some of the neoliberal aspects of the LFC and 
the increasing importance of rival projects. Moreover, they are also of relevance because they 
                                                            
664 Palma Rangel, Opcit. 
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show that Telmex was ready to mobilize its resources through litigation in order to feign-off the 
application of the LFC.  
 
The first episode of the above-mentioned unraveling resulted from a legal dispute about the 
applicability of the LFC to Telmex. In 1996 several companies that were part of the Iusacell group, 
which in turn was partially owned then by US corporation Bell Atlantic,665 accused Telmex before 
the CFC of cross subsidizing its affiliates in direct contravention to the Título de Concesión and the 
LFT. Telmex, in turn, argued that this particular claim was beyond this agency’s mandate, since its 
legal framework was composed of the Título de Concesión and the LFC. The CFC rejected the 
argument,666 and then Telmex filed an amparo action before the federal judiciary.667 A first-circuit 
administrative court settled the amparo in favor of the CFC by stating that article 3 of the LFC 
addresses all economic actors without distinction.668 This meant that independently of the Título 
de Concesión or the LFT, the company had to acknowledge the authority of the competition 
enforcement agency.  
 
The second episode involved a legal dispute regarding the capacity of the CFC to issue 
statements about the dominance of market actors according to the terms of the LFT. In 1998 
the CFC issued an opinion according to which Telmex was a dominant actor in five related 
markets, which in turn opened the possibility for the CFT to impose differential tariff regimes 
according to the telecoms law, the LFT. The company challenged the CFC’s opinion, which led 
to a protracted litigation between the company, on the one hand, and the CFT and the CFC, on 
the other. An administrative court decision settled both issues in 2000. First, it settled that Telmex 
was bound by the CFC, and second, that issuing an updated assessment of dominance does not 
amount to an unlawful application of the LFC.669 The CFC gave a new, updated opinion of the 
dominance of Telmex, but the courts annulled it too in 2006.670 The process to determine this 
company’s dominance would begin anew in 2007, but the differential tariff regulations would be 
                                                            
665 Regarding the partial acquisition of Iusacell by Bell Atlantic in 1993, see Revista Semana Pasos de Gigantes. 
November 15, 1993. 
666 See Comisión Federal de Competencia, Expediente RA-01-96. 
667 The amparo action is a special action devised in the 1917 Constitution that allows any individual to 
challenge the decisions of any authority – including laws enacted by Congress – on the grounds that it violates 
the rights established in the constitution. 
668 A summary of the judicial decision regarding this action can be found in Sánchez Ugarte, Fernando. "Diez 
Años De Política De Competencia." In La Primera Década De La Comisión Federal De Competencia. 2004. 
Pgs. 85 - 86. 
669 México, Honorable Primer Tribunal Colegiado en Materia Administrativa del Primer Circuito. Amparo en 
revisión RA-721 de 2000. Quoted in CFC, Expediente RA-036-2001. 
670 A short summary of this litigation can be found in Del Villar, Rafael. "Competition and Equity in 
Telecommunications." In No Growth Without Equity. World Bank, 2009. Pgs. 333 - 334. 
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stalled once more in the courts. The incapacity to enforce this regulation would become a matter 
of concern and lead to changes in both the competition and telecoms regimes. 
 
These early confrontations between Telmex and the CFC contributed to erode the 
institutional arrangement that made the company relatively insulated from competition law 
enforcement. In doing so, they mark the end of the first phase here considered and prompt the 
stage for the following phases. In the next phase the CFC assumed a more aggressive role and, 
correspondingly, tested the permanence of the original model of enforcement behind this 
agency. The more aggressive stance of the CFC was complemented with an increasing awareness 
of the government’s role in constructing and preserving Telmex dominance. On a longer term, 
they also contributed to raising awareness of the “slippage” between article 28 of the 
constitution and the LFC, and that addressing dominance required more than what the LFC 
stipulated. However, all of these processes would take time and, in particular, a realignment of 
the different actors involved in introducing these realizations into the ways Mexican competition 
law is understood. 
 
II.B. Competition Law Fights Forward 
 
The second phase involved a series of strategies against the institutional arrangements 
resulting from the neoliberal policies of the 1980s and 1990s, notably the privatization of Telmex 
in 1990 and the enactment of the LFC in 1992. They were many and varied; we will focus on 
two of them we consider particularly important. First, we will consider an instance of 
mobilization of litigious resources by actors to other legal fora to challenge Telmex’s dominance. 
Second, we will consider the proceedings directed by the CFC against Telmex. We contend that 
these reactions contributed to the amendments of the LFC of the late 2000s and, in light of 
political events, to the constitutional and legal changes that occurred in 2013 and 2014. Overall, 
these reactions suggest that the struggle over competition law has changed, but nonetheless 
continues to be fought over different legal and political fronts or stages. 
 
II.B.1 The 2004 WTO Panel Report 
 
The first strategy we consider here is the mobilization of litigious resources by Telmex’s rivals 
from national to supranational institutions, like the World Trade Organization (WTO) and its 
dispute settlement mechanism. In 1996 the SCT enacted regulations establishing the conditions 
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in which third parties can access the telecoms networks for long distance calls, national and 
international, and which were similar to the conditions established in Telmex’s original Título de 
Concesión. As a result of these regulations, these third parties had to contract with this company 
and were subject to the terms and conditions it imposed as part of granting this access. Between 
1998 and 2000 Avantel and Alestra, two Mexican companies owned partially by US companies 
MCI and AT&T, complained on different occasions before the CFC that Telmex resorted to 
anticompetitive practices. They alleged that this company prevented these companies from 
having adequate access to its network, and that this was to its advantage as a provider of the 
different services it offered. The CFC sided with the complainants in all the decisions it issued 
except one, but Telmex filed several amparo actions against them in order to prevent their 
application and, in some instances, was able to have judges overturn them.671 
 
In 2000 AT&T and MCI decided to try a different strategy and challenge the legality of the 
Mexican International Long Distance (hereinafter ILD) regulations. The US Trade 
Representative, on behalf of these companies, lodged before the WTO a formal complain 
against Mexico in 2000. After failing to reach an agreement with Mexico regarding the conditions 
of access to these companies, the US invoked the creation of a panel to decide on the legality of 
Mexico’s ILD rules according to the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body.672 The US argued that the 
ILD and interconnectivity regulations violated the commitments that Mexico had acquired in the 
Reference Paper included in the 1997 Agreement on Basic Telecommunications, and the GATS 
Annex on Telecommunications.673 This was so because the regulations i) established that 
Mexican companies should negotiate en bloc the rates of international calls they received, and ii) 
appointed Telmex, the company with the largest number of receiving calls, as negotiator on 
behalf of the other Mexican companies with their foreign counterparts companies.674 These rules 
established a collusive instrument between Mexican companies to the advantage of Telmex and 
prevented foreign companies from reaching their own agreements on rates in a competitive way. 
The response of the Mexican government was quite revealing. It asked the panel to rule that 
Mexico had not violated such legal provisions, on the grounds that i) the Reference Paper had a 
much less ambitious reach than what was argued by the US, ii) that because of Mexico’s 
regulatory sovereignty, this institutional arrangement provided Telmex and the other firms with a 
                                                            
671 México, CFC, Files DE-007-1998, DE-003-1999, DE-021-1999 (overturned), DE-033-1999 (overturned), 
DE-017-2000 (closed for insufficient evidence) and DE-045-2000 (overturned). 
672 WTO Panel Report, Mexico – Measures Affecting Telecommunication Services WT/DS204/R (April 2, 
2004). Pgs. 1 & 2. 
673 Ibid. Section IV (Referring to sections 2 and 1.1 of the Reference Paper and section 5 of the GATS Annex on 
Telecommunications.) 
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“state action” defense, and iii) that such arrangement prevented a) large phone call carriers, like 
the above mentioned company, to take advantage of their dominance and thwart the efforts of 
lesser companies and b) a price war that would negatively affect Mexican infrastructure.675 In 
2004 the panel ruled for the US, stating among other things that the ILD Rules were 
incompatible with the Reference Paper and the GATS, and that they enabled Telmex to affect 
international interconnection duties as established in the relevant provisions of these 
documents.676 In August of that year CFT issued new ILD rules to comply with the panel’s 
ruling, but connectivity would continue to be a disputed issue in the following years. We contend 
that the Report had effects beyond Mexican regulation because it contributed to the erosion of 
the legitimacy of the aforementioned legal foundations by serving as evidence before the global 
community of crony capitalism in Mexico. 
 
II.B.2 Suing Telmex Before the CFC 
 
 The second reaction we consider pertains to the role of the CFC as an enforcer of the 
LFC. It refers to both the proceedings directed by this agency against Telmex, as well as how, it 
used these proceedings in order to start gaining prominence before the media. Underlying these 
efforts was Eduardo Perez Motta, who as president of this agency was able to muster support 
for its activities as well as for changes in the LFC. Both the outcomes of the proceedings and the 
efforts undergone to raise the profile of the CFC contributed to legislative amendments of the 
LFC strengthening it.  
 
Since Telmex was bound by the LFC, the CFC could investigate allegations of anticompetitive 
conduct by this company. In turn, this company’s Título de Concesión enabled it to determine the 
conditions under which other telecoms providers could connect to its network.677 The first 
complaints against this company before the CFC took place after third parties began to have 
access to the Telmex network, which occurred in the mid 1990s after the enactment of the LFT. 
(The litigation involving Iusacell is an example of these contentions.) The conditions of the 
access, the quality of the connections and the strategic responses by this company to the 
entrance of these third parties would become a common feature in the proceedings before the 
CFC.  
                                                                                                                                                                                        
674 Ibid.  Pgs. 4 & 5. 
675 Ibid, section IV, especially pgs. 79 & 80 (referring to the legality of the ILD rules and the potentially ruinous 
effects of competition) and pgs. 86 - 90 (referring to anticompetitive practices). 
676 Ibid, Section VIII. (See also pgs. 195 – 199). 
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Based on data available by the CFC, between 1996 and 2011678 Telmex alone faced 18 
investigations, 7 of which resulted in fines against this company or settlements, 4 were 
overturned by judges, and 8 were closed because of lack of merits. Notably, 7 of all these 
proceedings began because of complaints filed in by Telmex’s rivals Avantel and Alestra, and only 
one investigation resulted from the CFC’s own enforcement efforts. The following table 
summarizes these findings: 
 
Table 7.1. CFC Investigations Involving Telmex (1996 – 2011)679 
 
Case 
# 
File 
Date 
Initiation 
Complainants Outcome Documents 
Date Finalization 
CFC 
Fine680 
1 DE-016-1995 29/11/1995 Grupo Iusacell Sanction RA-058-2002 22/11/2001 1’717605,75 
2 DE-007-1998 27/05/1998 Avantel/Alestra Sanction RA-033-2000 7/12/2000 585.875,32 
3 DE-003-1999 09/04/1999 
Avantel/Alestra/M
arcatel 
Sanction RA-112-2002 30/01/2002 2’533897,88 
4 DE-021-1999 26/08/1999 Avantel/Marcatel 
Sanction 
overturned 
RA-166-2001 015/04/2005 No fine 
5 DE-033-1999 17/08/1999 Avantel/Alestra 
Sanction 
overturned 
RA-078-2002 15/06/2005 No fine 
6 IO-01-2000 03/01/2000 
Public 
enforcement 
Sanction 
overturned 
RA-103-2002 22/04/2005 No fine 
7 DE-017-2000 16/06/2000 Avantel Closed RA-165-2001 06/05/2005 No fine 
8 DE-045-2000 13/11/2000 Avantel 
Sanction 
overturned 
RA-110-2002 22/05/2005 No fine 
9 DE-028-2001 16/07/2001 
Videotam/Pegaso/
Iuasacell 
Sanction RA-063-2001 12/12/2002 
405423,6
6 
10 DE-022-2003 28/05/2003 
Sistema 
Computarizado de 
Emergencia (SCE) 
Sanction RA-24-2004 17/11/2004 
310817,9
4 
11 DE-037-2006 29/11/2006 
Axtel, Alestra, 
Marcatel, 
Settlement RA-007-2011 07/04/2011 
Behavioral 
commitments 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
677 Título de Concesión, Op.cit. Sections 2-4 and 5-4. 
678 According to the CFC database, there are no public records of further investigations after 2011. This may 
because according to art. 31 bis, sections I and II of the LFC and art. 14, section I of the Federal Law of 
Transparency and Access to Public Governmental Information, certain documents can be considered classified 
for up to three years, which can be extended. We believe this is why there is very little information in the 
database about the last three proceedings. 
679 Based on data taken from https://www.cofece.mx/cofece/index.php/resoluciones-y-opiniones (Jan. 16, 2015). 
Some of these investigations were consolidated into single proceedings in spite that they began by investigating 
different claims. 
680 Amount in US dollars. Approximate conversion based on currency exchange of 17/01/2015 
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Megacable, Protel 
y Telefónica 
12 DE-015-2007 NA NA Closed  20/04/2007 No fine 
13 DE-033-2007 30/11/2007 GTM (Telefónica) Closed RA-014-2011 6/11/2011 No fine 
14 DE-039-2007 27/02/2008 GTM (Telefónica) Sanction RA-015-2011 26/05/2011 
6’285066
,02 
15 DE-040-2007 06/03/2008 GTM Closed RA-028-2011 27/10/2011 NA 
16 DE-016-2010 29/04/2011 Axtel/Avantel Ongoing RA-101-2010 29/04/2011 NA 
17 DE-005-2011 NA NA Closed RA-006-2011 25/03/2011 No fine 
18 DE-014-2011 25/10/2012 NA Closed RA-013-2011 18/05/2011 No fine 
 
This information shows several attempts by Telmex’s rivals to use the LFC to curb this 
company’s dominance in the telecoms sector. It also shows that Telmex was able to limit their 
efforts in several instances. In the four overturned decisions, Telmex used a ruling from an 
unrelated decision by the Mexican Supreme Court regarding the legality of section VII of article 
10 of the LFC, the “catch-all” section of this article. The unrelated decision stemmed from the 
Warner Lambert case, in which the CFC used the aforementioned section to challenge this 
company’s predatory pricing strategy (imposing predatory prices was not an offence in the 
original text of the LFC). Originally, the CFC investigated a complain against this company filed 
by Canel, its rival, for predatory prices, but the agency terminated the proceeding because the 
latter had not presented evidence of the losses incurred resulting from such pricing strategy.681 
But then the CFC began an investigation on its own based on similar facts and ruled against 
Warner-Lambert.682 Warner-Lambert filed two amparo actions in the wake of these proceedings, 
one against this decision and a second one against numeral VII of article 10 and other provisions 
of the LFCE. An administrative court ordered the CFC to reinstate the investigation against the 
defendant, which it did, and in 2002 it issued a new decision that is very similar to the one of 
1998.683 The second amparo action reached the Supreme Court, which ruled in 2003 that numeral 
VII of article 10 was unconstitutional because it did not afford citizens with a minimum of 
certainty regarding the scope of administrative actions, and therefore precluded the investigation 
and the sanctions levied against the defendant.684 This ruling enabled Telmex to feign-off the 
pressure exercised by the CFC. 
 
                                                            
681 México, CFC, DE-11-94 (1996) 
682 México, CFC, RA-04-98 (1998) 
683 México, CFC, RA-97-2002 (2002) 
684 Op.cit., México. Corte Suprema de Justicia. Decision of November 25 of 2003, in review of amparo 2589/96 
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The CFC’s role during these proceedings with Telmex and other economic actors met 
important criticisms. In some investigations - at least three of the investigations against Telmex685 
and Warner Lambert - the CFC turned a private enforcement initiative into a public enforcement 
process, thus assuming the roles of prosecutor and judge. According to Gabriel Castañeda, who 
wrote on this subject after a decade of activities by the CFC, this switch was contrary to the 
original design of this agency and is highly problematic. This is so because it relegates 
complainants to mere informants of anticompetitive conducts, and therefore distorts the 
incentives for filing complaints established in the LFC. In doing so, it replaces the adversarial 
ethos of private competition law enforcement with a public enforcement system where the agency 
is both prosecutor and judge. At the core of this issue, Castañeda noted, is a confusion regarding 
the roles the CFC’s president and its executive secretary.686  
 
The investigations carried forth by the CFC strained the relationship between Telmex and the 
competition law enforcers considerably. However, it was after Eduardo Perez Motta became 
president of the CFC that the tension turned into a resolute antagonism. At first glance, his 
professional trajectory does not reveal zealousness for competition law. He is an economist from 
ITAM, the private university counterpart to UNAM, and obtained a master’s degree from the 
University of California at Los Angeles. Since 1990 he held several positions in the government 
(including SECOFI) and participated in the negotiations of NAFTA and the Free-trade 
agreement with the EU taking place during the late 1990s. Moreover, between 2001 and 2004 he 
was the permanent representative for Mexico to the WTO. He was appointed to the CFC in 
September 2004.687 In spite of his rather technocratic profile, Perez Motta defined his endeavors 
by recurring to different, and often contrasting, figures of speech. In some instances, he stated 
that to lead the CFC it was necessary to have the high standards of Don Quixote (the famously 
deranged cavalier that charged against windmills).688 On others, he completely depersonalized 
competition law enforcement by referring to it as being about applying the law and economic 
                                                            
685 For example DE-017-2000, IO-01-2000 and DE-037-2006. 
686 Castañeda, Op.cit. Pg. 41. 
687 "Eduardo Pérez Motta" www.banxico.org.mx%2Fpublicaciones-y-
discursos%2Fpublicaciones%2Fseminarios%2Fretos-y-crecimiento-oct-2009%2F%257BE376294B-6AC5-
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hp.3...2146.2146.0.3024.1.1.0.0.0.0.0.0..0.0.msedr...0...1ac.1.34.heirloom-hp..1.0.0.xhO5oSWwo7I (accessed 
January 14, 2015). 
688 "El Zar de los Reflectores." http://www.cnnexpansion.com/expansion/2013/10/07/gestion-mediatica 
(accessed January 14, 2015) 
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efficiency.689 The result is an eclectic discourse that combined quite different ideas; competition 
law enforcement is, at the same time, about the public interest and economic efficiency, fighting 
illegitimate economic gains and economic growth.  
 
As part of a new advocacy strategy in the CFC, Perez Motta discussed before the media 
several proceedings undergone by this agency, involved international experts and lobbied before 
congress different initiatives pertaining to competition.690 The publicity resulting from these 
efforts earned him recognition as someone committed to competition even by individuals not 
directly involved in competition law or regulatory affairs.691 However, it also led to several 
confrontations. We consider here one example. In 2006 several of Telmex’s rivals complained 
before the CFC that this company’s cell phone subsidiary, Telcel, was engaging in anticompetitive 
practices. The agency found out that this company raised its rival’s costs by setting an 
interconnection rate (off-net) considerably higher than the rate it applied to its own network (on-
net), thus affecting competition negatively. The initial decision of the CFC was to impose a fine 
that amounted to one billion US dollars.692 This decision, however, had various weaknesses. 
First, one of the commissioners recused himself because he had a relative in one of the 
complaining companies, thus leaving the final decision to a Pleno composed of four 
commissioners, where a tie could only be resolved by the president’s powers. Furthermore, the 
lawyers of Telmex asked Perez Motta to recuse himself for the procedures that followed, arguing 
that in an interview with Reuters he had already expressed his opinion about the outcome of the 
proceedings. Two of the remaining commissioners voted in favor of recusing the president, thus 
limiting his participation in the final decision.693 As it turned out, the remaining commissioners 
decided not to continue with the imposition of the fine and instead accepted the plan that Telcel 
presented amending its anticompetitive behavior. The defendant offered to reduce considerably 
its interconnection rates and to offer plans that included minutes to other companies, in 
exchange of dropping all the pending trials regarding the 2011 rulings issued by the CFC on 
interconnection conditions.694 
 
                                                            
689 See Roundtable Conference with Enforcement Officials, The Antitrust Source, 2011. Pg.16. 
690 These three elements are part of what he defined as competition law advocacy. See Perez Motta, Eduardo. 
“Intervención estatal y competencia”. Presentation delivered in Honduras, 2011. 
691 See, for example, Dresser, Denise. El País De Uno: Reflexiones Para Entender Y Cambiar a México. 
Aguilar, 2011. Pg. 1918. 
692 México, CFC, file DE-037-2006, decision de 7 de Abril de 2011. 
693 México, CFC, Informe Annual 2011. Pgs. 31 – 32. 
694 México, CFC, file RA-007-2011. Decisión de Abril 12 de 2012. 
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Besides the personal drama involved in this proceeding, the final decision of the CFC 
evidences a form of competition law enforcement that is closer to regulation than to adversarial 
dispute resolution. In particular, three of the five commitments offered by Telcel, and accepted by 
this agency address prices and conditions for network access, which are topics usually addressed 
by the telecoms regulation. These commitments address the rates this company charges for calls 
terminating in its network,695 a lowered and universal tariff for connecting to its network,696 or 
having calling plans that do not distinguish the network where they are terminating.697 
Independently of the merits of this decision, by accepting these commitments (in exchange of 
foregoing a hefty fine) the CFC managed to change important aspects of this sector acting more 
like a regulator than like a classic adjudicator of disputes. This decision stands out as another 
example of the active role of the CFC that does not fit in its original design. 
 
During this phase the struggle over the content of Mexican competition law was not limited 
to proceedings before the CFC, as it included the Mexican congress via amendments to the LFC. 
The first amendment resulted from a draft bill submitted by the CFC to the Mexican congress in 
2005 and enacted as law in 2006. Perez Motta argued that this amendment was necessary to 
further the advocacy efforts undergone by the CFC in the past.698 It introduced changes 
regarding the investigation of both absolute and relative monopolistic practices, the amount of 
the fines imposed, and the agency’s proceedings and regulatory powers, among other topics. 
Regarding absolute monopolistic practices, it established a leniency program in order to facilitate 
the investigation of collusive practices.699 Also, it explicitly provided the CFC with powers to 
conduct inspections and collect copies of documents previously requested, although prior to 
judicial approval and after notifying the investigated party that such inspections were to take 
place.700  
 
Concerning relative monopoly practices, the amendment introduced five new types of 
practices considered anticompetitive – predatory prices, discounts subject to rebates, cross-
subsidies, price discrimination and raising rival’s costs. In doing so, these new types 
supplemented section VII of article 10 of this law, which was declared unconstitutional by the 
Supreme Court in the Warner Lambert ruling commented before. An “efficiency defense” was 
                                                            
695 File DE-037-2006, document RA-007-2011 (April 30, 2012) Pg. 25 
696 Ibid. Pg 37 
697 Ibid. Pg. 48. 
698 Sada Correa Heidi Claudia & Eduardo Perez Motta Competition Policy in México In: Lewis, David. Building 
New Competition Law Regimes: Selected Essays. Edward Elgar Publishing, 2013. Pg. 15 
699 México, LFC, art. 33 bis 3. (2006) 
  188 
also introduced, establishing that the legality of the practices addressed in article 10 will depend 
on their costs and benefits, including their impact on innovation and consumer choice.701 The 
amendment allowed investigated parties to settle with the CFC by offering to modify or end an 
allegedly anticompetitive practice under investigation.702  
 
The punitive regime concerning fines was also modified in important ways. The amount of 
the fines that can be imposed increased considerably. Recidivist defendants can be imposed 
twice the amount of a regular fine, ten per cent of their assets or ten per cent of their annual 
sales, whichever fine is the highest, or be forced to sell their assets in order to dissolve their 
market power.703 The proceedings before the CFC also changed in ways that reflected the 
agency’s practice at the time; the amendment states that individuals may file complains before 
the commission, but also that the commission has the leading role in the investigation and 
punishment of the practices forbidden by the LFC.704 (Notably, this amendment enabled the 
CFC to levy a fine of close to one billion US dollars to Telmex and, at the same time, allowed this 
company to settle through commitments in one of the cases considered above.) 
 
 Notwithstanding the novelty of the changes introduced in 2006, the government 
submitted before congress a new bill containing several proposals for reform in 2010 and which 
was enacted as a law in 2011. As before, Perez Motta argued that these new amendments were 
necessary to deter anticompetitive conduct effectively.705 A first group of reforms was about the 
CFC’s capacity to address anticompetitive conducts. Firstly, the amendment introduced the 
concept of joint dominance.706 It increased again the administrative fines that may be levied 
against individuals or corporations liable for committing absolute or relative monopolistic 
practices.707 It also introduced criminal punishments – imprisonment – for the individuals 
working for corporations that have participated in the commission of anticompetitive 
conducts.708 The amendment also enabled the CFC to conduct inspection un-notified inspections 
as well as to seize original documents related to the on-going investigations709 (and therefore 
changing the inspections regime of the 2006 amendment). Also, it enabled the CFC to issue 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
700 Ibid. art. 24, section II and art. 31, section IV. 
701 Ibid. art. 10. 
702 Ibid, art. 33 bis. 2 
703 Ibid. arts. 35 &  37. 
704 Ibid. arts. 24 num. I, & 32. 
705 This was acknowledged by the CFC itself; see CFC Reporte Anual 2011 (Pgs. 6 – 8) 
706 México, LFC art. 13 bis. (2011 amendments) 
707 Ibid. art. 35. 
708 México, Federal Criminal Code, arts. 253 I.d. & 254 bis. 
709 Op.cit. LFC, arts. 24.II, 31 & 34. 
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injunctions ordering investigated parties to seize an allegedly anticompetitive conduct before a 
final decision on its legality was issued.710 A second group of reforms addressed the procedures 
before the CFC. The amendments established a new set of oral hearings for defendants to 
present their arguments before this agency.711 They also extended the scope of the leniency given 
to collaborators, which now reached beyond administrative fines to criminal procedures.712 
Finally, the new amendment also modified the structure of the enforcement system within the 
CLR. It delineated the functions of the general secretary (secretaría general) by granting it the 
responsibility of carrying forth the investigation of anticompetitive conducts, while the Pleno of 
the commissioners was to have the last word based on the findings of the investigation.713 This 
separation of functions prevented the possible biases resulting from having the same officials 
within the CFC coordinate both the investigations and decide upon their findings. Finally, the 
amendments also stipulated that specialized tribunals should be established to decide upon the 
legality of the fines and procedures carried out by the CFC.714  
 
The enactment of the 2011 amendment to the LFC marks the end of the second phase here 
considered because, until then, the relation between competition law enforcement and Telmex 
were determined by the rules established in the LFC. This second phase is characterized by how 
competition law enforcement was turned against Telmex by this company’s rivals and the CFC. 
By the end of this phase, competition law became an instrument for addressing, imperfectly, 
sheer economic power. Championing for competition had become indeed a rallying call against 
entrenched economic power. This process resulted from the mobilization of different resources 
by the actors involved. Rivals to this company mobilized their legal resources for establishing 
investigations that would eventually undermine its dominance, both at a national and an 
international level. Notably, the process before the WTO Panel involved the mobilization of 
political resources as well, for the Panel would not have taken place if the Trade Representative 
of the US had not been involved. In turn, enforcers mobilized their resources as well by 
developing an agenda of their own within a established institutional framework. Castañeda’s 
complains regarding the CFC tell away the development of a public enforcement model whose 
purpose is not the resolution of private disputes in a non-intrusive manner. Several of the CFC’s 
decisions reveal these efforts. However, their mobilizations were not limited to the institutional 
framework of the CFC’s proceedings; they also reached to the political system and were able to 
                                                            
710 Ibid. 24 IV bis & 34 bis 4. 
711 Ibid. art. 32, VI. 
712 Ibid. art. 24 XVIII bis J. 
713 Ibid. arts. 28, 29 & 30. 
714 Ibid. Art. 39. 
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achieve the reforms considered necessary to increase their standing vis a vis companies like 
Telmex. Enforcers like Eduardo Perez Motta acquired prominence as they develop these 
strategies. Finally, Telmex itself also mobilized resources to prevent the full application of the 
LFC against it. In particular, by mobilizing its legal resources it managed to overturn several 
decisions against it and averted the imposition of a considerable fine. Competition law rules thus 
provided the means for challenging, as well as for fending off, the strategies of the different 
actors here considered. The contest for competition law was, during this second phase, a struggle 
that took place in different spaces and in different ways. 
 
II.C. Redefining Competition Law 
 
The third and current phase is quite different from the previous two because it continues to 
unravel. Just like the previous phase, it is made mostly of strategic reactions to previous events 
and ideas; in particular, it is based on the dominance that Telmex was able to preserve in spite of 
the enforcement activities led against it. It also comprises different strategies by actors engaged 
in this field aiming to transform it according to their own perspectives. But, contrary to the 
previous phases, it is very recent and we have little information about how it is unfolding, 
especially at the level of enforcement. Because of its novelty, our analysis will focus only on the 
amendments to the Mexican constitution and the drafting of a new competition law statute.715 
We will show that the amendment of article 28 redefined the relation between competition law 
enforcement and Telmex. It did so by using competition law as a template for telecoms regulation 
and, at the same time, severing the (legal) ties between competition law enforcement and 
enterprises in the telecoms sector. Then, we will show how the 2014 competition law develops 
the content of the amended article 28 and, in particular, how it addresses the gap or “slippage” 
identified before between the prohibition of monopoly and its enforcement. In doing so, we will 
show how the balance resulting from the second phase was redefined in the new constitutional 
and legal rules.  
 
 
 
 
                                                            
715 According to the information provided publicly by the CFCE, this agency has not concluded any of the 
investigations began after the enactment of the new LFCE and the courts – including the newly established 
specialised courts – continue solving claims against decisions by the extinguished CFC. ⁠ Because of this, there 
are no decisions that evidence how the new agency interprets and applies the new law in a concrete context. See 
Mexico, CFCE, Tercer Informe Trimestral (2014). Pg. 22. 
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II.C.1 Amending Article 28 Of the Constitution 
 
 The pervasive role that monopolies and anticompetitive practices had in the Mexican 
economy was one of the salient topics of the 2012 Mexican presidential campaigns. The elections 
themselves were highly disputed, and in the end the electoral tribunal awarded the presidency to 
Enrique Peña Nieto, who had achieved a narrow majority of the votes.716 Peña Nieto was the 
candidate of the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI), the same political party of Salinas and 
which had supported the neoliberal policies of the late 1980s and 1990s. On December 2, 2012, 
a day after assuming office, President Peña Nieto and the representatives of the other four 
political parties signed the “Pact for México” (Pacto por México), in which they detailed the basic 
agenda of reforms that the parties planned to establish during his six-year term. Among these 
reforms, the protection of competition has a prominent place; competition itself was viewed as a 
source of economic growth and as contributing to the reduction of poverty and inequality.717 
Besides this general statement, the Pact contains detailed proposals. Agreement 37 states that the 
CFC should be given the capacity to break up monopolies, the criminal provisions in the law 
would be further detailed, and the procedures before this agency will be shortened. Agreement 
38 states that specialized tribunals for competition law and telecoms regulatory procedures 
should be created.718 Agreement 40 states that the autonomy of CFT will be increased to make it 
more independent from the interests it regulates. In turn, agreements 43 to 45 state that 
measures will be taken to increase competition in the provision of radio, television and telephone 
services.719 In these agreements competition law and telecommunication issues are bundled 
together in the different points of the agreements and not as separate subjects.  
 
 The agreements contained in the Pact became the template for amending several articles 
of the Mexican constitution in 2013, including article 28 - the cornerstone of Mexican 
competition law. Notably, the reform of this article is known as the Reforma en Telecomunicaciones, 
or “Telecoms reform” even though it also modified core aspects of the CLR unrelated to 
telecoms. The draft bill, later enacted as the new version of article 28, redefined the legal 
boundaries between competition law enforcement and the telecoms sector and many important 
                                                            
716 Reuters, Mexico electoral judges reject challenge to Pena Nieto victory (Aug. 30, 2012) Available at: 
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aspects of each of these fields. It did so by addressing three general topics: the structure of the 
enforcement agencies, the legal standing of their decisions, and their conformation. 
 
 Regarding the structure and legal status of the enforcement agencies in each of these 
sectors, the new version of article 28 established two new independent enforcement agencies, the 
Comisisión Federal de Competencia Económica (CFCE) and the Instituto Federal de Telecomunicaciones 
(IFT). While the first agency will be in charge of competition law enforcement and advocacy in 
almost all sectors, the second will do so exclusively in the telecoms sector. The CFCE is based 
largely on the institutional template of the old CFC, but with a key difference: it is endowed with 
the power to order the removal of barriers to trade, to regulate essential facilities and to order 
the disinvestment of assets (including shares) of corporations in order to reduce their 
dominance. In turn, the IFT is designed as a twin institution of the new CFCE. It is given a 
similar structure and similar mandates, with two important differences. First, it can oversee the 
corporate control of the corporations that have concessions over the telecoms infrastructure, 
which entitles it to accept or reject corporate operations that change the owner of the 
entitlements represented in the concessions. Second, it is the only administrative agency in 
charge of granting or revoking concessions over the telecoms infrastructure. In doing so, this 
new agency would replace the CFT and would have higher standing than the SCT. 
 
 Just as the CFCE and its twin telecoms agency have special constitutional faculties, their 
proceedings also have special legal standing. Amparo actions can only be filed against decisions 
that conclude an investigation either by establishing a fine, accepting a settlement or absolving 
the investigated parties from liability, and filing these actions does not suspend their applicability 
(as is the case with how the amparo generally works). These actions can be challenged before 
specialized tribunals (also mentioned in the amended version of article 94).  
 
 Finally, regarding its conformation, the amendment states that both entities are 
conformed by seven commissioners (two more than before). The selection of the commissioners 
is a complex process; an evaluation committee composed of the directors of the central bank 
and other two independent federal bodies should issue a public call for aspiring commissioners 
once there is a vacancy. From the submissions to the public call, the committee selects between 
three and five postulants, and submits their names to the President, who in turn selects one 
candidate and presents him or her before the federal congress for approval. The commissioners 
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have nine-year terms, and the president of the commission, also appointed by the congress, has a 
four-year term that can be renewed only once.720  
 
 We wish to highlight several aspects of the amendment itself. First, there is some 
continuity with previous institutional designs. The new CFCE is not drastically different from 
the old CFC. However, the fact that the CFCE was created by the constitution gives it a special 
status and prevents it from being modified by future ordinary laws. Second, the amendment 
extends competition law enforcement unto the telecoms sector by framing telecoms regulation 
as a matter of competition within the content of article 28, and by creating a new regulator after 
the CFCE. This meant the end of the struggle between competition law enforcers and Telmex, 
but at the same time places competition law considerations at the heart of telecoms regulation. 
Thirdly, it does provide both agencies with powers to rearrange private entitlements  - regulating 
barriers to competition, regulating essential facilities and ordering the sale of assets of a company 
to reduce its dominance - in the name of competition. These functions enable these agencies to 
close the gap or “slippage” identified before between the prohibition against monopolies 
established in the Constitution and its enforcement via the legal mechanisms established in the 
law for such purpose.  
 
II.C.2 A New Competition Law Statute 
 
 The enactment of the amended version of article 28 prompted the formal establishment 
of the new CFCE, which was officially installed on September 10, 2013,721 and of the specialized 
courts on issues of competition and telecoms on August 10, 2013.722 It also prompted the 
enactment of a new competition law statute, Ley Federal de Competencia Económica (LFCE) 
containing the core aspects of the Mexican CLR. This new law, enacted on May 23, 2014 
replaced entirely the LFC, but follows closely some of its aspects. Here we will summarize the 
content of the law relating to its substantive provisions, the structure of the CFCE, and the new 
functions regarding the regulation of barriers to competition and essential facilities.  
 
One of the aspects in which the LFCE followed the rules laid down by the 1992 statute is 
how it addresses anticompetitive practices. The following articles develop more thoroughly such 
                                                            
720 México, “Se reforman y adicionan diversas disposiciones de los Artículos 6o, 7o., 27, 28, 73, 78, 94 y 105 de 
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721 México, CFCE, Informe Annual 2013. Pg. 3. 
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prohibition. Article 53 (like its predecessor, article 9 of the LFC) establishes a prohibition against 
absolute monopolistic practices, and adds sharing information with the purpose or effect of 
leading to collusive agreements as a new type of forbidden act. Article 54 defines relative 
monopolistic practices as i) the practices detailed in article 56, ii) carried forth by a single 
dominant actor or jointly with another in a relevant or in a related market, iii) and with the 
purpose or effect of unduly displacing rivals, prevent their access to a market or an essential 
facility, or establish exclusive advantages beneficial to a few actors.723 In turn, article 56 states the 
conducts that are considered as anticompetitive, which are basically the same ones established in 
article 10 of the old LFC (after the 2006 amendment), but with two additions; numeral XII, 
which refers to limiting access to an essential facility, and XIII, which refers to margin 
squeezes.724 Finally, article 55 establishes an efficiency defense, according to which the 
investigated party can prove that the allegedly anticompetitive conduct generates efficiency gains 
that i) have a positive impact on the process of competition and exceed potential anticompetitive 
effects, ii) and improve consumer welfare. It also contains a list of non-exhaustive examples of 
what such efficiency gains may be.725 Articles 58 and 59 address the definition of relevant 
markets and the identification of dominance.726 Finally, article 60 provides the conditions for 
determining whether an asset can be considered an essential facility.727  
 
The LFCE also maintains important features of the structure of the enforcement authority. 
The CFCE, like its predecessor, is an administrative agency in charge of investigating and 
deciding alleged violations of the substantive provisions. It is divided in two main bodies, the 
Pleno of commissioners, which is very similar to the old Pleno of the CFC, and the investigative 
authority (“autoridad investigativa”), which replaces the previous executive secretary of that 
institution. Moreover, it accentuates the division of function between these two bodies by stating 
that the Pleno of commissioners as the decision making instance, while the investigative authority 
is solely in charge of investigating alleged violations to the law.728  
 
The prohibition against the establishment of barriers to competition is an innovation 
introduced by the new LFCE. Article 3 defines such barriers as i) any structural characteristic of 
a market, fact or act of the incumbent economic actors that can by object or effect a) prevent the 
                                                            
723 Ibid. art. 54. 
724 Ibid. art. 56. 
725 Ibid. art. 55. 
726 Ibid. arts. 58 & 59. 
727 Ibid. art. 60. 
728 Ibid. Titulo II. (arts. 10 – 36). 
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access of competitors or limit their capacity to compete in markets; b) that prevent or distort the 
process of competition and free market participation (in Spanish, libre concurrencia), ii) as well as 
the rules proffered by any governmental entity that unduly impede or distort the process of 
competition and free market participation.729 The prohibition against the establishment of these 
barriers is contained in articles 52 and 57 of this law, but only the latter refers to a special 
procedure to accomplish such task, which is later on developed by article 94. According to this 
article, the CFCE begins an enquiry about how competition takes place in a given market. 
Depending on whether it identifies a barrier to entry or an essential facility, it may i) advice the 
regulators of the sector about appropriate measures, ii) order the incumbent actor(s) to remove a 
barrier, iii) regulate the terms and condition of access to an essential facility and iv) order the 
divestiture of assets (including shares) of the incumbent actor that are necessary for removing 
the obstacles to competition, if the other measures are inadequate. Notably, this article also has 
an efficiency defense; the incumbent actor(s) may prove before the CFCE that the identified 
barrier brings about efficiency gains that overcome the costs to competition it produces. Finally, 
the actor(s) may also argue that the competitive conditions of a market have changed and hence 
the conditions or limitations ordered previously for granting access to the market or an 
essentially facility are no longer necessary.730 As such, this provision would enable the CFCE to 
address what identifies as impediments to competition and free market participation even in the 
absence of an anticompetitive conduct or behavior by any actors. 731  
 
During the congressional debates about this law, this prohibition became a beacon of 
opinions of both local and international competition law lawyers and consultants. Their 
assessments share a common perspective and reach similar conclusions: although this new 
institution strengthens the CLR, it is nonetheless inadequate because it is too imprecise and may 
be used to unduly punish competitive arrangements.732 We contend that, because of the 
precedent of the Warner Lambert decision regarding the determinacy of competition law 
                                                            
729 Ibid. art. 3. 
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provisions, these assessments foreshadow future proceedings before courts regarding the 
constitutionality of this prohibition and its enforcement. 
 
Both the new text of article 28 of the Mexican constitution and the LFCE include elements 
that can hardly be considered part of the Mexican neoliberalism. Although the underlying 
rationale for some of the elements of the law, like the leniency regime, are clearly inspired by 
neoliberal ideas, the law as a whole is not as coherent as the 1992 LFC. The elements that make 
it so are reactions to the entrenched economic power of companies that, like Telmex, were 
dominant in their markets. They are reactions to the relative incapability of the law to address 
such economic power in ways that come across as definitive. There was a perceived need for a 
strong enforcement authority that, in the name of public interest, could micro-manage market 
arrangements and entitlements in order to increase consumer welfare. As a result, the new text of 
article 28 and the LFCE reinforced a series of practices and new institutions that appeared 
during the second phase precisely to address these issues. However, they go even further by 
addressing the gap between the core prohibition of article 28 and the old LFC by enabling the 
CFCE to deal with barriers to competition. Because of the interventionist ethos of these 
developments, they evidence the erosion that the stronghold of the neoliberal project had over 
this field of law; even so, such erosion can be quickly reversed by actors working within this field 
that invest considerable resources in diminishing their effect. If anything, we contend that these 
developments will exacerbate the tension that developed during the second phase and thus 
intensify the struggles over the different actors involved. 
 
III. Conclusions 
 
At the introduction of this chapter we argued that Mexican competition law was a site of 
struggle between different actors (politicians, lawyers, economists, international organizations 
and others) and their projects (neoliberal competition law project and its State-centered 
counterpart) competing for the power to determine the content and structure of the legal rules 
that make it up. In this section we present the transformations of the legal rules making up this 
field and the general trends they suggest in terms of this struggle. 
 
In México, as in other Latin American countries, neoliberalism was “translated” into 
particular institutional arrangements. The privatization of Telmex and the enactment of the LFC 
stand out as two different neoliberal processes of institutional transformation in a time in which 
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the State-centered alternatives were hardly an option. Both processes share premises about the 
role of the State in economic activities and the importance of protecting markets. Moreover, 
both are about making markets; the privatization of Telmex was precisely about making an 
entitlement, while the enactment of the LFC was originally about protecting markets from 
certain kinds of anticompetitive behaviors. Moreover, both processes resulted from the strategies 
of actors involved in these areas and were congenial to them to the extent that it enabled them to 
strengthen their positions. Regarding competition law, the enactment of the LFC also produced 
a new way of understanding what this was about - the technocrats in power were able to 
legitimate their choices before the politicians that enacted the law. This new understanding led to 
a “slippage” or gap between the content of article 28 of the constitution and the possible 
remedies established in the law. Overall, both processes suggest an uneasy alliance between 
entrepreneurs, politicians, academics, and technocrats. 
 
This uneasy alliance between the different actors broke away and led to a re-accommodation 
of their roles and loyalties. The first sign of change involved determining that Telmex was not 
relatively insulated from the LFC, in spite that an exemption could have been justifiable as per 
the terms of this company’s Título de Concesión and the LFT. After this, came a series of efforts by 
this company’s rivals and the CFC to limit the consequences of this company’s entitlements, 
both nationally and internationally. At a national level, this involved first mobilizing legal 
resources through the CFC in order to have proceedings that achieve such end. However, 
recurring to an international legal forum like the WTO evidences a capacity to move resources 
between different legal networks that is noteworthy, among other things, because it also involved 
mobilizing political resources. But the mobilization of resources did not take place only in one 
direction. Telmex was also able to move resources to feign-off the strategies implemented by the 
CFC and its rivals in successful ways. We therefore see that legal rules enable the development of 
strategies for attacking and defending entitlements (and the economic power they bring upon). 
 
The re-accommodation was furthered by a change of strategy of the lawyers-economists 
acting as enforcers of the LFC. This change of strategy consisted in the emergence of the CFC as 
a public competition law enforcer and the correlative erosion of its role as a forum for private 
dispute settlement. In part, this was a reaction to the rather meager results obtained from 
competition law enforcement initially. But it was also an opportunity for enforcers like Eduardo 
Perez Motta to gain professional pre-eminence by campaigning against anticompetitive practices. 
The idea that in order to face a company like Telmex a tougher, more capable competition law 
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enforcement agency animated the 2006 and 2011 amendments to the LFC. Notably, the changes 
introduced by these amendments strengthened the public enforcement functions of the CFCE 
considerably more than its private enforcement functions.  
 
A new re-accommodation took place in 2012. The political actors that in the previous phases 
had supported the economic power of companies like Telmex decided to support competition 
law enforcement as part of their efforts to win political support and legitimize their mandates. 
Thus, the 2013 amendments to article 28 of the Mexican constitution evidence a new, uneasy 
alliance between politicians and enforcers against entrepreneurs like Carlos Slim. Again, there 
were reactions and opportunities; the meager achievements of the CFC (and the CFT) in the 
telecoms sector called for an institutional response, but we contend it can also be interpreted as 
an opportunity for re-aligning political interests with popular dissatisfaction. This alliance was 
also developed in the new competition law statute, the 2014 LFCE. As the previous 
amendments, the new article 28 and the LFCE also strengthened the public enforcement 
functions of the CFCE considerably more than its private enforcement functions. These changes 
contribute to the consolidations of the CFC as a State-centered enforcer of competition law 
provisions.  
 
As a result of the re-accommodation of actors and their strategies during the period here 
considered, the content of Mexican competition law changed considerably. What started mainly 
as a neoliberal project based on having private actors ventilate their claims in a specialized forum 
is now a based on the idea of having an administrative agency capable of micro-managing market 
arrangements in the name of efficiency and consumer welfare. It is less neoliberal because it 
replaces the initial vision of the LFC, as Castañeda presents it, based on private initiative and 
reliance on markets with a State-centered view that relies on permanent governmental oversight. 
The change, we contend, is considerable, and evidences the continuous influence of the ideas we 
identify with the State-centered competition law project. At the same time, the neoliberal ethos of 
the Mexican CLR has been maintained, even complemented; the cost-benefit analysis underlying 
the changes in fines and the leniency regime suggest that much. This also evidences the 
endurance of the neoliberal competition law project. The result is a growing tension within this 
field of law that mirrors, to some extent, the struggles taking place between the different actors 
involved. The Mexican CLR wants to protect markets from anticompetitive conducts, and at the 
same time wants to redesign the type of entitlements and arrangements that make up markets in 
the first place. As we have shown, this tension was not originally there when the 1992 LFC was 
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enacted, but actually developed, in different ways, as a response to sheer economic power. We 
contend that it will continue to develop as the CFCE begins enforcing the law on its own. 
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8. Competition Law Convergence and Divergence in Latin 
America: The Case of Leniency Regimes 
 
I. Introduction  
 
In the last four chapters we focused mostly on the development of the competition law 
regimes (hereinafter CLRs) of Chile, Colombia and Mexico. In chapter 4 we argued that the 
development of the first regimes in each of these countries was related with a series of changes 
in constitutional law involving mostly the protection of private property. Then, in the following 
three chapters, we addressed the trajectory of the CLRs of each of these countries since the 
1990s by focusing on certain, quite distinctive interactions. In these chapters we mention briefly 
certain interactions with organizations like the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (hereinafter OECD), but we have not addressed their roles in shaping CLRs in 
Latin America. In the following pages we aim to do precisely that. 
 
In this chapter we address the role that organizations like the OECD, the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (hereinafter UNCTAD) and the International 
Competition Network (hereinafter ICN) have played in the development of CLRs in Latin 
America. We will argue that Latin American CLRs are in the process of converging towards 
institutions that are distinctive of their North-Atlantic counterparts partly because of the plans 
and activities developed by these organizations. This process is redefining the trajectory of these 
CLRs by altering the interactions between local actors that shaped these regimes in the past. 
Moreover, this process has led to rivalries and collaborations between these organizations, for 
their programs aim to further their own goals and, in doing so, also ascertain their own 
understandings about what competition law should be about. Importantly, these changes have 
been taking place in spite of the fact that actual convergence has not been achieved as evidenced 
by the disparate outcomes produced by the leniency regimes of Chile, Colombia and Mexico.  
 
This chapter is divided in several sections. In section II we briefly explain why organizations 
like the ones mentioned before have taken upon fostering the convergence of CLRs across the 
world. As we will show, this is a strategy that resulted in part because of the proliferation of 
individual CLRs across the world, but also because of the absence of a global CLR. As we argue 
in section III, it is against this background that the convergence of Latin American CLRs is 
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taking place and should be assessed. In this section we describe the approaches of these 
organizations to transform these regimes and how their rivalries have played out in Latin 
America. In section IV we use the development of leniency regimes in Latin America to illustrate 
both the role of the OECD in this process of convergence and the effectiveness of such process. 
We focus on the efforts of this organization because it is the most active of all the organizations 
involved in competition law reform in Latin America. We will show that in spite of this 
organization’s efforts in promoting these regimes in these three jurisdictions, convergence is not 
taking place. Finally, in chapter V we offer some conclusions about the issue we have identified 
and discussed in the previous sections.  
 
II. Convergence via Networks: The Internationalization of Competition Law 
Regimes 
 
In this section we will address why, in the absence of a global legal regime about competition 
law, the internationalization of this field of law has been developed by organizations like the 
OECD, UNCTAD and the ICN. 
 
II.A. The Absence of a Global Competition Law Regime 
 
Our story begins with the International Trade Association (hereinafter ITO). The initiative to 
establish this organization dates back to 1945, when the United States (hereinafter US) and Great 
Britain proposed to create an international regime that addressed different trade-related issued, 
including competition law, and to establish an international organization for its management. 
The release of this proposal occurred amidst discussions between these two States as to how to 
deal with anticompetitive practices and cartels. Eventually the more aggressive view against these 
practices, which was the one the US was advocating for, prevailed. As the preliminary 
negotiations in 1946 London advanced, the proposal continued to gather support. This changed 
during the 1947 negotiations taking place in Havana, Cuba. In order to maintain the support for 
the entire initiative, the US made important concessions to other States on issues like import 
quotas and the protection of foreign investment. However, this strategy proved to be 
counterproductive, because by ceding on these issues the proposal failed to acquire the support 
of the organized business community in the US, which has considerable influence at Capitol Hill. 
Business associations felt that the proposal failed to grant them the protection they expected 
when dealing with other States on key issues like foreign investment. Moreover, the interest of 
  202 
the White House on the proposal was less than enthusiastic, for it preferred to invest in securing 
support for the Marshall Plan, which was presented as a mechanism for containing the rising 
power of the Soviet Union.733 Also, in parallel to the negotiations of the ITO, the US and other 
22 States have reached an initial agreement concerning the reduction of tariffs on October 1947 
and which entered into force in June 1948; this agreement became the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (hereinafter GATT).734 Given these developments, the ITO no longer seemed 
that attractive and in 1950 the US government announced that it was no longer looking for its 
congressional approval. As a result, the proposal establishing the ITO, as per the articles of the 
1948 Havana Charter,735 did not muster the support to secure its approval. An unintended but 
foreseeable consequence of this development was the strengthening of institutions associated 
with the Marshall Plan, like the OECD and the GATT.  
 
Even if adopting an entirely new system of international law to address issues of competition 
law was not feasible, there remained the opportunity to take advantage of previously established 
organizations. The United Nations (hereinafter UN) offered such possibility via UNCTAD. 
Originally created in 1964, this organization offered a space for participation to developed and 
developing States alike. During its first years, developing States were particularly interested in 
creating an international legal framework governing trade and commodity prices as a policy 
mechanism that would contribute to their development,736 very much like they did during the 
negotiations of the ITO. The first director of this institution was none other than Raul Prebisch, 
who set the intellectual agenda for the discussions that would take place in the summits 
organized by this institution for the following decade.737 The leadership of Prebisch contributed 
to an affinity between this organization and the other UN institutions, like the Economic 
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, and accentuated an opposition between it 
and the Bretton Woods system developed under the auspices of the US and Great Britain.738   
 
The interest within the UN for issues related with competition law and development dates 
back from the 1970s, when UNCTAD managed the General Assembly to convene a formal UN 
                                                            
733 Wells, Wyatt C. Antitrust and the Formation of the Postwar World. Columbia University Press, 2002. Pgs. 
116 - 125. 
734 Regarding the origins of GATT in light of the ITO, see 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact4_e.htm (accessed October 23, 2015) 
735 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Havana Charter for an International Trade 
Organization (1948). 
736 Love, Joseph. "Latin America, UNCTAD, and the Postwar Trading System." Conference Proceeding In Latin 
America and Global Trade, Social Science History Institute, Stanford University, November. 2001. Pgs. 2 - 3. 
737 Ibid. Pg. 16. 
738 Ibid. Pg. 17. 
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Conference on Restrictive Business Practices in 1978.739 Less than two years after, this 
Conference adopted a resolution approving the “Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable 
Principles and Rules for the Control of Restrictive Business Practices” (hereinafter “The Set”).740 
According to Ioannis Lianos, the Set was adopted against a background of growing aspirations 
by developing States to change international trade conditions that were part of the “new 
international economic order”.741 The Set, in particular, was directed towards multinational 
corporations and aspired to be a code of good conduct,742 but by the time of its adoption - 1980 
- the economic strength of the States promoting it had changed and they lost political ground for 
doing so.743 The Set is updated regularly and has become a reference point in contemporary 
discussions about the evolving structure of international competition law.744 However, important 
actors in the development of international competition law, like the US, have not taken The Set 
seriously as a binding legal document competition law,745 in spite of the fact that it was 
specifically endorsed by the UN’s General Assembly via Resolution 35/63 of 1980.746 Just as 
well, this Resolution also created an Intergovernmental Group of Experts on competition law, 
which produced a “Model Law on Competition” that is updated regularly.747 Critics of 
UNCTAD’s involvement in competition law argue that its products, like The Set, are a minimum 
common denominator on competition law issues - too general to be useful.748 These aspects have 
not prevented UNCTAD from continuing with its competition law-related activities, even 
though as we will argue below this organization has been loosing ground vis a vis other 
international organizations in Latin America. 
 
The transformation of the GATT into the World Trade Organization (hereinafter WTO) 
rekindled once more the interest of promoting a global initiative concerning competition law. As 
we mentioned before, the GATT was originally about reducing tariffs in order to facilitate trade, 
but over time it became a platform that included other trade-related issues, such as dumping and 
                                                            
739 United Nations, General Assembly, Resolution 33/153 of 1978. 
740 United Nations Conference on Restrictive Business Practices, The Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable 
Principles and Rules for the Control of Restrictive Business Practices. 1980. 
741 Lianos, Ioannis. "The Contribution of the United Nations to the Emergence of Global Antitrust Law." Tulane 
Journal of International & Comparative Law 15, no. 2 (2007). Pgs. 7 – 8. 
742 Ibid Pgs. 9 - 10. 
743 Gerber, David. Global Competition: Law, Markets, and Globalization. Oxford University Press, 2010. Pgs. 
114 - 115. 
744 Lianos, Ibid. Pgs. 2 & 3. 
745 Lianos, Ibid. Pg. 41. 
746 United Nations, General Assembly, Resolution 35/63 of 1980. (G.A. Res. 35/63, pmbl., U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/35/63) 
747 “Group of Experts” http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DITC/CompetitionLaw/Intergovernmental-Group-of-Experts-
on-Competition-Law-and-Policy.aspx (accessed October 23, 2015). 
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non-tariff restrictions to trade. After the 1986 - 1994 Uruguay Round the GATT became the 
WTO, and the GATT treaty became a sort of umbrella that covered other, more recent 
agreements involving different trade issues.749  
 
The recent transformations of the GATT raised hopes about becoming an adequate 
institution for promoting the development of a global CLR. The European Commission 
contributed to put competition law in the agenda of the discussions taking place in the WTO.750 
In the 1996 Singapore Ministerial Conference a special Working Group was created to discuss 
the nature and content of the competition law provisions that could be feasible annexed to the 
GATT system. This initiative met with considerable resistance from certain actors; in particular, 
developing countries were concerned that such rules would be fashioned after the commercial 
interests of their developed counterparts. Even so, the Working Group continued to produce 
reports on the subject during the following years, and in the Doha conference of 2001 it received 
further support. However, the lack of agreement within its members (including the skeptic 
approach of the US), and the difficulties addressing these issues evidenced in the Cancun 
conference,751 led to the abandonment of the initiative after the Cancun meeting of 2003.752  
 
II.B. Issues and Responses to the Absence of A Global Competition law Regime 
 
There are some practices regarding competition law that have a distinctive international 
dimension, and in the absences of a global CLR, they are addressed imperfectly by the regimes of 
each State. These issues include export cartels as well as the extraterritorial application of a CLR, 
international cartels and multi-jurisdiction mergers, just to name a few. Using the notion of 
externalities as a metaphor, the first two practices mentioned above can be characterized as 
negative and positive externalities. Export cartels internalize the economic benefits resulting 
from cartels and externalize the restrictions to competition they entail. In turn, the extraterritorial 
application of a CLR externalizes a prohibition beyond the borders of the jurisdiction where 
such prohibition was enacted, making the border itself irrelevant (as long as the effects are felt 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
748 See for example Sokol, D Daniel. "Monopolists Without Borders: The Institutional Challenge of 
International Antitrust in a Global Gilded Age." Berkeley Business Law Journal 4 (2007): 37-122. Pg. 104 
749 Regarding the Uruguay Round, see https://www.wto.org/English/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact5_e.htm 
750 Fox, Eleanor M. "Linked-in: Antitrust and the Virtues of a Virtual Network." The International Lawyer 
(2009): 151-174. Pg. 155. 
751 A summary view of the differences can be found in Hollman & Kovacic, Op.cit. Pgs. 300 - 301; Sokol, 
Op.cit. Pgs. 49 - 51. 
752 This part of the so-called “July Package” announced by the General Council of the WTO in August, 2004. 
See https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/draft_text_gc_dg_31july04_e.htm (accessed October 23, 
2015). 
  205 
within such jurisdiction in the first place). International cartels are also imperfectly dissuaded as 
long as the capacity to detect and punish them severely varies importantly across jurisdictions. 
This is very important regarding leniency applications; if a cartel member applies for leniency in 
several jurisdictions but some of these regimes are considerably less effective than others, this 
impacts the effectiveness of all the regimes. Finally, multi-jurisdiction mergers face similar issues; 
differing standards and the speed of the proceedings across jurisdictions may lead to different 
outcomes, such as allowing the merger in some jurisdictions while forbidding it in others. 
 
Given these issues, it becomes easier to understand why there have been efforts to create an 
international regime of competition law. Such regime could outlaw practices like export cartels 
independently of the particular laws of the States, address the conflicts resulting from 
extraterritorial enforcement, and establish common procedures for both international cartels and 
multi-jurisdictional mergers. In other words, it would provide the means for coordinating the 
otherwise interdependent, locally driven trajectory of CLRs all over the world. The absence of 
such formal regime makes evident the problems resulting from lack of coordination, and has 
generated a series of strategies by States and international organizations to address these issues. 
The one we are concerned here is the development of networks based on the convergence of 
different CLRs via programs of technical assistance, policy recommendations and policy 
diagnostics (including peer reviews), that coexist with other, long-standing efforts. Following 
Hollman and Kovacic, by convergence we mean “the broad acceptance of standards concerning 
the substantive doctrine and analytical methods of competition law, the procedures for applying 
substantive commands, and the methods for administering a competition agency.”753 
Importantly, the organizers of the networks have the privileged position to choose among 
different substantive elements those around which the convergence should take place. All the 
above elements suggest that each of these organizations can be understood as a “field” in itself. 
 
The evolution of organizations like UNCTAD and the OECD and the appearance of new 
ones dedicated exclusively to competition law issues, like the ICN, suggest some interesting 
dynamics. First, it shows that the transnational field organized around economic policies, where 
the OECD and UNCTAD are prominent actors,754 is changing by furthering a new, semi 
autonomous field dedicated exclusively to competition law issues. Second, it also hints to the 
                                                            
753 Hollman, Hugh, and William E Kovacic. "The International Competition Network: Its Past, Current, and 
Future Role." Minnesota Journal of International Law 20 (2011): 274. Pg. 278. 
754 See in general Gereffi, Gary. "The Global Economy: Organization, Governance, and Development." In The 
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possibility that there is growing competition between these different organizations for 
establishing their own views about what should the CLRs of their member States should be like. 
We will address this issue below as we discuss the interactions between these organizations in 
their attempts to shape the CLRs of Latin American States. 
 
We begin our analysis of the field of transnational competition law advice by focusing on the 
second oldest of the organizations that populate this field, the OECD. The forerunner of this 
organization, the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation, was established in 1948 as 
part of the administration of the Marshall Plan by the US and Canada. Encouraged by the 
success of the plan, the member States decided to join efforts on a more permanent basis, giving 
birth to the OECD in 1961. Since then, this organization has become one of the foremost 
advocates of free market reforms in the name of economic development. The process of 
accession to this rather selective organization involves that the aspiring States amend their 
policies in order to comply with the standards and guidelines promoted by this organization.755 
However, States that are not members of this organization, like Brazil, interact regularly with 
it.756 In the last decades, the scope of attention of this organization broadened and started to 
address the development issues of other non-European or North Atlantic States.757 Its main 
venue of action involves policy advice. Peer reviews sponsored by this institution play an 
important role in these interactions, as they identify the drawbacks of the policies under study 
and identifying particular venues for improvement.  
 
The OECD’s involvement with competition law dates back to the early 1960s, with the 
creation of the Competition Law and Policy Committee (CLPC), a body currently lodged in the 
Directorate for Financial and Enterprise affairs.758 The committee was conceived as a network in 
which the representatives from member States could discuss policy issues and propose solutions 
that eventually became non-binding recommendations.759 Since its establishment, this committee 
has issued recommendations on many competition law topics, including cartels, abuse of 
dominance, mergers and market studies. It has also commissioned the development of peer 
reviews of the CLRs of both member and non-member States. 
 
                                                            
755 http://www.oecd.org/about/membersandpartners/enlargement.htm (accessed October 2, 2015) 
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Global Gilded Age." Berkeley Business Law Journal 4 (2007): 37-122. Pg. 98. 
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It is important to note that the OECD played an important role in providing an institutional 
voice for the preferred approach by the US regarding competition law issues at the time that the 
WTO efforts were gaining traction. As mentioned before, the European Union played an 
important role in crafting what became the basis of the competition law initiative established in 
the 1996 Singapore Conference. As the Working Group deliberated, the skepticism of the US 
was made evident, for it feared that the approach would conflict with the ideas underlying its 
competition law regime. As the initiative advanced, the US decided to develop a new strategy. US 
officials proposed a recommendation against hard-core cartels to the OECD, which eventually 
enacted it.760 (As we will argue later, this recommendation has played a central role in the 
adoption of leniency regimes.) In doing so, the US shifted the emphasis of the nascent 
international competition law issues from its European perspective to their own, which 
prioritized cartel prosecution over the prosecution of other anticompetitive practices. This 
arrangement also assured that if the development of an international CLR continued, it would 
take place in a forum where no sanctioning powers were involved and along a community of 
alike-minded States.761 As the WTO efforts faltered after the Cancun Conference of 2003, the 
involvement of the OECD increased. 
 
However, the efforts of the US did not remain confined to the OECD. While US officials 
were unreceptive of the WTO initiative, the government invited in 1997 a group of experts to 
make part of the International Competition Policy Advisory Committee (hereinafter ICPAC), 
convened precisely to address the international dimension of the practices mentioned above.762 
The ICPAC Report, issued officially in 2000, recommended the “Global Competition initiative”, 
which was “(…) a new venue where government officials, as well as private firms, 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and others can exchange ideas and work toward 
common solutions of competition law and policy problems.”763 Noticeably this initiative found 
support in the US and in other important jurisdictions, especially in the EU. In a meeting 
organized by the International Bar Association (hereinafter IBA) in Brussels in September, 2000 
Joel Klein (who was Assistant Attorney General) addressed the importance of the ICPAC report. 
After Klein’s presentation the initiative received the public support of Mario Monti, who was 
then EU commissioner. In another IBA meeting held at New York in October of that same year, 
                                                            
760 OECD Council, Recommendation of the Council concerning Effective Action against Hard Core Cartels, 
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761 Fox, Op.cit. Pg. 156 - 157. 
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763 Final Report to the Attorney General and the Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust. Chapter 6, 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/chapter-6 (accessed October 17, 2015). Italics in the original text. 
  208 
this initiative was discussed and supported by various members of the US competition law 
community, including members of the George W. Bush government.764 Finally, US and EU 
competition law enforcers were well aware of the difficulties posed by the differential standards 
their CLRs had regarding particular fields like mergers and abuse of dominance. A series of high 
profile cases evidences these difficulties. The first of this was the McDonnell Douglass/Boeing 
merger in 1997, followed by the General Electric/Honeywell merger in 2001 and by the 
investigations against Microsoft in the years that followed.765 While these cases made evident the 
differences across the Atlantic, they also made evident the relevance of the Global Competition 
initiative.766 It is against this background that the ICN was born in 2001. 
 
The organization of the ICN has some particular features that contrast with those of the 
OECD and UNCTAD. Firstly, this organization is only concerned with competition law-related 
issues.767 Second, membership to this organization is extended to competition law enforcement 
authorities from all over the world (and not to their governments), independently of their 
development.768 This is meant to facilitate the interactions between these authorities rather than 
making them agents of their government’s interests.769 Also, non-governmental advisors are 
invited to participate and they do so actively (especially law firms from the US).770 Thirdly, this 
organization is run as a virtual network; it has no physical site from which its activities are 
directed. Management duties are rotated among its members every two years, and the agency 
chairing this organization pays for its costs while the rest of the members pay for their own.771 
Most of the ordinary activities related to running this organization take place via telephone calls 
and through the Internet.772 Fourthly, the agenda of the activities developed by the ICN is set by 
a “steering group” that identifies potentially relevant topics, and which then allocates them to 
working groups, which in turn develop particular products along the instructions given to them.  
 
For most part of the 20th century the OECD and UNCTAD stood out for different views 
about competition law and represented different interests; the former represented the views 
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from its member States, which are mostly industrialized and developed, while the latter 
represented the interests of all States member to the UN. To some extent this rivalry has 
withered as the OECD decided to extend its membership to developing States (such as Mexico 
and Chile), and the latter has adopted views more in line with prevailing views about competition 
law in the US.773 The stillbirth of the WTO’s efforts on these issues could only buttress the 
influence of these two organizations. However, the appearance (and apparently quick success) of 
the ICN was perceived as a threat by these institutions, and especially by the OECD. William 
Kovacic comments that shortly after the creation of the ICN, officials from the OECD’s 
competition secretariat were concerned that the new organization would deviate resources away 
from their organization and prevented members from joining ICN activities.774 In turn, 
UNCTAD has also much to loose, for the ICN caters to a similar group of members that may in 
turn devote their resources to this new organization rather than to its counterparts.775 The 
OECD’s decision to set regional competition centers and to organize the Global Forum on 
Competition and its Latin American counterpart are, arguably, part of a strategy that responds to 
the threat embodied by the ICN.776 The COMPAL projects developed by UNCTAD in Latin 
America can be viewed under a similar light.  
 
III. Strategies Towards the Organization of Competition law-Related Advice as a 
Field in Latin America  
 
The strategies resulting from the absence of an international CLR provide an important 
context for understanding the role of the OECD, UNCTAD and the ICN in the development of 
CLRs in Latin America. As we will show below, these organizations are developing programs in 
this region that evidence their growing influence in determining the trajectory of the 
development of CLRs. Their involvement, which increased since the mid 2000s, has been key in 
the consolidation of the neoliberal competition law project. Moreover, these interactions have 
led to rivalries and collaborations between these organizations. In this section we describe briefly 
the programs of these organizations, and then focus briefly in their interactions in Colombia, the 
only country of the ones we consider here that partakes in the programs developed by these 
three organizations. 
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III.A. Achieving Convergence in Latin America 
 
The adoption of new CLRs and the refashioning of previously existing ones in Latin 
America during the 1990s created an opportunity for organizations like the ones we have been 
addressing to reach out to Latin America. As in the previous section, we begin our analysis with 
the OECD. The activities of this organization in Latin America date from 1994, the year that 
Mexico joined this organization. Regarding competition law advice, the OECD’s first activities is 
from 1997, when this organization prepared a summary overview of Mexico’s CLR and the cases 
and activities the Comisión Federal de Competencia (CFC) was undertaking - including those 
regarding telecoms regulation.777 Since then, the OECD has published several documents on 
Mexico’s CLR. In turn, policy analyses pertaining to competition law in Chile, the other Member 
State in this region since 2010, are considerably more recent. The first official document 
regarding Chile’s CLR is the 2004 OECD Peer Review.778  
 
Besides conducting activities in individual States, the OECD has also developed regional 
activities. In alliance with the Inter-American Development Bank (hereinafter IDB), this 
organization organized a regional network for competition law enforcers where they could 
discuss the different issues involved in enforcement in the region. This network was officially 
established in 2003 as the Latin America Competition Forum (hereinafter LACF). We contend 
that this alliance has been very successful, prompting the OECD ahead of other international 
organizations currently involved in providing technical assistance for the development of 
competition law in this region. The LACF hosts annual meetings in which particular topics are 
addressed; for example, the 2014 meeting in Uruguay was focused on electricity markets and 
“mainstreaming” CLRs in this region.779 This network has provided a platform for local 
competition law experts and increased the frequency of the interactions between present and 
former officials from the OECD member States and their counterparts from local competition 
law enforcement bodies. 
 
The renewed interest of UNCTAD in CLRs in Latin America is largely a result of a 
redefinition of its strategy. Rather than aiming to generate a sort of convergence towards the Set, 
since the early 2000s UNCTAD focuses on providing technical assistance to developing 
countries in different parts of the world on issues pertaining to competition law and consumer 
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protection, including Latin America.780 Two examples of this new focus on technical assistance 
on a regional basis can be found in the "Competition and Consumer Protection for Latin 
America” (COMPAL) programs in Latin America.781 The COMPAL I program started in 2003 
and its focus was on providing policy recommendations and training to the beneficiary States, 
which included Colombia, Peru and other Andean States but not Brazil, Chile or Mexico.782 
COMPAL II, which started in 2009, has focused on the smaller, less developed States in Central 
America and the Andes.783 Certain subtleties evidence key elements of their strategy, such as the 
adoption of Spanish as the official language of the proceedings.784 
 
The ICN involves different Latin American States in its activities, and counts 10 of these 
States as its members, including Venezuela.785 It is also the only organization that deals explicitly 
with the Andean Community of Nations.786 Most of the activities involve the participation of 
one of these member States in the events organized by the ICN all over the world, including 
hosting the events themselves. Chile’s Fiscalía Nacional Económica (hereinafter FNE), for example, 
announces its participation in ICN events taking place in different places.787 Colombia’s 
Superintendencia de Industria y Comercio (hereinafter SIC) has hosted a few topical meetings and 
workshops, including one addressing cartels in 2015.788 Moreover, Latin American States have 
hosted ICN events of a much higher profile than the event hosted in Latin America by other 
organizations (perhaps with the exception of the LACF), and in doing so they have had the 
support of non-governmental advisors. An example of this was the ICN’s 2012 Annual Meeting, 
which was hosted by Brazil.789 The IBA, in order to take advantage of the meeting, organized a 
joint event on the first day of the conference addressing precisely issues about the ICN’s role vis 
a vis local CLRs and other relevant issues.790 Overall, the ICN has made considerable inroads in 
Latin America because it gives importance to States in this region in ways that the OECD does 
                                                            
780 Ibid. Pgs. 42 - 45. 
781 What is COMPAL?." UNCTAD. http://www.unctadxi.org/templates/Page____1487.aspx (accessed October 
2, 2015). 
782 "Impact of Compal I in Latin America." UNCTAD. http://www.unctadxi.org/templates/Page____9169.aspx 
(accessed October 2, 2015). 
783 "New Beneficiary Countries." UNCTAD. http://www.unctadxi.org/templates/Page____9165.aspx (accessed 
October 2, 2015) 
784 Op.cit, UNCTAD, What is COMPAL? 
785 Regarding the members of the ICN, see http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/members/member-
directory.aspx (accessed October 18, 2015). 
786 Ibid. 
787 http://www.fne.gob.cl/english/internacional/activities/ (accessed October 18, 2015) 
788 http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/news-and-events/all-events.aspx (accessed October 18, 
2015) 
789 Ibid. 
790 http://www.ibanet.org/Article/Detail.aspx?ArticleUid=3F311256-D890-4F3A-BD08-CEB9C4629A19 
(accessed October 18, 2015) 
  212 
not because of the latter’s selective membership policy. Hence, a country like Brazil continues to 
be a non-membership partner for the OECD, while at the same time it is one of the most active 
members of the ICN. 
 
We contend that while there is a rivalry between the OECD and the ICN regarding which of 
these two organizations influences more the CLRs of Latin American States, while UNCTAD’s 
focus on technical assistance suggests a strategy of complementarity. The OECD exerts 
considerable influence across this region and has focused on States (like Mexico or Chile) where 
the development of CLRs requires relatively less effort than in others. Having close ties with the 
IDB facilitates the inclusion of competition law-related policies as part of the structural reforms 
suggested by this institution. This strategic relation is highly convenient from the policy 
perspective of adopting CLRs as a complement to liberalization policies; it mirrors the 
neoliberal/neoinstitutional argument that CLRs are necessary for preventing that private firms 
raise barriers to trade replacing public barriers recently abolished. This idea, which we identified 
previously in a 2004 OECD Peer Review of Mexico’s CLR,791 can also be found in documents 
about the existence of the LACF.792 The UNCTAD, on the other hand, has focused on technical 
assistance programs in countries where the neoliberal views of competition law developed in the 
1990s are (arguably) harder to sell - countries like Bolivia, Ecuador or Dominican Republic. Its 
ties with the UN would have facilitated the reception of its recommendations but for the relative 
advantage acquired by the WTO on trade-related issues. Finally, it is important to note that this 
complementarity also brings about grey areas; there are countries where both the OECD and 
UNCTAD invest in policy assistance, like Colombia, as well as countries with a strong OECD 
and ICN affiliation that recently began to collaborate with UNCTAD, like Mexico. 
 
III.B. Head to Head: Converging Over Colombia 
 
The development of Colombia’s CLR is an interesting field for briefly noting how the 
competition between these organizations takes place. This is so because Colombia is the only of 
the States studied here that participates in the activities organized by the OECD, the UNCTAD 
and the ICN. Chile and Mexico are active participant in activities organized by the OECD and 
the ICN, and the latter has also joined certain activities advances by UNCTAD on a non-
permanent basis. The fact that Colombia belongs to these three networks makes the trajectory of 
                                                            
791 Schaffer, Jay C. Competition Law and Policy in Mexico. OECD, 2004. Pg. 11. 
792 Competition in Latin America and the Caribbean 10 Years of the OECD-IDB Latin American Competition 
Forum. OECD - IDB, 2013. Pg. 1. (Statement of Luis Alberto Moreno) 
  213 
its CLR particularly appealing for understanding the links between the field related to the 
development of its CLR and the transnational field related with competition law-related advice.  
 
We contend that while Colombia’s government (including SIC) participates in activities 
organized by both UNCTAD and the ICN, its interests of late have tended towards the OECD. 
Initially Colombia was one of the core beneficiaries of the COMPAL I program, which started in 
2003.793 Arguably, this early involvement gave this organization a head start with regard to the 
other organizations. However, there is little evidence about the effects of this interaction, and the 
developmental approach to competition law that characterized this organization cannot be found 
in SIC’s decisions. During the mid 2000s Colombia started to participate in the ICN’s activities. 
The earliest document we have found in the ICN’s database dates from 2006 and is about the 
Colombian merger review notification procedure;794 later documents address other topics, such 
as market investigations involved in particular proceedings.795 Even so, just as with UNCTAD 
there is little evidence about the effects of this interaction. In turn, the decision to begin a formal 
accession process to the OECD has made this organization much more visible in Colombian 
politics. The first steps in this direction date back to a short documents prepared for the second 
meeting of the Latin American Competition Forum in 2004. The “tipping point” that would give 
this organization an advantage over the others was the beginning of the formal accession process 
by Colombia in 2013. This accession process could be motivated by the advantages of belonging 
to the OECD, as well as by the agenda of the current Colombian President, Juan Manuel Santos, 
who is close to Angel Gurria, the Secretary General of the OECD, since their days at the 
International Coffee Association.796 As a consequence of the accession process, meeting the 
expectations of the OECD has figured highly among the priorities of the government and SIC. 
For example, public discussions about the direction of the future changes of SIC are framed in 
terms of whether they comply with the OECD, leaving aside what other organizations have 
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recommended on the subject.797 Correlatively, it would also explain why recent events organized 
in Colombia by the ICN have little publicity in SIC’s web page.798 
 
IV. The Local Dimensions of Global Strategies: The Trajectory of Leniency 
Regimes in Chile, Colombia and Mexico 
 
In the previous section we argued that organizations like the OECD, UNCTAD and the 
ICN compete and collaborate for furthering their influence across CLRs in Latin America. We 
mentioned that their goal was to achieve certain level of convergence across these CLRs so that 
belonging to these organizations benefits its members and attracts new ones. In this section we 
look at the trajectory of one of the most important policy recommendations given by the 
OECD, arguably the most influential of these organizations, in Chile, Colombia and Mexico. We 
begin by commenting briefly on the origins of this figure and then we describe how it has 
evolved in each of the countries above mentioned. We do so to identify the extent to which 
convergence has actually happened and its usefulness from the perspective of being (or 
becoming) part of a network like the OECD. 
 
IV.A. A (Brief) Genealogy of Leniency Regimes and the Global Fight Against 
Cartels 
 
For the last two decades or so, the OECD has been promoting the idea that cartels are the 
most egregious form of competition law violations because of their effect on both competition 
and consumers. This idea is often coupled with the statement that in order to fight cartels, CLRs 
need to implement the institutions necessary for fighting cartels effectively.799 Such institutions 
involve raising the level of fines charged to cartels and leniency regimes. The interaction between 
these two is complex, but boils down to the idea that high fines become an incentive for cartel 
members to “blow the whistle” on their counterparts in exchange of total or partial amnesty, 
regarding both civil and criminal liability.800 
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The premise that cartels are the most egregious form of anticompetitive conducts is a policy 
choice that follows from a particular set of political priorities, and as such it is hard to defend as 
a universal prescription for all and any CLR. Therefore, we suggest assessing the OECD’s views 
regarding cartels as part of its strategy to promote leniency regimes and increases in fines in 
order to promote this organizations views as to what competition law should be about. Leniency 
regimes are a relatively recent set of institutions that involve inter-agency collaboration and their 
success depends critically upon the actions taken by other competition law enforcement 
agencies. Their implementation is competition law bureaucracy at its best, and entails the 
coordination efforts that technical assistance and other programs developed by international 
organizations aim to achieve. Among these organizations, the experience of the OECD core 
members places it strategically well to contribute to the transfer of such regimes.   
 
Why did the fight against cartels become part of a global campaign while other enforcement 
areas did not? We contend that this is so because of the dominance of the neoliberal project over 
the definition of what competition law should be about in a jurisdiction key for all the 
organizations here considered, which is the US. In particular, the focus on fighting cartels makes 
sense not just because their global presence or the harm they cause, but also because since the 
1970s there has been a deep skepticism about prosecuting other forms of anticompetitive 
conducts. This is in part a consequence of the growing influence that the “Chicago School” was 
acquiring in the US federal agencies in charge of competition law enforcement. As we will argue 
below, the global expansion of leniency regimes can be understood as an example of the 
expansion of a neoliberal policy whose transfer across jurisdictions has taken place thanks to the 
OECD. It is important to note, moreover, the making of a community of interests underlying 
the expansion of these regimes - the development of a project, of doxa in the making. On one 
hand, the US benefits that other important jurisdictions like the EU adopt a strong leniency 
policy because it increases the effectiveness of its own; on the other it also benefits from 
transferring both an institutional template as well as the theory that animates it. 
 
Since the late 1930s the prosecution of cartels has been one of the priorities of competition 
law enforcers in the US. This continued well after WW II, reaching both national and 
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international cartels.801 The interest in cartels had also been in the radar of academics, although 
by the 1960s the appreciation of how they worked began to change, in part because of the 
growing influence of the so-called “Chicago School”. Contrary to their views on resale price 
maintenance and other practices banned by courts and statutes, “Chicagoans” did not argue that 
cartels had any redeeming feature, but were much more unstable than what was considered until 
then.802 A key author in bringing forth this view was George Stigler. In his 1964 article “A 
Theory of Oligopoly”, Stigler argued that cartels tend to break down because members are 
tempted to cheat each other by secretly increasing their volume of sales to increasing their 
revenue. Hence cartels often set up enforcing mechanisms to ensure their success.803   
 
Leniency regimes are a way of translating these insights into competition law policy. Cartels 
are secretive and their members often take measures to avoid detection. However, if they are 
inclined to cheat to increase their revenue, they can also be inclined to cheat to cut short the 
potential losses resulting from being discovered and punished by competition law enforcers. 
From the perspective of enforcers, doing so could come across as being more sensible than 
focusing on other enforcement policies targeting practices whose harms were unclear; cartels, in 
turn, continue to have no redeeming features.  
 
The first leniency policy was adopted by the US Department of Justice (hereinafter DOJ) in 
1978, just when the impact of the “Chicago School” was beginning to be felt in both the federal 
courts and competition law enforcement agencies.804 However, it was not initially successful. 
During the 1980s there were about one leniency application per year and these did not 
contribute to the discovery of national or international cartels.805 Apparently the policy was not 
transparent enough; even if applicants met the established requirements, the DOJ could still 
withhold the leniency from the applicants. According to Scott Hammond, former Deputy 
Assistant at the DOJ, the changes introduced in 1993 improved the effectiveness of this policy. 
These consisted of granting leniency automatically to applicants that fulfill all the established 
requirements, making leniency available to members of cartels that the DOJ was already aware 
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of, and protecting individuals working for the applicant company from criminal liability.806 As a 
result of these changes, Hammond argues, leniency application rates have increased twenty-fold 
and the leniency program itself became the most effective investigative tool for this department. 
Between the fiscal years 1996 and 2010, companies have been fined about USD 5 billion; of 
these convictions, about ninety per cent of them are related to leniency investigations. The reach 
of this policy is also international, for the DOJ has about 50 international cartel investigations, 
half of which are related with leniency applications.807 The success of the DOJ’s leniency policy 
after 1993, coupled with the increasing number of international cartels prosecuted, made 
leniency regimes a suitable candidate for transfer across the Atlantic.  
 
The adoption of a leniency regime in the EU was part of a wider process involving the 
redefinition of the goals and purposes of EU competition law.808 Looking in retrospective it 
seems that this process relied on two fronts that are closely related. First, making cartel 
prosecution a priority required that the EU Commission could devote the resources necessary 
for doing so. The 1999 White Paper on Modernisation of The Rules Implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the 
EC Treaty809 argues that freeing the Commission of the burden of the notification system enables 
it to focus on competition enforcement. Regulation 1 of 2003 contributed to this by eliminating 
the notification system and granting more investigatory powers to the Commission. Since then, 
about half of the investigations done by the Commission are about cartels, which led to a 
considerably higher number of decisions in this area than before.810 Second, making cartel 
prosecution a priority seems to be closely related with the adoption of leniency regimes. The 
1996 Commission Notice on the non-imposition or reduction of fines in cartel cases states explicitly that 
"secret cartels (…) are among the most serious restrictions of competition encountered by the 
Commission" in its first paragraph.811 The Notices issued on 2002 and 2006 have almost identical 
statements.812 Moreover, just like its US counterpart, the EU leniency regime required 
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considerable adjustments to increase its effectiveness.813 The connection between the 
“modernization” of EU competition law and leniency regimes is that a thorough implementation 
of a leniency policy demanded from the EU Commission resources that it was devoting to other 
activities. Therefore, the fight against cartels, and with it the implementation of the leniency 
regime, could be seen as a justification for changing the allocation of resources within the 
Commission.  
 
It is important to note then that the OECD’s recommendation from 1998 takes place against 
this background, where US leniency policy was obtaining considerable victories and EU leniency 
policy went hand-in-hand with the “modernization” process of this area of law. We contend that 
the OECD’s recommendation contributed to shape the idea that EU anti-cartel enforcement 
required a shift in the activities and resources managed by the Commission. By the time leniency 
regimes were firmly established in the US and the EU - the early 2000s - it made sense to 
consider the importance of having other jurisdictions to adopt their own leniency regimes as 
well, especially if not doing so affected the effectiveness of the leniency regimes already in place. 
Precisely because strengthening the leniency regime of a few members of the network also 
benefits those members that have high stakes in their own regimes, such as the US and the EU, 
it makes sense to seek the improvement of such regimes in Latin America. 
 
IV.B. Chile: From Opportunity to Skepticism 
 
The adoption of a leniency regime in Chile involved considerably higher stakes than the ones 
entailed by the implementation of this regime in the US or the EU. This was so because while in 
these jurisdictions the leniency regime complemented the other mechanisms available for 
fighting cartels, in Chile it became very important for obtaining evidence to prosecute cartels in 
the first place. Hence, the adoption of leniency solved an immediate problem regarding 
prosecution, and only after it did so it became a complement to other enforcement mechanisms. 
 
In chapter 5 we showed how shortly after its creation in 2003 the Tribunal de Defensa de la 
Libre Competencia (hereinafter TDLC) and the Chilean Supreme Court adopted a more demanding 
evidentiary standard for condemning collusive behaviors. First the Supreme Court and then the 
TDLC began requiring from the competition law enforcer, the Fiscalía Nacional Económica 
(hereinafter FNE), that it provides direct evidence of the occurrence of the above mentioned 
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conducts. As a consequence of this new requirement, the FNE lost most of its collusion cases 
between 2003 and 2009. As mentioned in chapter 5, officials from this agency considered that 
their situation at the time was particularly problematic.  
 
The solution to this complex situation came from several fronts. Firstly, the FNE decided to 
engage in cases where it could obtain direct and indirect evidence of collusive agreements easily; 
this paid-off with a case involving large retail stores. The second front involved an amendment 
to Chile’s core competition law statute, DL 211 of 1973, by adopting the basics of a leniency 
regime developed after suggestions by the OECD.814 The particular parts referring to the 
leniency regime were highly criticized, among other reasons, because the mechanism of leniency 
was reserved for criminal activities considered particularly damning.815 Finally, the third front 
came from a litigation strategy developed by the FNE itself in another case involving drugstores. 
Regarding this particular front, the enforcer settled with one of the investigative parties early on, 
and in exchange it obtained first-hand evidence that was used successfully before the TDLC 
against the other cartel members. While this result did not stem from a leniency application itself, 
it did contribute to the enactment of law 20.361 of 2009 by the Congress and to meet the 
evidentiary standard set by the courts. 
 
As we mentioned in chapter 5, the leniency regime was used by the FNE shortly after the 
enactment of law 20.361 of 2009 but since then it has been used only in a few cases (as of 
February 2015). The first instance in which this regime was used involved several manufactures 
of compressors for refrigerators and freezing cabinets; the information resulting from the 
leniency application produced useful evidence for a positive verdict by the TDLC.816 However, 
since then the leniency regime has been used successfully only in two other cases involving 
transport companies and asphalt vendors.817 Perhaps the lack of enthusiasm that this regime has 
produced is a consequence of the fact that it has been highly criticized by different actors, 
including the President of the TDLC, because it does not clear applicants from criminal liability. 
Such criticism stems from an unintended development. In spite of the fact that explicit criminal 
liability for anticompetitive conducts had been eliminated in 2003, Chile’s public prosecutor used 
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an arcane article from the criminal law code to prosecute the drugstores involved in the case 
above-mentioned.818 Furthermore, the bill currently discussed in this country’s congress is quite 
likely to reintroduce once more explicit criminal liability for conducts like cartels,819 in part 
because the recent cartel cases caused considerable uproar. 
 
Chile’s leniency regime, as it stands today, plays a role in the acquisition of evidence 
necessary for a conviction regarding collusive agreements and cartels. It appeared in a particular 
context and quickly became a mechanism for addressing a particular situation that, from the 
perspective of the enforcement agency, threatened to affect severely the entire enforcement 
system. Hence, it is more than a useful tool, which is the way that leniency regimes are 
characterized in the US and the EU. However, its sparse use (and the low numbers of collusion 
cases), as well as the criticisms levied against it by important actors, suggests that it may have to 
change in different aspects before it is used as it is in other jurisdictions. 
 
IV.C. Colombia: Performance Anxiety 
 
The adoption of Colombia’s leniency regime occurred at about the same time it happened in 
Chile, but the reasons for this were quite different. As we mentioned in chapter 6, the directors 
of SIC had tried to reform Colombia’s CLR in order to make this agency more politically 
independent, sometimes against the will of the government and business associations. In one of 
these instances, the director of SIC at the time, Jairo Rubio Escobar, submitted to Congress a bill 
amending the CLR and which included a short paragraph facilitating the development of a 
leniency regime.820 The proposal for leniency was modified as the bill underwent the legislative 
procedure, and was finally enacted as article 14 of law 1340 of 2009. It is important to note that 
there is no formal reference to the OECD or the leniency practice of other jurisdictions in the 
original submission of the bill, or in the presentation made by the congressman in charge of its 
discussion before Congress.821A general reference to the practices of enforcer to member States 
to the EU appears much later on in the text presented for the fourth and last debate before 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
817 FNE, Requerimiento contra Pullman Bus Costa Central y otros de Julio 2 de 2001 and La Tercera FNE 
requiere por colusión a cuatro grandes proveedoras de asfalto July 2011. 
818 Menchaca, Tomás. "Novena Cuenta Pública Del Presidente Del Tribunal De Defensa De La Libre 
Competencia." 2013. Pgs. 10 & 11. 
819 Diario UChile, Ministro de Economía: “La colusión de pollos es el delito más grande de la competencia en 
Chile”. Septiembre 25 de 2014. 
820 Colombia, Congreso de la República de Colombia, Exposición de Motivos. Proyecto de ley 195 de 2007 
Senado. Gaceta 583 de 2007 (published Nov. 16, 2007). 
821 Colombia, Congreso de la Republica de Colombia, Proyecto de Ley 195 de 2007 Senado (texto para primer 
debate). Gaceta 169 de 2008 (published April 23, 2008). 
  221 
Congress.822 Even so, by the time the bill was presented to Congress (2007) the Colombian 
authorities and the OECD were already building a relation, especially as a result of the analysis of 
the Colombian regime presented in the second LACF forum in 2004. Hence we believe the 
inclusion of the leniency provisions in the bill evidences the increasing proximity between 
competition law enforcers and this organization. This proximity crystalized with the publication 
of the Peer Review report in 2009, which emphasizes the importance of the swift 
implementation of this provision.823  
 
The first leniency application was informed shortly after the Colombian government 
announced its formal intention of beginning the review process to become a formal member of 
the OECD. We contend that the application became an opportunity to show that the CLR met 
the demanding standards of this organization. (I personally recall a director of SIC being 
particular eager to apply this regime shortly after law 1340 of 2009 was enacted.) The first 
application resulted from a visit that SIC did to a firm that participated in a cartel involving baby 
diapers in 2013 - four years after the regime was officially established. However, only until 
August 2014 SIC made the public announcement that it had formally begun the first leniency 
application in this case.824 Even so, over a year later, there is still no final decision either 
sanctioning or absolving the investigated parties. Instead, thanks to the media hype created by 
SIC, it was possible to guess the identity of all the firms involved, including the likely identity of 
the “whistle-blowers”, and the benefits to be gained through these actions.825 This has also 
exposed this regime’s weakness from the perspective of the due process rights of the 
investigated parties, who until then did not have the opportunity to challenge the evidence 
collected against them.826 The other two cartels where leniency has been involved are connected 
with the first one, and this was disclosed (perhaps by accident) early on;827 even so SIC’s director 
proceeded to announce each one of them within a few months of difference and as if each one 
of them were a major achievement. 
 
There is no solution in sight to the situation created by SIC regarding the application of the 
leniency regime. After the first three announcements of leniency applications there have been no 
new announcements on this issue. The rumors of a new amendment to Colombia’s CLR suggest 
                                                            
822 Colombia, Congreso de la Republica de Colombia, Proyecto de Ley 195 de 2007 Senado (texto para tercer 
debate). Gaceta 335 de 2009. (published May 19, 2009). 
823 Petracola, Diego. Competition Law and Policy in Colombia A Peer Review. 2009. Pg. 59. 
824 Revista Semana “El cartel de los pañales caros” Agosto 4 de 2014. 
825 La Silla Vacía. “La empresa que está en todos los carteles”. March 4, 2015. 
826 Revista Dinero. “La Superindustria quiere más autonomía y herramientas”. May 14, 2015. 
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that SIC wants to establish clearer rules regarding when certain information about a leniency 
application can be disclosed to the media and the access to reserved information by third parties. 
However, the recent decisions against the sugar mills (which we commented briefly in chapter 6) 
have not created a hospitable political environment for reforming the CLR. Even so, SIC 
continues to enforce the substantive prohibitions of the CLR against different cartels and the 
business associations participating in them. 
 
The current state of Colombia’s leniency regime comes across as a non sequitur. It is unclear 
that SIC can muster the trust from potential “whistle-blowers” to participate in its leniency 
regime. Instead of considering this case as one of lack of transparency, it comes across more as 
an example of rushing in to show results where there are very few. This may be, ultimately, a 
consequence of SIC depending politically from the government as the latter aims to ensure 
Colombia’s membership in the OECD. In other words, the strategy of following the events 
taking place in other jurisdictions misfired, and maybe the outcomes would have been different if 
SIC (and the government) were not so busy trying to show that they produce results. 
 
IV.D. Mexico: Early Success 
  
Mexico’s leniency regime is the oldest of the ones we consider here, and it is also one of the 
most successful. As we mentioned in chapter 7, this regime dates back from the 2006 
amendments made to the 1992 Ley Federal de Competencia Económica and which the OECD in its 
Peer Review of 2004 also advised for.828 An amendment, dating from 2011, apparently 
contributed to improve this regime as suggested by the number of leniency applications per year 
- which reached 19 up to October 2012.829 This placed Mexico’s leniency regime ahead of their 
Chilean and Colombian counterparts. The amendments to Mexico’s constitution that took place 
in 2013, and the enactment of a new law the year after did not affect significantly the application 
of the leniency regime. According to an OECD Workshop about markers in leniency programs, 
Mexico’s leniency regime (at the time) included clear definitions about the benefits held by the 
parties, their place in particular investigations (the “marker”) and other elements.830 In June 25 of 
2015 the new competition law enforcer, the Comisión Federal de Competencia Económica (COFECE) 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
827 El Tiempo, 'Cartel de los pañales' salpica a 4 países y a otros productos. August 9, 2014. 
828 Schaffer, Jay C. Competition Law and Policy in Mexico. OECD, 2004. Pg. 65. 
829 Guerrero Rodríguez, Omar, and Alan Ramirez Casazza. "Mexican Competition Law Aligned Incentives for 
Effective Cartel Enforcement." Competition Policy International (2012). Pgs. 3 - 4. 
830 OECD Working Party No. 3 on Co-operation and Enforcement. Use of markers in leniency programs - 
Mexico. (2014). 
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adopted new leniency guidelines (based on previous experiences) that grants criminal immunity 
and reduced fines to investigated parties.831 In a report issued on October 7, 2015, COFECE 
states that in the last two years it received 24 leniency applications.832  
 
There is much to be said about the efforts undergone by different Latin American States to 
adopt leniency regimes that contribute to fighting more effectively against cartels. However, the 
analysis of the trajectories of the leniency regimes of these three countries casts a shadow over 
the success that an organization like the OECD may have in achieving convergence across 
CLRs. In this sense, it is interesting to note the different roles that leniency regimes have in these 
States. This is a consequence precisely of the capacity of local interactions to shape the trajectory 
of the transfer and development of new institutions. From the perspective of the OECD, 
Mexico’s regime is a hallmark of adequate competition law enforcement. Assessing the role of 
these regimes is more complex in Chile and in Colombia. In the former, we saw that it 
contributed to overcome a particularly difficult situation involving evidentiary requirements. 
However, its fate is uncertain. In the latter, we contend that it was an opportunity to show 
compliance with the demanding requirements of the OECD - and a missed one. The outcomes 
of this continue to be unclear, but the trust that different actors place in SIC has been affected 
by its mismanagement of the leniency applications. Hence, while all three regimes purport to do 
the same thing, in each of their contexts they produced different outcomes and have different 
connotations that are ignored by considering only whether they converge or not. 
 
V. Conclusions 
 
Throughout this chapter we have addressed the roles that international organizations like the 
OECD, UNCTAD and the ICN had in the development of a transnational field of competition 
law-related advice. We argued that each of these organizations compete and collaborate to 
extend their influence to the different member States, as well as partnering States, that make part 
of each organization. We then described briefly their history and their approaches. All of this in 
order to consider the extent to which these organizations have contributed to a convergence of 
the different CLR’s in Latin America. Furthermore, in order to consider the extent to which 
convergence may be taking place, we compared the development of leniency regimes in the US 
and in the EU with the development of the same regimes in Chile, Colombia and Mexico. We 
                                                            
831 COFECE. "Guía Del Programa De Inmunidad Y Reducción De Sanciones. 
832 https://www.cofece.mx/cofece/index.php/prensa/historico-de-noticias/inaugura-presidente-pena-nieto-
jornada-por-la-competencia (accessed October 20, 2015) 
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assert that while these three States now have such regimes, this does not amount to convergence 
in any significant sense because the regimes themselves bring about quite different outcomes. 
For convergence to be truly useful to a network-like organization like the ones mentioned above, 
it has to bring about a series of similar outcomes, which is quite different from the outcomes 
observed in these three examples. 
 
An aspect that we have not drawn upon but that is very important is how these changes have 
affected the trajectories of the different individuals that have contributed to the development of 
Latin American CLRs. In chapter 3, where we mentioned briefly the relationships between the 
literature about these regimes and the trajectory of their authors, we noted that most of the 
authors were elite lawyers and economists involved directly with the changes taking place. In 
doing so, they were taking advantage of their expertise over foreign languages and legal materials, 
and their social connections, to bring about changes that were beneficial to them professionally. 
We contend that the activities organized by the organizations we have been referring to so far 
have opened new opportunities for these individuals. Thanks to these activities, these individuals 
are able to meet with other like-minded individuals in institutional settings dedicated to the 
promotion of competition law. In doing so, they create an “epistemic community” based on very 
similar perspectives and which enables them to offer their expertise across jurisdictions with 
considerable ease.833 Organizations like the OECD and the ICN facilitate the development of 
these communities. Firstly, they provide the material basis for their meetings when they organize 
meetings like the LACF or workshops associated with particular competition law topics. 
Moreover, they also become directly involved with these organizations when they are hired to do 
peer reviews or formulate policy recommendations. However, this otherwise brief 
characterization would fall short if it only considered that these individuals are independent from 
enforcement agencies. In some cases, it is belonging to these enforcement authorities that brings 
them close to these organizations. Doing so enables them to build their network of contacts that 
they can rely upon once they develop their own personal projects as academics, litigants and 
consultants (sometimes simultaneously). Hence, these individuals are positioned in-between their 
jurisdictions and international organizations, and are becoming increasingly influential in bridging 
the relations between enforcement authorities (and their States) and these organizations. The 
                                                            
833 Regarding epistemic communities, see Haas, Peter ‘Do Regimes Matter? Epistemic Communities and 
Mediterranean Pollution Control’, International Organization 43.3 (1989): 377–403. Regarding epistemic 
communities and competition law see Djelic, Marie-Laure. "From Local Legislation to Global Structuring 
Frame The Story of Antitrust." Global Social Policy 5, no. 1 (2005): 55-76. 
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“competition law generation” of the 1990s became a generation of competition law compradors,834 
as the internationalization of CLRs continues to take place. Whether these developments have 
also intensified competition or collaboration between them remains unclear. 
 
The professional trajectory of Ignacio de León illustrates this tendency. Between 1991 and 
1994 he was a member of the Venezuelan competition law authority of the time, Pro Competencia. 
In 1994 he enrolled at University College London, where he obtained his PhD from UCL in 
1999 based on his dissertation about the institutional foundation of CLRs in Latin America. This 
dissertation became the main input for his two books, which are the most extensive work about 
competition law in this region. Between 2000 and 2012 he chaired EconLex, a firm dedicated to 
provide assistance to developing States (and to other international organizations dealing with 
them) for the development of projects that ranged from building regulatory capacity to 
facilitating access to credit. Between 2006 and 2009 he also chaired a non-governmental 
organization dedicated to the promotion of free markets, the Centro de Divulgación del Conocimiento 
Económico para la Libertad. More recently, in 2012, he joined the IDB as a specialist in innovation 
and competition policy.835 From this position he continues to write about the development of 
competition law in Latin America, and through which he has a privileged position to influence 
the discussions of the OECD - IDB events.836   
 
The internationalization of CLRs, and the corresponding internationalization of the elites 
that contributed to its development evidence a “double movement” away from the governance 
structures of these regimes. Since their inception, the legitimacy of CLRs in Latin America has 
been related to the legitimacy of presidentialist bureaucratic structures, and in the case of Chile 
and Mexico, to the legitimacy of semi-autonomous administrative bodies and specialized courts. 
In the same vein, the actors involved in the development of these CLRs were elites by local 
accounts; the internationalization of CLRs enables them to participate in places of global 
                                                            
834 See Dezalay, Yves, and Bryant G Garth. The Internationalization of Palace Wars: Lawyers, Economists, and 
the Contest to Transform Latin American States. University of Chicago Press, 2002. Chapter 12. 
835 We learn this much from his Linked-in profile. See 
https://www.linkedin.com/profile/view?id=ADEAAALJebQBa9UoCz9gdrPSkAP4wIaet2V1-
y0&authType=NAME_SEARCH&authToken=xYFV&locale=es_ES&srchid=1230370081445735709504&srch
index=1&srchtotal=8&trk=vsrp_people_res_name&trkInfo=VSRPsearchId%3A1230370081445735709504%2
CVSRPtargetId%3A46758324%2CVSRPcmpt%3Aprimary%2CVSRPnm%3Atrue%2CauthType%3ANAME_
SEARCH. (accessed October 23, 2015). 
836 See for example Umaña, Mario A. Advocacy: Mainstreaming Competition Policy into the Overall Economic 
Policy and Government Actions in Latin America and the Caribbean. Background paper by the IDB Secretariat, 
Latin American Competition Forum, Washington: OECD - IDB, 2014 
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economic advice, such as the OECD or the ICN. Neither of these schemes has been particularly 
open and participatory from the perspective of the “demands of democracy”. 
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9. Conclusions: Assessing The Trajectories of Competition Law 
Regimes in Chile, Colombia and Mexico 
 
I. Introduction 
 
 A background paper for the Latin American Competition Forum asks why competition 
law policies do not figure prominently in the economic policies of Latin American and 
Caribbean States.837 These policies are, according to this paper, like "a second division player waiting 
to be promoted to the premier league".838 A tentative answer it offers is that this is so because of a series 
of factors, including the low priority that governments give to competition law policies. In light 
of the preceding chapters, such a statement should bring about questions. If competition law 
policies are so unimportant, then how can we explain the recent inclusion of competition law 
issues in political programs in Mexico and Chile noted in chapters 5 and 7? What about the use 
of competition law to challenge anticompetitive practices in the agricultural sector in Colombia 
noted in chapter 6? To be sure, this background paper states that within Latin America and the 
Caribbean there are some regimes that stand out, like Chile's, and there are other that have been 
recently reformed in order to strengthen them, like Mexico's.839 Even so, the state of affairs that 
this paper describes is quite dismal and, as expected, is used to advocate for further reforms to 
the different CLRs in this region. 
 
In this final chapter we offer an alternative account of the trajectory of the development of 
competition law regimes (hereinafter CLRs) in Latin America by resorting to the experiences in 
Chile, Colombia and Mexico. We do so as a conclusion because it is an opportunity to build 
upon the framework and the findings presented in the preceding chapters to offer a different, 
more nuanced answer to questions like the ones that the background paper mentioned above 
asks. It is also an opportunity to reinstate the argument that we have advanced in this 
dissertation. Therefore, in this chapter we argue that the interplay between the neoliberal 
competition law project and its State-centered counterpart have shaped competition law regimes 
                                                            
837 Umaña, Mario. Background paper by the IDB Secretariat, Washington: Inter-American Development Bank, 
August 28, 2014. This forum is organized jointly by the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and 
Development (hereinafter OECD) and the Inter-American Development Bank (hereinafter IDB) 
838 Ibid. Pg. 2 (Italics in the original). 
839 Ibid. Pg. 4. 
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in Latin America along particular trajectories of their own. If anything, there is considerable 
diversity among CLRs at this moment in time. 
 
This chapter is divided in several sections. In section II we refer to the analysis presented in 
chapters 3 and 4 about what we know about the development of CLRs in Latin America and 
how this process is portrayed. We will argue there that for the most part the different regimes in 
this period were very similar, organized towards State-centered ideas and institutions. In section 
III we address how the advance of neoliberalism in the different countries we consider here set 
their competition law regimes in different trajectories. The trajectories of these three regimes, 
based on the analyses presented in chapters 5 through 8, shows that there is considerable 
diversity amidst the limited number of ideas and institutions promoted by the projects that shape 
these regimes. Finally, in section IV we conclude by assessing the contributions and relevance of 
this dissertation, its limitations, and future venues of enquiry. 
 
II. The Origins of Competition law in Latin America 
 
In this section we discuss the findings and the conclusions that we presented in chapters 3 
and 4 regarding what we know about the emergence of competition law in Latin America. While 
there is very little information about the enforcement of these CLRs (and not withstanding 
Eduardo White’s efforts to the contrary), the few data we collected shows that there was a 
relative proximity between these regimes. This proximity involved the different elements that 
made the regimes as well as the particular understandings about their purpose and how they "fit" 
with regard to other economic policies at the time. However, this particular aspect was all but 
forgotten by the literature that emerged in the 1990s. This particular body of literature argues, 
like the background paper commented above, that during the time period that the first CLRs 
were adopted - in 1917 in Mexico and in the 1950s in Chile and Colombia - the protection of 
competition was not a priority to the governments in place at the time. This is so because the 
economic ideas that prevailed then favored protectionism, and so there was little interest in 
enforcing the CLRs when doing so would run counter to more important policies.840  
 
                                                            
840 See for example Peña, Julian. "The Consolidation of Competition Law in Latin America." Antitrust 
Chronicle 11 (2011). Also De León, Ignacio. An Institutional Assessment of Antitrust Policy: The Latin 
American Experience. Kluwer Law International, 2009. Also Coate, Malcolm B, Rene Bustamante, and A E 
Rodríguez. "Antitrust in Latin America: Regulating Government and Business." The University of Miami Inter-
American Law Review (1992): 37-85. 
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We argued in chapter 4 that such views brought about questions that were not addressed 
satisfactorily. In particular, this view involved an implicit self-contradiction, for if Latin 
American States were so bent in protectionism then they would not have adopted CLRs in the 
first place, much less enforced them. Since we have evidence that these events did happen - 
CLRs were enacted and enforced - then clearly there must be a better explanation for how these 
regimes came to be and were understood at the time than the one offered by these texts. 
 
The answer that we advanced in chapter 4 to this particular issue involves considering the 
proximate fields from which CLRs originated. We argued that there was a connection between 
the changes that occurred in constitutional law during the first half of the 20th century and the 
adoption of CLRs by the 1950s (with the exception of Mexico, where these changes happened 
simultaneously). In particular, in Chile, Colombia and Mexico the adoption of CLRs was 
preceded by changes in the constitutional protection awarded to private property and by the 
bureaucratic development of the State itself via the extension of its duties and prerogatives. 
These changes occurred because of the mounting pressures that social issues were exerting in the 
constitutional and legal systems at the time.841 This connection makes sense for two reasons. 
First, because competition law enforcement requires resorting to higher values (like the ones 
explicitly stated in constitutional doctrines) that justify limiting the agreements individuals could 
make or how they used their property. Second, because enforcement also presupposes that the 
State has the bureaucratic capacity to conduct investigations, take decisions and impose 
sanctions, and this too required the development of constitutional mandates relating to the 
duties and prerogatives of the executive branch, and especially of the presidents. There are a few 
pieces of data that corroborate this argument. One of them is a decision issued by the 
Colombian competition law enforcement authority that refers explicitly to constitutional 
doctrine - concerning the "social function of property" - to justify its decision.842 
 
The Constitution - competition law nexus that we advance relies on the historical fact that 
constitutional doctrines related to "the social function of property" in Chile, Colombia and 
Mexico served as a foundation for a wide array of economic policies that were established in 
each of these States. The case of Mexico is quite unique, because since article 28 of its 1917 
Constitution addressed issues pertaining to competition law directly, it complemented the 
famous article 27 of the same charter in providing a constitutional foundation for regulating 
                                                            
841 See Gargarella, Roberto. Latin American Constitutionalism, 1810-2010: The Engine Room of the 
Constitution. Oxford University Press, 2013. Chapter 6. 
842 República de Colombia. Superintendencia de Regulación Económica. Resolución 021 de 1963. Pg. 23. 
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different aspects of the economy. Hence Mexico has a long tradition of laws and bylaws 
developing its constitutional provisions regarding competition. (See Appendix 1) In Chile and in 
Colombia these developments were less straightforward because their constitutions did not 
include, at that time, provisions about competition. In any case, the "social function of property" 
doctrine enabled the adoption of their respective CLRs in 1959 in both of these countries. In 
Chile, the 1959 regime followed from the recommendations of the misión Klein - Saks issued for 
the government of Carlos Ibañez and which were later adopted by the government of Jorge 
Alessandri. This first regime, contained in law 13.305 of 1959, was enforced continuously since 
the early 1960s until it was replaced by Decreto Ley 211 of 1973. In Colombia the military 
government ruling during the mid 1950s issued the first CLR, of which little is known today, and 
the reformist democratic government that followed issued a relatable regime in 1959. Overall, 
constitutional doctrines setting the limits for private property and hence the scope of action for 
regulatory proceeding provided the substantive foundations of these two CLRs 
 
The reference to doctrines such as the one of "the social function of property" is also telling 
of how competition law regimes were understood during this particular period. We argue in 
chapters 3 and 4 that they were understood as one of several policy tools that the governments 
had at their disposal to achieve development via industrialization. In this sense, CLRs were part 
of the patchy quilt of economic policies that were in place at the time, and which granted the 
government with considerable discretion as to how to address particular issues related with the 
economic development. We find further corroboration of this theory in the combination of the 
administrative structure of the enforcement agencies and the content of the regimes themselves. 
As to the former, the competition law enforcement bodies were administrative bodies with little 
political autonomy and often under the direct supervision of a ministry. This was convenient, for 
it facilitated the coordination of competition law enforcement with other policies - a legitimate 
end in of itself, especially so at a time in which all of these policies were geared towards 
development. As to the content of the regimes themselves, we find that they have wide 
exemption regimes that allow the enforcers to accept an anticompetitive practice if other 
administrative authorities allow it. Once more, this is a highly convenient mechanism for 
coordinating different economic policies with competition law enforcement. We find further 
evidence of this particular way of understanding these CLRs in a few decisions that justify certain 
practices by presenting their effects in terms of their contribution to the development of a 
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particular economic sector.843 We also find support for this particular understanding in the texts 
of influential development economists like the Chilean Jorge Ahumada.844 Even though these 
three regimes had all these aspects in common, their particular developments varied. 
 
It is important to note that the enforcement record of these different regimes is notoriously 
incomplete, except for the case of Chile, where there is a record of the decisions issued since 
1959. The situation is quite different in Colombia and in Mexico. Different authors state that law 
Colombia's 155 of 1959 was seldom enforced or not at all.845 Our own research, however, shows 
otherwise. We found 22 decisions issued between 1961 and 1969 by the enforcement body at 
that time, the Superintendencia de Regulación Económica, concerning mergers, collusive practices and 
abuses of dominance (see appendix 1). Our research, however, was limited to Colombia's general 
archives and we have reasons to believe that in SIC's archives there are other decisions from that 
period, although we did not have access to it. In the case of Mexico, our research of the database 
of the Supreme Court showed that there were more than 90 rulings issued by this Court between 
the late 1910s and 1990. In these decisions, the Court addresses the constitutionality of bylaws 
and other judicial rulings based on article 28 of the 1917 Constitution through the figure of 
amparo (see appendix 1). We have reason to believe that our findings complement other studies 
describing the enforcement practice of the different enforcement authorities before the 1990s.846 
Even so, there is a great deal to find out regarding this particular issue. 
 
Overall, the preceding considerations invite further analyses about the history of competition 
law in Latin America before the 1990s. The generalized claim that the CLRs in place before the 
1990s were seldom enforced or were irrelevant deserves better foundations - both theoretical 
and empirical - than the ones provided by the relevant literature. Just as well, the relation 
between these regimes and the other economic policies in place at the time cannot be summarily 
stated as being about competition versus protectionism. As we suggest, the relation was 
considerably more complex, for State-led development strategies sought a balance between both 
which cannot be properly captured in such a stark opposition. Hence, the literature about 
competition law that developed in the 1990s, addressing it both as a regional or a national issue, 
                                                            
843 República de Colombia. República de Colombia. Superintendencia de Regulación Económica. Resolución 
0008 de 1963. Pg. 2. 
844 See Ahumada, Jorge. En Vez De La Miseria. Editorial del Pacífico, 1958. Pgs. 71 - 72. 
845 See for example Petracola, Diego. "Colombia - Peer Review of Competition Law and Policy." OECD - IDB, 
2009. Country Studies. Pg. 12. Also Miranda, Alfonso. "El Derecho De La Competencia Desde La Constitución 
De 1886 Hasta La Expedición Del Decreto 2153 De 1992." August 2, 2012. Slide 10. Finally, Cortazar Mora, 
Javier. "Colombian Competition Law Regime." Institute De Droit De La Concurrence, 2012. Pg. 2. 
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set apart important pieces of information that challenged the thesis they advanced. Because this 
literature supports the advance of the neoliberal competition law project, such a move is 
particularly suspicious. 
 
III. The Advance of Neoliberalism and the Trajectories of Competition law  
 
In this section we recall the analysis and conclusions presented in chapters 5 through 8 of 
this dissertation to show how the advance of the neoliberal competition law project set the 
trajectories of the different regimes we consider here in particular paths of their own. We 
describe each of these trajectories and the particular field dynamics that contributed to their 
establishment.  
 
III.A. Chile: Fixed on Neoliberalism 
 
The advent of neoliberalism in Chile was particularly forceful and affected its society in ways 
that continue to have a lasting impact today, quite notably in its political system, its constitutional 
law and its CLR. All of these aspects are related. The military regime that resulted from the 1973 
coup was politically intolerant to ideas and views about social ordering that were related with the 
socialist regime it has overtaken. As a result of this, the regime promoted a particularly narrow 
political regime that came to be embedded in the 1980 constitution and its political system even 
after the military regime and during the transition to democracy. Because of this particular issue, 
we argued that developing a State-centered competition law project like the one that prevailed 
before the coup was not politically feasible.  
 
We argue in chapter 5 that these background conditions have fixed Chile's CLR along a 
neoliberal trajectory. Even so, since the advent of neoliberalism we identify two variants of the 
neoliberal competition law project developing in this country. We identified the first variant with 
the development of the 1980 Constitution, the activities organized by the Centro de Estudios 
Públicos and the doctrines regarding competition law in place between the late 1970s and the 
1990s (although it remains popular among the legal community). In turn, we identified the 
second variant with a more “law and economics” approach to competition law and which we 
identified with the works of Chilean economist Ricardo Paredes. The transition between one 
variant and the other occurred precisely during the 1990s, when the latter variant (and the actors 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
846 See for example White, Eduardo. "La Legislación Antimonópolica Y El Control Del Poder Económico En 
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that supported) became influential enough to promote changes to the CLR as it was established 
in the early 1970s. This transition was not without problems for it led to an institutional 
mismatch between enforcers and adjudicators, and which was ultimately resolved by furthering 
the neoliberal aspects of this regime. In the aftermath resulting from this transition, the more 
recent reforms that have been proposed continue to further the neoliberal aspects of this regime, 
like its leniency regimes, and plan to amend previously established ones, like mandatory merger 
control. 
 
Even so, the neoliberal competition law project in Chile's CLR may not be internally stable. 
As we mention in chapter 2, one of the particularities of such projects is that they are not entirely 
coherent and can be porous, allowing for some internal inconsistencies. The institutional 
mismatch referred to above evidences the reality of this possibility in the Chilean context. This is 
so because this mismatch was a consequence of the efforts to mold the enforcement institutions 
after the second variant of neoliberalism that was becoming increasingly influential at the time. 
Moreover, there is the possibility that future confrontations take place within the current variant 
of the neoliberal project. In chapter 5 we pointed to the possibility that actors that oppose to the 
current reforms based on the first variant of neoliberalism do so using arguments dear to them 
and to other actors from beyond the neoliberal camp. We suggested that rights-based arguments 
about governmental transparency, privacy, the protection of individual communications and due 
process could challenge reforms that seek to further the powers of the enforcers in the name of 
efficiency.847 The key question is whether the rights involved in these issues can be curtailed in 
the name of making competition law enforcement more effective. This question reveals the 
tension between the classic liberal ideas and values upheld by the first variant of neoliberalism 
and the more efficiency-oriented considerations of the second variant of neoliberalism.  
 
III.B. Colombia: The Persistence of State-centered Competition law 
 
In contrast with Chile, the advent of neoliberalism in Colombia took place amidst regular 
democratic practices, although these practices themselves occurred at the shadow of an internal 
conflict that has taken place for more than five decades. As we argued in chapter 6, the uneven 
impact of neoliberalism has to do with the 1991 Constitution, which was enacted to address 
peacefully the conflicts taking place in this country. While it established for the first time a 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
América Latina: Recientes Tendencias." Derecho de la integración 11, no. 29 (1978): 35 - 59. 
847 See for example Chile, Congressional record of law 20.361. Pgs. 102 & 205. See also Ibid, statement by Axel 
Buchesteir, member of Libertad y Desarrollo. Pgs. 57 - 58. 
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mandate for protecting competition, it also allowed such mandate to be easily overcome for 
other considerations. Business associations, which are very important in the politics of this 
country, obtained protection for their activities and pressured against the establishment of a 
strong CLR. Just as well, other actors interested in the development of regimes related to 
competition opted for the establishment of sector-specific CLRs because they were skeptic of 
the efforts undergone to strengthen the main regime enforced by SIC. As a consequence, 
Colombia’s CLR was dispersed across several regimes, and the main provisions, which date back 
to the 1950s, were extended in time and their enforcement resumed in the late 1990s.  
 
Against this background, SIC’s directives developed an increasingly activist agenda during 
the 2000s that targeted business associations. This agenda paid off initially, for in 2009 a new law 
made SIC the sole enforcer of the different regimes and granted it more prerogatives via new 
enforcement tools and higher sanctions. However, once SIC decided to use its new prerogatives, 
it faced a backlash from a new government and the business sector. This led to the appointment 
of a new director of SIC and a less contentious approach to competition law. Also SIC’s 
reliability has been questioned by its mismanagement of leniency applications. Although a new 
competition law statute is in the making, it is unclear what the future holds for competition law 
enforcement in Colombia. Consequently, Colombia’s CLR continues to be fashioned around 
State-centered institutions and provisions, in spite of efforts to sway it in the direction of the 
neoliberal competition law project.  
 
Overall, the trajectory of SIC and of Colombia's CLR in general shows the extent to which 
the different projects are intertwined with the collaborations and struggles of the different actors 
involved in the development of this area of law. This is arguably the case of the relations 
between the business associations and the political establishment in Colombia. While Colombia's 
presidents have close ties with such associations since the mid 1950s, the armed struggle brings 
their interests together because it addresses fundamental issues related to the integrity of the 
State and of the business sector. Against such issues, the protection of competition does not 
come close as a major political priority. This would also explain why the governments have not 
actively supported changes to Colombia's CLR, and as a result, the endurance of the State-
centered institutions. The directors of SIC, however, may view this issue differently. For them, 
acquiring prominence facilitates that when they return to the private sector, where they are 
sought by firms facing investigations before SIC. Developing "activist" agendas is a way in which 
they raise their own professional profiles as well as those of their agency, both locally as well as 
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internationally. This would explain the de facto independence that they have tried to assert in 
office. It is unlikely that as the armed conflict looms in the background these issues will change. 
 
III.C. Mexico: Plots, Heroes and Villains. 
 
The advent of neoliberalism in Mexico was quite different from how it happened in Chile 
and in Colombia. As in Colombia, it took place within the confines of the democratic practices 
in this country. As in Chile, it was a profound process that had a lasting impact on various areas 
of law, including its CLR. However, contrary to what happened in these countries, it also 
involved a higher degree of internationalization that is quite unique and that the other two 
countries would not experience until much later. It was only natural that the development of its 
CLR exhibited these different characteristics, albeit in unique ways. 
 
In chapter 7 we characterize the trajectory of Mexico's CLR as a story of institutional 
transformation. We argued that the adoption of a new CLR in 1992 took place against several 
important legal reforms, including the privatization of State-owned enterprises, like the 
telephone company Telmex. In particular, the adoption of the regime was largely consistent with 
this privatization effort. At the time of the enactment of the new regime, embodied in the Ley 
Federal de Competencia Económica, it was not clear if it would be applicable because this company's 
own legal regime and the difficulties of doing so retroactively. Also, the law did not establish the 
legal prerogatives for the competition law enforcer, the Comisión Federal de Competencia (hereinafter 
CFC), to address its sheer economic power but only some of its manifestations.  
 
Against this background, the CFC began to enforce the law against Telmex after clearing the 
hurdles of its jurisdiction in the late 1990s. At this moment several strategies come into place. 
On one hand, the CFC continued its enforcement activities against Telmex based on the 
complaints of its foreign-owned rivals. On the other, these same rivals persuaded the United 
States government to take action against the Mexican government before the World Trade 
Organization (hereinafter WTO). The United States argued that Mexico had failed to comply 
with the duties established in the telecoms treatises that were part of the "umbrella" of this 
organization by skewing its regulation in favor of Telmex. On both accounts these companies 
achieved partial success. While they obtained favorable rulings from the CFC, Telmex was still 
able to delay its compliance through legal hurdles. At that same time, a panel organized by the 
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WTO ruled against the Mexican State, but the redesign of its telecoms regulation depended once 
more on the same local actors that favored this company in the first place.  
 
By the mid 2000s the CFC began to impose higher punishments to Telmex and to figure 
prominently in the news. The director of the CFC, Eduardo Perez Motta, began to figure 
prominently as a champion of competition law as he regularly appeared in the news explaining 
the activities of the CFC and to advocate for more powers for this agency, which he obtained 
from congress in 2006 and in 2011. In one particular episode involving an investigation 
regarding the tariffs for connecting to Telmex's network, Perez Motta advocated for the 
imposition of a 1 billion dollar fine to this company. He was forced to recuse himself from the 
final judgment by the other commissioners of the CFC, and Telmex accepted a new tariff system 
fashioned after a recommendation made by the OECD. This episode contributed importantly to 
the image of Perez Motta as a Don Quixote of competition law. 
 
The confrontations between the CFC and Telmex have had a profound impact on the general 
perception of the ties between the Mexican political establishment and the business sector (as 
well as on the literature about competition law in Mexico). In the 2012 presidential elections, 
then candidate Enrique Peña Nieto addressed this issue in his campaign, which included issues 
about reforms in the telecoms sector and the strengthening of competition law enforcement. 
These issues also appeared in his "Pacto por Mexico", a multi-party political platform that has 
guided his government's legislative agenda since his election. More important still, these issues 
were addressed in the 2013 Constitutional amendment to article 28 of the 1917 Constitution and 
led to a new competition law statute in 2014. While in other aspects this regime evidences a clear 
neoliberal inspiration, the political drive resulting from the Telmex saga has reaffirmed the State-
centered ethos that inspired Mexico's competition law tradition based on preventing abuses of 
economic power. 
 
III.D. Convergence and Leniency Regimes in Chile, Colombia and Mexico  
 
Until now our analysis has focused mostly on local field dynamics resulting from the 
interactions between local actors. In chapter 8 we addressed the role that organizations like the 
OECD, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (hereinafter UNCTAD) 
and the International Competition Network (hereinafter ICN) had in the development of CLRs 
in Latin America. We argue that in spite of the efforts of the above-mentioned institutions, Latin 
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American CLRs are not in the process of converging towards institutions similar to those of their 
North-Atlantic counterparts. The programs deployed by these institutions are part of their 
strategy to achieve convergence in the absence of an international CLR, and given the fate of the 
efforts behind the International Trade Organization in the late 1940s and the World Trade 
Organization in the late 1990s. However, these programs are redefining the trajectory of these 
CLRs by altering the interactions between local actors that shaped these regimes in the past. 
Moreover, the deployment of these programs has led to rivalries and collaborations between 
these organizations, for each one of them aims to further its own goals and, in doing so, also 
ascertain their own understandings about what competition law should be about.  
 
An aspect we focused on was the trajectory of the leniency regimes of the different countries 
we study here. These regimes are of particular interest for the OECD because they are   
connected with its agenda of prioritizing the fight against cartels. We traced the origins of these 
regimes back to the writings of George Stigler and the amnesty policies of the Department of 
Justice of the 1970s, and from there to the European Union in the mid 1990s. Underlying this 
policy is also the idea that cartels are the most harmful of anticompetitive behavior. In Latin 
America, the OECD Peer Reviews of the three countries we investigate address the importance 
of adopting or strengthening such regimes as a useful mechanism for fighting cartels. 
 
As expected, the reception of leniency regimes has been cultured by the local field dynamics 
in particular ways. Regarding Mexico there is very little information about the regime itself 
except for the information provided by the CFC, and which states that it has received about 12 
leniency applications per year. This regime was established in 2006 and continued operating 
during the reforms that took place in 2013 and 2014. According to the information collected, it 
is the most successful leniency regime of the three CLRs we study here.  
 
The success of Mexico's leniency regime contrasts with that of Colombia. In the former, 
there has only been one leniency application involving three different markets. This came across 
as a great opportunity to show Colombia's commitment to the OECD's competition law 
prescriptions. However, SIC did not manage well the filings and because of all the publicity it 
gave to this issue, the media found out soon enough who were the parties involved and had been 
the whistle-blower. Moreover, SIC has taken a considerable amount of time in deciding the case, 
an aspect that has undermined the confidence on it. SIC's "performance anxiety" seems to have 
been the source of its own undoing. 
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The success of Mexico's leniency regimes also contrasts with that of Chile. In this country 
the leniency regime appeared at a moment in which it was particularly difficult for the FNE to 
produce direct evidence of an anticompetitive agreement - part of the institutional mismatch we 
mentioned before. In a collusion case, one of the investigated parties decided to settle with the 
FNE and provided it with first hand information that the FNE then used to prosecute the other 
parties involved. While this procedure did not amount to a formal leniency process, it showed 
that having a leniency regime could increase the effectiveness of the prosecution efforts of the 
FNE, and contributed to the enactment of the law that established the leniency regime formally. 
However, since then the leniency regime has been used sparingly. Apparently this is so because 
even in the presence of a leniency application Chile's public prosecutor, who is different from 
the FNE, can open a criminal investigation against the parties involved. 
 
What can we learn about these three examples involving the convergence of CLR? The most 
obvious lesson is that promoting the adoption of a particular regime, like a leniency regime, is 
not enough to assure that convergence is taking place. On the contrary, these examples show 
that there is an important degree of diversity amidst a very narrow set of policy prescriptions 
regarding such regimes. For convergence to deliver the results that is expected of it, the 
differences between the different regimes have to be minimal. It is entirely unclear that such 
possibility is feasible given how field dynamics shape CLRs and their different aspects. It is 
unclear if, as the neoliberal project continues to advance in Latin America, different field 
dynamics could produce very similar outcomes.  
 
IV. Looking Back: Contributions and Relevance, Limitations and Further Venues 
of Enquiry 
 
IV.A. Contributions and Relevance 
 
Throughout this dissertation we have advanced a particular view about CLRs in Chile, 
Colombia and Mexico, and which consists in showing how these regimes are shaped by different 
actors that compete and collaborate to determine what competition law is about and how it is 
practiced. Our argument relies on a particular framework that consists of two parts; the first one 
is about the different substantive ideas that underlie these regimes, while the latter is about the 
different dynamics that led to the establishment of the abovementioned ideas as the "common 
  239 
sense" of these regimes. And then, through a variety of data that ranges from previously 
unaddressed legal decisions to newspaper articles and academic texts, we have described how 
these ideas and power struggles continue to shape the regimes of these countries. In doing so, 
we have also pointed to issues that are not properly addressed by the literature on competition 
law in Latin America, and which range from the origins of these regimes to how they are 
characterized at present. 
 
The main contribution of this dissertation is to offer a different narrative about the origins 
and trajectories of CLRs in Latin America, and especially in these three countries. This narrative 
challenges the traditional ideas about how this area of law is understood and shows, with 
examples taken from the regimes themselves as well as from other sources, that they are 
inadequate. Another important contribution is precisely to rely on first-hand sources like 
decisions issued by different competition law enforcement bodies, a practice that unfortunately is 
not that common in the literature about this area of law in these jurisdictions. Finally, a third and 
just as important contribution consists of identifying scores of decisions issued by the 
enforcement authority in Colombia during the 1960s and by the Mexican Supreme Court since 
the 1910s until 1990. The fact that this dissertation relies on different sources provides a solid 
foundation for the argument it advances and should be taken as a point of entry towards 
reconsidering how competition law is understood in this region. 
 
These contributions highlight the relevance of this dissertation from two separate 
perspectives. On one hand, this dissertation is highly relevant for the study of competition law in 
Latin America for the reasons mentioned above, and in particular because it contrasts 
importantly with the existing literature on this issue. On the other, it is also highly relevant for 
the study of how ideas and power shape legal rules. In particular, we believe that by relying on 
field theory, this dissertation becomes highly relevant for lawyers and social scientists that want 
to approach Latin American economic regulation from an interdisciplinary perspective. In doing 
so, it bridges different theories and approaches that show the importance of studying law as a 
social fact. Overall, its relevance is mostly related with its substantive approaches and can also be 
of interest for its theoretical framework and data analyses. 
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IV.B. The Limitations of This Research 
 
In completing the research that led to this dissertation we identified three particular 
limitations that prevented us from offering more profound insights about the origins and 
trajectories of the different CLRs we study. This has to do with the amplitude of the research, 
the sample of the countries we selected, and the availability of certain sources. We conclude by 
considering whether the lack of generalizability of our findings may constitute a limitation or not. 
 
To begin with, our research aims to balance depth with breadth - getting to know a particular 
area of law very well in several countries. Also, we wanted to describe legal reforms and to 
address different time periods. Looking back at it, we can now see that this has been an 
ambitious and challenging project. Such an ambition can easily turn out to be a limitation if a 
proper balance is not struck between these different goals. In striving for this balance, we 
decided to exclude considerable amounts of information, some of which might be useful in 
future, more detailed research about each of the countries considered. While we are convinced 
that this dissertation strikes a good balance, we are aware that by aiming to address legal reforms 
and different periods of time we foreclosed the opportunity of delving deeper into each of the 
CLRs we address. 
 
Originally, our research aimed to cover the jurisdictions we studied and four more countries 
- Argentina, Brazil, Peru and Venezuela. However, we decided to discard the last four because 
the volume of the data exceeded the time and capacity we had to complete this research on time. 
This decision came across as particularly important since we did not want to limit ourselves to a 
summary analysis of the enforcement activity taking place in all these States, but we also wanted 
to dive more into the details related to particular areas of law that we considered important, the 
interplay of different actors in the formation of the respective competition law projects. In the 
particular case of Brazil, we decided to exclude it also because of language barriers, and the depth 
of our analysis was not something that could be achieved by reading translations and reports of 
decisions and statutes. Even so, the three countries we worked with - Chile, Colombia and 
Mexico - are very interesting, as developments there influence other jurisdictions, and have more 
than enough issues to address in future research. 
 
Just as well, our research aimed to look at all the areas of the CLRs we study here, that is, 
mergers, vertical and horizontal agreements, abuse of dominance, leniency and competition 
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advocacy. Partly this was motivated by the sheer curiosity of wanting to know why a country like 
Chile does not have a mandatory merger review regime while a country like Colombia does. 
However, the sheer volume of data necessary to understand the field dynamics of each of these 
regimes exceeds our research capacity. As we mentioned in the introduction, we decided to focus 
instead in one area of each of these regimes in order to understand it well enough and to trace its 
trajectories over time. 
 
Finally, the fact that our sample consists of only three countries, and of a sub-set of the 
competition law activities that takes place in each one of them can be seen as a limitation for 
generalizing the findings and conclusions that we reach to the whole Continent. We could agree 
on this if we aimed to make such generalizations, but we do not. Our research was not done with 
the purpose of identifying elements that could be generalizable. We are actually skeptic about 
such generalizations, for they tend to disregard the particularities of the contexts that led to the 
legal rules studied in the first place. Instead, we believe that our analysis could be useful for 
individuals and policymakers in the three countries we focus on as well as in others more 
because of the discussions and reflections it provokes. We also believe that our framework could 
be of benefit for those researchers aiming to understand better the connections between ideas 
and power in Latin American law. In this sense, throughout we emphasize the importance of 
focusing on the ideas and individuals behind competition law enforcement in each of the 
different countries we study. Further research on the intellectual history of competition law in 
Latin America could benefit from the ideas and findings we present. 
 
 
IV.C. Future Venues of Enquiry 
 
In this dissertation we offer a particular perspective about the development of competition 
law in this region, knowing well in advance that it can be complemented or refuted by different 
lines of enquiries.  
 
One particular line of enquiry that could be particularly useful relates with the empirical 
foundations of what we know about competition law enforcement before the 1990s. The 
absence of thorough archival research continues to be one of the biggest shortcomings of the 
literature about competition law in Latin America, both as a region as well as in each of the 
different countries this region is made up. Moreover, international organizations as well as local 
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competition law enforcement bodies would benefit from this research, for it would give them a 
better understanding of how the legal provisions they engage with came to be, and would have 
to rely less on semi-fictional accounts of their history. Such research could disprove the 
prevailing understandings, or could give them better foundations; in either case we would know 
more about competition law in Latin America than what we know now. 
 
The literature about legal transplants, discussed in chapter 1, provides useful elements for the 
development of such research. By focusing on the interactions between legal rules and the 
different contexts in which they are enforced, future researchers may eventually “unpack” the 
processes through which US antitrust and EU competition law are influential in this region. 
Determining how their influence works, what does it amount to, and what are the political and 
economic elements underlying could be highly useful for further enquiries about CLRs in Latin 
America. Moreover, such a enquiry can be highly useful for determining the extent to which 
competition law rules depend on the epistemic power balances present in the contexts in which 
they are being enforced. 
 
A second interesting line of enquiry has to do with the internal tensions that take place 
within the neoliberal competition law project regarding the conflict between efficiency and 
enforcement effectiveness over classic liberal rights like the inviolability of communications and 
due process. This issue is at the forefront of the concerns of the competition law community all 
over the world, and is a consequence of the transfer of leniency regimes across the world. 
Studying this tension in different jurisdictions, including the three ones we research here, would 
be of enormous practical utility as well as of academic interest. Moreover, such a research could 
also rely on the framework we advance here because it would facilitate showing how this conflict 
originated and how it has evolved over time. 
 
A third interesting line of enquiry has to do with the activities of international organizations 
like the OECD, UNCTAD and the ICN in Latin America. Our discussion in chapter 8 provides 
a summary at best, and further research on the agendas of these organizations, their rivalries and 
collaborations would also be particularly useful. It could also provide further information about 
the trajectories of the different Latin Americans that work with these organizations, either 
permanently or sporadically. Also, it could explore the development of a regional network of 
individuals that are dedicated to provide counsel on competition law enforcement issues 
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regarding what type of ideas and institutions they promote, their intellectual itinerary, and other 
related issues. 
 
* * * 
 
In this dissertation we argued that there is a different way of understanding the origins and 
trajectories of competition law in Latin America by looking at the CLRs of Chile, Colombia and 
Mexico. Doing so involves exploring the different sources of data available from a critical 
perspective, and challenging well-established views about this area of law. We hope to provoke 
further reflections and enquiries about what competition law has been about in this region. 
Predicting what it can become in the future is a daunting task, the single most important 
question left unanswered in this dissertation. 
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Appendix 1 
Competition law Developments in Colombia and in Mexico 
 
Table 1 
Competition law Decisions by Superintendencia de Regulación Económica (Colombia)  
1961 - 1968 
 
Decision # Year Topic Parties Outcome 
005 1961 
Price fixing Cooperativa Nal. Del Cuero 
Fine not 
specified (had to be 
assessed by the 
agency’s council). 
003 1962 
Bylaws of 
cooperative are 
approved 
001 1962 Merger 
Productora 
Nal. De 
Automotores S.A. 
(PANAL) & 
Fábrica Col. De 
Automotores S.A. 
Approved; 
PANAL is 
exempted 
002 1962 Merger 
Seguros 
Tequendama & 
Seguros la Unión 
and others 
Approved; La 
Unión is 
considered 
exempted. 
008 1962 Merger 
Cristalería 
Peldar & Owen 
Illinois 
International 
Merger 
approved 
001 1963 Price fixing 
Fábrica Nal. 
De Oxigeno y 
Productos 
Metálicos//Gases 
Industriales de 
Colombia 
Possible 
agreement; orders 
oversight of pricing 
policy 
011 1963 Price fixing 
Amendment 
to Res. 01 of 1963 
is not granted 
017 1963 Price fixing Distribuidora de Fosforos Ltda. 
Amends Res. 
10 of 1963. 
019 1963 
Merger 
Seguros 
Tequendama & 
Sociedad Nal. De 
Seguros Albingia 
S.A. 
Merger 
rejected for 
insufficient 
information and 
lack of clarity 
about the merger 
proposed 
022 1963 
 
Petition to 
repeal res. 019 of 
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1963 denied 
 
023 1963   
Orders 
investigation about 
the legality of the 
bylaws of the 
merging firms 
031 1963   
Orders 
extending the 
information 
gathered to the 
Superintendencia 
Bancaria 
006 1964   
Petition to 
repeal res. 031 of 
1963 denied 
032 1964   
Parties 
provide missing 
documents; merger 
cleared 
021 1963 
Abuse of 
dominance 
Fábrica de 
Hilasas Vanylon 
Repeal of Res. 
03 of 1963 denied; 
amends a term, 
007 1964 
Orders 
termination of the 
investigation 
(No number) 1965 Abuse of dominance 
Film Board of 
Trade//Alvaro 
Sánchez and others 
Denies 
complaint; denial 
of service is 
adequate when 
absence of 
payment 
05 1966 Interlocking directorates 
Compañía 
Colombiana de 
Cauchos El Sol 
Order to 
replace board 
members that 
attend boards of 
other corporations 
involved in 
distribution 
377 1966 Merger 
Sedalana SA & 
Textiles La 
Esmeralda 
Merger 
approved 
571 1966 Merger 
Seguros 
Tequendama SA & 
Aseguradora 
Mercantíl SA 
Merger 
approved 
108 1968 Merger 
Banco de 
Bogotá & Banco 
de Los Andes 
Merger 
approved 
145 1968 Merger 
Ladrillera 
Santa Fe Ltda. & 
Empresa Ladrillera 
de Soacha 
Merger 
approved 
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Table 2 
Laws and Bylaws Developing Article 28 of the 1917 Mexican Constitution 
 
Laws  
Title 
Bylaws 
Title Date  
(dd/mm/yy) 
Date  
(dd/mm/yy) 
28/06/26 Ley reglamentaria 
del articulo 28 
constitucional 
31/12/26 Reglamento de la 
ley reglamentaria del 
articulo 28 constitucional  
24/08/31 
Ley orgánica del 
articulo 28 
constitucional, relativa a 
monopolios 
19/12/31 
Reglamento de la 
ley orgánica del articulo 
28 constitucional 
31/08/34 
Ley orgánica del 
articulo 28 constitucional 
en materia de 
monopolios 
01/02/36 
Decreto que 
reglamenta el 
otorgamiento de las 
autorizaciones a que se 
refiere la fracción II del 
artículo 4 de la Ley 
Orgánica del Artículo 28 
Constitucional 
  12/08/38 
Reglamento de las 
fracciones IV y V del 
artículo 5º de la Ley 
Orgánica del Artículo 28 
Constitucional 
  07/01/42 
Reglamento del 
artículo 15 de la Ley 
orgánica del artículo 28 
constitucional en materia 
de monopolios. 
  21/05/42 
Reglamento de la 
fracción II del artículo 7 
de la Ley orgánica del 
artículo 28 constitucional 
en materia de 
monopolios 
30/12/50 
Ley sobre 
atribuciones del 
ejecutivo federal en 
materia económica 
04/01/51 
Decreto que declara 
comprendidas en el 
artículo 1º de la Ley 
sobre atribuciones del 
Ejecutivo Federal en 
materia económica las 
mercancías que en el 
mismo se especifican. 
  10/01/51 
Reglamento de los 
Artículos 2; 3; 4; 8; 11; 
13; 14 y 16 a 20 de la Ley 
sobre atribuciones del 
ejecutivo federal en 
materia económica. 
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  26/01/51 
Reglamento para los 
comités especiales a que 
se refiere el artículo 22 
del Reglamento de la Ley 
sobre atribuciones del 
ejecutivo federal en 
materia económica. 
  21/02/51 
Reglamento de los 
Comités de Precios y 
Distribución. 
  03/10/74 
Decreto que regula 
los precios de diversas 
mercancías. 
  24/09/76 
Reglamento para la 
fijación de precios a los 
productos de 
importación. 
  21/10/77  
Decreto que 
reforma el Reglamento 
de los Artículos 2o., 3o., 
4o., 8o., 11, 13, 14 y 16 a 
20 de la Ley sobre 
Atribuciones del 
Ejecutivo Federal en 
Materia Económica. 
(Corrected on 
25/10/77) 
  24/02/82 
Decreto que declara 
comprendidas en el 
artículo 1º de la Ley 
sobre atribuciones del 
Ejecutivo Federal en 
materia económica las 
mercancías que se 
indican. 
  30/12/82 
Decreto que declara 
comprendidas en el 
artículo 1º de la Ley 
sobre atribuciones del 
Ejecutivo Federal en 
materia económica, las 
mercancías que se 
indican. 
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Table 3 
Mexican Supreme Court Decisions Regarding Article 28 of the 1917 Constitution 
(1917 - 1990)848 
 
 Year Registration No. 
Section of 
the Court Period Volume Page Procedure 
1 1918 81154 Pleno 5th II 695 Amparo admtvo 
2 1919 289587 Pleno  IV 303 
Amparo 
admtvo. en 
revisión 
3 1928 280607 Pleno  XXXIV 499 
Amparo 
admtvo. en 
revisión 
4 1931 337625 2nd  XXXI 888 
Amparo 
admtvo. en 
revisión 
5 1932 337262 1st  XXXIV 2745 Amparo penal 
6 1934 809441 2nd  XL 3479 
Amparo 
admtvo. en 
revisión 
7 1934 336264 2nd  XLI 2277 
Amparo 
admtvo. en 
revisión 
8 1934 336168 2nd  XLI 426 
Amparo 
admtvo. en 
revisión 
9 1934 336083 2nd  XLII 2477 
Amparo 
admtvo. en 
revisión 
10 1935 312692 Pleno  XLIII 2761 
Review of 
criminal 
decision 
11 1935 335916 2nd  XLIII 2586 
Amparo 
admtvo. en 
revisión 
12 1935 335901 2nd  XLIII 2237 
Amparo 
admtvo. en 
revisión 
13 1935 335900 2nd  XLIII 2144 
Amparo 
admtvo. en 
revisión 
14 1935 335836 2nd  XLIII 782 
Amparo 
admtvo. en 
revisión 
15 1935 335807 2nd  XLIII 180 Amparo 
                                                            
848 These were the results obtained from combining the original results of two searches in the database of the 
Mexican Supreme Court based on the keywords “libre competencia” and “monopolio”. 
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admtvo. en 
revisión 
16 1935 33570 1st  XLIV 4032 Incidente de suspensión 
17 1935 335605 2nd  XLIV 2024 
Amparo 
admtvo. en 
revisión 
18 1935 335338 2nd  XLV 3456 
Amparo 
admtvo. en 
revisión 
19 1935 334980 2nd  XLVI 2777 Amparo 
20 1936 327792 2nd  LXX 4649 
Amparo 
admtvo. en 
revisión 
21 1936 334321 2nd  XLVIII 2267 
Amparo 
admtvo. en 
revisión 
22 1936 334026 2nd  XLIX 1234 
Amparo 
admtvo. en 
revisión 
23 1936 333616 2nd  L 752 
Amparo 
admtvo. en 
revisión 
24 1937 333358 2nd  LII 1716 
Amparo 
admtvo. en 
revisión 
25 1937 332803 2nd  LII 2572 
Amparo 
admtvo. en 
revisión 
26 1937 331863 2nd  LV 1166 
Amparo 
admtvo. en 
revisión 
27 1938 331003 2nd  LVIII 3889 
Amparos 
admtvo. 
Acumulado
s 
28 1938 331111 2nd  LVII 818 Amparo admtvo. 
29 1938 330773 2nd  LVIII 802 
Amparo 
admtvo. en 
revisión 
30 1939 330657 2nd  LIX 2861 
Amparo 
admtvo. en 
revisión 
31 1939 330387 2nd  LX 2588 
Amparo 
admtvo. en 
revisión 
32 1939 330056 2nd  LXI 2914 
Amparo 
admtvo. en 
revisión 
33 1939 329830 2nd  LXII 3029 Amparo admtvo. en 
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revisión 
34 1940 329020 2nd  LXV 2563 
Amparo 
admtvo. en 
revisión 
35 1941 327590 2nd  LXX 1386 
Amparo 
admtvo. en 
revisión 
36 1942 326755 2nd  LXXII 3236 
Amparo 
admtvo. en 
revisión 
37 1942 326385 2nd  LXXIII 6614 
Amparo 
admtvo. en 
revisión 
38 1942 326037 2nd  LXIII 1386 
Amparo 
administrati
vo directo 
39 1942 325641 2nd  LXXIV 1123 
Amparo 
admtvo. en 
revisión 
40 1942 325638 2nd   LXXIV 1107 
Amparo 
admtvo. en 
revisión 
41 1943 325387 2nd  LXXV 5841 
Amparo 
admtvo. en 
revisión 
42 1943 324426 2nd  LXXVII 1069 
Amparo 
admtvo. en 
revisión 
43 1943 324349 2nd  LXXVIII 4405 
Amparo 
admtvo. en 
revisión 
44 1944 323938 2nd  LXXIX 3038 
Amparo 
admtvo. en 
revisión 
45 1944 323916 2nd  LXXIX 2673 
Amparo 
admtvo. en 
revisión 
46 1944 374336 2nd  LXXIX 36 
Amparo en 
materia de 
trabajo 
47 1945 373251 2nd  LXXXIII 3878 
Amparo 
directo en 
materia de 
trabajo 
48 1946 322051 2nd  LXXXVIII 2863 
Amparo 
admtvo. en 
revisión 
49 1947 321156 2nd  XCI 1220 
Amparo 
admtvo. en 
revisión 
50 1948 302300 1st  XCV 537 Amparo penal 
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51 1948 806171 2nd  XCVI 1931 
Amparo 
admtvo. en 
revisión 
52 1948 805809 2nd  XCVIII 1381 
Amparo 
admtvo. en 
revisión 
53 1949 301319 1st  XCIV 1543 
Amparo 
penal 
directo 
54 1951 386340 Auxiliary   CVIII 1655 Amparo civil directo 
55 1952 319068 2nd  CXI 978 
Amparo 
admtvo. en 
revisión 
56 1953 296062 1st  CXX 2182 
Amparo 
penal 
directo 
57 1953 804945 4th  CXVII 998 
Amparo en 
revisión en 
materia de 
trabajo 
58 1954 240793 3rd  CXXI 2163 Amparo civil directo 
59 1955 366670 4th  CXXVI 209 Amparo en revisión 
60 1955 803953 2nd  CXXIII 45 
Amparo 
admtvo. en 
revisión 
61 1956 316289 2nd  CXXVIII 10 Amparo en revisión 
62 1958 268610 2nd 6a epoca XII, 3d part 103 
Amparo en 
revisión 
63 1961 804108 Pleno  LIII, 1
st 
part 157 
Amparo en 
revisión 
64 1965 257746 Pleno  CI, 1st part 33 Amparo en revisión 
65 1967 803549 Pleno  CXXIV, 1
st 
part 13 
Amparo en 
revisión 
66 1968 805876 Pleno  CXXXIII 123 Amparo en revisión 
67 1969 239190 2nd 7a epoca XII, 3d part 75 
revisión 
fiscal 
68 1969 233840 Pleno  XII, 1
st 
part 37 
Amparo en 
revisión 
69 1970 233825 Pleno  XIV, 1
st 
part 25 
Amparo en 
revisión 
70 1971 233536 Pleno  XXXV, 1st part 19 
Amparo en 
revisión 
71 1971 233559 Pleno  XXXIV, 1st part 31 
Amparo en 
revisión 
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72 1972 233415 Pleno  44, 1st part 55 Amparo en revisión 
73 1973 255761 Trib. Circ.  58, 6th part 41 
Amparo en 
revisión 
74 1973 233344 Pleno  49, 1st part 59 Amparo en revisión 
75 1973 233280 Pleno  52, 1st part 34 Amparo en revisión 
76 1973 233244 Pleno  55 1st part 37 Amparo en revisión 
77 1973 233190 Pleno  59, 1st part 64 Amparo en revisión 
78 1973 238540 2nd  66, 3rd part 47 Amparo en revisión 
79 1974 25541 Trib. Circ.  67, 6th part 41 Amparo en revisión 
80 1975 253318 Trib. Circ.  97 - 102, 6th part 384 
Amparo en 
revisión 
81 1975 254592 Trib. Circ.  78, 6th part 84 
Amparo en 
revisión 
82 1975 254889 Trib. Circ.  73, 6th part 62 Amparo en revisión 
83 1975 254282 Trib. Circ.  81, 6th part 24 Amparo en revisión 
84 1976 253397 Trib. Circ.  87, 6th part 98 
Amparo en 
revisión 
85 1977 253185 Trib. Circ.  97 - 102, 6th part 213 
Amparo en 
revisión 
86 1981 250793 Trib. Circ.  145 - 150, 6th part 69 
Amparo 
directo 
87 1981 251055 Trib. Circ.  145 - 150, 6th part 287 
Juicio de 
amparo 
88 1981 251033 Trib. Circ.  145 - 150, 6th part 270 
Incidente en 
revisión 
89 1983 249740 Trib. Circ.  169-174, 6th part 56 
Queja, 
juicio de 
amparo 
90 1983 249531 Trib. Circ.  175 - 180, 6th part 134 
Amparo 
directo 
91 1988 231108 Trib. Circ. 8a epoca 
I, 2nd part 
- 1, Jan-
Jun. 1988 
170 Amparo en revisión 
92 1988 231557 Trib. Circ.  
I, 2nd part - 
1, Jan-Jun. 
1988 
403 Amparo en revisión 
93 1989 228654 Trib. Circ.  
III, 2nd 
part, Jan – 
Jun. 1989 
454 
Amparo en 
revisión 
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